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Abstract 
The thesis examines the use of the concept of power in cultural studies, offering a 
revisionist perspective on the history of this use. The dominant approach to questions of 
power in the field, it is argued, is a 'rationalist' one: the various phenomena 
comprehended under the concept are conceived ultimately as instances of the one 
phenomenon. This approach implies that positions in relation to power share a common 
referent, allowing them to be assessed according to general criteria of 'correctness' or 
theoretical adequacy. It also allows developments in debates around power to be 
represented in terms of a narrative of enlightenment in which the 'truth' of power is 
progressively revealed. 
As an alternative to this, the thesis develops an 'empiricist' perspective on questions of 
power. From this perspective, the various phenomena comprehended under the concept 
are, in fact, distinct. Generalised uses of the singular 'power' do not share a common 
referent but are imaginative constructions gaining their sense from the particular 
contexts in which they are used. They cannot be assessed according to general criteria 
of theoretical adequacy, but only in terms of qualities of response to historical 
circumstances. 
The perspective is used to throw sceptical light on progressivist accounts of cultural 
studies as having discovered a phenomenon (power) which had not previously been 
recognised. It is demonstrated that the field has a history which precedes the 
introduction of generalised references to power. It is further argued that generalised 
references, when they were introduced, did not identify unrecognised phenomena but 
merely addressed them in a different way. The conditions for this intellectual shift are 
iii 
traced to the historical circumstances of the Cold War, particularly to a rapid and 
massive expansion of tertiary education, government programs and media forms. 
A major sub-theme of the thesis is developed around the 'englishness' of cultural 
studies, where 'englishness' is used in an abstract sense to refer to a certain political 
response (exemplified by England as an actual polity) to the possibilities of modernity. 
This response is defined by a tendency to maintain a 'pre-modem' sense of powers as 
particular and a corresponding resistance to generalised references to power in the 
singular. It is pointed out that the tension between this tendency and European 
theoretical imports was very sharply articulated in the early formation of cultural 
studies. It is further argued that it has never entirely disappeared and has continued, at 
some level, to define the field. 
The significance of this is that cultural studies offers an intellectual resource for 
thinking about questions of power which is distinct from the European theoretical 
positions which it nonetheless cites. In the final chapters of the thesis, attention is given 
to the possibility of making this resource more visible in its own terms as a way of 
broadening options for the field in responding to changed conditions for intellectual 
work post-Cold War. 
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Introduction 
There is no moment now, in American cultural studies, where we are not able, 
extensively and without end, to theorize power - politics, race, class, and 
gender, subjugation, domination, exclusion, marginality, Otherness etc. There is 
hardly anything in cultural studies which isn't so theorized ... [T]here are ways 
of constituting power as an easy floating signifier which just leaves the crude 
exercise and connections of power and culture altogether emptied of 
signification. 
Stuart Hall (1992: 286) 
Perhaps I've insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. 
Michel Foucault ( 1988: 19) 
When the most basic concepts ... are suddenly seen to be not concepts but 
problems ... there is no sense in listening to their sonorous summons or their 
resounding clashes. We have only, if we can, to recover the substance from 
which their forms were cast. 
Raymond Williams ( 1977: 11) 
In the late 1950s, Raymond Williams set out to map an influential tradition of English 
thought, a constellation of discourse which gravitated around a single word - 'culture'. 
By revealing the complicated history of the word, he opened it to the possibility of 
further development, narrowing the gap between the limited range of established formal 
usage and new contexts emerging from a rapid democratisation of British society. As 
Williams was the first to recognise, the project he attempted to give form to in Culture 
and Society (1958) and The Long Revolution (1965) was by no means his own 
invention. It connected not only with other important texts of the time - Richard 
Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy (1957) and E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English 
Working Class (1963); it also connected much more generally with a diverse range of 
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initiatives in education, literary discussion groups, film societies, publishing and 
journalism. Nor was it entirely new. Post-war debates around culture belonged, for 
Williams, to a history of creative responses to modernity which went back at least to the 
eighteenth century. Even the more radical democratic initiatives had important 
precedents. To recognise new groups as participants to debates over culture or to 
broaden the reference of the term was to contribute to a process - the 'long revolution' 
- which was already some hundreds of years old. 
But the field of which Williams is generally credited as a founder, cultural studies, has 
been organised as much around another word - 'power'. It often seems, in fact, that 
'culture' has effectively been displaced. In an essay of the mid 1980s, James Carey 
suggested that the field might almost be renamed: 
British cultural studies could be described just as easily and perhaps more 
accurately as ideological studies in that it assimilates, in a variety of complex 
ways, culture to ideology. More accurately, it makes ideology synecdochal of 
culture as a whole (Carey 1989: 97). 
In view of more recent developments, the suggestion may need to be modified. Given 
the increasing distance from Marxism and the shift in some quarters to genealogy and 
discourse analysis, the concept of ideology no longer appears so central. It has become 
clear that the fundamental concept has been, more specifically, the concept of power. 
But Carey's general point still holds. As Bruce Robbins (1993: 209) has nicely 
summarised the transformation of the field since the 1950s, the emblematic figure of 
Matthew Arnold has been substituted with that of Michel Foucault. 
There has never been an equivalent for 'power' of Williams' magisterial survey of the 
history of 'culture'. This is not to say that power has not been theorised; it clearly has 
been - as Stuart Hall puts it, 'extensively and without end'. In the rejection of the 
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English literary tradition, in the shift to Marxism and subsequent revisions inspired by 
Althusser and Gramsci, in the emergence of feminism and post-colonial criticism, and 
in the turn to Foucault - in all these moves, power has been, in fact, the single most 
visible theme. Nor has there been any shortage of commentary; each of the twists and 
turns and revisions in the theorisation of power have been carefully examined and its 
implications discussed. There is a difference, however, between a history of theories of 
power and a history of the concept of power. Williams' history of the concept of culture 
rested upon a basic enabling assumption: that the concept does not correspond in a 
simple way to any positive phenomenon; that there is, in other words, no 'essence' of 
culture. It is an assumption which allows the uses of the concept to be considered not 
according to general criteria of correctness or theoretical adequacy, but for how they 
have responded to historically specific circumstances. Particular uses, for Williams, 
were not simply descriptive or theoretical but also ethical; they involved an active 
disposition towards certain ways of seeing and, as a consequence, to certain ways of 
life. 
There have been occasional approaches in cultural studies to a similar understanding of 
the concept of power. Part of my argument in this dissertation is, in fact, that they have 
been more common than at first appears, running as a continuous submerged current 
through the development of the field. But the dominant tendency has been the reverse. 
The clear assumption in most debates over power is that the concept has no history. It 
has no history because the phenomenon it identifies is universal. While it may be 
necessary to recognise different forms or 'modalities' of power, the phenomenon itself 
remains substantially the same. Given this assumption, developments in debates around 
power can only be understood according to a simple narrative of enlightenment, a 
narrative in which the 'truth' of power is progressively revealed. That social relations 
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are relations of power, that power works in the cultural domain through ideology or 
discourse, that it operates along the axes of gender and race in addition to class, that 
there are always sites of resistance to power, that there are multiple forms of power -
these propositions appear not as intellectual responses to particular conditions but as 
general laws of human existence. It is true that the internal complexity of theoretical 
positions on power often allows detailed attention to widely varying historical 
circumstances, but this does not alter the basic point: there remains a closure to 
questions of the historical formation of the concept of power itself. 
There are good reasons why such a closure might be maintained, particularly at the 
present time. What is at stake in the concept of power cannot be considered in isolation. 
Its introduction to debates around culture is linked, in particular, with the complex of 
social, political and cultural developments associated with the 1960s and 1970s. Despite 
more than twenty years of intervening history, these developments remain highly 
controversial with differences continuing to bear in important ways on current forms of 
public culture. To admit a relativity to the concept of power would appear to weaken the 
authority of cultural studies in what is often a battleground. There is clear justification 
for such a concern. In polemics around 'political correctness' and other 'culture wars' 
of the 1990s, suggestions that the use of the concept has motivations other than to 
designate a positive phenomenon have often appeared as little more than a hostile 
argumentative ploy. Commitments to the concept have been crudely reduced, in 
attempts to discredit them, to a lust for control over public debate, to a simple 
resentment or to a nai"ve romanticism. Nor is the threat only from zealous ideological 
opponents. Cultural studies has also had to justify itself in the face of more general 
pressures from market-oriented reforms in the institutions in which it has found a place. 
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It might seem wiser in this context to shore up theoretical foundations than to expose 
them to uncertainty. 
But the risks for cultural studies may be even greater the other way. The strength of the 
field has never been simply the objective validity of its claims; it has also been its 
ability to reach beyond the formal institutional contexts in which such claims are 
adjudicated to wider constituencies for whom they have mattered. There is no doubt 
that claims in relation to power have connected in this way, but there is little reason to 
believe that they will necessarily continue to do so - at least, in the same way. In fact, 
the problem with the concept of power may be that at a certain moment it mattered too 
much, setting a standard against which anything which follows can only appear 
inadequate. The danger in this is that cultural studies may become hostage, as John 
Hartley has put it, to 'the biorhythms of an ageing intellectual generation' (1992a: 16). 
By grounding itself in the experience of a particular historical conjuncture, it may see its 
relevance fade with the memories of those who were 'there'. There is an irony here in 
similarities to the situation of the 1950s. What Williams saw so clearly in relation to 
'culture' may now apply in relation to 'power': to defend a tradition in the use of a term 
merely on the grounds of a supposed formal correctness is to see it become a reactive 
formation without the capacity for renewal. 
The problem cannot be addressed by developing more sophisticated theories of power. 
While such a strategy may overcome immediate suggestions of inflexibility, it only 
postpones the question of motivation. As Chris Rojek has commented of the recent 
work of Stuart Hall: 
One has the feeling that Hall himself is no longer able to give shape to his 
labours. In reviewing Hall's work at length, I am struck by the image of a 
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master builder who has added so many rooms, doors and passages to his house 
that he is no longer able to find his way around the premises (Rojek 1998: 61 ). 
To be fair to Hall, the significance of claims about power have been clearly related, 
throughout most of his career, to the circumstances in which they have been made. 
While this has been so, his openness to correction and modification has been a major 
strength, preventing the formation of dogmatic tendencies often in the midst of highly 
polarised debates. As these debates become abstracted from their original points of 
reference, however, there are real dangers in the situation which Rojek identifies. In 
failing to address the question of motivations, appeals to complexity leave a vacuum 
which is all too easily filled by unsympathetic commentators. More seriously still, the 
field becomes exposed to a further charge of obfuscation. There is, in short, no 
substitute for explaining openly why the theme of power is, or has been, important to 
pursue. 
Or so, at least, I wish to argue. It is necessary, however, to set limits. An enquiry into 
the motivations involved in the use of the concept of power in cultural studies could 
easily become unmanageable. In fact, any generalisation about cultural studies has 
become virtually impossible. The term is now used to cover so many different traditions 
and styles of work that almost anything which is said of one will not apply to others. 
The field at the end of the 1990s is quite unlike the English literary tradition reviewed 
by Williams in the 1950s. Where the latter was bound by national, linguistic and 
institutional continuities, cultural studies has become a complex international network 
with little consistency beyond a few shared references and a decision to go by a 
common name. If, as I have begun to suggest, the meaning of the concept of power is 
specific to the contexts in which it is used, then the project of charting its various 
histories would be too large to undertake. The problem is one which I will not attempt 
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to overcome; to do so would only result in an arbitrariness and tokenism. While 
Williams' survey of 'culture' is a useful point of comparison, I make no claim to 
providing the missing companion survey of 'power'. 
The aim of the dissertation is more preliminary: to establish that a historical approach to 
the concept of power is possible and to indicate some of the directions it might lead. But 
even this may seem ambitious. The problem here is almost the reverse of the one above; 
not the practical difficulties of allowing for local differences, but the theoretical 
obstacles which must be overcome for such differences to be recognised. A 
universalism in relation to power appears extremely difficult to avoid. 
The point is perhaps best illustrated by a brief review of previous attempts. The most 
significant of these has been inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault's major 
innovation was to suggest that there is no single form of power - that there are, more 
specifically, other forms than domination. The move has been extremely important in 
questioning the authority of certain dogmatic positions. By throwing doubt on claims to 
have identified a single 'truth' of power, it opens a space in which such claims are 
exposed to historical and ethical considerations. How has the idea of power as 
domination emerged? What political forms are favoured by continuing to think of 
power in this way? Foucault has made it possible for these questions to be asked. But 
however impressive this achievement, it has come at a certain cost. As I argue in 
Chapter 1, the multiplication of forms of power has the effect of further inflating its 
ontological status. Power comes to be defined as that which transcends particular 
historical conditions - an indestructible element which survives any and every change. 
In some of Foucault's formulations, in fact, power is conceived as a fundamental 
substrate of all human relations. While removing the ground from one kind of dogma, 
this puts in place the conditions for another. In weakening the definition of the concept, 
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it universalises its reference: a certainty as to the form of power is replaced by a 
certainty that everything is explicable in terms of power. While power becomes 
uncertain in its implications, it is further elevated as a master concept. 
A similar point could be made of the attempt by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to 
identify a discursive aspect to power. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), 
Laclau and Mouffe draw a provocative distinction between 'subordination' and 
'oppression'. A relation of 'subordination' is one in which 'an agent is subjected to the 
decisions of another - an employee with respect to an employer, for example, or in 
certain forms of family organization the woman with respect to the man, and so on' 
(153). A relation of 'oppression', by contrast, is one in which relations of subordination 
have 'transformed themselves into sites of antagonism' (154). The important point is 
that 'oppression' is not conceived as a timeless or universal phenomenon, but as 
discursively produced as a result of particular historical developments. The 
understanding of relations of subordination as 'oppressive' is, for Laclau and Mouffe, a 
quite specific achievement only made possible by the emergence in modernity of the 
'democratic discourse': 'Our thesis is that it is only from the moment when the 
democratic discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to 
subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against 
different kinds of inequality.' (154) 
Like Foucault's pluralisation of forms of power, the argument works to limit 
universalising claims and allow greater sensitivity to different historical contexts. 
Claims in relation to oppression can no longer be asserted simply as fact but must be 
presented more persuasively, openly setting out to win over constituencies to what is 
only a particular way of seeing. The distinction between 'subordination' and 
'oppression' is part of an important attempt by Laclau and Mouffe to insist on the 
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democratic responsibilities of left political projects. But again, there is a cost in the way 
their theoretical leverage is achieved. As with any distinction between a 'discursive' and 
a 'real' aspect of a phenomenon, the aspect which is marked as 'real' - in this case 
'subordination' - is further universalised, becoming rigorously set apart from historical 
considerations. Subordination comes to be conceived by Laclau and Mouffe as a 
bedrock of power, entirely independent of its various instances or the way it might be 
framed. There is always a risk, in fact, that the democratic thrust of their argument 
might collapse. Given the continued assumption of a fundamental underlying 
phenomenon (subordination), the question must arise whether the independence of the 
discursive aspect (oppression) can be sustained. Discourses of power remain grounded, 
ultimately, in a simple universal truth. 
A third revisionist approach to theories of power has been to tum them on themselves. 
A good example of this strategy is an attempt by Bruce Robbins to deflate the authority 
of Pierre Bourdieu in debates around popular culture. Where, for Bourdieu, we must 
always inquire into the interests of those who speak of popular culture, Robbins 
suggests that we might equally inquire into the interests of those who speak of power -
not least, the interests of Bourdieu himself: 
It is hard not to notice ... that Bourdieu's interest in defending the notion of a 
single 'dominant form' [of culture] coincides with an interest in defending the 
'symbolic profits' he himself has drawn from analyzing that dominant form, 
that is, from the discovery or the invention of 'cultural capital'. The threat to 
cultural capital posed by cultural studies is clear. For Bourdieu, culture is 
necessarily empty of any popular or democratic input. Its contents are arbitrary, 
fixed in advance by the state, and ruled only by the goal of allowing the 
dominant class to win at the 'main social games' ... If culture's contents were 
not arbitrary ... , if 'the people' had some special access, competence, or 
authority where culture is concerned, then the system would not work as he 
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describes ... [T]he metaphor of cultural capital would collapse (Robbins l 993: 
208). 
A slightly different variant of the argument has been developed by John Hartley in 
criticism of the 'classic' cultural studies paradigm of the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. Hartley speculates whether the oppositional 
intellectuals of the 1970s were interested in the 'manipulation of the masses' because 
'some time in the future they hoped they'd be able to have a go at doing that too' 
(1992a: 25). Similar arguments have also become common in debates within feminism 
in criticism of fundamentalist tendencies in claims in relation to patriarchal domination 
(Roiphe 1993; Denfeld 1995; Lumby 1997). 
Once again, these arguments are highly effective in unsettling an aura of moral certainty 
often associated with the use of the concept of power. But they also follow other 
revisionist approaches in further entrenching the universalism of the concept. The use of 
theories of power against theories of power sets up a vicious cycle in which the 
attribution of positions to strategies of power becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. What 
are the interests of Robbins or Hartley in drawing our attention to the interests of 
oppositional criticism? What are my interests here in drawing attention to their 
interests? The only conclusion that can be drawn from this game is a confirmation and 
extension of Bourdieu's reduction of arguments about culture to strategies for the 
accumulation of cultural capital. While part of the motivation for criticising this 
reduction may be discomfort with its relentless zero-sum negativity, the criticisms only 
further eliminate any space for the recognition of other possibilities. 
The apparent inevitability of this tendency is confirmed by a recent interest in cultural 
studies in the class position of intellectuals. As John Prow concludes, in one of the more 
thorough and authoritative studies of the issue: 
JO 
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A key condition of any institutional politics ... is that intellectuals do not 
denegate their own status as possessors of cultural capital; that they accept and 
struggle with the contradictions that this entails; and that their cultural politics, 
right across the spectrum of cultural texts, should be openly and without 
embarrassment presented as their politics, not someone else's (Frow 1995: 
169). 
Like Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, Robbins and Hartley, Prow is concerned to reject the 
tendency towards fundamentalism in left political analyses of the relations between 
culture and power. '[I]t is politically crucial', he warns, 'for intellectuals not to 
universalize the competences they possess as norms which can be used to totalize the 
cultural field'. Yet precisely in making the argument, Prow himself 'totalizes the 
cultural field' in terms of the metaphor of cultural capital and the concept of power. The 
evidence seems overwhelming: any attempt to intervene against the tendency to 
universalism in cultural studies is condemned to enter a vortex in which everything else 
is liquidated before a single, unquestionable certainty - the universality and 
intractability of power. 
The one significant escape from this vortex within the orbit of reference of theoretical 
debates in cultural studies has been the exception which proves the rule - the 
provocation by Jean Baudrillard that 'power no longer exists'. The suggestion is one 
which appears inevitably as the nemesis which awaits the inflation of the concept. For 
Baudrillard, in fact, it is not so much his own suggestion as one which is already 
implicit in the discourses in which the inflation occurs. At the very point where 
everything is explained in terms of power, he argues, the concept loses any specific 
reference and therefore its 'reality principle'. The exemplary case is the meticulous 
anatomy of power developed by Foucault: 
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The very perfection of this analytical chronicle of power is disturbing. 
Something tells us - but implicitly, as if seen in a reverse shot of this writing 
too beautiful to be true - that if it is possible to talk with such definitive 
understanding about power, sexuality, the body, and discipline, even down to 
their most delicate metamorphoses, it is because at some point all this is here 
and now over with ... [W]hat if Foucault spoke so well to us concerning power 
- and let us not forget it, in real objective terms which cover manifold 
diffractions but nonetheless do not question the objective point of view one has 
about them ... - only because power is dead? (Baudrillard 1987: 11) 
However compelling the internal logic of the argument (and it is difficult to ignore a 
similarity to the opening quotation from Hall), it has done more to inhibit sceptical 
approaches to questions of power than it has to encourage them. Any move towards 
scepticism is immediately embarrassed by an association with 'unacceptable' claims. In 
a world of widening inequalities of wealth and access to resources, of continuing 
suffering as a consequence of organised violence and of increasing coordination of 
functions at a global level, the proposition that 'power is dead' appears not just absurd 
but politically irresponsible. To the extent that it has been deemed worthy of notice, it 
has generally been dismissed out of hand. The spectre of Baudrillard has become the 
major obstacle to his own suggestion that we 'forget Foucault'. 
It would be foolish, in view of all this, to underestimate the difficulty of developing a 
sceptical, historical approach to the concept of power. Cultural studies has become, in 
many ways, an intellectual space in which anything can be questioned - indeed, must be 
questioned - except the universal reference of this one concept. Yet the situation cannot 
be explained by a lack of awareness of the problems this generates. There is clearly 
something about the concept which makes it highly resistant to historical understanding. 
A promising lead is provided, however, in Barry Hindess's recent book, Discourses of 
Power (1996). The book is located within political theory rather than cultural studies 
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and does not address quite the problem I have outlined above, but Hindess's argument 
can be taken in other directions than he does himself. As presented, his thesis is that 
there have been two main conceptions of power in Western political thought in the 
modem period: 
One, which has been especially prominent in recent academic discussion, is the 
idea of power as a simple quantitative phenomenon. Power, in this sense, is 
nothing more than a kind of generalized capacity to act. The second, more 
complex, understanding is that of power as involving not only a capacity but 
also a right to act, with both capacity and right being seen to rest on the consent 
of those over whom power is exercised (Hindess I 996: 1 ). 
The argument is an interesting one in itself and Hindess develops it with exemplary 
clarity. In doing so, however, he introduces another distinction which is perhaps more 
significant in its implications - and certainly for the project which I have begun to 
outline. This is a distinction between general ideas of power (whether as capacity or 
right) and particular ideas of distinct and specific powers. It might be described as a 
distinction between rationalist and empiricist concepts of power. It is in the recognition 
of the possibility of empiricism, I want to suggest, that a window is opened to a cultural 
history of the concept of power. 
The distinction appears most clearly in a discussion of the concept of power in Hobbes' 
Leviathan. Chapter X of Leviathan opens with a simple definition: 'The power of a man 
is his present means to obtain some future apparent Good'. Hobbes amplifies by 
distinguishing between 'Originall' and 'Instrumentall' powers. The first refers to 
faculties of body or mind such as 'extraordinary Strength, Forms, Prudence, Arts, 
Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility'; the second to 'those powers, which acquired by these, 
or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, 
Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck'. As Hindess points 
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out, 'power in this view ... refers to any one, or any combination, of a remarkably 
heterogeneous set of attributes which appear to have in common the fact that they may 
be useful to their possessor in pursuit of at least some of his or her purposes' (23). On 
the basis of this definition, he goes on, 'there would be little that could usefully be said 
about power in general' (24): 
Rather than investigate the properties of power as such, any serious inquiry 
would have to concern itself separately with the discrete powers associated with 
extraordinary Strength or Eloquence, or with Riches, the secret working of God 
and other such attributes, as well as with the diverse uses to which those powers 
can be put. (24) 
There is, however, an inconsistency in Hobbes for he does attempt to address the 
properties of 'power as such'. We must therefore assume, Hindess infers, that there is 
another understanding of power in play: 
one in which power refers not to extraordinary Strength, Eloquence, Riches or 
whatever, but rather to something that these various attributes are thought to 
have in common ... some common stuff, some shared underlying capacity or 
essence of effectiveness, which each of these attributes possesses in some 
quantity, and which accounts for their utility in obtaining 'future apparent 
goods' (24-5). 
Nor is it only Hobbes who has taken this course. Most of those who have since written 
on power have been reluctant to follow what Hindess calls the 'self-denying ordinance' 
which the first interpretation would seem to require. The idea of a generalised 'essence 
of effectiveness' lies at the very heart of modem discourses of power. 
In describing the distinction as one between 'empiricism' and 'rationalism', I am using 
the terms in the sense which Gilles Deleuze derives from the philosophy of David 
Hume (Deleuze and Parnet 1987; Deleuze 1991 ). This sense is somewhat different from 
that suggested by the textbook definition of empiricism as a doctrine that the origin of 
14 
Introduction 
all knowledge is to be found in experience. The latter definition is misleading, for 
Deleuze, because it implies that empiricism is to be distinguished from 'conceptual' 
orientations. What is important, he suggests, is not the recognition or non-recognition of 
concepts but the status which is accorded to them: 
The concept exists just as much in empiricism as in rationalism, but it has a 
completely different nature: it is a being-multiple, instead of a being-one, a 
being-whole or being as subject. Empiricism is fundamentally linked to a logic 
- a logic of multiplicities (Deleuze and Pamet 1987: preface). 
Whereas, for rationalism, the various phenomena comprehended under a concept are 
ultimately conceived as instances of the one phenomenon, for empiricism they are 
conceived as distinct. The relation between them is not essential but the result of 
conventional associations arising from the way concepts are used. As Constantin 
Boundas puts it in his introduction to Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity: 
'Knowledge is possible because our passions provide our ideas with associative links in 
view of our actions and ends' (Deleuze 1991: 6). 
The significance of empiricism as applied to the concept of power is that it permits a 
scepticism in relation to the concept which does not raise the spectre of Baudrillard. The 
alternative to an unqualified commitment to general theories of power is not an 
apocalyptic claim that the phenomena to which they refer have somehow 'disappeared'. 
Nor is it that the ways in which powers are exercised cannot be described, analysed and, 
where necessary, criticised. There is nothing to suggest an anti-realism in the sense of a 
view that powers do not exist or have effects. To adopt an empiricist approach to power 
does not even require that the term be used only in the plural; while this may be 
indicative, it is not required. What is at issue is only the question of whether the singular 
'power' is grounded in a common essence shared by the various phenomena to which it 
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is applied. A generalised use of the term does not necessarily involve this assumption. 
On first impressions, in fact, there may be little to distinguish an 'empiricist' position 
from a 'rationalist' one. Yet the difference in the status attributed to concepts defines 
quite different intellectual styles. A basis for confidence in generalisations gives 
rationalism a certain intellectual boldness, particularly at the upper reaches of 
abstraction. It is empiricism, however, which provides an opening to historical, 
contextualising modes of inquiry. 
Hindess goes some way towards such an inquiry in drawing a connection between 
generalised concepts of power and the emergence in modernity of the idea of 
sovereignty. It is in developing an account of the powers of the sovereign that Hobbes is 
drawn to write of power as a singular, homogeneous phenomenon. He suggests, 
specifically, that the discrete powers of many individuals might be 'united by consent' 
to form a power greater than all. It is in the disposal of this power that sovereignty is 
held to consist. As Hindess points out, the suggestion introduces three important 
propositions which exceed the simple definition of powers as capacities: first, that 
power is a 'quantitative and cumulative phenomenon'; second, that it is 'capable of 
aggregation'; and third, that it is generally determining of events, those who possess a 
greater 'quantity' prevailing in a global sense over those who possess lesser quantities 
(Hindess 1996: 25-26). 
It is here that Hindess's empiricist scepticism is decisive in the analysis he is able to 
provide. In a test of Hobbes' supplementary propositions, he asks us to imagine a 
contest between heterogeneous powers: 'the power of extraordinary Strength on the one 
side and the power of Riches on the other, or an international dispute in which tanks are 
pitted against submarines': 
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There is little point in considering these cases in terms of the sheer quantities of 
power involved on the two sides. What matters rather is the presence or absence 
of conditions under which the means of action available to the contending 
parties can in fact be deployed ... Means of action of different kinds will be 
effective under different conditions, and in this respect the idea of an 
underlying common substance or essence of power is clearly unsatisfactory. 
(29) 
What is interesting in this analysis is its implication that general discourses of power are 
not simply descriptive or analytical but also imaginative, always exceeding validation 
by any objective referent. For Hindess, Hobbes' discussion of 'sovereign power' is, in 
fact, 'less about power, understood in the manner of his definition, than it is about the 
political constitution of society and the character of government' (39). Even Hobbes 
himself would admit that no ruler is able, in fact, to make effective use of the powers of 
all of his or her subjects in the way his model requires. His account of the power of the 
sovereign is 'an unrealized, and almost certainly as unrealizable, aspiration' (38). The 
generalised notion of power as quantitative, cumulative and globally determining is not 
descriptive of political arrangements as they exist so much as an ideal of how he would 
like them to be. 
My interest in the dissertation is not in the development of sovereignty in seventeenth 
century Europe, but in the period in which cultural studies has emerged - from the late 
1950s to the 1990s. A similar approach to Hindess's can nevertheless be applied. This is 
not to suggest that the motivations for the use of the concept of power in cultural studies 
can be equated with those of Hobbes. To the extent that political alignments at the end 
of the English Civil War can be translated with those of the Cold War, most within the 
field would see themselves as opposed to the Hobbesian dream of an absolute sovereign 
power. My argument is only that cultural studies' discourses on power are no less open 
to what might be described as an 'ethico-historical' mode of criticism. To speak 
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'against' power does not give the concept any greater certainty of reference than 
speaking 'for' it. From an empiricist perspective, this is only to say that the knowledge 
associated with oppositional politics submits to the normal condition of conceptual 
indeterminacy. It may be important to add, however, that my intention is not to deflate 
such knowledge. It is, in fact, almost the contrary: to reconnect it, in Boundas' terms, 
with the 'passions', 'actions' and 'ends' which have made it compelling. To expose the 
latter without the cover of objective validation may appear embarrassing, but it is only if 
they are honestly revealed that cultural studies can honour its past while also moving 
on. 
It is necessary in relation to this point to raise one major difference from Hindess: over 
the historical importance he attributes to empiricism. This he appears to regard as 
negligible. There is still something in his writing of the Althusserian Marxist of the 
1970s, ever in search of the 'epistemological break' between an ideological past and a 
scientific future (Hindess and Hirst 1977; 1975). The history of the concept of power is 
dramatised, in his account, as overwhelmingly dominated by essentialism. No good 
reason is provided for thinking that this is the case. It may be true, as he points out, that 
those who have written on power have not been satisfied merely to investigate 
individual powers, but this is no evidence of a general absence of empiricism. By his 
own account, those who conceive of powers as particular will not be inclined to address 
power 'as such'. They will address Strength, Eloquence, Riches or any one of numerous 
other powers each under their individual names. It is only where these are all conceived 
as aspects of a single phenomenon that a discussion will be framed as a discussion of 
'power'. To limit one's focus to discussions which are so framed is already to have 
excluded the alternative. There can be little question that such an alternative exists. In 
military strategy, sport and body-building; in commentary on political speech-making 
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and corporate presentations; in financial journalism and household budgeting; particular 
discussions of Strength, Eloquence and Riches appear at least as common as general 
discussions of power. 
Even where the term 'power' is used in the singular, Hindess infers too easily that an 
'essence of effectiveness' is being presumed. By his own account again, Hobbes does 
not entirely delude himself that the powers of numerous individuals could ever be put 
fully at the disposal of the sovereign (Hindess 1996: 38). He is aware, in other words, 
that his general references to power are not entirely validated by an objective 
phenomenon. If this is so, then how can we be sure that others have not shared a similar 
awareness? The question is one which needs to be addressed if the charge of 
essentialism is to be applied. The presumption involved in general references to power 
can only be judged in view of what they are claiming. Where a use of the concept 
pretends to pure description, with absolute validation in the phenomenon described, 
then it does seem fair to characterise the usage as essentialist in the sense which Hindess 
identifies. At the opposite pole, however, there is at least a potential usage which is 
openly presented as imaginative or rhetorical. Such usages are perhaps not common 
within formal political discourse, but if Hobbes is any indication, there are usages 
which fall between the two extremes. In informal contexts, where there is less demand 
to claim authority, they are even more likely to be the norm. It may be best, in this 
context, to avoid blanket charges of 'essentialism' and seek instead to identify 
tendencies. 
The point introduces the main argument of the dissertation: that the history of the 
concept of power in cultural studies is the history of a tendency from empiricism to 
rationalism. This history can be traced in at least two major dimensions. The most 
obvious is simply temporal. Since cultural studies first began to take form in the late 
19 
Introduction 
1950s, it has seen an extraordinary explosion of generalised references to power. In the 
British case at least, such references were almost completely absent from the early work 
of the field. With the achievement in the 1990s of an international profile, they more or 
less came to define it. The key moment in this transformation was undoubtedly the 
1970s with the uptake of Marxism and the establishment of connections with the 'new 
social movements'. This is the period in which 'power as such' was adopted as a central 
focus. But I also want to suggest that the tendency to rationalism has continued 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The shift in this case has been registered not so much 
in the appearance of a generalised concept of power as the status it has been accorded. 
Contrary to a common narrative in which the 'faith' of the 1970s has given way to the 
'scepticism' of the 1980s and 1990s, I suggest that in respect of the concept of power, 
the tendency has been more the reverse. 
The second dimension to this history was a major theme of debates in the early phases 
of the developments outlined above but has since become relatively submerged. This is 
a geopolitical - or perhaps rather 'geo-intellectual' - dimension. While cultural studies 
is almost entirely an English language phenomenon, with strongest bases in the 
hollowed-out shell of the British Empire, it has become over the last thirty years a 
highly sophisticated intellectual import operation. The introduction of generalised 
references to power has coincided with the apparent abandonment of an English (or 
Anglo-derived) intellectual inheritance and a wholesale resort to continental European 
'theory'. This is no accident; as the early entrepreneurs of theory pointed out, English 
intellectual culture has been strikingly lacking in any sustained address to questions of 
power in general. It was in covering this lack that the proposal was first developed to 
look for resources elsewhere. 
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The full significance of this can only be seen in a longer perspective - a perspective 
which takes in the discipline of 'English' out of which cultural studies for the most part 
emerged. As Terence Hawkes has argued, English was born in crisis. There is a nice 
irony in the fact that it gained formal recognition at Cambridge in 1917, the year of the 
Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war in Europe. The major 
expansion of English in the period following the First World War was also the period in 
which 'Englishness' was confronted by the two historic challenges: the idea of world 
revolution and the dynamism of American capitalism: 
It might even be reasonable to detect in the invention of the subject itself a 
major diagnostic response to an early apprehension of the complexities 
surrounding cultural identity. Current talk of a 'crisis' in English neglects that 
history. There is no crisis in English. There was and is a crisis which created 
English and of which it remains a distinctive manifestation: a child of Empire's 
decline, we might say, by America out of Russia (Hawkes 1986: 122). 
The more recent history of cultural studies might be seen as a late episode of this crisis 
- an episode which has come to be played out around the concept of power. To present 
it in its boldest terms, it is a history of the conversion of a major intellectual formation, 
central to the development of the contemporary global system, from empiricism to 
rationalism. 
Given that I have already indicated a certain preference for empiricism, it may appear 
that the implication of the thesis is a pessimistic one, perhaps even betraying a nostalgia 
for an imagined golden age of Anglo ascendancy. This is not at all the impression I 
want to convey. While I do agree with Hindess that a tum to empiricism is now 
important in bringing some clarity to discussions of power, the judgement is intended as 
historical. I have no wish to suggest that the introduction of general references to power 
has been, in any sense, 'wrong' or ill-conceived. To do so would merely reinforce 
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assumptions that there is a universally 'right' way in which the concept might be used. 
In addition, however, I will argue that the tendency to rationalism is not irreversible. 
There are, in fact, a number of signs that empiricism has begun to recapture a certain 
initiative. Hindess is not entirely alone in exposing generalising theoretical discourses to 
sceptical inquiry; there has been a range of attempts in recent debates to regain a 
historical sensibility. It is broadly represented, for example, in the so-called 'new 
historicism' (Veeser 1989). In the case, more specifically, of cultural studies, it is 
evident in a developing interest in the history of the field. Particularly significant, in this 
context, have been a number of attempts to reconnect with the early project before the 
introduction of generalised references to power (Steele 1997; Pickering 1997; Hartley 
1999; Milner 1997). 
All that has so far been lacking from these developments is a mature response to the 
intellectual challenge of general theories of power. The point is well illustrated by a 
contribution from James Carey. After a compelling account of the early project as one 
of its leading American exponents, Carey goes on to outline the ways it has been 
displaced by more recent theoretical concerns. But just at the point where he is moving 
to propose a program of reconstruction, he admits an obstacle to his argument: 'I know I 
have not allayed the fear, and perhaps I cannot, that I have again neglected the facts of 
power, that I have placed too much emphasis on inquiry, community and 
communication' (Carey 1997: 22). An inability to see a way around this problem 
appears closely related to an inability to see a positive future for the field. The current 
sales of books and numbers of students represent, for Carey, a 'false prosperity': 
Intellectually and politically cultural studies is not very healthy and I believe its 
days are numbered except as an irrelevant outpost in the academy. The 
encounter between British cultural studies and French structuralism and 
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poststructuralism has been, I think, a deeply deforming episode (Carey 1997: 
15). 
A similar problem affects the late contributions of Raymond Williams. In the essays 
collected in The Politics of Modemism (1989a), Williams employed his unmatched 
skills as a cultural historian in an attempt to historicise cultural theory and its sources in 
European philosophy and aesthetics. But nowhere did he apply those skills specifically 
to the concept of power. The concept remained, throughout his work, a highly 
significant absence, an absence which left a damaging suspicion that he never quite 
succeeded in coming to terms with the major intellectual movements of the last thirty 
years. 
Yet few solutions have been offered by those who have embraced these movements 
more fully. The obstacle here is a different one: a belief that the problems which have 
emerged in general theories of power might somehow be resolved through internal 
reform. Even Hindess appears finally to invest his hopes here. To resort to shorthand, 
the problem might be given a name: Foucault. For Hindess, Foucault represents a 
'radical alternative' to the dominant Western discourses of power, an approach which is 
free of essentialism but which nonetheless manages to address power in general. Early 
in his discussion of Foucault, he quotes him in his most sceptical mode: 
To ask 'How do things happen?' is to suggest that power as such does not exist. 
At the very least it is to ask what contents one has in mind when using this all-
embracing and reifying term: it is to suspect that an extremely complex 
configuration of realities is allowed to escape when one treads endlessly the 
double question: What is power? Where does power come from? (Hindess 
1996: I 00; original Foucault 1982: 217) 
This is evidence, for Hindess, that Foucault penetrated the illusion of generalised 
references to power: 'Foucault ... concludes that there is little that can be said about 
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power in general' (Hindess 1996: 141 ). Yet in the remainder of his exposition of 
Foucault's work on power, such references mysteriously reappear: 'power requires a 
degree of freedom on the part of its subjects' (101), 'power is ubiquitous' (150), 'there 
can be no personalities that are formed independently of its effects' (150). The clear 
implication is that a general theory of power might somehow be recuperated. 
It is tempting to suggest that much of the appeal of Foucault for English-language 
theorists of Hindess' s generation has been a desire to have things both ways. To the 
extent that Foucault was ultimately committed to a general concept of power, he marks 
a continuing differentiation from what were once derided as 'atheoretical' approaches, 
most typical of English intellectual culture, in which power was never framed 'as such'. 
There is still an aura around Foucault of theoretical radicalism and the promise of 
revolutionary change. In that sense, he validates the g~nerational experience of those 
whose intellectual and political formation belongs to the 1970s. At the same time, 
however, he has provided cover for a retreat to empiricism. The historical inflection of 
Foucault's writing and his revaluation of 'modesty', 'specificity' and 'complexity' 
resonate with all the virtues which were dismissed in the first resort to 'theory'. It 
becomes possible to reconnect with these virtues without having to submit to an 
awkward historical accounting. 
I do not wish to minimise the importance of Foucault in bringing new life to debates in 
the 1980s and 1990s. But I do want to suggest that appeals to Foucault have now 
become a serious obstacle to an open assessment of the importance of the concept of 
power in debates of the last thirty years. In Chapter 1 of the dissertation, therefore, I 
explain 'Why I am not a Foucauldian'. The chapter is in no way a 'critique' of Foucault, 
but rather an attempt to locate his significance as an anti-Stalinist intellectual within the 
post-war Left in France. Like any thinker, I argue, he was bound in various ways by the 
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context in which he wrote. One of the most important limitations this imposed, from the 
perspective of my project, was a difficulty, ultimately, in questioning a rationalist 
concept of power. This limitation is evident particularly in a confusion between the idea 
of a plurality of powers (an empiricist position) and the idea of a plurality of forms of 
power (a rationalist one). As a point of contrast, I compare Foucault with the English 
political essayist Michael Oakeshott who can be taken to represent at least one approach 
to questions of power available within English intellectual culture prior to the formation 
of cultural studies. I suggest that Oakeshott's position allowed him to take a 
considerably more sceptical position on these questions than Foucault. While such 
scepticism came to be defined as 'conservative', it might now be seen ironically as the 
more 'radical' altemati ve to rationalism. 
In Chapter 2, I continue the argument by locating a strong scepticism towards 
generalised concepts of power in the early work in British cultural studies of Richard 
Hoggart and Raymond Williams. While both were interested in questions of class - an 
interest they shared with Marxism-, they did not represent class relations in terms of 
power. Such representations were, in fact, specifically rejected, not only as reductive 
but also as implicitly condescending towards the working class. The identification as 
'culture' of areas of life outside the formal domains of art and literature was closely 
associated with an argument that these areas had their own specific histories, resources 
and characters which were neither formed by, nor in opposition to, centralised agencies 
of government, education and the media. The political significance of 'Richard 
Hoggart's Grandmother's Ironing' was neither as evidence of 'domination' of the 
working class nor of 'resistance', but rather in its status as unique and particular. 
It is against this background that I trace the emergence of a generalised concept of 
power. Taking issue with a common tendency to suggest that the concept was always 
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already central to cultural studies (and therefore fundamental to its very definition), I 
argue that there is a history to its introduction to the field. I illustrate the case with a 
review by E.P. Thompson of Williams' The Long Revolution in which Thompson 
criticises the absence of the concept in Williams' writing. In sketching an alternative to 
Williams, Thompson anticipates many of the themes of later cultural studies: the 
concept of ideology, the treatment of culture as a specific instance within larger social 
totalities, the appeal for a general account of such totalities to European 'theory' and a 
commitment to oppositional political positions. But in doing so, he establishes a tension 
with an earlier set of political commitments and an earlier understanding of the 
significance of extending cultural criticism to popular culture and the 'everyday'. 
In Chapter 3, I review the use of the concept of power in the work of Stuart Hall and the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, arguing that even here an 
empiricism in relation to power continues to exercise a major influence. While the 
formal adoption of Marxism appears, superficially, to have committed the field to a 
generalised concept of power (following Thompson over Williams) the 'tension' I 
identify in the early formation of the field is not resolved. It is manifested, instead, in an 
increasing contradiction between theoretical statements and more empirically-oriented 
description and analysis. This contradiction is thematised explicitly by Paul Willis in 
Learning to Labour (1980), through a contrast between the perspectives of 'Monday 
morning' and 'the Millennium'. Willis presents his theoretical and empirical analyses as 
having divergent political implications. The theoretical analysis points in the direction 
of what Oakeshott would call the 'politics of faith', implying an ambition for a general 
reform of society (the Millennium). The empirical analysis points, by contrast, in the 
direction of a 'politics of scepticism', suggesting a more limited and immediate 
attention (Monday morning) to the conditions of civil exchange. The first implies a 
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generalised (rationalist) concept of power, the second a restricted (empiricist) one. I 
conclude that both are present within what is often regarded as the 'classical' cultural 
studies paradigm. 
In Chapter 4, I consider the emergence of feminism in cultural studies, taking it to be 
the most important bridge with the politics of the 'new social movements'. I argue that 
it is this moment which most clearly confirms the ascendancy of rationalism. Within 
Marxist theoretical frameworks, especially when applied within single national context 
such as Britain, there always remained an ambiguity as to whether generalised 
references to power were a shorthand for the power of a specific state formation or 
referred to a global phenomenon. With the emergence of feminism, this ambiguity is 
substantially resolved. Particularly where gender and class are conceived as alternative 
axes 'of' power, power comes to be conceived as universal, varying between contexts 
only at the level of different forms. It is important to emphasise, however, that I see 
feminism as much as a response to this development as an agent of it. The tendency to 
rationalism cannot be identified with any single position or movement but needs to be 
traced in relation to the highly charged political context of the Cold War. Taking the 
work of Meaghan Morris as an exemplary case, I argue that some of the most 
significant contributions of feminism to cultural studies have involved an internal 
critique of rationalism, maintaining a space for sceptical, historical approaches to 
cultural politics against the pressure to universalism from generalised concepts of 
power. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I attempt to identify two possible sites for a re-emergence of 
empiricism. I set both within the context of changes in government, education and 
media during the 1980s and 1990s - particularly as determined by institutional 
convergence around models of business management and the disappearance, at the end 
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of the Cold War, of an alternative ideological pole to state-sponsored capitalism. I argue 
that there are at least two ways these changes can be read: as the final consummation of 
a process in which separate powers have become subsumed into one (the power of 
global capital), or as the point at which the concept of power, in the generalised sense, 
loses its capacity for discrimination (and hence its meaning). While the latter reading 
has often been associated with apocalyptic 'end of the world' scenarios in the style of 
Baudrillard, I suggest that it might also be associated with the re-emergence of an 
empiricist understanding of powers as plural - this possibility being particularly strong 
in Anglo-derived political cultures with strong empiricist intellectual traditions and 
histories of sceptical governance. 
In Chapter 5, I consider the arguments of Tony Bennett, Ian Hunter, Stuart Cunningham 
and others for a re-orientation of cultural studies towards questions of 'policy' or 
'governmentality'. To the extent that these arguments draw significantly on the work of 
Foucault, my discussion returns to some of the issues discussed in Chapter 1. As in the 
case of Foucault, I argue, the insistence by Bennett, Hunter and Cunningham on the 
'specificity' of institutional mechanisms of power does not free them from the problems 
associated with a generalised use of the concept. Certain of their positions - and 
particularly a tendency to accept a closure on dialogue - confirm the limitations which 
such a use of the concept continues to impose. But there is, I suggest, another potential 
in the 'policy' writing, where institutional specificities begin to emerge as particular 
'powers' rather than merely as differentiated instances of a global 'power'. 
In Chapter 6, I consider a set of arguments for new directions in cultural studies which 
might loosely be grouped under the theme of 'media republicanism'. While the theme is 
quite widespread - with resonances across a range of writing on postmodernism, 'new 
times', queer theory and new media technologies - I focus on the initiatives of John 
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Hartley, McKenzie Wark and Catharine Lumby. I suggest that this work might be seen 
in some ways as the mirror image of the 'policy' position. Where the 'policy' advocates 
have tended to generalise the concept of power to the point where it accounts for 
everything, the 'media republican' alternative has been to question its relevance, 
suggesting that cultural politics be viewed, instead, in terms of pleasure, desire or 
aesthetic appreciation. Many of the arguments of 'media republicanism' remain heavily 
shadowed by a generalised concept of power and tend, as a consequence, towards an 
abstract libertarianism. As in the case of 'policy', however, I argue that there are also 
significant points of reconnection with empiricism. 
It may be worth adding a note, finally, about the selection of examples, which might 
appear to reflect a rather partial view of cultural studies. I say almost nothing, for 
example, about the field in America, despite the fact that it now defines the international 
centre of gravity. One answer to this, as I have already indicated, is that it is simply not 
possible to address everything. I have found it necessary, in establishing the contexts in 
which the concept of power has been used, to work intensively with limited examples. 
The approach makes it difficult to maintain the breadth of reference which is made 
possible by the assumption of a universal phenomenon, where contexts of use are 
considered relatively unimportant. There is also, however, a more particular reason why 
I have chosen the examples I have. They are examples which I have found to best 
illustrate the existence within cultural studies of an alternative strand to rationalist 
concepts of power. If my argument about the 'geo-intellectual' dimension is accepted, it 
is no accident that they come from Britain and Australia. These are the two sites within 
the present international distribution of cultural studies, in which tendencies to 
rationalism are perhaps least deeply rooted within a broader political culture. It is only 
really in the post-war period, then most specifically since the late 1960s, that they have 
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been significantly exposed to the intellectual currents which have since become so 
influential. 
The United States has a more complicated intellectual history which would need to be 
examined in more detail than is possible here. While developing from an 'Anglo' base 
and with its own 'indigenous' traditions of scepticism, it has also been strongly formed 
by other influences. American intellectual life was profoundly affected by the exodus of 
European intellectuals to the United States in the period between the two world wars. In 
contrast to the British and Australian cases, cultural studies in America has always had 
to define itself against a well-developed theoretical sociology. The revolutionary 
dynamism of American capitalism has also proved particularly hospitable to what 
Williams called 'modernist abstractions'. It appears as no accident in this context, that 
Hall's reservations about recent tendencies in the use of the concept of power should be 
directed specifically at American cultural studies. In this context, the latter is present in 
the dissertation despite its absence. I take a deliberate detour away from the present 
definition of cultural studies in order to return to it with the possibility of alternative 
definitions. 
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Why I am not a Foucauldian 
On the Peculiarities of the French 
For most of the students of our generation - the one that began its course of 
studies in the 1960s - the ideals of the Enlightenment could not but be a bad 
joke, a somber mystification. That, anyhow, was what was taught to us. The 
master thinkers in those days were called Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Althusser, Lacan. Merleau-Ponty, the humanist, was old hat, and most of us no 
longer read Sartre. From the rue d'Ulm to the College de France we discovered 
the philosophers of suspicion: Marx, Freud, and Heidegger of course, but, 
above all, Nietzsche, the inventor of the 'genealogy' in the name of which we 
had to treat every discourse as a symptom. 
Retrospective illusion or ruse of history? Those who intended to be the heirs of 
this 'philosophy with a hammer' with which Nietzsche wanted to smash the 
idols of metaphysics now look like the last creators of a philosophical tradition 
that has come to its exhaustion. This has become increasingly obvious to our 
generation (Ferry and Renaut 1997: vii). 
The above passage by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut from the introduction to their 
collection Why We Are Not Nietzscheans- first published in French in 1991 -might be 
placed ironically beside Michel Foucault' s preface, twenty years earlier, to Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari 's Anti-Oedipus: 
During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a certain way 
of thinking correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the 
intellectual. One had to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one's dreams 
stray too far from Freud. And one had to treat sign-systems - the signifier -
with the greatest respect. These were the three requirements that made the 
strange occupation of writing and speaking a measure of truth about oneself and 
one's time acceptable. (Foucault 1983: xi) 
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From the perspective of English-language cultural criticism, both passages are 
unsettling, for the periodisation they suggest is out of phase with experience. In Britain, 
North America and Australia, it was only from around 1965 that the 'way of writing and 
speaking a measure of truth about oneself and one's time' which Foucault represents as 
the then established orthodoxy first began to be explored. Similarly, those in the 
English-speaking world who, like Ferry and Renaut, began their studies in the 1960s 
could not have encountered Foucault himself as an established 'master thinker', as his 
work was barely known. It is only again twenty years later, as this generation has taken 
up senior academic positions, that Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and Lacan could appear 
as having acquired a certain canonical status (Althusser being the only figure whose 
'French' and 'English' fortunes have coincided to some extent). Even in the 1990s, they 
could still appear in English-language debates as 'new', being juxtaposed with an older 
order with allegiances still to structuralism, Marxism and various liberationist political 
rhetorics associated with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Some familiar stereotypes might be called up at this point in order to suggest 
conclusions. In the way that the opposition of Francophile and the Anglophile has often 
been used to organise polemics in cultural criticism, the 'lag' in English-language 
debates relative to the French could be taken to illustrate the superiority of one or other 
side. The diagnosis by Ferry and Renaut of a recent shift in the fortunes of theory might 
be taken, for example, as evidence of the relative intellectual 'backwardness' of Anglo-
derived political cultures, what Stuart Hall once described as the 'discipleship through 
which British intellectuals reproduce today their dependency on yesterday's French 
ideas' (Hall 1996b: 47). 
The argument, in relation to the present, might then run as follows: Having, after 
twenty years, absorbed the implications of the shift in thought indicated by Foucault in 
32 
Why I am not a F oucauldian 
1972, English-language criticism has failed to recognise that the new concepts and 
approaches introduced by this shift have now also been superseded. While authorial 
positions, teaching programs and publishing industries are still consolidating around the 
figures particularly of Foucault and Deleuze, the debates within which their work 
emerged have meanwhile moved elsewhere. A story might be told, in short, about the 
need for further theoretical exertions and a renewed attention to developments in 
European philosophy. 
Alternatively, one might side the other way, citing the apparently relentless turnover of 
theory as evidence of an unfortunate tendency of the French towards a modish avant-
gardism, a tendency which reveals English-language criticism as more solid and 
dependable. The practical implications of such an assessment would vary according to 
which point in the change of Parisian fashions one decided to stay with last season's 
wardrobe. The recent work of Tony Bennett is, perhaps, a good example of an attempt 
to define a position at the 'near' end of the spectrum - promoting a carefully-tailored 
Foucauldianism as a kind of 'contemporary classic'. While Bennett's arguments call 
most explicitly for a commitment to institutional engagement, they are also clearly 
calculated to hold the line against further revolutions in theory. Incoming fashions seem 
to him unattractive and poorly-made; all we can hope for is 'perhaps a few more years 
of heady skirmishing with postmodernism before it goes out of style or a little more 
sleuth-like searching for subversive practices just where you'd least expect to find 
them' (Bennett 1992a: 32). It seems best to accept a cut which, while showing a certain 
sophistication, promises to wear indefinitely. 
·The sartorial metaphor is difficult to resist. Somewhere towards the middle of the same 
spectrum we might locate Stuart Hall, never fully won over from 'genuine classic' and 
showing that it can still be worn with style. Further still towards the end of fashion-
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scepticism would be those who have begun to wonder whether it might have been better 
to stay all along in home-spun tweed. In a recent review of the history of cultural 
studies, James Carey goes so far as to describe the encounter with Foucault as 'a 
particular misfortune': 'While Foucault's historical work contained some extraordinary 
and extraordinarily useful scholarship, the framework within which it was encased was 
a bad prescription for democratic politics' (Carey 1997: 18). But for Carey, the problem 
can be traced to an earlier moment still, in the adoption of structuralist Marxism and the 
embrace of Althusser. It is time, he suggests, to reject the prejudice according to which 
the early, 'pre-theoretical' versions of British cultural studies can easily be dismissed as 
a naive Anglo provincialism: 'The strength of cultural studies in [Raymond] Williams's 
hands, and the same applies to [Richard] Haggart and [E.P.] Thompson, was precisely 
its ethnocentrism. Intellectual work ... is always and everywhere decisively touched and 
shaped by the national formation (and the sub-formations of class, race, gender, etc,) 
within which it is produced' (16). The seductions of the Parisian boutiques - past or 
present - are ones we should resist. 
But while distinctions between the French and the English can invoke a rich tradition of 
colourful caricature, the present situation calls for something rather more complex. The 
recent generational shift suggested by Ferry and Renaut is not, in fact, the same in kind 
as the earlier shift suggested by Foucault. Foucault articulates his generational 
experience in critical relation to an established order of truth: 'a certain way of thinking 
correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the individual ... that 
made ... writing and speaking a measure of truth about oneself and one's time 
acceptable'. In elaborating an alternative, and in commending the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, he does, admittedly, give a novel twist to the terms 'theory' and 'philosophy': 
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It would be a mistake to read Anti-Oedipus as the new theoretical reference 
(you know, that much-heralded theory that finally encompasses everything, that 
finally totalizes and reassures, the one we are told we 'need so badly' in our age 
of dispersion and specialization where 'hope' is lacking). One must not look for 
a 'philosophy' amid the extraordinary profusion of new notions and surprise 
concepts (Foucault 1983: xii). 
The criticism of established truths is not be taken as a preliminary to their substitution 
with other truths. 'Theory' - claiming a comprehensiveness and finality - is to be 
replaced with 'theorising', and 'philosophy' with a more active and ongoing 
'philosophising'. 
Nevertheless, the critical moment of this intellectual ensemble is very well-formed and 
its procedures precisely defined. There are, according to Foucault, 'three adversaries' 
confronted in Anti-Oedipus: 
1. The political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who 
would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse. Bureaucrats of 
the revolution and civil servants of Truth. 
2. The poor technicians of desire - psychoanalysis and semiologists of every 
sign and symptom - who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the 
twofold law of structure and lack. 
3. Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary of fascism ... 
And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini ... but also 
the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism 
that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and 
exploits us (Foucault 1983: xii-xiii). 
Despite the 'playfulness' of Deleuze and Guattari' s arguments, we should not forget, 
Foucault argues, 'that something essential is taking place, something of extreme 
seriousness: the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that 
surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our 
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everyday lives.' (xiv) It is the gravity of this project and the force of critical intellect 
with which it is pursued which makes Deleuze and Guattari's work impressive, as it 
does Foucault's own writing, giving them both their particular aura and prestige. 
It is not difficult to see from this why the articulation of generational difference by 
Ferry and Renaut cannot take the same form. They are, quite simply, faced with no clear 
order of truth which might be subjected to critical scrutiny. Some relation must be 
defined, on the contrary, to an insistent problematisation of truth as such. The profile of 
the leading figures of the previous generation renders 'critique' impossible, condemning 
it always to find its arguments already anticipated in the object of criticism. The 
difficulty is similar to the one which Andre Comte-Sponville identifies in attempting to 
find a point on which to develop a critique of Nietzsche: 
Whatever the position you wish to criticize, the first Nietzschean around ... will 
always be able to object that Nietzsche said exactly the contrary - and the worst 
is that the Nietzschean will be right almost all of the time: not that you credited 
Nietzsche with a position that wasn't his, but that he always, or almost always, 
also defended the opposite argument ... Nietzsche makes the position of 
whoever would [criticize him] in his stead or after him most uncomfortable! 
(Comte-Sponville 1997: 22) 
It is no doubt too simple to identify post-1968 French philosophy simply with 
Nietzscheanism. Nietzsche has not been the only 'external' inspiration, and there has 
also been an extraordinary 'internal' inventiveness. There are, however, similarities in 
the predicament facing any attempt to articulate differences in the form of systematic 
criticism. The problem consistently encountered by those who have tried is the counter-
criticism that they have 'failed to understand' the sophistication and complexity of the 
positions being criticised - a charge, as in the case of Nietzsche, which is often quite 
justified. 
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Articulating a certain generational frustration, Comte-Sponville speculates that we may 
therefore need to 'give up debate and contend- whether out of submission or lassitude, 
fascination or rejection - that Nietzsche makes the examination of reasons impossible or 
obsolete, that we have to take him as a whole or not at all and that we are always wrong 
to argue with geniuses' (Comte-Sponville 1997: 22). But as Ferry and Renaut's 
collection demonstrates, and Comte-Sponville himself argues, such a conclusion does 
not necessarily follow. The situation simply means that debate must adopt a different 
objective and style. The attempt to explain 'why we are not Nietzscheans' is not the 
same as an attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche or Nietzscheans are wrong or their 
arguments misconceived. The exercise is frankly personalised, explicitly aware of 
reasoning only from a particular base of experience - a felt sense, in the specific case, 
that a tradition for which one is expected to show enthusiasm is somehow 'exhausted'. 
It does not aim to compel assent from those who hold different intellectual 
commitments, to demonstrate to Nietzscheans the 'error of their ways'; only to achieve 
a recognition of why those commitments may not be shared. The stakes involved in 
discussion are reduced rather than raised, making possible an approach which is more 
open, reflective and interrogative. While unable to claim the 'extreme seriousness' 
which Foucault identifies in Deleuze and Guattari, it is an approach which is able to 
venture out less heavily armed. 
My aim in the present chapter is to attempt to explain, in the spirit of Ferry and Renaut, 
why I am not a Foucauldian. This is not to proclaim myself an anti-Foucauldian; it is 
rather 'to think with Foucault against Foucault'. Among the paradoxes of articulating 
any relation to Foucault, it would be possible, in fact, to claim such a project as the only 
'true' Foucauldianism. Foucault, during his lifetime, frequently expressed distaste for 
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the idea of an intellectual 'following' and for reasons which clearly went beyond mere 
personal modesty. As he wrote towards the end of his life: 
What is philosophy today if it does not consist not in legitimating what one 
already knows but in undertaking to know how and to what extent it might be 
possible to think differently? (Foucault 1986: 8-9) 
In so far as Foucault's own work now belongs to the body of the 'known', we should, 
on this advice, undertake to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think 
differently than he himself did. We should seek to understand the 'Foucault effect' to 
identify what it is in the discourses of a particular historical moment which has made his 
arguments seem compelling. And in locating this effect, we should work to develop 
strategies for escaping its gravitational field. 1 
It may seem from this that I have simply opted for fashion over durability, taking my 
lead, in a well-established tradition, from new directions in European philosophy. But 
again, the cross-generational analogies do not hold. Foucault along with the other 
'master thinkers' of his generation represents, in many ways, the logical terminus of a 
particular trajectory in post-war French philosophy (a terminus which Ferry and Renaut 
identify in shorthand as 'Nietzschean'). To depart from Foucault is not therefore to 
extend the trajectory, but rather to jump outside it, to reflect upon it from elsewhere. For 
those who have dedicated themselves to exploring the labyrinth of European 
· philosophy, such a feat may appear implausible, requiring evidence of an insight which 
somehow transcends more than forty years of highly creative, varied and rigorous 
intellectual development. My claim is not, however, to an unforeseen stroke of 
1 The term 'Foucault effect' has been quite widely used (see, for example, the titles of Burchell, Gordon 
et al. 1991; and Bennett 1998: Chapter 3). Curiously, however, the 'Foucauldian' implication is not 
drawn. Where Foucault uses the idea of 'truth effects', it is almost always associated with a suggestion 
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theoretical genius; it is rather that the resources for 'thinking differently' can be found 
in an alternative intellectual tradition which has been maturing for a similar length of 
time: the tradition, that is, of cultural studies. 
PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL STUDIES: DIALOGUE MECHANISMS IN THE SEMIOSPHERE 
In Universe of the Mind, Yuri Lotman proposes a theory of cross-cultural 
communication which can be used to clarify this suggestion and lend it perhaps some 
initial plausibility. According to Lotman, cultures pass through alternate periods of 
'reception' and 'transmission'. It appears at times that particular structures - which may 
range from genres to national cultures - go into decline, becoming inert, reactive or 
unoriginal. But for Lotman, such periods are better thought of as 'pauses in dialogue' 
during which the structure absorbs cultural inputs from outside. An example is Italy 
from the fall of Rome to the Renaissance: 
For a certain period [particularly the eleventh and twelfth centuries] Italy 
became a 'text-receiver'. It 'received' the lyric poetry of the Proven~al 
troubadours, together with the fashion for courtly behaviour and the Proven~al 
language ... Other cultural currents swept it as well: epic poetry from France, 
Hispano-Arab culture from Sicily ... Finally the influence of the classical 'soil' 
which though it had died down had never ceased altogether was felt once more 
(Lotman 1990: 145). 
Having passed through such a period, the receiving structure reaches a point of 
saturation, the language of the transmitting structure is mastered and its texts adapted. 
When saturation reaches a certain limit, 'the receiving structure sets in motion internal 
mechanisms of text-production. Its passive state changes to a state of alertness and it 
begins rapidly to produce new texts, bombarding other structures with them, including 
that we distance ourselves from the 'effect' being observed. Both Burchell et al and Bennett look to 
Foucault, by contrast, for positive theoretical inspiration or support. 
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the structure that "provoked" it.' (145) The reversal is often spectacular. In the Italian 
case, for example: 
The result was ... a burst of cultural activity unheard of in the history of world 
civilization. Over the next centuries Italy became like a volcano spewing out a 
great diversity of texts which flooded the cultural oikumene of the West 
(Lotman 1990: 145). 
When the direction of flow is clearly set, the transmitting culture becomes defined as a 
'centre' and those who receive its texts 'peripheries'. In the initial phase, incoming texts 
in the receiving culture tend to be regarded as 'true, beautiful, of divine origin etc.' 
'Already existing texts in "one's own" language are correspondingly valued lowly, 
being classed as untrue, "coarse", "uncultured'"(l46). A strong opposition forms, 
leaving little option but to declare oneself 'for' or 'against' the values articulated at the 
centre. As the relationship matures, however, there is an increasing loss of 
differentiation as the 'imported' texts and the 'home' culture restructure each other. 
When the imported texts are entirely dissolved in the receiving culture, 'the culture 
itself changes to a state of activity and begins rapidly to produce new texts': 'these new 
texts are based on cultural codes which in the distant past were stimulated by invasions 
from outside, but which now have been wholly transformed through the many 
asymmetrical transformations into a new and original structural model' (147). At this 
point, the receiving culture, which now becomes the general centre of the semiosphere, 
'changes into a transmitting culture and issues forth a flood of texts directed to other, 
peripheral areas of the semiosphere' (147). 
In terms of Lotman's model, the present state of cultural criticism might be described as 
a confusion of currents at a change of tide, where the high point of a surge in one 
direction is already being met by a counterflow. For the past forty years, English-
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language criticism has exhibited the classic characteristics of a 'receiving structure', 
progressing through each of the early phases which Lotman identifies. The 
corresponding 'transmitting structure' has been a complex of European linguistics, 
philosophy and aesthetics, particularly as mediated through Paris - a body of texts 
which became popularly identified in the 1980s by the simple collective term 'French 
theory'. 
Perhaps the exemplary statement, in the initial phase, of the 'coarseness' of 'existing 
texts in "one's own" language' is Perry Anderson's landmark essay 'The Origins of the 
Present Crisis', first published in 1964. Surveying the scene of English intellectual life 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, Anderson could see only a 'miasma of commonplace 
prejudices and taboos'; a poverty of ideas which he traced to the fact that Britain had 
failed to make an unambiguous transition to modernity (Anderson 1964: 40). In the 
absence of major traumatic experiences such as revolution or invasion, it had retained a 
"'feudal" hierarchy of orders and ranks, distinguished by a multiplicity of trivial but 
ceremonial insignia - accent, vocabulary, diet, dress, recreation etc.' (39). The result 
was that English political and intellectual culture was fundamentally flawed: 
Traditionalism and empiricism ... fuse as a single legitimating system: 
traditionalism sanctions the present by deriving it from the past, empiricism 
shackles the future by riveting it to the present. A comprehensive, coagulated 
conservatism is the result, covering the whole of society with a thick pall of 
simultaneous philistinism (towards ideas) and mystagogy (towards institutions) 
for which England has justly won an international reputation (Anderson 1964: 
40). 
Such gross limitations could only be overcome, for Anderson, by a wholesale rejection 
of English intellectual traditions and an effort to appropriate 'a wider cultural universe' 
(Anderson 1980: 149). As editor of the influential New Left Review he set out 
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determinedly to import the resources of European political philosophy, particularly 
those of 'Western Marxism' .2 It was through the journal, in conjunction with its 
publishing arm, New Left Books, that the work of theorists such as Althusser, Gramsci, 
Sartre, Lukacs and Poulantzas were first given widespread exposure to an English-
language readership. 
Even those who sought to resist the tide of European theory were forced to recognise its 
overwhelming intellectual force. The very trenchancy, for example, of E.P. Thompson's 
attack on Althusserianism in The Poverty of Theory clearly betrays a consciousness of 
defending an embattled position. Thompson's mock deference to Althusser does not 
conceal a real insecurity in what he called his 'theoretical line of supply': 
I commence my argument at a manifest disadvantage. Few spectacles would be 
more ludicrous than that of an English historian - and, moreover, one 
manifestly self-incriminated of empirical practices - attempting to offer 
epistemological correction to a rigorous Parisian philosopher ... I can sense, as 
I stare at the paper before me, the shadowy faces of an expectant audience, 
scarcely able to conceal their rising mirth (Thompson 1978: 197). 
The famous polemic between Anderson and Thompson over the 'peculiarities of the 
English' could be read as exemplary of the initial phase of Lotman's cycle ofreception, 
where positions are polarised 'for' or 'against' the incoming cultural influence. 
In the subsequent history of the encounter with 'theory', the status of imported texts has 
become increasingly normalised; earlier antagonisms have come at most to simmer 
beneath the surface of debate, rarely being defined as an issue in themselves. But 
throughout the process of negotiation and accommodation, the structural asymmetry in 
2 Dennis Dworkin has argued that 'Western Marxism' is, in fact, a construction which only makes sense 
within this conjuncture: '[I]t was precisely because Anderson was not within Western Marxism, because 
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the relative status of European theory and the local resources of English-language 
criticism has largely been retained. It is reproduced, for example, by Graeme Turner in 
what is often cited as the most comprehensive and authoritative introduction to British 
cultural studies: 
The distinctiveness and usefulness of the British tradition of cultural studies ... 
could be said to lie in its relatively accessible applications of European 
theoretical models to specific cultural formations (Turner 1996: 4 ). 
Turner does, admittedly, stress that cultural studies is unique in 'the emphasis it has 
given to "concrete" or applied studies' (4), but the opposition between 'European 
theoretical models' and their British 'application' attributes the former with a clear 
priority. The point is significant not because of any unusual emphasis, but because it is 
so unexceptional. As 'An Introduction', Turner's book is clearly addressing readers who 
are new to the field, merely stating in an accessible way what is generally understood: 
as an English-language tradition, cultural studies is derivative, borrowing its intellectual 
resources from elsewhere. 
I do not wish to suggest that there is any inevitability that the direction of intellectual 
exchange will be reversed, that we might confidently predict that European philosophy 
is soon to be inundated by a renaissance in English-language criticism. As Lotman 
warns, his schematic outline of the cycle of transmission and reception may not be fully 
realised: 
It anyway demands favourable historical, social and psychological conditions. 
The process of 'infection' needs certain external conditions to bring it about 
and needs to be felt to be necessary and desirable. As with any dialogue a 
he read these thinkers at virtually the same time, and because he thought about them as an alternative to 
an impoverished English tradition that he represented them as a tradition' (Dworkin 1997: 138). 
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situation of mutual attraction must precede the actual contact (Lotman 1990: 
147). 
The point remains, however, that reception is an active process which always creates a 
potential for a reversal of the positions in dialogue to occur. No culture is ever simply 
derivative of another whose texts it imports. A process of translation must occur- in 
more than a literal sense - producing texts whose meanings are significantly displaced 
from the context of transmission. While this is often seen as an unfortunate 'corruption' 
of the values associated with the transmitting structure (giving rise, for example, to 
regrets about the lost subtleties of French texts in English translation) , it also provides 
the basis for a renewal of dialogue; the resources for a new opening when the creative 
potential of the transmitting structure has exhausted itself. 
As a general proposition, the argument is not an exceptional one. The cultural activity 
involved in reception is widely accepted in ethnographies of cross-cultural exchange 
and is also well-established in media audience studies. But it is not often applied in 
thinking about cultural criticism itself. English-language critics are frequently discussed 
as if they were lesser versions of one or other of the major figures of European 
philosophy: Descartes, Rousseau, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Habermas ... Such identifications allow a certain 
predictable management of debate which neglects the extent to which the positions 
being discussed may not be owed to any of these figures - or even to philosophy at all. 
To make this point is not to deny the importance or value of arguments within 
philosophy; it is merely to suggest that there are other styles of thinking about culture 
and politics which an insistence on 'high theoretical' references may prevent us from 
seeing. In over-valuing the cultural importance of transmission, the specificity of the 
receiving structure (in this case cultural studies) is systematically ignored. 
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DIALOGIC INITIATIVE AND THE CONCEPT OF POWER 
That there is such a specificity will be argued in some detail in following chapters, 
through a study of the way cultural studies has used the concept of power. I will also 
make clearer what I mean by a 'counterflow' to European theoretical perspectives. The 
remainder of this chapter is, however, more preparatory. As Lotman suggests, a 
precondition for dialogue is that there be a 'situation of mutual attraction'. The mere 
generation of new knowledge or information is not sufficient for significant exchange. 
There must first be an interest to provide the initial impulse, to overcome occasional 
failures of connection and to sustain attention to detail. Or as John Hartley (1996) has 
argued, the development of knowledge cannot be reduced simply to the discovery of 
information or production of new ideas (however original or creative they may be); it 
must always also involve the gathering of readerships to a proposition or field. This 
may seem to venture too far in the direction of the sociology of knowledge, giving an 
inappropriate emphasis to the 'extrinsic' fate of an argument over its 'intrinsic' value, 
but the principle operates even in the most formal academic contexts: It is not enough in 
claims to the development of knowledge to show that something can be done; it must 
also be demonstrated that there are reasons for believing that it is worth doing. 
As I will argue in following chapters, the 'switch' which has set up a mutual attraction 
between English-language criticism and European theory has been the intellectual 
leverage which the latter appears to have over the concept of power. At almost every 
stage, the introduction of 'theory' has been associated with greater authority in the use 
of the concept. And at almost every stage, the inadequacy of the local resources of 
. English-language criticism has been associated with a corresponding lack of authority. 
The fate of European theory within English-language criticism has, in short, been 
inextricably bound up with the fate of the concept of power. So long as this equation 
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holds (and assuming that power continues to be regarded as an important if not 
fundamental concept in debates about contemporary culture), then it will remain 
difficult to generate substantial interest in the subject I have indicated I wish to 
consider: the differences of English-language criticism from the theoretical perspectives 
it imports. Such differences will continue to be regarded as merely a 'corruption' - or at 
best a worthy 'application' - of more authoritative positions to be found elsewhere. My 
aim in what follows is therefore to demonstrate that there is at least a plausibility that 
the switch might be thrown the other way; that a certain authority in the use of the 
concept of power might be developed from within distinctively 'English' intellectual 
traditions. 
My approach in doing so is to stage a dialogue between Michel Foucault and the 
English political philosopher Michael Oakeshott. The dialogue is intended as a kind of 
'probe' disclosing some of the implications of reconstructing an 'English' approach to 
thinking about power which is not derivative of post-war European philosophy. Taking 
the arguments of Oakeshott and Foucault as elaborated statements of potentials existing 
within each tradition, I suggest: 
• firstly, that there is a distinctive 'English' way of thinking about power- one that is 
not anticipated in debates within European-derived theory, and which those debates 
cannot easily be modified to accommodate;3 
3 I acknowledge a certain blurring here between European philosophy (a term which would cover a 
complex and diverse history of debates not only in France but also in Germany, Italy, Spain and other 
countries) and European-derived 'theory' as it has circulated within English-language cultural studies. It 
should be made clear that I am not intending to characterise the whole of European political thought - a 
project which would be absurdly reductive - but only those concepts and emphases (marked particularly 
as 'French') which have been seen as covering a 'lack' in Anglo-derived intellectual culture. Even in 
focussing on Foucault, I am considering his work only in its significance within English-language debates 
around power. 
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• secondly, that this way of thinking is capable of generating well-developed patterns 
of response to the cultural and political problems of modernity (or postmodernity), 
patterns which differ significantly from those associated with European-derived 
theoretical positions; and 
• thirdly, that such patterns suggest an alternative perspective from which to address 
what Foucault identifies as 'the problem of power', the problem which has provided 
the motivating impulse for a significant strand of post-war European thought on the 
relation between politics and culture. 
In terms of the overall argument of this chapter, the third of these aims is perhaps the 
most important. The sense in which I am not anti-Foucauldian is that I wish to take 
seriously the motivations of Foucault' s arguments while suggesting that they might be 
responded to in quite a different way. 
The choice of Foucault as the figure on one side of this dialogue requires little 
justification. He is, without doubt, the pre-eminent theorist of power within post-war 
European philosophy and political thought. The significance of his work in this context 
is threefold: Firstly, he has sharply characterised the use of the concept in earlier 
theoretical positions, exposing this use to an unprecedented clarity of focus. Secondly, 
he has developed a sustained critique of the established usage on the basis of clearly 
articulated ethical commitments. And thirdly, he has presented an alternative conception 
which appears to overcome the problems he identifies in the established usage, 
developing its implications in considerable detail. In all three areas, his arguments have 
been highly influential, largely defining the horizon of thought in the way power is 
conceptualised at the theoretical level. 
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The choice of Oakeshott requires more explanation. If discussions of power in cultural 
studies are saturated with references to Foucault, he is by contrast almost unknown. 
This absence is closely related to the history which I have briefly sketched above: 
Oakeshott is one of the thinkers rejected by Anderson in 1964 as most clearly 
exemplifying the bankruptcy of English political thinking - a bankruptcy revealed at its 
most acute on the question of power. In the development, over the next thirty years, of 
what has become cultural studies, the two have only further diverged. In apparent 
confirmation of Anderson's good judgement, Oakeshott's ideas have circulated mostly 
in conservative politics. He is sometimes cited in similar contexts to free market 
individualists such as Friedrich von Hayek and has occasionally been claimed as an 
intellectual ally by the British Conservative Party (Grant 1990). It is difficult to imagine 
associations which cultural studies has held in greater suspicion, or which are more 
remote from the kinds of politics generally associated with Foucault. The case 
exemplifies a marked tendency for 'English' and 'European' styles of political thinking 
to become identified with 'right' and 'left' respectively. 
To the limited extent that Oakeshott has figured positively in contexts closer to cultural 
studies, it has not been in connection with the concept of power. In The Return of the 
Political, Chantal Mouffe makes use of some of his arguments in developing the 
program of radical democracy advanced in earlier work in collaboration with Ernesto 
Laclau. Mouffe is particularly interested in his distinction between two modes of 
political association: universitas, which involves 'an engagement in an enterprise to 
pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest'; and societas 
(or 'civil association'), which implies no common purpose or interest but designates a 
'formal relationship in terms of rules' (Mouffe 1993: 66). She argues that societas (the 
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mode which Oakeshott himself prefers) is the sort of concept required for an affirmative 
understanding of modem democratic regimes: 
Indeed it is a mode of human association that recognizes the disappearance of a 
single substantive idea of the common good and makes room for individual 
liberty. It is a form of association that can be enjoyed among relative strangers 
belonging to many purposive associations and whose allegiances to specific 
communities are not seen as conflicting with their membership of the civil 
association (Mouffe 1993: 67). 
Having found this much of value, however, Mouffe turns to distance herself from 
Oakeshott precisely on the question of power. 'What is completely lacking in 
Oakeshott', she argues, 'is division and antagonism' (68-9). The idea of societas can be 
appropriated for democratic politics only on condition that this lack is overcome: 
To introduce conflict and antagonism into Oakeshott's model it is necessary to 
recognize that the respublica [formation based on societas] is the product of a 
given hegemony, the expression of power relations, and that it can be 
challenged ... Antagonistic forces will never disappear and politics is 
characterized by conflict and division (Mouffe 1993: 69). 
While I agree with Mouffe that a democratic potential can be extracted from Oakeshott, 
my argument below would suggest that this potential can be found not despite but 
because of the way he thinks about power. In affirming, as a matter of commitment, that 
conflict and antagonism are the fundamental basis of politics, Mouffe does not 
complement the idea of societas but on the contrary compromises it. In her mode of 
address, she assumes an association with her readers which is closer to universitas. 'The 
left', as she conceives it, is a political association with a 'common substantive purpose'. 
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It is defined by a 'common interest' in political struggle: to insist on the primary reality 
of power relations, against the mystifications of conservative hegemony .4 
This is, however, to anticipate my argument. My purpose in introducing Oakeshott is 
not, at this point, to raise these larger issues, but merely to establish that he represents a 
distinctive way of thinking about politics and culture in modernity. There are several 
reasons for choosing him, in particular, to represent an 'English' style of political 
thought. He offers, firstly, a highly-developed exposition of this style, advocating 
explicitly on its behalf. This is unusual. From Samuel Johnson to Raymond Williams, 
the English tradition in political thinking has been a tradition of letters much more than 
of philosophy. Oakeshott himself was more comfortable as an essayist than as a 
systematic political 'theorist'. The work from which I wish to draw particularly, The 
Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, was not published during his lifetime 
despite the fact that he developed it to the point of a highly-polished manuscript. His 
editor, Timothy Fuller, suggests that he may have regarded the work as an attempt at 
self-clarification, abstracting themes from published work where he had not developed 
them so explicitly. But if it is not the work on which he may have wished to be 
assessed, it provides an unusual clarity of insight into a certain way of thinking about 
politics. 
Secondly, Oakeshott suggests the possibility of a more sophisticated understanding of 
the dialogic positions which I have so far been identifying as 'European' and 'English'. 
His terms 'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism' cannot simply be 
mapped onto national, linguistic or geographic categories, but they do stand in some 
4 There is a certain irony in this, as Mouffe adopts the principle of the fundamental adversarialism of 
politics from another conservative thinker, Carl Schmidt. Schmidt's arguments are useful, she suggests, in 
50 
Why I am not a Foucauldian 
definite relation. Actual political formations are never, for Oakeshott, pure examples 
either of 'faith' or 'scepticism'; they are always complex hybrids. There are, however, 
tendencies in some formations towards one or other extreme. England (as an actual 
polity) has been weighted historically towards the politics of scepticism: 
England has been peculiarly the home of this style of government; and in 
English political literature there are examples of a revealing kind of writing in 
support of this style of politics which are not easily to be found elsewhere -
writing which touches, but lightly, upon principle but which is alive in every 
line with the idiom of scepticism (Oakeshott 1996: 80-81 ). 
This does not mean that scepticism cannot also be found elsewhere or that there are not 
English writers who have tended more towards the politics of faith: Oakeshott cites 
Machiavelli as an early example of sceptical inclinations and Francis Bacon of 
tendencies towards faith. In attempting to strengthen the case for scepticism, he is far 
from a nationalist or xenophobe, recognising precedents in Spinoza, Pascal, 
Montesquieu, Montaigne and Hegel as much as in Hobbes, Hume, Burke, Paine, 
Bentham, Coleridge, Calhoun and Macaulay.5 
The importance of this point for my argument cannot be overstated. Since the debates of 
the 1960s over the 'peculiarities of the English', the single greatest obstacle to a 
consideration of the differences between English-language criticism and European 
demolishing the pretensions of universalist humanism. He counters the latter by arguing that all forms of 
political association imply an 'enemy' . 
5 As Oakeshott himself admits, this appears from most perspectives an ill-assorted gallery. The 
eclecticism merely illustrates, however, that 'faith' and 'scepticism' do not correspond to recognised 
political positions so much as the style in which those positions are articulated. A tendency towards one 
or the other cannot be taken to predict, in any situation, which party someone will belong to. In making 
use of Oakeshott, I want to extend the point by suggesting that the meaning of such terms as 'left' and 
'right' are articulated differently in political cultures tending towards scepticism than in cultures tending 
'towards faith. That a spokesman for the slave-holding South in the American Civil War (John Calhoun) 
can appear as a 'sceptic' does not, therefore, entail that sceptical tendencies in others place them in his 
company. The ambiguation of political positions at Oakeshott's 'metapolitical' level corresponds to a 
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theoretical perspectives has been the way 'Englishness' has been ethnicised or 
personalised. In the absence of any clear identification of the specific character of 
English intellectual culture, the latter has come to be associated with eccentricities of 
nation or, in a more alarming way, with race. A defining moment in this history - a 
moment which I will visit again in the following chapter - is the point where Richard 
Hoggart and Raymond Williams could be associated by a writer as sophisticated as Paul 
Gilroy with the racist exclusionism of Enoch Powell (Gilroy 1987: 49). Even where 
assessments of the early 'pre-theoretical' work in cultural studies have been more 
charitable, they have tended to emphasise the personal or 'folk' qualities of its 
exponents rather than what it is they actually said.6 The effect of this has only been to 
increase suspicions of ad hominem prejudices. Having degenerated to a stand-off 
between high accusations and poorly-articulated intuitions, the debate has reached a 
stalemate and has largely been abandoned. 
Oakeshott's perspective allows the blockage to be removed. A sceptical 'English' style 
of thought has no more necessary relation to person, race or nation than any other. It is 
not grounded in an essence but is always, in Lotman' s terms, a translation of other 
styles of thought. Recognition of this makes it possible to revisit the 'peculiarities of the 
English' without having to opt for one or other side of a tired debate. E.P. Thompson 
clearly had a point in his exasperation at the importers of 'theory' for representing 
England as if, before their heroic arrival, it had been hermetically sealed off from the 
world: 
similar ambiguation in European philosophy in debates around the relation to fascism of Nietzsche and 
• Heidegger. 
6 As Tony Bennett points out, good examples of this phenomenon were provided by Williams' obituaries, 
which tended to emphasise a set of 'quasi-personalised attributes' (1998: 53-54). For a sample, see 
Garnham (1988), Hall (1988) and Bennett's (1989) own contribution. 
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Here is an island, and there, across a few wet miles, are Other Countries. Those 
waters have, on occasion, been crossed. That city, London, is not in the 
Antarctic but has been, alongside Paris, Vienna and Prague, a great European 
capital. In its East End there have been deposit after deposit of refugee and 
immigrant workers. In the universities there have been deposit after deposit of 
emigre intellectuals. Across that water there came, in the 1930s, wave after 
wave of refugees from Fascism; across that water there went, in the early 
1940s, wave after wave of troops to assist in the liberation of Southern and 
Western Europe; and across that water there came, in the later 1940s and 1950s, 
a further wave of refugees from Eastern Europe (Thompson 1978: 74-75). 
To agree with this does not mean, however, that consistent differences cannot be 
observed. Perry Anderson was also correct, for example, in pointing out the tendency 
for the 'emigre intellectuals' - from Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein to Isaiah 
Berlin, Ernst Gombrich and Lewis Namier - to adapt themselves to English idioms, 
reinforcing rather than displacing the characteristics of the national culture: 'Traditional 
British culture has an elective affinity with certain types of expatriates and not others. It 
promotes what is attuned to its own inherited nature, and suppresses what is dissonant 
with it' (Anderson 1968: 38). 'Englishness' as an intellectual style can be treated in a 
way which is taken for granted in European philosophy: its 'peculiarities' can be 
distinguished from the origins of those who have owned or disowned it. 
FOUCAULDIAN FAITH 
While I have not yet indicated how Oakeshott defines his terms, it may already appear 
strange that I am opening up a comparison with Foucault on the point of 'scepticism'. In 
a simple, unspecified sense of the term, Foucault himself is generally taken to be a 
profoundly sceptical thinker; one whose very reputation rests on having taken the 
ground from under such concepts as 'the author', 'sex', 'the Enlightenment' and 'man'. 
There is no doubt, in the context in which he wrote, that his arguments were largely 
designed to undermine certainties. This context was, however, of a very particular kind. 
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Foucault belonged to a time and an intellectual culture characterised by an extraordinary 
willingness to entertain abstract schemes of political action, schemes which proposed 
uncompromising and sweeping changes not only as desirable but as 'necessary' or 
'correct'. However much he may have dissented from such schemes (and I have no wish 
to question that he did), the context leaves clear traces in his positions and concepts if 
not his whole style of thought. 
The most immediate way of gaining a sense of this is to consider the kinds of positions 
Foucault was debating. A good example is an argument of one of his interlocutors in 
'On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists', an interview on the subject of justice 
in a revolutionary society: 
Let us suppose that it is desirable that the middle bourgeoisie be rallied to the 
cause of the revolution, that it is said only the very small handful of 
archcriminals should be executed, and that these can be identified by objective 
criteria; then this enemy would not be executed ... This could constitute a 
perfectly correct policy, as was, for example, during the Chinese revolution, the 
deliberate minimising of the contradictions between the workers and the 
national bourgeoisie. I don't know if it would happen like that here ... It is 
probable that not all the bosses would be liquidated, particularly in a country 
like France where there is a large number of small- and medium-sized firms so 
that this would amount to too many people (Victor in Foucault 1980: 12). 
Given that the discussion takes place less than three years after the dramatic evenements 
of May 1968, these speculations cannot be entirely dismissed as idle fantasies. The 
'liquidation' of the bosses (for which we must read their possible execution) does not 
appear as a wild suggestion in a minor fringe publication by a virtual unknown; it is an 
idea casually entertained by a respected figure close to the centre of French intellectual 
life. The interview first appeared in Les Temps Modernes and the author of the quoted 
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passage, Pierre Victor, was a co-author and theoretical collaborator with Jean-Paul 
Sartre. 
Most of Foucault' s contributions in the interview take the form of sceptical 
interventions. He questions, for example, whether 'people's courts' are an appropriate 
instrument for dispensing revolutionary justice; whether they are really, as Victor 
suggests, a departure from the kinds of oppression which the revolution is designed to 
overthrow: 
Can we not see the embryonic, albeit fragile form of a state apparatus 
reappearing here? The possibility of class oppression? ... I am wondering 
whether the court is not a form of popular justice but rather its first deformation 
(Foucault 1980: 2). 
Similarly, Foucault injects doubt into Victor's assumption that there exists among the 
masses a fully-formed revolutionary consciousness: 
You say that it is under the leadership of the proletariat that the non-
proletarianised people will join in the revolutionary battle. I entirely agree. But 
when you say that this happens under the leadership of the ideology of the 
proletariat, then I want to ask you what you mean by the ideology of the 
proletariat (Foucault 1980: 26). 
It is nevertheless clear throughout the interview that Foucault and Victor belong to a 
common universe of discourse. Certain key words and phrases are freely exchanged 
('struggle', 'the revolution', 'the masses', 'the exploitation of the proletariat') and 
arguments are formed on the basis of shared assumptions about the significance of 
historical events (the French Revolution, the Liberation, May 1968). There is a 
sufficient mutuality of views for Victor to conclude at the end of the discussion that 'we 
agree about the interpretation of actual practices', only having failed to resolve 
'philosophical differences' (36). 
55 
Why I am not a F oucauldian 
A similar point can be made about the elaboration of positions at a more theoretical 
level. However original Foucault' s arguments, they were nevertheless developed from 
the intellectual resources immediately available to him. As he himself indicated in the 
passage I have cited from the preface to Anti-Oedipus, to be an intellectual in France in 
the period after the Second World War was to define some relation to the overwhelming 
prestige of Marxism, structuralism and psychoanalysis, three comprehensive systems 
often brought together in attempted grand syntheses. The version of Marxism in 
question was also a particular one, heavily inflected by philosophical concerns. Through 
the influence, particularly, of Jean Hippolyte and Alexandre Kojeve's interpretations of 
Hegel, Marx's writings were traced to their early formation in German metaphysics and 
read back into its terms. This connection was further reinforced by the absorption of 
more recent turns in the German philosophical tradition, through the reception of 
Husserl and Heidegger and the development of phenomenology. The resulting 
intellectual complex was characterised by an extremely high level of abstraction. While 
positions and arguments might claim a relation to actual political institutions and 
processes, they could also be traded backwards and forwards in terms of such general 
categories as 'the subject', 'structure' or 'the sign'. 
But even this does not quite locate the specificity of the context in which Foucault 
comes to address questions of power. Equally important is an institutionalised set of 
relations in France between the public figure of 'the intellectual' and political change, a 
set of relations established in the period of the Enlightenment. As Foucault himself put 
it: 
What we call today 'the intellectual' (I mean the intellectual in the political, not 
the sociological sense of the word, in other words the person who utilises 
knowledge, his competence and his relation to truth in the field of political 
struggles) was, I think, an offspring of the jurist, or at any rate of the man who 
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invoked the universality of a just law, if necessary against the legal professions 
themselves (Voltaire, in France, is the prototype of such intellectuals) (Foucault 
1980: 128). 
The subtle qualification of Voltaire's status as the prototype 'in France' makes it appear 
that other prototypes might be found elsewhere, but it is not at all clear that this is so. 
The intellectual as radical jurist was a figure which emerged during a period in which 
France was, as Yuri Lotman points out, the undisputed centre of the European 
semiosphere: 
What the Renaissance did to Italian culture, the Enlightenment did with French. 
France had absorbed cultural currents from the whole of Europe but in the age 
of the Enlightenment she made all Europe speak her language ... [l]n the 
eighteenth century there was a choice: either to be a follower or an opponent of 
the ideas of the Enlightenment, namely, religious toleration, the cult of Nature 
and Reason, and the eradication of age-old superstitions in the name of the 
freedom of Man. Paris became the capital of European thought, and 
innumerable texts poured out of France to all the comers of Europe (Lotman 
1990: 146). 
Foucault's 'in France' is therefore somewhat misleading. The prototype for what he 
calls the 'general intellectual' was French. It may have been exported to many other 
sites, but if we accept Lotman's view of reception as translation, it cannot have done so 
without alteration. We should expect to find a significant displacement from the 
'original' as it has been transformed by the local formations on which it has been 
overlaid even as it has also transformed them. It is in France, quite specifically, that 
there is the continuity of tradition which Foucault identifies. It is a continuity, one might 
further suggest, which is sustained not only by historical memory or textual reference 
but also in the legal code, political constitution, education system, in forms of public 
administration, the articulation of class relations, even in urban design. 
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It is true that Foucault questioned the assumptions of these intellectual and political 
traditions. Throughout his work, he insists continually on the recognition of specificities 
at the empirical level and deliberately refuses universalising claims. These 
commitments are also explicitly stated in the way he understood his position as a 
'specific' intellectual: 
My role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people that they are 
much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes 
which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-
called evidence can be criticized and destroyed ... All my analyses are against 
the idea· of universal necessities in human existence (Foucault 1988: 10). 
There is no reason to doubt that these were his motivations, or that his work has often 
had the effects he wished it to achieve. If there has indeed been a 'Foucault effect', it 
has been closely associated with a liberating realisation that what is 'accepted as 
evidence' is more contingent than it sometimes seems. But this should not prevent us 
from recognising that Foucault was, himself, historically situated and could not avoid 
carrying over themes and assumptions from the positions he was defining himself 
against. The very ease, for example, with which he generalised from French historical 
experience is an indication of a tendency to regard the problems he was considering as 
more universal than they may be. 
The suggestion I want to make in associating Foucault with 'faith' is, therefore, a quite 
specific one. It is not that, in general terms, Foucault is not a highly sceptical writer; it is 
simply that his scepticism has a very definite limit. This limit is revealed in the status he 
assigns to the concept of power. Power is the single major concept where the sceptical 
, principles which he brings to the use of other concepts no longer seem to apply. This is 
often indicated quite unambiguously: 
58 
' ·, 
Why I am not a Foucauldian 
[I]n a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, 
and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning 
of a discourse (Foucault 1980: 93, emphasis added). 
It is precisely here that Foucault is not a sceptical or 'specific' intellectual. The theme of 
power is not taken to be one which has 'built up at a certain moment during history'; it 
is understood to be a 'universal necessity of human existence'. It is easy to be distracted 
by the emphasis on the complexity of power ('manifold relations'; 'permeating, 
characterising, constituting'; 'establishing, consolidating, implementing'; 'producing, 
accumulating, circulating, functioning'), a gesture which recognises a variety of forms. 
But the proliferation of modes of operation of power only reinforces the universalising 
force of the concept. However culturally or historically diverse societies may be, they 
come to appear as no more than variations on a theme. To push the emphasis on 
complexity would only be to reduce differences to multiple versions of the same. 
This is not, in an absolute sense, a criticism of Foucault so much as a recognition of his 
limits, a recognition which allows closer attention to what is involved in the translation 
of his arguments between different contexts. His positions were developed not in a 
placeless realm of pure theoretical considerations but within active debates with real 
historical consequences. There is little to be gained by abstracting them from these 
debates and attempting to judge them according to universal criteria. It is this tendency, 
more than Foucault's own writings, which I am wishing to identify as 'Foucauldian'. 
'THE PROBLEM OF POWER' 
lt is significant that Foucault said almost nothing directly on the subject of power until 
after May 1968. By his own account, given in the late 1970s: 
• 
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When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, 
in Madness and Civilisation [1961] or The Birth of the Clinic [1963], but 
power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never 
had such a field of analyses [as developed in later work] at my disposal 
(Foucault 1980: 115). 
Nor was a systematic attention to power to be found elsewhere in political debates or 
theories in France at the time: 
It is hard to see where, either on the Right or the Left, this problem of power 
could then have been posed. On the Right, it was posed only in terms of 
constitution, sovereignty, etc., that is, in juridical terms; on the Marxist side, it 
was posed only in terms of the State apparatus ... Where Soviet socialist power 
was in question, its opponents called it totalitarianism; power in Western 
capitalism was denounced by Marxists as class domination; but the mechanics 
of power in themselves were never analysed (Foucault 1980: 115-116). 
This does not mean the word (in French, pouvoir) was not used; only that it appeared in 
a casual, unreflective way. Foucault specifically refused the suggestion that his work on 
power formulated a problem which had not already begun to emerge. What strikes him 
after 1968 is, in fact, the way in which an extraordinary range of political discourses and 
rhetorics had converged on a single, abstract use of the term, a use designating a general 
prohibition or 'Thou shalt not': 
Thus one single and identical 'formula' of power (the interdict) comes to be 
applied to all forms of society and all levels of subjection. And so through 
treating power as the instance of negation one is led to a double 
'subjectivisation'. In the aspect of its exercise, power is conceived as a great 
absolute Subject which pronounces the interdict ... In the aspect of subjection 
to power, there is an equal tendency to 'subjectivise' it by specifying the point 
at which the interdict is accepted, the point where one says yes or no to power 
(Foucault 1980: 140). 
The striking clarity of analysis here makes it seem obvious that Marxism and other 
oppositional political discourses have always been, in some sense, 'about' power. As 
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Foucault points out, however, they could only appear as such when the general 
abstraction of post-war intellectual culture was thrown into sharp relief by the urgency 
of responding to action on the streets: 
This task [the analysis of power in itself] could only begin after 1968, that is to 
say on the basis of daily struggles at grass roots level, among those whose fight 
was located in the fine meshes of the web of power. This was where the 
concrete nature of power became visible, along with the prospect that these 
analyses of power would prove fruitful in accounting for all that had hitherto 
remained outside the field of political analysis (Foucault 1980: 116). 
In other words, power only appeared as a central term of political analysis in France as a 
result of a specific development: the appearance of a volatile interface between high 
theoretical discourses and the immediacy of direct political action. As a term which 
crossed this interface, it also revealed a stark disjuncture in the levels of abstraction on 
either side. On one hand, it crystallised political theory at its most simplified extreme 
(the reduction of all political phenomena to a simple binary opposition or 'instance of 
negation'); on the other hand, it was applied as a description at 'grass roots level' to 
relations and actions which were finely-textured, complex and often obscure. It is the 
intellectual and political crisis occasioned by this disjuncture which brings into focus, 
for Foucault, 'the problem of power'. 
There is little evidence to suggest that the first consideration in responding to this crisis 
was ever theoretical consistency. Foucault himself frequently expressed impatience with 
attempts to enforce such criteria. It is not, he argued, that global theories have not 
provided 'in a fairly consistent fashion useful tools for local research': 
But I believe these tools have only been provided on the condition that the 
theoretical unity of these discourses was in some sense put in abeyance, or at 
least curtailed, divided, overthrown, caricatured, theatricalised, or what you 
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will. In each case, the attempt to think in terms of a totality has in fact proved a 
hindrance to research (Foucault 1980: 81 ). 
To look for complete theoretical consistency in Foucault's writings on power is also to 
read them without reference to their evident motivations. The context in which his 
thinking on the subject took form was one in which the internal procedures of academic 
accounting were, for a time, relatively suspended. Even where his arguments are at their 
most scholarly or theoretically developed, they are always framed by external political 
considerations. 
Almost everything Foucault wrote in the period after 1968 is pervaded, in tone as much 
as content, by a sense of political urgency. It is easy, from a position of distance, to read 
his references to 'terrorists of theory', 'fascism', the 'carceral society' or 'the Gulag' as 
metaphor or hyperbole. But it is clear that he thought of the last of these, at least, as 
suggesting quite concrete comparisons with an immediate and present reality. He had 
lived for a time in Poland and had some familiarity with the actual historical experience 
of Eastern Bloc communism. The Gulag should not be used, he argued, as a mere 
rhetorical figure signifying 'error'. To invoke it did not mean to denounce it as a 
betrayal of the revolution or a corruption of the original purity of Marx and Lenin: 
On the contrary, it means questioning all these theoretical texts, however old, 
from the standpoint of the reality of the Gulag. Rather than of searching in 
those texts for a condemnation in advance of the Gulag, it is a matter of asking 
what in those texts could have made the Gulag possible, what might even now 
continue to justify it ... We must open our eyes ... to what enables people 
there, on the spot, to resist the Gulag, what gives the people of the anti-Gulag 
the courage to stand up and die in order to be able to utter a word or a poem ... 
We should listen to these people, not our century-old little love-song for 
'socialism' ... The leverage against the Gulag is not in our heads, but in their 
bodies, their energy, what they say, think and do (Foucault 1980: 135-6). 
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The appropriateness of the comparison, on the other side, to French intellectual culture, 
must be assessed in relation to Pierre Victor's casual reflections on whether it would be 
'correct policy' to liquidate all the bosses in France or whether this might amount to 
'too many people'. It is in relation to these kinds of concerns that the problem of power 
is addressed. 
The central weakness of the dominant conception of power, for Foucault, is not so much 
a theoretical as an ethical one: its inability to offer standards of accountability in 
engaging at the level of political action. Given the level of abstraction at which power is 
conceptualised, the translation of arguments to the level of actual institutions and 
practices becomes arbitrary. In the case of versions of Marxism current at the time, 
Foucault argued, 'anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the 
domination of the bourgeois class'_. One of the reasons for his interest in prisoners, the 
insane and other marginal but non-proletarian populations is that their anomalous status 
within capitalism illustrates this arbitrariness so clearly: 
The descending type of analysis [starting from the proposition of a fundamental 
social axis of power], the one of which I believe one ought to be wary, will say 
that the bourgeoisie has, since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, been the 
dominant class; from this premise, it will then set out to deduce the internment 
of the insane. One can always make this deduction, it is always easily done and 
that is precisely what I hold against it (Foucault 1980: 99-100). 
A similar problem can be found in arguments about the political function of sexuality: 
Given the domination of the bourgeois class, how can one understand the 
repression of infantile sexuality? Well, very simply - given that the human 
body had become essentially a force of production from the time of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, all the forms of its expenditure which did 
not lend themselves to the constitution of the productive forces ... were banned, 
excluded and repressed. These kinds of deduction are always possible. They are 
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simultaneously correct and false. Above all they are too glib, because one can 
always do exactly the opposite (Foucault 1980: IOO). 
The problem, for Foucault, was made serious by the fact that the advocates of the 
theories which made such arbitrary deductions tended to claim an absolute ethical 
integrity in criticising arbitrariness in the arguments or actions of others. Rather than 
examining their own shortcomings, 'they contented themselves with denouncing 
[power] in a polemical and global fashion as it existed among the "others", in the 
adversary camp' (Foucault 1980: 116). Given that the 'others' were doing the same in 
reverse, a prospect appeared of an escalating spiral of denunciation both fuelling and 
fuelled by an increasing ethical and intellectual bankruptcy on all sides. In the light of 
the comparative points of reference Foucault clearly had in mind, such a prospect could 
only suggest dangerous political consequences. 
THREE FOUCAULTS: NIETZSCHE, SPINOZA, BENTHAM 
Much of Foucault's writing on power is actually quite exploratory, starting simply from 
a desire to find some other way of using the concept. In the 'Two Lectures' from which 
the above passages are quoted, he entertains a range of possibilities for thinking about 
power and the provisionality of his ideas is quite explicit: '[W]hat I am saying here is 
above all to be taken as a hypothesis ... I would like to put forward a few 'propositions' 
- not firm assertions, but simply suggestions ... ' (Foucault 1980: 133). In his work 
more generally there are at least three identifiable sources of inspiration which are 
juggled in various combinations and permutations: 
The first and most clearly attributed is Nietzsche. Foucault takes from Nietzsche a 
·conception of power as the multiplicity of relations of force within a field of conflict, 
where such conflict is seen as the basis of all human relations. He sometimes describes 
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the position as an inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism that 'war is the continuation of 
politics by other means'. According to this inversion: 
[N]one of the political struggles, the conflicts waged over power, with power, 
for power, the alterations in the relations of forces, the favouring of tendencies, 
the reinforcements etc., etc. that come about within [a] 'civil peace' - ... none 
of these phenomena in a political system should be interpreted except as the 
continuation of war ... Even when one writes the history of peace and its 
institutions, it is always the history of war that one is writing (Foucault 1980: 
90-1). 
An immediate consequence of this conception is that there is no possibility of escaping 
from or 'transcending' power. This means there can be no moral authority or ethical 
integrity to be claimed in denouncing it. The very denunciation must be recognised as 
itself an exercise of power, merely one disposition of force among others in an ongoing 
battle for strategic advantage. 
The second inspiration which can be traced is Spinoza. Foucault's argument in 
Discipline and Punish is developed around the idea of 'modalities' of power, of which 
other social and political phenomena ('the subject', 'man', 'the sovereign', 'discipline' 
etc.) are all 'effects'. The terms, as well as the insistence on the 'immanence' of 
phenomena within a single continuous plane of existence, borrow directly from 
Spinozan metaphysics - the idea, specifically, that all of existence inheres in a single 
substance. According to the 'Spinozan' option, power is conceived as the fundamental 
basis or substrate of human association. As Foucault puts it in a particularly striking 
formulation: 
Between every point of the social body, between a man and a woman, between 
the members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between every one 
who knows and every one who does not, there exists relations of power which 
are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign's great power over the 
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individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign's 
power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible to function (Foucault 
I 980: 187, emphasis added). 
The importance of this conception is that it removes any implication of 'negation'. As 
an immanent principle formally equivalent to Spinoza's God, power can be thought of 
not as negative but as positive. It does not act 'against' the purposive actions of groups 
or individuals but 'in and through' them. Foucault makes frequent use of such 
formulations, particularly in articulating the political status of the 'subject' or 
'individual': 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus ... on 
which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so 
doing subdues and crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime 
effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, 
that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects 
(Foucault 1980: 98). 
A similar argument informs the concept of 'power-knowledge'. If power is the basic 
substrate of human activity, knowledge cannot stand 'against' power because it is an 
attribute or effect of power. Despite the 'mental' associations of knowledge and the 
'material' associations of power, they are substantially identical, differing only as 
aspects of the same phenomenon. 
The third inspiration, perhaps the least well-recognised as such, is Jeremy Bentham. It is 
clear that Bentham's Panopticon is a significant text in the development of Foucault's 
thinking on power. In an interview, 'The Eye of Power', he relates his encounter with 
. Bentham as a major discovery (Foucault 1980: 146-165). The discussion of the 
panopticon is central to the argument of Discipline and Punish and the positions 
developed there continue to inform much of his later writing. Foucault takes from 
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Bentham a conception of power as a practical capacity to act. In the case of the 
panopticon itself the capacity is defined by an architectural arrangement. The situation 
of an observation tower in a central position surrounded by multiple prison cells creates 
a potential for a single observer to see many others without themselves being seen. The 
important point here is that this capacity is independent of the identities or intentions of 
observer and observed. In other words, power can be thought of as distinct from agency. 
It is not 'held' but 'exercised'; it is not invested in people or classes but is a function of 
practical arrangements. Capacities or potentials can be described and analysed without 
reference to those who actually exercise them or the purposes they may have in doing 
so. Whether or not, for example, the central observer is an agent of the bourgeoisie, the 
power being exercised has a specificity which remains unchanged. 
A clear implication of this is that changing the identities of those who occupy different 
positions within a political structure may do nothing to change the operation of power. 
If, for example, the proletariat were to assume control of the state, they may exercise 
exactly the same powers as were previously exercised by the bourgeoisie. This is one of 
the major arguments which Foucault uses in the interview with Pierre Victor. If, as 
Victor suggests, 'the people' were to take control of the justice system while retaining 
the established form of the court, there may be no real change in the configuration of 
power. For Foucault, the spatial arrangement of the court is more important in defining 
political relations than the actual identity of the judge and litigants. It is this kind of 
argument which informs much of his interest in space. It is also the basis for the central 
Foucauldian idea of 'technologies' of power. Perhaps most importantly, a 'Benthamite' 
approach to questions of power allows an emphasis on specific 'mechanisms', 
providing a crucial argumentative advantage over approaches which operate only at a 
more abstract level. 
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The 'Nietzschean', 'Spinozan' and 'Benthamite' conceptions of power do not appear to 
have any necessary consistency. Being conceptually quite distinct, they converge or 
diverge on various points. On the question, for example, of whether power is 'positive' 
or 'negative', there appear to be three different answers. According to the 'Nietzschean' 
conception, there must always be some negativity, even if it does not appear in the form 
of a simple contradiction between monolithic social blocks. In so far as the idea of 
conflict is central to the conception, power is closely identified with the opposition to 
forces by other forces. According to the 'Spinozan' conception, as I have indicated 
above, power appears as positive; it is the 'soil' on which all forms of human 
association are based. According to the 'Benthamite' conception, power is neither 
positive or negative; such descriptions could only be applied to the actual exercise of a 
power, not to the power itself. On the question of whether power may be overcome or 
removed, the 'Nietzschean' and 'Spinozan' conceptions would seem to agree in 
suggesting that the answer is no. Both imply that power is omnipresent and absolute. 
The 'Benthamite' conception suggests, by contrast, that power may admit at least of 
degrees. In some societies there are capacities to act which are not available in others. 
The panopticon, for example, defines a power which did not previously exist. In 
general, it would seem that the range of powers available increases roughly in 
proportion to technological development. 
IN THE SHADOW OF THE ANCIEN REGIME 
It might appear, in view of this, that it is a mistake to talk of any coherent 'Foucauldian' 
position on power. But the widespread belief that there is such a position cannot be 
,attributed entirely to misunderstanding. All ofFoucault's scepticism in relation to 
power is balanced against a single over-riding assumption. To return to the terms I 
proposed in the Introduction, it is the assumption of rationalism. The questions Foucault 
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asks - 'What is power?', 'How does it operate?', 'What forms does it take?' - all take 
as given that there is a single phenomenon to be investigated, a phenomenon which can 
be presumed to exist at all times and independently of the way it might be framed. The 
various 'hypotheses' which are made about power all meet, therefore, as attempts to 
explain a common object. Foucault never really develops (although he does 
occasionally recognise) the possibility of a more empiricist view: that the word 'power' 
might actually be referring to different phenomena, phenomena whose relation to each 
other cannot be assumed. 
The issue here is clouded, again, by his repeated insistence on multiple forms of power. 
It often appears, because of this, that he is suggesting that the word might be used in 
different ways. 'Juridico-discursive' power is distinguished, for example, from 
'disciplinary' power. The first bel~ngs to political systems organised around the 
authority of a sovereign, the second to modem political systems based on more abstract 
systems of administration. It is easy to infer from this that Foucault does not view 
power as a single phenomenon. Such an inference is made by Hindess in Discourses of 
Power. It is also appears in a defence of Foucault by Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace 
against the criticism that his account of power lacks 'differentiation': 
This criticism is the result of not grasping Foucault' s emphasis on the historical 
specificity of whatever forms of power exist in a society. It is equivalent to 
accusing Marx of failing to differentiate systems of economic production 
(McHoul and Grace 1993: 63). 
In one sense, this is clearly correct; if the argument in question is that Foucault sees 
power as a uniform and unchanging phenomenon, then it can only be described as 
'misinformed. But there is a different argument which could be made: that precisely in 
differentiating 'forms' of power, Foucault assumes a substantial continuity. 
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The comparison with Marx might be used, in fact, to illustrate the point. As Jean 
Baudrillard argued in The Mirror of Production, Marx's differentiation of modes of 
production had a double edge. It admitted a plurality of forms within the sphere of 
production, but in the very act of doing so it universalised production as the 
fundamental basis of all human societies: 
[D]ifferentiating modes of production renders unchallengeable the evidence of 
production as a determinate instance. It generalizes the economic mode of 
rationality over the entire expanse of human history, as the generic mode of 
human becoming (Baudrillard 1975: 33). 
There is a serious point here, however one might view Baudrillard' s subsequent 
attempts to substitute the concept of production with the concepts of simulation and 
seduction. In comprehending all human societies according to their 'mode of 
production', Marx assumed that they were organised according to the same rationalising 
logic as capitalism - around 'relations of production' in the provision of universal 
'needs'. Given, however, that all the major concepts by which this logic was identified 
and analysed emerged specifically in the context of capitalism ('labour', 'surplus value', 
'relations or production' etc.), the assumption is questionable. Even as it identifies 
historical differences, the differentiation of modes of production installs a universalising 
view of all forms of social organisation as modes of production. 
A similar argument could be made about Foucault's differentiation between historical 
'modalities' of power. Foucault, himself, sometimes invited comparisons with Marxism, 
particularly in foregrounding his debt to Nietzsche. If Marxism offered a theory of 
production, he argued, Nietzsche offered a theory of power: 'It was Nietzsche who 
· specified the power relation as the general focus, shall we say, of philosophical 
discourse - whereas for Marx it was the production relation' (Foucault 1980: 53). The 
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parallel allows Baudrillard' s observations about Marxism to be transposed to Foucault 
himself. Just as, for Marx, all societies are appropriately characterised according to their 
mode of production, they are, for Foucault, appropriately characterised according to 
their modality of power. Just as, for Marx, production remains a constant no matter 
what other variations may occur, a similar constant is found by Foucault in power. In 
both cases, a formidable intellectual breadth is enabled by a single simplifying 
assumption: for Marx, that everything can be viewed under the aspect of production; for 
Foucault, that everything can be viewed under the aspect of power. While McHoul and 
Grace are right, therefore, in pointing out that Foucault differentiates between forms of 
power, there may also be something in the criticisms they are countering. In the very 
distinction between power and its various 'forms', there is a clear implication that 
power in itself remains somehow essentially unchanged. 
It is not my intention to press this point as a criticism of Foucault; it is rather to draw 
attention, again, to the contextual specificity of his arguments. The pluralisation of 
forms of power has a clear strategic purpose: to throw sceptical light on ideas of 
'liberation' according to which power might be removed or overthrown in the name of 
'freedom'. In engaging Marxism and other oppositional discourses, Foucault clearly 
needed to define some common ground. This is essentially a consensus over the 
characterisation of the 'before' case in narratives of oppression-liberation (or 
repression-liberation) 7, an agreement that social totalities may be comprehensively 
organised according to a single consistent regime of power. It is from this common 
7 Foucault distinguishes 'oppression' and 'repression', with reference to eighteenth century political 
theory, over the question of whether a contractual relation is implied. 'Oppression' exists where a 
'sovereign power transgresses the limit set by the terms of a contract with its subjects or citizens. 
'Repression', by contrast, applies to situations of domination where no contract is implied- the paradigm 
case being war. '[R]epression no longer occupies the place that oppression occupies in relation to the 
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baseline that the point of disagreement is defined. In other words, the rationalist 
assumption about power is accepted as a condition of entry into major intellectual 
debates in France at the time. 
The real originality of Foucault's work on power is in the interpretation of the 'after' 
case in narratives of liberation. The historical cases discussed are specifically chosen for 
this purpose. In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault is interested in changes in 
systems of punishment from the end of the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. 
The significance of this historical moment is that it is the one, if any, in which the ideas 
of the Enlightenment were actually put into effect. If a claim is to be made that the 
Enlightenment bore political fruit in a liberation from the oppressions of the ancien 
regime, then this is the moment where such a liberation must be demonstrated. In The 
History of Sexuality - Volume 1 ( 1981 ), the other major text in which he develops the 
concept of power, Foucault concentrates for similar reasons on the emergence of 
Victorian discourses of sexuality. The significance of this moment is that it is one in 
which 'repression' is supposed to have been established, providing the backdrop for the 
sexual 'liberation' of the twentieth century. In the narratives which Foucault attempts to 
counter, Victorian prudery figures in a similar way to the ancien regime - as an 
'instance of negation' from which liberation is supposed to have been achieved. 
In both cases, Foucault's general argumentative strategy is the same: he attempts to 
demonstrate that power operates both before and after the claimed moment of 
liberation. In Discipline and Punish he argues that the difference between the eighteenth 
century theatre of public executions and the 'enlightened' penal system which 
~ucceeded it was not that one was organised around power and the other around the 
contract, that is, it is not abuse, but is, on the contrary, the mere effect and continuation of a relation of 
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more 'humane' objective of reform. If the mutilation of the body of the condemned was 
a graphic illustration of the power of the sovereign under the ancien regime, then the 
system which followed was no less a regime of power. While the arbitrary excesses of 
corporal punishment may have disappeared, their loss was more than compensated by 
the obsessive detail of prison schedules and the omnipresence of surveillance: 
The true objective of the reform movement ... was not so much to establish 
new rights to punish based on more equitable principles, as to set up a new 
'economy' of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution ... The 
reform of criminal law must be read as a strategy for the rearrangement of the 
power to punish, according to modalities that render it more regular, more 
effective, more constant and more detailed in its effects ... (Foucault 1979: 80) 
The argument in The History of Sexuality- Volume 1 is slightly different as it does not 
deal specifically with the historical period_in which the 'liberation' of sexuality is 
supposed to have occurred. Foucault attempts to demonstrate instead that Victorian 
sexuality, far from being 'repressed', was characterised by an 'incitement to discourse': 
Since the eighteenth century, sex has not ceased to provoke a kind of 
generalized discursive erethism ... Incitements to speak were orchestrated from 
all quarters, apparatuses everywhere for listening and recording, procedures for 
observing, questioning, and formulating. Sex was driven out of hiding and 
constrained to lead a discursive existence. From the singular imperialism that 
compels everyone to transform their sexuality into a perpetual discourse, to the 
manifold mechanisms which ... incite, extract, distribute and institutionalize the 
sexual discourse, an immense verbosity is what our civilization has required 
and organized (Foucault 1981: 32-33). 
The significance of the argument is, however, much the same. If the Victorian period 
was one in which sex was 'driven out of hiding', then a liberation from a Victorian 
"repression' of sexuality comes to seem impossible. Any attempt to free the 'truth' of 
domination' (Foucault 1980: 92). 
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sex from its distorted representations would only reinforce the 'incitement to speak'. 
Once again, claims to liberate from power appear instead as the instruments of power -
as deepening and extending, in this case, the 'singular imperialism' and 'manifold 
mechanisms' by which sexual practices are organised. 
There can be no doubt of the effectiveness of these arguments within the forms of 
argumentative engagement for which they were designed. But this effectiveness should 
not be allowed to obscure the historical specificity of those forms themselves. There is 
always another alternative than Foucault' s to abstract narratives of oppression-
liberation: that is, simply to question whether the societies, cultures or 'regimes' which 
are made to represent the 'before' case in such narratives have indeed been 
comprehensively organised by a single phenomenon - 'power'. This may not have been 
a realistic option in the context in which Foucault was seeking to intervene, but there is 
no reason to assume that it has not been elsewhere. As I will suggest below, it is an 
alternative which emerges quite clearly from the history of English political thought. In 
Chapter 2, I will argue further that it was explicitly articulated in early British cultural 
studies, most notably by Richard Haggart and Raymond Williams. In order to locate the 
significance of Foucault, therefore, it is not sufficient to compare him only with 
Marxism or other theoretical positions which are committed to a totalising view of 
power; it is also necessary to compare him with those which are not. 
I do not wish to argue here that the relevance of Foucault be restricted merely to local 
debates within the postwar left in France. The influence of his work has followed the 
vector of rationalist concepts of power, a vector which has become so pervasive in left 
cultural criticism since the 1970s that the alternative has largely been eclipsed. The 
significance of Foucauldian arguments in this context has been undeniable. My 
suggestion is only that this context has nevertheless been a particular one. As is clear 
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from Foucault' s writing, French intellectual culture has been profoundly affected by 
universalist concepts of sovereignty and justice in a tradition which goes back to the 
eighteenth century. The impulse to totalise around figures of domination and oppression 
has been renewed periodically and acted upon in ways which are far more than 
theoretical. It is not surprising, given this, that so many of the intellectual resources for 
responding to the tendency towards rationalism have come from France. But the 
strength of French intellectual culture must also be recognised as its limitation. Even in 
the work of Foucault, there remains a certain blindness to the possibility of empiricism. 
It is in overcoming this blindness that it becomes important to look elsewhere. 
It is significant, in the context of my argument, that Foucault returned again and again, 
in considering power, to the 'problem of sovereignty'. The importance of the theme is 
made clear, for example, in his suggestion that 'We need to cut off the King's head: in 
political theory that has still to be done' (Foucault 1980: 121). The suggestion is 
revealing in its ambiguity. On the one hand, the argument is clearly that political theory 
should be less concerned than it is with the 'King's head' - with symbolic 
representations of the ancien regime or their metaphorical equivalents. On the other 
hand, it still appears necessary to 'cut off' the King's head - presumably at some meta-
theoretical level - in order to be relieved of this obsession. There is an important sense 
in which Foucault, despite all the originality which he brings to the consideration of 
power, writes in the shadow of the ancien regime. While he rejects an exclusive focus 
on a single 'determinate instance' (the sovereign), he retains in doing so the reality 
principle which such a focus allows. Power retains its status as 'fundamental' which is 
first established by the idea of a determinate instance. The entire character of a polity 
may no longer be condensed in a single person, class or political office, but in more 
diffuse manifestations there is still a single phenomenon to be observed. In the very 
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rejection of the Enlightenment model of the 'general intellectual', the universalising 
tendency of the philosophes returns in a reflected form: instead of proclaiming the 
universality of the 'Rights of Man', Foucault proclaims the universality of power. 
0AKESHOTTIAN SCEPTICISM 
If it is unusual to frame Foucault's work in terms of 'faith', it may seem equally strange 
to frame Oakeshott' s in terms of 'scepticism'. It might be conceded that he comes close 
to Foucault on a number of questions: he rejects interpretative approaches which 
attribute 'inner' psychological states to political agents, for example, and also dismisses 
the idea of a universal 'human nature'. But of the two writers, Foucault appears far 
more searching and insistent in challenging commonly-held beliefs. The difference is 
not so much one of propositions; it is more a difference of method. Foucault assumes 
the onus of proof and pursues his sceptical claims systematically. He seeks to give them 
a decisive authority, capitalising on highly-developed philosophical arguments and 
supporting them also with historical evidence. If Oakeshott adopts sceptical positions, 
they lack any such hard intellectual edge. He opens The Politics of Faith and the 
Politics of Scepticism, in fact, with an exaggerated gesture of modesty: 'For one who 
speaks neither as a philosopher nor as an historian and whose knowledge of affairs is no 
more intimate than the low average of his fellows - for such a person to speak about 
politics requires an apology' (Oakeshott 1996: 1). Any possibility of a systematic 
interrogation of concepts or historical interpretations is thus immediately foreclosed. 
The weakness of the reason given for assuming a sceptical position on psychological 
states is typical of Oakeshott's approach: 
[B]y 'interpretation' I do not mean discovering something that lies outside the 
world of activity, discovering (for example) what was 'in the mind' of the ruler 
before he performed [an] action, or discovering his 'motives' or even his 
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'intentions': these are all unnecessarily complicated and misleading ways of 
describing what we do when we try to elucidate an action (Oakeshott 1996: 4). 
The word 'misleading' suggests that there may be some strong case to be made against 
invoking what is 'in the mind', but the suggestion is not taken further. The position is 
left to hang on little more than the view that reference to psychological states is 
'unnecessarily complicated'. There is no comparison with the rigour of Foucault's 
approach to similar questions. Foucault constructs arguments which actively displace 
psychologising interpretations. This is his strategy, for example, in developing the 
concept of the 'author function', a concept which disqualifies reference to authorial 
intention by reducing the author to a function of discourse (Foucault 1977). Oakeshott, 
by contrast, offers no strong reason not to engage in speculation about mental states; he 
simply indicates a preference for less elaborate interpretations. 
It is precisely this lack of critical 'edge' which Perry Anderson observed in the 1960s as 
typical of English intellectual culture. It was the weakness, for Anderson, which made it 
a slave to 'empiricism'. With no disciplined approach to cutting through surface 
appearances, English intellectual life remained mired in 'common sense'. Far from 
demonstrating scepticism, it showed a simple-minded credulity towards the aspect in 
which evidence was immediately presented- a credulity reflected at the political level 
in a blind faith in the established order. While activist student movements had 
developed in Germany, Italy and France, students in Britain remained 'muzzled and 
quiescent', bound by a culture which was 'mediocre and inert' (Anderson 1968: 4). The 
ascendant discipline which elsewhere provided the intellectual basis for a 
comprehensive and critical social awareness - sociology - had developed only a weak 
and ineffective presence: 
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To this day, despite the recent belated growth of sociology as a formal 
discipline in England, the record of listless mediocrity and wizened 
provincialism is unrelieved. The subject is still largely a poor cousin of 'social 
work' and 'social administration', the dispirited descendants of Victorian 
charity (Anderson 1968: 8). 
Nor, according to Anderson, had critical methodologies developed in other disciplines. 
Under the influence of Wittgenstein, English philosophy had come to 'consecrate the 
banalities of everyday language' (21). Under Popper and Berlin, political theory was 
reduced either to a 'manichean morality tale' or a prophylactic against revolutionary 
ideas (26). While Leavisite literary criticism had some ambition to comprehend social 
totalities, it offered no general theoretical position: 'The critic does not judge by an 
external philosophical norm, he achieves a complete internal possession of a work and 
then fits it into his assessment of other works' (51). The only intellectual achievement 
of international significance, Keynesian economics, refused to question a cyclical view 
of time in which all that can be expected are periodic fluctuations of capitalism within a 
social order which remains unchanged. 
In Arguments Within English Marxism, Anderson names Oakeshott explicitly as one of 
the objects of his earlier criticisms, representing him, in fact, as almost the emblem of 
the 'reactionary consolidation of the 1950s': 'The "left" version of the political culture 
of the time descended from the maudlin social patriotism of Orwell; the "right" variant 
from the anthems to the wisdom of gradualist "experience" of thinkers like Oakeshott' 
(Anderson 1980: 147). Even on the basis of Oakeshott's mode of address, it is not 
difficult to see the point of antagonism. For Anderson, the symptomatic refusal of 
British intellectuals to adopt disciplined and systematic methodologies was an implicit 
claim to ad hominem privileges, a claim which could be traced to residual attachments 
to the imagined virtues of aristocracy: 
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The aristocrat is defined not by acts which denote skills but by gestures which 
reveal quintessences: a specific training or aptitude would be a derogation of 
the impalpable essence of nobility, a finite qualification of the infinite. The 
famous amateurism of the English 'upper class' has its direct source in this 
ideal (Anderson 1964: 41). 
The form of this argument has been reproduced many times since, with various 
substitutions for the charge of class supremacism. Not to offer a systematic 
methodology is to refuse to submit to general criteria of accountability; not to submit to 
such criteria is to rest one's claims on an assumed superiority, if not of class then of 
gender or race: such inferences have been highly influential, if not decisive, in 
identifying abstract theoretical argument with the cause of democratic reform. 
It is not my intention here to question the positions taken by Anderson or other 
theoretical entrepreneurs of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s; they are positions 
which can only be judged in relation to their time. It is rather to point out that the 
developments of the intervening thirty years present them in a very different light from 
the one in which they first appeared, a light which requires us to re-examine the 
question of 'scepticism'. There is no reason to doubt that the introduction to Britain of 
systematic theory effectively challenged what had become a reactive, if not reactionary, 
intellectual culture. The question which cannot now be avoided, however, is what new 
problems it may have introduced. The irony of Anderson's admiration for the grand 
totalising moves of French intellectual culture is that at almost the same time French 
intellectuals themselves were becoming acutely aware of their costs. It was these costs, 
as we have seen, which came particularly to concern Foucault. As he put it in 1976: 
[W]hat has emerged in the course of the last ten or fifteen years is a sense of the 
increasing vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourses. 
A certain fragility has been discovered in the very bedrock of existence ... But 
together with this sense of instability and this amazing efficacy of 
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discontinuous, particular and local criticism, one in fact also discovers 
something that perhaps was not initially foreseen, something one might 
describe as precisely the inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian theories 
(Foucault 1980: 80, original emphasis). 
The problems perceived by Foucault and Anderson could hardly be more opposed. 
What appears as the relative invulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices 
and discourses in Britain is directly related by Anderson to an absence of totalising 
theory. The relative inefficacy of criticism within British intellectual culture was a 
direct consequence of the fact that the bourgeoisie 'refused ever to put society as a 
whole in question. A deep, instinctive aversion to the very category of totality marks its 
entire trajectory' (Anderson 1968: 13). 
There is a strong association in Anderson's arguments between systematic criticism and 
an orientation of belief towards fundamental truths. The model of such an orientation is 
the French Enlightenment and the revolutionary political movements which have since 
adopted its universalist premises: 
It is a general historical rule that a rising social class acquires a significant part 
of its ideological equipment from the armoury of the ruling class itself. Thus 
the universal axioms of the French revolution were turned by the working-class 
in France against the bourgeoisie which first proclaimed them; they founded a 
revolutionary ideology directed against the initiators of the revolution 
(Anderson 1964: 43). 
The problem with Britain, according to this argument, was that its entry to modernity 
never produced a sharply-defined conflict between social classes. As a consequence, the 
bourgeoisie failed to articulate a totalising vision of society: 'It handed on no impulse of 
,liberation, no revolutionary values, no universal language' (43). The New Left project 
of developing a systematic critique of British society and culture had therefore to import 
'fundamental concepts of man and society' (Anderson 1968: 5). 
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Foucault, of course, is highly suspicious of any such 'fundamental concepts'. As I have 
argued, however, he retains, in his work on power, at least one important 'universal 
axiom': 'In any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, 
characterise and constitute the social body.' It is this axiom which continues to provide 
a foundation for systematic criticism. Foucault's procedure in criticising the concepts of 
'man' and 'society' is similar, in fact, to Anderson's in criticising the concepts proposed 
by 'common sense'. The concepts are revealed as relatively insubstantial by shifting the 
theoretical referent to a still more fundamental level of reality. Hence, for example, the 
categories of 'sovereignty' and 'rights' which are central to Enlightenment models of 
criticism are exposed as merely a surface distraction: 
[T]he theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centred upon 
it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of 
discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of 
domination inherent in its techniques ... The juridical systems ... have enabled 
sovereignty to be democratised through the constitution of public right 
articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the same time this 
democratisation of sovereignty was fundamentally determined and grounded in 
mechanisms of disciplinary coercion (Foucault 1980: 105, emphasis added). 
Foucault is clearly uncomfortable with metaphors of surface and depth. In the following 
paragraph he hedges the interpretation he has only just offered. He does not wish to 
suggest, he says, 'that there is on the one hand an explicit and sovereign system of right 
which is that of sovereignty, and, on the other hand, obscure and unspoken disciplines 
which carry out their shadowy operations in the depths, and thus constitute the bedrock 
of the great mechanism of power' (106). But it is difficult to see how he can maintain 
his critical leverage over Enlightenment categories without committing himself to 
precisely such a claim. 
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It would be pushing the argument too far to say of either Anderson or Foucault that they 
were dogmatic writers. In his essays of the 1960s, Anderson was certainly a vigorous 
polemicist, but in the context in which he wrote the 'fundamental concepts' which 
allowed him his intellectual boldness and breadth of vision were not ones which could 
be applied with any certainty; their introduction to British debates was a speculative 
adventure, still largely into the unknown. Writing in France, Foucault was far more 
aware of the order of claims implied in strong forms of criticism, but was also more 
wary of giving them his unqualified support; his unease at the suggestion that he may 
have discovered the hidden 'bedrock' of power is typical of his reluctance to be drawn 
towards authoritative assertions. But the quality of writing in both cases should not i 
prevent us from recognising now that systematic criticism was associated in both with at :, 
least an incipient intellectual fundamentalism. It is this recognition which gives a quite / 
different complexion to the apparent 'weakness' of the sceptical arguments of a writer 
such as Oakeshott. 
It is typical of Oakeshott that he does not present scepticism as a general philosophical 
position. The word is used only to refer to a particular attitude towards government and 
then only in European or European-derived political cultures since the break-up of the 
medieval system and the development of modernity. His approach is frankly empiricist: 
generalisations are offered on the basis of specific observations and are always qualified 
by what the evidence appears to allow. It is not, however, a positivist empiricism: 
observations are not presumed to be a foundation guaranteeing the validity of general 
claims. Any determinate relation between generalisations and evidence in the analysis 
of politics is impossible, in Oakeshott's view, because of the ambiguous nature of 
language: 
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There are no simple expressions in our political vocabulary, and there are few 
words which have not done duty, over a period of many centuries, in a great 
variety of circumstances; and each circumstance, each context, has implanted 
some special meaning which it is thereafter difficult to exclude ... We do not 
possess a 'scientific' political language in which each expression has a fixed, 
simple and universally recognized meaning; we have only a living, popular 
language, at the mercy of use and circumstance, in which each expression is 
susceptible of many interpretations, none of which is without force and 
significance (Oakeshott 1996: 9). 
Oakeshott recognises, of course, that terms can be given specialist definitions: 'writing 
may, on occasion, grind its edge to a sharpness and definition it would not otherwise 
possess' (7). But this is a special case, an 'interruption in the flow of talk and practice, 
bearing always the strong impress of an individuality'. There is a tendency in specialist 
approaches to focus on a single aspect of a phenomenon. While they may clarify an 
understanding of that aspect, there is always a danger that it will then be mistaken for 
the whole. Such writing is 'not to be despised, but to be used with appropriate caution' . 
The difference between this 'appropriate caution' and the more active suspicion of truth 
claims in Foucault's work on power might usefully be clarified by a distinction made by 
Comte-Sponville between the classical scepticism of Montaigne and Hume - a 
scepticism applied to particular claims to truth - and the insistent interrogation of the 
general concept of truth in Nietzschean philosophy. Despite apparent similarities, for 
Comte-Sponville, the two should not be confused. Montaigne and Hume do not seek to 
challenge the concept of truth as such: 
What they question - and what they criticise in the name of truth - is the 
pertinence and ontological reliability of our knowledge: their skepticism is 
negation not of knowledge but of dogmatism, not of truth but of certitude ... 
Such skepticism, though radical, remains ... a moderate skepticism: they do not 
state as Nietzsche does that 'nothing is true' (which would be contradictory: if 
nothing is true, it cannot be true that nothing is true) ... but - something very 
83 
' ,' 
'1· •• 
Why I am not a F oucauldian 
different - that everything is uncertain, which is not contradictory (it only 
follows from it, as Pascal, reading Montaigne had seen, that 'it is not certain 
that everything is uncertain', but that fact, far from refuting skepticism, 
confirms it ... ) (Comte-Sponville 1997: 47-8, original emphasis). 
There is perhaps a certain contradiction in Comte-Sponville himself as he sometimes 
seems, despite his admiration for scepticism, to be seeking a final and decisive 
argument against Nietzsche. But the distinction he makes is nevertheless revealing. 
Relating it to my argument above, Oakeshott might be placed in the tradition of 
Montaigne and Hume. Foucault - at least Foucault the critic of Enlightenment 'truths' -
tends more towards Nietzsche, seeking paradoxically a foundation against 
foundationalisms, a foundation which he finds in the concept of power. 
ENGLISH {TRANS)MODERNITY 
The central difference between Oakeshott and Foucault in their treatment of the concept 
of power is that Oakeshott does not write in the shadow of the ancien regime. His 
project is not to cut off the 'King's head' (either in practice or in political theory), nor is 
it to defend it against attack. It is rather to suggest that there are political traditions in 
which this figure has always been relatively unimportant. These are traditions in which 
the 'King', or metaphorical equivalents, has never signified power 'as such', but only 
one power among others - albeit an important one. The opening to a recognition of this 
possibility is provided not by any philosophical argument, but by an orientation to 
different historical experiences. The field of evidence on which Oakeshott draws is not, 
in the first instance, the French Enlightenment or the revolutions of the late eighteenth 
century, but the more protracted and obscure entry of British political institutions to 
modernity. This orientation has a number of significant consequences. 
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The first is that Oakeshott does not see modernity as involving a decisive rupture from 
anything which preceded it. In this he confirms a recurrent theme of the debate of the 
1960s over the 'peculiarities of the English': the absence in English history of any 
single event in which the transition to modernity was focussed or condensed. As E.P. 
Thompson put it, with a typically vivid use of metaphor: 'The Enlightenment proceeded 
in Britain, not like one of those flood-tides massing against a crumbling dyke, but like 
the tide which seeps into the eroded shores, mudflats and creeks of an estuary whose 
declivities are ready to receive it' (Thompson 1978: 58). The observation was not a 
point of disagreement. In a discussion of the English Civil War, Anderson presents 
much the same view, pointing out that the one major political upheaval which might be 
seen as England's 'modem revolution' cannot easily be forced into such a mould. The 
stakes were too confused, conflict took place within rather than between social classes, 
the terms in which the struggle was conducted were largely religious and those who 
benefited most from the outcome were not those who had been the most active 
protagonists. The event did nothing to clarify either an agent or a project of modernity: 
'the ideological legacy of the Revolution was almost nil' (Anderson 1964: 30). 
A second and related consequence of considering the English case is a comparatively 
long view of modernity. Modem politics, for Oakeshott, 'are those habits and manners 
which began to emerge in the fifteenth century and to which our current habits and 
manners are joined in an unbroken pedigree' (Oakeshott 1996: 3). He is aware that 
attributing modernity with such a long life may be surprising: 'We seem to have got into 
the habit of thinking that what is significant (whether we like it or deplore it) in current 
politics dates from the French Revolution, or from 1832 or 1640, and this is unfortunate 
because by abridging the pedigree of our political character we restrict our 
understanding of it' (3). But the sense in taking a long view is confirmed by the field of 
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evidence he considers. If there is no decisive moment in which modernity was 
'inaugurated', then it becomes somewhat arbitrary how far back one chooses to go. In 
the absence of any essential defining characteristic, attention is directed to a range of 
external features - hence the focus on 'habits and manners'. At this level, continuities 
appear which go back well before the breaks or ruptures fixed as periodising limits by 
more categorical definitions of modernity. 
A good example here is Oakeshott' s discussion of religious political movements in 
England in the seventeenth century. If the difference between pre-modern and modern is 
identified with a distinction between 'religious' and 'secular', these movements are 
disqualified from any consideration of modern politics. For Anderson, whose model is 
always the French Revolution, they were politically insignificant: 'Puritanism was a 
useless passion' (Anderson 1964: 30). But Oakeshott is relatively indifferent to the 
religious/secular distinction and does not see it as marking a fundamental divide. This 
allows him to recognise similarities between the English Protestant sects and later 
political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their 'modernity' is 
evident above all, in the dispositions they exhibited towards government. While these 
varied greatly, they all implied an understanding of the potential for government to 
conduct reforms affecting entire populations. The imagined ends of such reforms were 
represented in religious terms - the establishment, for example, of a pattern of activity 
coinciding with 'righteous conduct'. But the relation between religion and politics was 
quite different from that of the medieval system, in which no such role for government 
was contemplated. The Puritans, for Oakeshott, were recognisably 'modern'; their 
religious version of governmental ambition bears comparison to contemporary versions: 
'the particular idiom is always less significant than the common understanding of 
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governing as the activity of imposing a mundane condition of things designated as 
"perfection"' (Oakeshott 1996: 61). 
A third consequence of considering the English case is a tendency to attribute a limited 
role to intellectuals as agents of historical change. Thompson is illuminating here again 
in identifying the differences between the French and English experiences: 
The French experience was marked by a clarity of confrontation, a levee en 
masse of the intelligentsia, a disposition towards systematizing and towards 
intellectual hierarchy - the staff officers, attaches, and so on, who grouped 
around the great radical chef de bataille. The English experience ... did not 
encourage sustained efforts of synthesis: since few intellectuals were thrown 
into prominence in a conflict with authority, few felt the need to develop a 
systematic critique. They thought of themselves, rather, as exchanging 
specialized products in a market which was tolerably free, and the sum of 
whose intellectual commodities made up the sum of 'knowledge' (Thompson 
1978: 59). 
It is not easy, in the English case, to associate modernity with any conscious 'project'. 
Incremental changes contributed over long periods to produce major overall 
transformations, but there was no obvious point at which intellectual interventions 
might gain a leverage over the process as a whole. Knowledge - characterised more 
appropriately as a market commodity than as a political weapon - appears as a highly-
mediated contributor to political outcomes, and then only as one among others. Its 
function is more to manage or respond to change than it is to direct it. 
The key point in all this is that Oakeshott' s considerations begin not with the 
comprehensive 'regimes' of the late modem absolutist state but earlier, in the 
, ramshackle alliances and partial administrative arrangements inherited from the 
medieval system. This means that the idea of a comprehensive regime becomes 
relativised, representing a particular tendency in European politics, rather than the form 
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of politics as such. As Oakeshott points out, there could be no question in the medieval 
system of a single consistent principle informing all social organisation because there 
was no institution with the means to impose or maintain one. Government was limited 
as a matter of necessity; all the administrative instruments now taken for granted- 'the 
apparatus of banking and book-keeping, the records, registers, files, passports, dossiers 
and indexes' (50) - were simply unavailable. The political institutions inherited from 
the middle ages were, in fact, little more than courts of law: 'The understanding of 
government they carried with them was that of ajudicial activity' (Oakeshott 1996: 77, 
original emphasis). It was only gradually, as the possibility of additional functions 
began to be recognised, that they started to assume a wider authority. 
These observations raise two questions which are highly significant for the 
conceptualisation of power. The first is a question of whether a comprehensive order 
has ever, in fact, been achieved. If the sovereign state is viewed as a relatively recent 
development, it comes to seem unlikely that the authorities which preceded it should 
have so aligned themselves in pursuit of common goals as to constitute a fully-
consistent 'regime'. The second question which arises is how to attribute motivations 
for such an alignment in the first place. Where a comprehensive order is assumed, this 
question does not arise because an integration of political functions is taken simply as a 
given. The only issue from this perspective is the constitution and purpose of particular 
regimes: Who occupies the position of sovereign? To what ends are activities being 
directed? But for Oakeshott, there is a prior question which is in some ways more 
important: What is it that leads political agents to assume the functions of a single 
order? To suggest that they may be forced would be to presuppose an original authority 
with the means to compel them. Yet the existence of such an authority is precisely what 
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needs to be explained. Some account is required of the process by which independent 
activities are willingly subordinated to some larger corporate enterprise. 
This perspective means that there is a certain distance or detachment in Oakeshott's use 
of the concept of power. He clearly does not believe that there is any fundamental 
principle informing all social organisation. Mouffe is right, to this extent, in pointing 
out that he does not attribute the same importance to power as do Marxist and post-
Marxist political theory. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that he has 
no place for the concept at all. The concept is simply an empiricist one in the 
'Humean/Deleuzian' sense which I outlined in the Introduction. It gains its meaning not 
from a supposed objective referent but in relation to the 'passions, actions and ends' 
which inform its use. The value of Oakeshott is in offering a framework within which 
the latter can begin to be brought into view. Taken at a general level, this framework is 
schematic, but there are also signs of a specific address to the context in which it was 
developed. The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism was first written in the 
1930s but was substantially revised in the 1950s. This historical location, combined 
with Oakeshott' s empiricism, make it a useful text for sounding the context of 
formation of the concept of power at the beginnings of cultural studies. 
THE POLITICS OF SCEPTICISM 
Oakeshott' s perspective presents no obstacle to recognising the sorts of political 
phenomena described by Foucault. There are, in fact, striking similarities between some 
of their themes. Oakeshott is interested, for example, in the connection between 
government and surveillance. There is a certain political logic, he argues, for which 
governing is conceived as 'minute, inquisitive, and unindulgent: society will become a 
panopticon and its rulers panoverseers' (Oakeshott 1996: 29). He makes similar points 
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to Foucault about the intimate relation which can exist between knowledge and power. 
The potential for such a relation was recognised early and explicitly by Francis Bacon: 
'Knowledge, he perceived, could provide power, and the organized pursuit of 
knowledge could provide power in great quantity: it was power he was interested in, 
and he imagined it as the mastery of the world for the benefit of mankind' (55). Such an 
instrumentalisation of knowledge means that questions of 'truth' and politics become 
inseparable: '[I]n this understanding of politics, the institutions of government will be 
interpreted, not as means for getting things done or for allowing decisions of some sort 
to be made, but as means for arriving at the "truth", for excluding "error" and for 
making the "truth" prevail' (27). 
In Oakeshott's analysis, this tendency requires something more from citizens or subjects 
than an outward conformity to the law; demands are made over what Foucault would 
call 'the soul': 'Mere obedience is not enough; it must be accompanied by fervour ... 
whenever our politics has turned decisively in the direction of the horizon of faith 
government has always demanded not acquiescence but love and devotion' (97). The 
similarity with Foucault extends, remarkably, to observations about the potential for 
ideas of liberation to deepen the operation of power. In the style of politics being 
considered 
the virtue of 'popular' institutions is recognized to be their capacity to provide 
government with greater quantities of power than any others. 'Democracy' is 
superior to 'monarchy' because it generates more power; 'divine right' cannot 
compete with the plebiscite as a source of power; and every extension of the 
franchise is seen to be an addition to the power at the disposal of government 
(131). 
Finally, there is a tendency in this context for politics to be modelled on war. Each 
enterprise in pursuit of 'perfection' will both seek to accumulate power and to oppose 
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other enterprises 'because ex hypothesi "perfection" cannot have alternative forms' 
(105). 
Where Oakeshott differs from Foucault, however, is that he does not see these 
tendencies as ever having been fully realised. Modem societies have never actually been 
panoptic regimes, knowledge and power have never been simply identified, questions of 
'truth' and politics have never been completely inseparable, politics has never been 
entirely modelled on war and government has never fully aspired to command 'the 
soul'. This is not only because each tendency has been met by 'resistance'. Oakeshott 
does not deny that the latter exists. The more successful a government in subordinating 
the diverse activities of a society to a single aim, he suggests, 'the more closely it will 
come to resemble an alien authority' (95). Those whose activities are being directed will 
begin to regard government as a phenomenon to oppose or outwit. Government is 
therefore compelled not only to direct activity but also to 'search for imprecisions in the 
pattern, the profitless activity of circumventing the minute control it is endeavouring to 
impose' (95). Such limits can certainly be observed. But the more important point, for 
Oakeshott, is that all of this is only to characterise the logical extreme of a particular 
style of politics. There is another style which has always had some influence in the 
development of modem political systems. The tension between the two has prevented 
the extreme ever from being reached. 
It is the distinction between these two styles which provides the terms of Oakeshott's 
title: 'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism'. Both are conceived as 
responses to the potential for modem governments to coordinate the activities of entire 
·populations, not only through gross interventions but through a continuous influence 
over everyday lives. The 'politics of faith' is a response which regards this development 
enthusiastically, imagining the positive social improvements which it might allow. The 
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activity of governing is understood in this case to be 'in the service of human 
perfection' (45). As Oakeshott points out, there are many kinds of perfectionism, but the 
politics of faith is a specifically modem phenomenon which is quite distinct from 
others: 
perfection itself is understood to be a mundane condition of human 
circumstances; and the achievement of perfection is understood to depend on 
human effort. The office of government is to direct the activities of its subjects, 
either so that they contribute to the improvements which in tum converge upon 
perfection, or (in another version) so that they conform to the pattern imposed 
(Oakeshott I 996: 45). 
Perfection is not seen as guaranteed by providence or as realised in some transcendent 
realm. Nor is human improvement regarded as a matter to be left to the devices of 
individuals or small associations. The impulse to imagine more perfect worlds arises 
from an appreciation of the novelty of political modernity: 'it is believed that the chief 
agent of the improvement, which is to culminate in perfection, is government' (24). 
The 'politics of scepticism' corresponds, by contrast, to a response of apprehension. It is 
a style which seeks to restrict the function of government to the maintenance of a 
'superficial order'. Whatever reason there may be for endorsing a more ambitious role 
is seen as outweighed by the dangers. Oakeshott is careful to point out that such a view 
is very different from opposing government as such or suggesting its abolition: 
[A]s a manner of understanding the activity of governing, scepticism is not to 
be identified with anarchy or with the stark individualism which is often the 
partner of anarchy. On the contrary, in the politics of scepticism governing is 
understood as a specific activity, and in particular it is understood to be 
detached from the pursuit of human perfection (Oakeshott 1996:31 ). 
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While scepticism expects little from government, it nonetheless affirms it. The grounds 
for affirmation do not lie in hopes for what it might achieve so much as in concerns 
about the consequences of its absence: 
The sceptic in politics observes that men live in proximity with one another 
and, pursuing various activities, are apt to come into conflict with each other. 
And this conflict, when it reaches certain dimensions, not only makes life 
barbaric and intolerable, but may even terminate it abruptly. In this 
understanding of politics, the activity of governing subsists not because it is 
good, but because it is necessary (Oakeshott 1996: 32). 
The view is not as pessimistic as it seems. Oakeshott suggests that the most common 
version of the politics of scepticism is not based on a rejection of aspirations for human 
improvement but on a 'prudent diffidence' about government specifically- a view that 
'we know too little about the conditions of human perfection for it to be wise to 
concentrate our energies in a single direction by associating its pursuit with the activity 
of governing' (31). 
It is important to the argument that the politics of scepticism is not seen merely as a 
reaction to the politics of faith. If anything, for Oakeshott, it is the older of the two 
styles, approximating more closely the understanding of government inherited from the 
medieval system. Yet it cannot be interpreted, either, as merely a pre-modem 'residue'. 
The modem potential of government for an extensive coordination of social activities 
has required continuous innovation in the definition and practice of government. The 
key historical achievement of scepticism has been to specify the activity of governing 
such that 'to govern was not the exercise of an undefined guardianship over the 
activities of the subject, but the performance of certain public duties ... closer definition 
of the sphere of the office evoked a limitation of the sphere of activity' (75). Among the 
more notable examples have been the recognition of the distinction between 
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government and religion and the development of diplomatic protocols for the conduct of 
foreign affairs. 
In general terms, Oakeshott' s sympathies clearly lie with the politics of scepticism. He 
is particularly critical of the erosion by the politics of faith of ethical limits to 
government. Governing in pursuit of perfection is, as he puts it, a 'total' activity; the 
coordination of activities to produce a general improvement requires their subordination 
to a single purpose: 
And this means that every permitted activity is itself an activity of government 
(and is recognized as such), and that every subject legitimately employed is eo 
ipso an agent of government ... There is, then, in such a community only one 
work being carried on; and the various manners in which it may be pursued 
(sleeping, agriculture, painting pictures, nurturing children etc.) are not distinct 
and independent activities, they are components of a single pattern ... And the 
threefold division of activities possible elsewhere - governing, going about 
one's lawful business, and behaving unlawfully - is reduced to two by the 
coalescence of the first and the second (Oakeshott 1996: 93). 
Given that 'perfection' tends to be a receding ideal, government is enjoined to a 
continuous pursuit of further powers. Each improvement becomes merely a sign of what 
more could be achieved. Given, too, that modem societies are characterised by 
competing ideas of perfection, the logical extreme of the politics of faith is a reduction 
of politics to the 'incitement of power' (103). 
Placing Oakeshott in historical context, these criticisms might be read as a thinly-veiled 
polemic against communism. It is certainly easy to see how he could have been cast as a 
Cold Warrior. But his position is more complex than such a reading would suggest. To 
seek any absolute argument against the politics of faith is, for Oakeshott, merely to 
adopt the style oneself. The attempt to define some fundamental ground for rejecting it 
reproduces, paradoxically, precisely what it sets out to oppose. Worse than that, it 
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confirms a 'counterfeit predicament' in which the politics of faith appears as the 
necessary form of politics as such: 'Consequently, mere denunciation is out of place. 
We have to recognize [the politics of faith], not in its own terms as a final simplification 
of politics, but as the exclusive pursuit of one of their potentialities' (127). The most 
effective strategy in keeping alive alternative possibilities is not so much argumentative 
as documentary: 'It consists in a more thorough and a more candid study of the history 
of modem politics. For this will at once reveal strains in our politics other than that of 
faith and will dispose of this mistaken and disingenuous theory of a single direction' 
(67). 
What is most surprising, given Oakeshott's status as a 'conservative', is his 
preparedness to concede that there are sometimes good reasons for favouring the 
politics of faith. The politics of scepticism is not a simple ideal; when it tends to a 
'pure' form, it has its own limitations: 
Government in this style is, we have seen, primarily a judicial activity; and 
where men are intent upon achievement, either individual or communal, 
judicial activity is easily mistaken for a hindrance. It abdicates exactly at the 
point where the activist expects an assertion of authority; it withdraws where he 
expects it to proceed; it insists on technicalities; it is narrow, severe and 
unenthusiastic (Oakeshott 1996: 109). 
To suggest possible connections, again, with the historical context, Oakeshott could be 
read here as joining with the British postwar left in rejecting the legalism and formality 
of the political culture of the 1930s - the inadequacy, in particular, of its response to the 
depression and the threat of fascism. The limitations of the politics of scepticism are 
most evident, he suggests, at times of major social upheaval, when it is likely to be 
overtaken by 'the nemesis of political quietism' (108). At such times, the style fails in 
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its own terms: in jeopardising respect for governmental institutions, it weakens their 
capacity to maintain a relevant public order. 
What is important, for Oakeshott then, is merely that some awareness is maintained that 
there is an alternative style of politics to the politics of faith. Scepticism, he admits, 
'cannot be said to be the tide which our politics is at present riding': 
But the history of politics in the last hundred and fifty years would have been 
very different from what in fact it has been if the pull of political scepticism had 
been either absent or weak. In so far as this history has been the story not of the 
promotion of rapid change or the imposition of a comprehensive pattern of 
activity, but a succession of political expedients to mediate current changes, to 
secure workable arrangements and to remove manifest disequilibriums; in so 
far as speculative ideas and large ambitions have played a subordinate part; in 
so far as changes have not been pressed to their so-called 'logical' conclusions 
... the politics of scepticism, in these, if in no other respects, has made itself felt 
(Oakeshott 1996: 89). 
AFTER THE COLD WAR 
To return finally to Foucault and the question I set at the beginning of the chapter, the 
reason I am not a Foucauldian is that Foucault's use of the concept of power inhibits a 
recognition of the political complexity which Oakeshott draws our attention to. Within 
the terms of a rationalist concept of power, Foucault's contribution has been highly 
significant. There can be no question that his pluralisation of forms or modalities 'of' 
power has had major effects on the discourses in which the term is used. In general, too, 
many of these effects can be recognised as 'positive', permitting a retreat from common 
tendencies in left politics towards intellectual fundamentalism. But in the way he 
achieved these effects, Foucault has made it difficult to think outside the terms of a 
rationalist concept of power. The enclosure of his arguments within a field of debate in 
which such a concept is presumed prevents it ever from being opened to critical 
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consideration. There is certainly a complexity to these arguments - it is one of 
Foucault's most insistent themes - but it is, as Oakeshott might put it, a 'counterfeit' 
complexity. Any question of whether it is appropriate to characterise social totalities in 
terms of a single analytic category, 'power', is displaced by questions concerning the 
details of such a characterisation. 
How significant is this limitation? How significant, apart from any assessment of 
Foucault, is the continued attachment in cultural studies to a rationalist concept of 
power? These are not questions which I want to answer definitively, but to keep open 
through the remainder of the dissertation. There are reasons, however, for pursuing 
them with some vigour. The first is an observation of the historical circumstances which 
now need to addressed. As has already begun to emerge in the discussion of Foucault, 
the development of an abstract, generalised concept of power has been closely related to 
the political climate of the Cold War. Foucault's own interventions in the use of the 
concept are scarcely intelligible without reference to the explosive interface between 
Western capitalism and Soviet-style communism. There is no absolute reason to think 
that concepts developed in this context should not be translated to other contexts. To 
refuse to expose them to critical scrutiny is, however, to restrict the range of possible 
responses to new historical circumstances. This is a theme which I will continue to 
develop throughout the dissertation, particularly in Chapters 5 and 6. 
A second reason is more specific to cultural studies. The problem for the field in 
assuming a rationalist concept of power is that it distorts its sense of itself and its 
history. To read this history through a lens derived from French debates is to ignore a 
crucial difference: the relative absence in English-language intellectual traditions of a 
sustained address to power 'as such'. This difference in initial formation has meant 
ongoing differences in the whole inflection of the concept of power. In simple terms, 
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cultural studies has always been alive to precisely the question suppressed by Foucault: 
'Why the concept of power?' If the question has sometimes appeared as a challenge 
from hostile 'outsiders', it has also coloured the entire development of the field. The use 
of the concept of power has never been able to rest, as in France, on the assumption of 
an objective referent. It has been negotiated, instead, in relation to historical contexts 
and with a particularist sense of specific projects. And, in fact, when the history is 
examined closely, it becomes clear that a scepticism in relation to the concept has not 
been voiced only by cultural studies' critics: it has pervaded the field itself. 
When seen together, these two reasons are doubly compelling. If, indeed, new 
approaches are needed for thinking about cultural politics after the Cold War, cultural 
studies may have some of the resources for providing them. Rather than accepting a 
status as a faded copy or 'application' of European political theory, it might begin to 
take its own tum in dialogue, proposing alternative understandings of what politics can 
be. 
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Cultural Studies 'Before Power' 
In an interview with Raymond Williams in the late 1970s, the editorial committee of 
New Left Review summarises a series of responses to questions about his childhood and 
adolescence: 
One might say, then, that in your boyhood there was an absence of the typical 
town-country relation, absence of direct confrontation between privileged 
exploiters and working people, an absence of antagonism between manual and 
mental labour. Your early experience appears to have been exempt from a 
whole series of typical conflicts and tensions which most people of your 
generation from working-class families would have felt at some point. Your 
own history seems to have escaped nearly all of them (New Left Review in 
Williams 1979: 35). 
The repetitive emphasis of this resume - if not by Perry Anderson, then by close 
collaborators Anthony Barnett or Francis Mulhern - reflects a certain frustration at an 
inability to locate Williams in relation to structural contradictions in British society. 
After a failure of various attempts to draw him on the issue, his biography begins to 
appear as lacking any positive political points of reference, as nothing more than a 
series of 'absences'. Even the accumulated evidence of these absences leaves Williams 
unmoved; he does not attempt to deny them: 'I think it is true' (Williams 1979: 36). 
Yet his response cannot have been surprising. Williams' view of his own formation 
remained quite consistent throughout his life. It can be traced back twenty years to 
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'Culture is Ordinary' (first published 1958), where he denied a sense of contradiction 
between his Welsh working-class background and studying at Cambridge: 
I was not ... oppressed by Cambridge. I was not cast down by old buildings, for 
I had come from a country with twenty centuries of history written visibly into 
the earth: I liked walking through the Tudor court, but it did not make me feel 
raw ... Nor was learning, in my family, some strange eccentricity; I was not, on 
a scholarship to Cambridge, a new kind of animal up a brand-new ladder. 
Leaming was ordinary; we learned where we could (Williams 1989b: 5). 
At this point, furthermore, his self-understanding was clearly consistent with his 
political vision. Responding to an argument, particularly common among Marxists at 
the time, that working people were 'excluded from English culture', he dismisses it 
simply as 'nonsense': 
They [ working people] have their own growing institutions, and much of the 
strictly bourgeois culture they would in any case not want. A great part of the 
English way of life, and of its art and learning, is not bourgeois in any 
discoverable sense ... The leisure which the bourgeoisie attained has given us 
much of cultural value. But this is not to say that contemporary culture is 
bourgeois culture ... There is a distinct working-class way of life (Williams 
1989b: 7-8). 
It was not only that Williams himself did not feel 'excluded'; he doubted whether any 
systematic exclusion existed. 
The frustration, then, is not one of thwarted expectations but of a more substantial 
incomprehension: How could Britain's leading socialist writer of the postwar period not 
have been inspired by a stronger sense of social injustice? It is a question which had 
been raised more aggressively by Anderson in 'Origins of the Present Crisis' where he 
traced it to the 'proletarian positivity' of the English working class (Anderson 1964: 
44). The criticism was extended not only to Williams but also to Richard Hoggart: 
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The whole dense, object-infested universe described by Haggart in The Uses of 
Literacy testifies to the monumental positivity of the oldest working-class in the 
world. Too much so ... The very density and specificity of English working-
class culture has limited its political range and checked the emergence of 
socialism in England. Williams' attempt to solve the difficulty by attributing an 
indefinite extendability to working-class ... institutions, besides its factual 
weakness, rests on an evacuation of conflict concepts from his whole idiom 
(Anderson 1964: 45). 
The later interview with Williams, along with others collected in Politics and Letters, 
was conducted in a spirit of reconciliation, occasioned particularly by Williams' much-
celebrated tum to 'rejoin a wider international Marxist debate' (New Left Review in 
Williams 1979: 9). Yet it is clear that differences in political assumptions and 
motivations remain. They are differences which run as continuing tension through the 
history of the British New Left. 
The relation of cultural studies to this history is paradoxical. While Williams and 
Haggart are generally recognised, together with E.P. Thompson, as the key 'founders' 
of the field in Britain, it is the position represented by Anderson which is usually taken 
to define it. The consensus here is succinctly stated by Graeme Turner in his 
introduction to British cultural studies: 'Work in cultural studies has consistently 
addressed itself to society's structures of domination' (Turner 1996: 5). The view is one 
for which the early work of Williams and Haggart can only appear ambiguously -
present, as Williams appeared to New Left Review, only as an absence. The pair are 
sometimes referred to, with post-feminist irony, as the 'founding fathers', but if we are 
to invoke metaphors of patriarchal gender relations they might better be described as 
'mothers'. By most accounts, they provided little more than fertile ground on which the 
seeds of others were laid. As Turner puts it of Williams' The Long Revolution, 'it lacks 
a theory of cultural structure and an appropriate method of textual analysis ... It is 
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difficult to read the book's focus on the constitutive "patterns" of cultural relationships 
... without regretting the absence of structuralist methodologies' (Turner 1996: 55, 57). 
The achievement of the book, for Turner, was to offer a receptive matrix for cultural 
studies, 'ready for the influence of European Marxism and structuralism to provide the 
methodologies for its future development' (58). 
My aim in this chapter is to offer a more positive account of the early initiatives in 
British cultural studies. My motivation in doing so is not so much to right a historical 
wrong as to open the way for a different understanding of cultural studies in the present. 
As I will argue in Chapter 3, the introduction of Marxism and structuralism which 
occurred during the 1970s was less revolutionary than it has often been seen. The shift 
was certainly significant, but the new theoretical imports did not enter an empty vessel; 
they were overlaid on well-formed intellectual and political positions which 
transformed them as much as those positions themselves were transformed. To 
represent European 'theory' as providing the only positive terms for the development of 
cultural studies is, therefore, systematically to distort our understanding of it. Most 
significantly, it limits the resources on which the field is now able to draw. The situation 
has a certain perversity: precisely the qualities which have made cultural studies 
distinctive in relation to comparable intellectual traditions - its differences from 
'European Marxism and structuralism' - are ruled out of consideration as it seeks to 
reinvent itself after the Cold War. 
At the centre of these issues is the concept of power. The concept is, in many ways, the 
defining 'absence' attributed to the first generation of British cultural studies, an 
absence set off against a more recent 'presence'. It is this opposition which determines 
the peculiar relation of the field to its own past. If, as Turner suggests, it was only with 
the introduction of European theoretical perspectives that questions of power could be 
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adequately addressed, then it can only have been then that cultural studies came 
properly to 'exist'. The ambiguous status of Williams and Hoggart follows directly from 
this logic. Their absence of address to power locates them outside the field whose birth 
they can only appear as vaguely 'facilitating'. If the relation, then, between the first and 
later generations of cultural studies is to be reviewed, it is the use and significance of 
the concept of power which, above all, must be examined. 
My suggestion in what follows is that the point of difference between early cultural 
studies and later theoretical perspectives needs to be recast. The distinction to be made 
is not so much whether questions of power are addressed as the style which is adopted 
in doing so. To return to the terms of the Introduction, the distinction is between 
empiricism and rationalism, between an assumption of a plurality of powers and an 
assumption of a single, global phenomenon 'power'. It is true that the term is relatively 
absent from early British cultural studies, but such an absence cannot be simply equated 
with an absence of address to the phenomena it identifies. What has been at stake in the 
use of the term (in the singular) is only whether these phenomena should be totalised as 
instances or aspects of the one phenomenon. Any 'absence' from the work of Williams 
and Hoggart is therefore only a relative one. It is more important in understanding the 
history of cultural studies to recognise the presence of quite a different approach to 
questions of power (or powers). This approach may have become relatively invisible, 
but it has continued to exercise a significant influence. 
None of this is to judge, in absolute terms, the relative merits of empiricism and 
rationalism. My position throughout the dissertation is that it there is little sense in 
<ioing so. The two intellectual styles respond to different historical circumstances and 
can only be assessed in terms of the quality of responses to those circumstances. The 
weaknesses of early cultural studies in the context of Britain in the 1970s and 1980s 
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have been more than adequately rehearsed and were partly conceded, at least by 
Williams. My proposal is only that recognition also be given to its possible strengths. 
These have sometimes been seen most clearly by observers who are somewhat 
removed. A striking example is Jean-Claude Passeron's contrast between 'French' and 
'English' approaches to the study of class in his introduction to the French edition of 
Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy: 
The discussion of the realities of class is certainly to the credit of numerous 
fractions of the French intellectual milieu, but it is not altogether wrong to 
suppose that its theoretical and abstract tone serves also to keep at bay a whole 
set of realities at once simple and scandalous - or worse than scandalous, 
vulgar. The whole empirical force of these realities is evident when a 
description at once ethnographic and autobiographical such as Richard 
Hoggart's brings them into focus directly, above literary artifice and scholarly 
exercises (Passeron 1971: 130). 
Passeron, best-known as a co-author with Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1979; 1990; Bourdieu, Chamboredon et al. 1991; Bourdieu, Passeron et al. 1994), was 
fully engaged in precisely the theoretical projects which cultural studies came, after 
Hoggart, to admire. It is instructive, then, at the point where Hoggart himself has almost 
been forgotten, to see that a certain admiration has also flowed the other way. 
It has often been suggested that one of the revolutionary moments of post-war cultural 
criticism was Roland Barthes' analysis in 1959 of a cover of the magazine Paris Match 
picturing an African soldier saluting the French flag. As Stephen Muecke writes in his 
recent book No Road, it was, for many, a moment of revelation: 
Being at the time of the Algerian war, this image was that of a European power 
sending a clear ideological message about its relationship to its colonies. But 
what was new and surprising about Barthes' analysis was that previously 
nobody expected to find ideology while flicking through popular magazines in 
the hairdresser's (Muecke 1997: 168). 
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But exactly contemporary with Barthes' essay was a less-remembered 'English' 
revolution which needs to be understood in different terms - the moment when Richard 
Hoggart's grandmother's ironing appeared as an object of serious contemplation before 
an educated reading public. Unlike Barthes' ideological analysis of popular culture, 
Hoggart did not seek to connect ordinary experience with issues of world-historical 
importance, to capture the weighty political significance of ideology or myth. He 
showed simply that it could be considered in its cultural specificity, for no more than 
what it is. 
Two PARADIGMS? 
Before the case can be made more fully, some work is required to disentangle Williams 
and Hoggart from received accounts of their significance. The major point of reference 
here is Stuart Hall's 'Cultural Studies: two paradigms', which set much of the 
framework for representing the relation between the early initiatives in cultural studies 
and later theoretical perspectives. The essay is in many ways unique in the sympathy 
and depth of understanding it shows for both sides. As I will argue in Chapter 3, much 
of the significance of Hall within British cultural studies has been in maintaining a 
productive tension between the 'first' and 'second' generations in the field. While he is 
often read simply as a 'theorist', he has always retained a connection with what he 
called the 'indigenous' or 'native' tradition (Hall 1996b: 33), a connection which goes 
well beyond mere sentimental attachment or personal loyalty. But his major public 
statement on the specificity of this tradition was made at a high point in the ascendancy 
of European theoretical imports. It is deeply marked by the 'structuralist moment' and 
.has never seriously been revised. 
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The 'structuralist' bias of Hall's account is evident in its very title. The term 'paradigm' 
has perhaps softened now to the point where it sometimes means little more than 
'approach'. But in the 1970s and early 1980s it had a more precise meaning, derived 
particularly from Thomas Kuhn's (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In 
drawing his points of contrast, Hall assumes, as Kuhn had argued, that intellectual 
positions are informed by general governing principles which structure thought and 
perception. The provenance of the assumption is explicitly anti-empiricist. What is 
important in examining a position is not - so the argument goes - its relation to 
'experience' or 'evidence', but the categories it employs in organising experience. The 
classical exposition of the general perspective is in Kantian and post-Kantian 
philosophy, in which 'forms' of thought and experience are considered in abstract from 
their specific 'contents'. 
Such a mode of analysis is thoroughly at odds with early British cultural studies. As 
Hall himself recognises, one of the most distinctive characteristics of the latter was its 
resistance to abstraction (Hall 1996b: 39). This was a resistance, most notably, to the 
separation out of different instances of the social - 'culture', 'the economy', 'social 
institutions' - as if these had a merely external or mechanical relation with each other. 
But it was also a resistance to the separation out of forms or structures of thought and 
perception from their contents. The style of thought represented by Williams and 
Haggart is strongly historical. Ideas, like other cultural phenomena, are related to the 
particular times and places in which they take form and are not seen as transcending 
them. Hence there is no question of distinguishing general structures from the various 
instances in which they are merely 'instantiated' or 'applied'. 
What occurs in Hall's essay is not, therefore, a neutral representation of early cultural 
studies, but an active translation of its concerns into a different intellectual idiom. There 
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is an obvious context for this in his efforts to mediate between different generations and 
intellectual commitments whose relations had become fraught, if not openly 
antagonistic. The essay can be read as an attempt to address what he describes at one 
point as 'the sectarian and self-righteous climate of critical intellectual work in 
England' in which 'arguments and debates have most frequently been over-polarized 
into their extremes' (Hall 1996b: 42). The desire to establish a more productive 
dialogue leads Hall to seek terms in which different positions can be represented to each 
other. Given the ascendancy of 'structuralism', it is from the structuralist lexicon that 
these terms are drawn. Hence, early British cultural studies, cast as 'culturalism', is 
tailored for diplomatic purposes as a fully-respectable 'paradigm'. 
Hall's achievement here should not be underestimated. It is probable that no better 
solution could have been found at the time and it succeeded, at least, in ensuring that 
dialogue at some level remained open. This does not mean, however, that the strategy 
remains good for all time. In fact, it has increasingly come to have an opposite function 
from that which Hall initially intended it. Its long term effect has been to place the early 
work of Williams and Hoggart in an inherently weak position in which it can be 
represented only in terms which are not its own. The result has been to burden it with 
criticisms which appear insurmountable, consigning it effectively to the dustbin of 
history. 
The most damaging of these criticisms have been charges of 'expressivism', 
'humanism' and 'essentialism', all of which claim to identify uncritical or dogmatic 
ontological assumptions. The terms derive from Althusserian Marxism, but have 
· survived well beyond the point where Althusser himself has faded from view. Their 
sense was originally developed out of quite a specific engagement with 'Hegelian' 
versions of Marxism which gained considerable influence in France in the postwar 
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period (Althusser 1971 ). In the wake of the Liberation, the French Communist Party and 
other Marxist-inspired left political movements attempted to claim some of the aura of 
nationalist mythology by emphasising collective human agency in effecting historical 
change. Support was found at the doctrinal level in the rediscovery of the 'early Marx' 
which still showed the clear influence of Hegelian conceptions of the realisation of the 
human subject in History. Althusser's theoretical project can be read as an attempt to 
head off what he saw as fundamentalist tendencies in this development (Benton 1984: 
14ft). While 'humanist' Marxism congratulated itself on its distance from Stalinism, it 
was, in his view, no less prone to dogma. The root of this dogma lay, he argued, in an 
absolute faith in a human 'essence' which, while it was held to exist independently of 
specific historical contexts, was believed nevertheless to 'express' itself in historical 
processes. 
The translation of Althusserianism to the British context was assisted by two factors. 
The first was an identification by Althusser between 'essentialism' and 'empiricism'. In 
the French context, 'empiricism' had already become established in left political 
debates as little more than a term of abuse, being closely associated with the 
authoritarianism of Stalinist claims to possession of the 'facts' of history. Althusser's 
provocation was to suggest that humanist Marxism, which saw itself as rejecting 
empiricism in this sense, was in fact little different from the positions it claimed to 
oppose: If 'empiricism' presupposed an essence in objective reality, then 'humanism' 
presupposed an essence in human subjectivity; one could be seen as merely the mirror 
of the other. In the British context, the significance of Althusserianism was quite 
different. Given that versions of empiricism were openly professed, it did not trap its 
interlocutors in the contradictions of their own logic, but appeared instead as an assault 
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on the very style of intellectual debate. The term 'empiricism' functioned, however, as 
an important point of translation. 
The second factor in easing this translation was, ironically, attempts by some to oppose 
it. The most significant of these for cultural studies was E.P. Thompson's The Poverty 
of Theory (1978). While Thompson was virulent in his opposition to Althusserian 
'theoretical practice', his engagement with Althusser succeeded in casting empiricism 
as, precisely, a 'theoretical' position. The paradox is one which Anderson had 
recognised as afflicting any attempt to provide empiricism with a general theoretical 
defence. The most common of these was an appeal to the criterion of 'verifiability'. As 
Anderson noted, 'Empiricism pushed to this extreme was subversive of the very 
experience it should have underwritten: the criterion of verifiability was itself 
notoriously unverifiable' (Anderson 1968: 21). But the significance of Thompson's 
anti-theoretical theorising goes further than this. In rejecting Althusser' s emphasis on 
'structure', he appealed to the category of human 'agency', appearing in doing so to 
confirm his vulnerability to Althusserian criticisms. The emphasis on agency appears 
not only in overt polemic, but also thematises Thompson's monumental The Making of 
the English Working Class (1963) which, in its framing rhetoric, might perhaps be 
described as 'expressivist'. 
Much of the confusion over the significance of early British cultural studies has resulted 
from a tendency to make Thompson the representative figure. The precedent here was 
set, again, by Hall. He is clearly aware in 'Cultural Studies: two paradigms' of 
substantial differences between Thompson and Williams - differences, as he points out, 
which were sharply articulated by Thompson himself in a review of Williams' The Long 
Revolution. Yet when he comes to summarise the general principles of 'culturalism', it 
is Thompson's positions, not Williams', which are abstracted. Hoggart, who showed 
109 
Richard Hoggart's Grandmother's Ironing 
little interest in general theoretical debates, disappears from view entirely. The result is 
that Williams and Haggart are assimilated first to Thompsonism and then, more 
bizarrely, to Althusser's 'Hegelianism'. However much Hall resists the polemical 
tendencies of British Althusserianism, he is compelled in conclusion to indicate general 
'weaknesses' in early cultural studies. These are almost exactly the weaknesses which 
Althusser had identified in 'humanism': a tendency to voluntarism and populism, 
theoretical inadequacy, a nai"ve 'expressivist' view of social totalities and a 
fundamentalism of subjective 'experience'. It is at this point that Hall's continued 
attachment to early cultural studies comes to appear, despite protestations, as little more 
than sentimental. 
The full extent of the damage here becomes evident in Paul Gilroy's There Ain't No 
Black in the Union Jack (1987), where the claimed essentialism of Williams and 
Haggart becomes further associated with a fundamentalism of race and nation. Gilroy 
takes the point so far as to associate Williams with the racial exclusionism of Enoch 
Powell and Peregrine Worsthome: 
The distinction which Powell and W orsthome make between authentic and 
inauthentic types of national belonging, appears in an almost identical form in 
the work of Raymond Williams. It provides a striking example of the way in 
which the cultural dimensions of the new racism confound the left/right 
distinction (Gilroy 1987: 49). 
It is unlikely that Hall would have pressed quite the same charge, but he contributed to 
the context in which it could be made. A clear suggestion of his characterisation of 
Williams was that he claimed experience as 'authenticating' in some absolute sense (see 
Hall 1996b: 45). This is a characterisation not so much of empiricism as of positivism. It 
is in the confusion between these two that the left/right distinction in British politics is 
'confounded'. Significant differences in political and intellectual orientation are erased 
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as the entire terrain to which they belong becomes identified simply with 
'conservatism'. 
'THE PRESENT VIEW OF THE OBJECT' 
It should now be possible to ask, however, whether this tendency is not reversible. 
When viewed outside the context of the debates above, the association between early 
British cultural studies and 'Hegelianism' appears as highly idiosyncratic. There is no 
direct evidence in Williams or Hoggart of any significant influence from the German 
metaphysical tradition. Where the latter is recognised - as an influence, for example, on 
some of the writers reviewed by Williams in Culture and Society - it generally appears 
in a negative light (see, particularly, his comments on Carlyle in Williams 1958: 76-7). 
Williams was much criticised, in fact, for his reluctance to engage with continental 
philosophy. Hoggart was so remote from doing so that the point has not even been 
considered worth making. Nor were either involved in the kinds of liberationist politics 
which Althusser set out to criticise in France. The logic of translation from French to 
English debates belonged to a particular historical conjuncture and has no more 
substantial justification. 
It is questionable whether an alternative philosophical genealogy should be sought for 
the early work of Williams and Hoggart; it may be better to say simply that it did not 
owe much to philosophy. It is useful, however, in freeing it from the terms through 
which it has been read, to consider a point of intersection with philosophical concerns. 
This is in a similarity in key terms and characteristic arguments with the more local 
tradition of British empiricism. Here there is at least some evidence, the most relevant 
reference being an essay on David Hume in Williams' Writing and Society. 
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The essay is significant not only in revealing clear connections between Burne's style of 
thought and Williams' own, but also in indicating how Williams regarded philosophy. 
He finds a precedent on this question in Hume himself, for whom philosophy was a 
variety of letters: 
We can quote his most recent and best biographer, Ernest Mossner, for the 
opinion that from the beginning Hume 'regarded philosophy as part-and-parcel 
of literature. To be a philosopher is to be a man of letters: the proposition was 
received by Hume and the eighteenth century as axiomatic' (Williams 1983: 
121). 
Williams cites this view in order to revive it; the remainder of his essay is an attempt to 
show that Burne's philosophy can still be read as a certain kind of writing. The 
important point in the argument is that the specialisation of philosophy in abstract 
'reason' does not distinguish it categorically from writing which is immersed in the 
particularities of 'experience'. It is a point, again, on which Williams follows Hume. As 
he understands Burne's empiricism, it is not a doctrine that reason gains authority from 
experience, but a view of the two as ultimately inseparable. 
It is significant that Williams does not attempt to justify this view in general terms; 
consistent with the style of thought to which it belongs, he traces the circumstances in 
which it arose. As he points out, Burne's historical position was perhaps unique: it was 
possible, in eighteenth century Scotland, to recognise the transformative power of a 
developing capitalist economy, to sense the tempo and texture of modernity, but not yet 
to have obvious cause to regard it as cataclysmic or revolutionary. The space of his 
thought was one which was sensitised to the kind of change which has since come to be 
.accepted as an inescapable dimension of modem life, but where it could be considered 
in a way that was even and contemplative. 
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It is in this context, for Williams, that the major themes of Hume' s philosophy are best 
understood. The most familiar of these is his empiricist scepticism, his distrust of 
reasoning from abstract or uni versalist premises: 
I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under 
the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of 
being entirely Hypothetical, and depending more upon Invention than 
Experience. Every one consulted his Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue and 
Happiness, without regarding Human Nature, upon which every moral 
Conclusion must depend (Hume quoted in Williams 1983: 123 ). 
Where Williams' interpretation of this differs from most is that he does not take it to be 
pitched exclusively at the level of formal argument; nor does he see it as preparing the 
way for an alternative ontology or conceptual system. Its impulse arises, he suggests, 
from a troubled relation between the formal discipline of writing and the elusive 
qualities of enthusiasm, passion and warmth of social engagement. It is on this point 
that Hume considers the weaknesses of other positions: 
I have notic'd in the Writings of the French Mysticks, and in those of our 
Fanatics here, that, when they give a History of the Situation of their Souls, 
they mention a Coldness and Desertion of the Spirit, which frequently returns, 
and some of them ... have been tormented by it many Years (Hume quoted in 
Williams 1983: 123). 
And it is on the same point that he is troubled by tendencies in himself: 
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my 
friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd and ridiculous, that I cannot find 
in my heart to enter into them any farther (Hume quoted in Williams 1983: 
127). 
For Williams, the whole of Hume's moral philosophy might be read as an attempt to 
develop a response to this problem - to define a new relation between reasoning and 
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experience, writing and social engagement, the time of the study and a wider world 
whose pace was visibly increasing. 
The distinctiveness of Hume's approach to this problem lies, for Williams, in a complex 
relation to convention. On the one hand, he directs an insistent scepticism against 
formalism and dogma, whether in social and political institutions or in thought and 
writing. As in the case of 'the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity', these 
qualities are taken more generally to imply a fixity and irrelevance. But on the other 
hand, he openly appeals to convention in defining a relation between reason and 
experience. This is evident in stylistic devices used to engage the assent of the reader, 
particularly small affirmative judgements on questions where a basis for common 
agreement is assumed- "tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable'. Hume admits that the 
use of such expressions might be seen to contradict his scepticism, but defends himself 
against the charge of authoritarian intent: 
[They] were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no 
dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own judgement, which are 
sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than 
any other (Hume quoted in Williams 1983: 128). 
While 'the present view of the object' may be conventional, it is also negotiable, being 
always qualified by the particular circumstances - 'according to the light' (128)- in 
which it arises. The approach is one which does not judge tradition and convention in 
themselves, but only for the kinds of communicative relation they do or do not allow. 
Williams' commentary on this is as revealing of himself as it is of Hume. While he 
notes certain limitations in Hume's thinking, and criticises some of the positions which 
have been abstracted from it, his exposition overall is clearly sympathetic. Most telling, 
perhaps, is a defence of Hume's position on religion: 
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[H]ere (we have still to observe, in twentieth-century England as well as in 
eighteenth-century Scotland) an obstinate kind of questioning, a scepticism, can 
lead, suddenly, to a cry of fire. Angry prejudices are released, only to tum 
suddenly and assume the name and body of love (Williams 1983: 130). 
There is no question, for Williams, that this concern must be taken seriously; but it is 
not, he argues, an objection which can be made against Hume. It is true that he 
questioned the consequences of religion as he saw it practiced and expounded, but this 
questioning never ignited a desire that the institution of religion itself be destroyed. 
Hume' s temper here is clearly regarded by Williams as a virtue, illustrating precisely 
the attractions of his style of thought: its ability, particularly, to combine an open 
tolerance - which does not wish people to be fundamentally other than they are - with a 
force of critical intellect brought to bear on petty dogmas, tyrannies and complacencies. 
There are unmistakable parallels between themes in Williams' own work and those he 
identifies in Hume. His classic formulation 'structures of feeling', is Humean in exactly 
the sense which he himself outlines, resisting an opposition between the formal aspects 
of phenomena and those qualities which give rise to affirmation. The same might be 
said of the idea of the 'long revolution'. Williams' vision of the process of democratic 
social transformation is not of one carried forward by 'an obstinate kind of questioning'; 
nor is it one in which tradition is simply rejected in favour of 'the new'. It is a process 
in which there is a gradual synchronisation of reasoning and experience, in which 
traditional institutions and conventions are gradually adjusted to respond to modernity. 
Perhaps most importantly, there are similarities in the principles employed in judging 
social or political arrangements. Like Hume, Williams insists on the qualification of 
j_udgements by the 'light' in which they are made: '[M]y general position [is] to seek the 
maximum disclosure of the circumstances of judgment, which would allow someone 
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else to dissociate himself from it; but then openly and not by a presumptive category' 
(Williams 1979: 34 7). 
It is here, then, that we might clarify some of the bearings of early British cultural 
studies. If Hume represents for Williams 'a whole movement of thought - in effect the 
movement of empiricism' (1983: 126), the 'empiricism' in question has a very different 
sense from that assumed by Althusser. When Althusser used the term it was an abstract 
metaphysics which he clearly had in mind- the positing of substances or 'essences' 
understood as independent not only from theoretical discourse but also from evidence. 
This is almost the opposite of Humean empiricism, which is distinguished precisely by 
a rejection of the metaphysical category of substance. The category, Hume argued, was 
a 'fiction of the antient philosophy'. The belief in substances was merely a habit of 
mind which reconciled the contradictory appearance in phenomena of similarities and 
variations through time: 'In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is 
apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue the same 
under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a substance, or 
original and first matter' (Hume 1978: 220). 
Similar caution is required in relation to 'humanism'. If Williams might be described as 
a 'humanist', it is in the same sense, again, as the term might be applied to Hume. As 
Williams summarises the basic assumptions, they are of 
the shared conventions of humane feeling; the certainty that these are embodied 
in the common language of approval and disapproval; the conviction that moral 
activity is the use of this language, and that reasoning is necessary mainly to 
confirm this use and to expose the inadequacy of other definitions of morals. 
(Williams 1983: 134) 
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These convictions might be criticised for many things, but the assumption of an 
ontological essence in 'man' or 'Spirit' is not one of them. Hume was no less sceptical 
of such assumptions than he was of a metaphysics of 'substances'. The point of this 
scepticism, for Williams at least, was precisely to deny to reason any absolute court of 
appeal. There is no alternative, in the Humean tradition, than to engage 
communicatively in 'the common language of approval and disapproval'; it is only from 
this that 'humane feeling' gains its point of reference. 8 
'POLICEMEN DON'T SHIT ROSES' 
One of the most immediately illuminating points to begin in considering the relevance 
of all this to questions of power is Williams' ambiguous 'conversion' to Marxism. 
Perhaps the most decisive passage appears in a discussion of the concept of hegemony 
in Marxism and Literature. Having given an outline of the concept, Williams considers, 
then rejects, an objection to its use: 
There is of course the difficulty that domination and subordination, as effective 
descriptions of cultural formation, will, by many, be refused; that the alternative 
language of co-operative shaping, of common contribution, which the 
traditional concept of 'culture' so notably expressed, will be found preferable. 
In this fundamental choice there is no alternative, from any socialist position, to 
recognition and emphasis of the massive historical and immediate experience of 
class domination and subordination, in all their various forms (Williams 1977: 
112). 
This is undoubtedly an important turning point in Williams' writing. His reference to 
the 'alternative language of co-operative shaping' is very close to a description of his 
own earlier work and the decision to reject it is clearly arrived at with difficulty. But the 
8 McKenzie Wark (1997: 194-6) has made a useful suggestion in coining the term 'Humean nature'. The 
term introduces a similar distinction to the one I am drawing between Humean empiricism and 
metaphysical humanism. 
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significance of the tum should not be overstated. The terms of Williams' engagement 
with Marxism remain very much his own. 
The point here was not lost on Terry Eagleton, one of the keenest observers at the time. 
As both a one-time student of Williams and a rising exponent of Marxist cultural 
criticism in Britain, Eagleton had an intense interest in the question. Like many others 
of a younger generation, he clearly sought the vindication of Williams' recognition of 
Marxist theory, but he could not help but find his tum to Marxism disappointing. The 
key term in contention is, significantly, 'experience': 
It is symptomatic ofWilliams's whole method that he should point to the 
experiential force of hegemony, as an index of its structural primacy. 
Hegemony is deeply, pervasively lived ... It goes logically with this confusion 
that his concept of hegemony is a structurally undifferentiated one: 'a central 
system of practices, meanings and values' which is not distributed into its 
constitutive economic, political and ideological formations. Williams' s 
rapprochement with Marxism is still, evidently, a fraught, dissentient, 
intellectually unclarified affair (Eagleton 1976: 23, original emphasis). 
Even in what appears to be Williams' clearest announcement of a commitment to 
Marxism, there is a crucial reservation. At no point are 'domination' and 
'subordination' recognised unequivocally as fundamental social realities; the terms are 
granted no further validity than that they correspond to a 'historical and immediate 
experience'. The decision to adopt them avoids any question of final correctness, 
appearing instead as a choice, given particular political commitments ('socialism'), of 
an appropriate 'language'. Williams does not so much reject an earlier position as find 
ways of adapting a Marxist vocabulary to what remains a highly sceptical view of 
, general theoretical principles. 
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The example is a striking illustration of my overall argument in this chapter: that the 
concept of power in early British cultural studies is an empiricist one. To use the terms I 
took from Barry Hindess in the Introduction, there is no assumption of an 'essence of 
effectiveness'. Where for Eagleton, 'domination' and 'subordination' are properly 
theoretical concepts, with a validity independent of experience, their status for Williams 
is quite different. They are concepts which have developed within particular historical 
contexts and whose meaning goes no further than those contexts. Any role for theory is 
limited, as in Humean philosophy, to a clarification of the ways in which they are used 
and a demonstration of the inadequacy of attempts to ground them at some more 
fundamental level. To return, alternatively, to the definition of empiricism proposed by 
Deleuze, 'domination' and 'subordination' are understood as designating 
'multiplicities'. With no guarantee of an essential identity between the phenomena 
which the terms describe, the latter appear as many, potentially, as the instances in 
which the terms are used. The same must hold of the concept under which they are most 
often capitalised: the concept, that is, of power. 
But to consider the issues only as they are clarified by an engagement with Marxism is 
also, in some ways, misleading. It suggests, firstly, that an attention to questions of 
power is confined to those who use the concept or related concepts in their most 
generalised forms - to those, that is, who speak of 'power' or 'domination' in the 
abstract. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it suggests an equation between 
generalised concepts of power and a recognition of social conflict. This equation is 
explicit in the way Williams frames his 'fundamental choice': on the one hand, the 
'language of co-operative shaping', on the other, the language of 'domination and 
subordination'. There is no place in this presentation of options for a consideration of 
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social relations which are neither co-operative nor subsumed under a generalised rubric 
of power. 
The point is important because it has haunted attempts to resist generalising theoretical 
tendencies in cultural studies. The problem was already present in Williams, whose 
work was always highly sensitised to Marxism even when not actually 'Marxist'. It can 
be stated as a simple dilemma: whether to emphasise conflict or whether to emphasise 
local differences and historical particularities.9 The 'fraught, dissentient, intellectually 
unclarified' character of Williams' Marxism can largely be attributed to a continuing 
discomfort with settling for either of these options against the other. References to 
conflict evoke, for Williams, a universal form of human relations, an implication which 
he must then strain to circumvent. But to avoid such references is to suppress an 
obvious dimension of social experience. The problem has proved remarkably persistent 
in cultural studies. As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6 it has re-appeared in recent 
attempts to disengage from general theories of domination. These attempts have been 
shadowed by much the same criticism which Anderson made of the early Williams: that 
he had 'evacuated conflict concepts from his whole idiom'. As Meaghan Morris has put 
it, borrowing terms from Michel de Certeau, the move against general theories of 
domination has been accompanied by a loss in cultural studies of a 'polemological 
edge' (Morris 1990: 31 ). 
For an indication of why the dilemma may be misleading, it is necessary to look to the 
figure in the development of British cultural studies who was least sensitised to 
Marxism: Richard Haggart. There is a paradox here: while Haggart is further than 
9 It was a dilemma which was personified, for Williams, by the figures of Marx ('conflict') and F.R. 
Leavis ('culture'). As is clear from 'Culture is Ordinary' , Williams' thought, from his days as a student 
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Williams from Anderson or Eagleton, he is not so open to their criticisms.10 There is a 
directness about social conflict in his writing which is not hedged by elaborate 
qualifications. A dislike of an artificial smoothing of human relations is, in fact, one of 
his most persistent themes. As he put it in The Uses of Literacy: 
'Everyone's entitled to his own opinion' may indicate strength or weakness; but 
when, as today, it is constantly surrounded by appeals for the 'open mind' and 
for 'broadmindedness' - open for its own sake and broad enough not to cause 
any unpleasantness by requiring disagreement from anyone - one knows where 
the emphasis lies (Haggart 1957: 177). 
Yet Haggart is the figure, more than any other, who resisted both a generalised concept 
of power and universalising theoretical tendencies. His blindness to Marxism 
undoubtedly had its costs - in an inability, particularly, to engage with the concerns of a 
younger generation. But it is a blindness which may now have a certain virtue. 
Hoggart's writing preserves the memory of different understanding of conflict - not as 
an index of structural contradictions but as a contingent quality of social encounters. 
A good example here is his comments on the relation between working class 
communities and the police - an issue more famously addressed from a 
'Marxist' perspective by Stuart Hall and others (1978) in Policing the Crisis. 
There is no question, for Haggart, that the relation has always involved a major 
element of conflict and he is critical of those who fail to recognise it. In an essay 
at Cambridge, was always located somewhere in the tension between these two (see Williams 1989b: 3-
18). 
~
0 It is interesting to note, in passing, that Hoggart' s own early impressions of Williams were less than 
favourable. In a review of The Critic, a journal set up by Williams and Wolf Mankowitz as a left 
engagement with Leavisism, he wrote: 'To begin with there is too much jingling of critical loose change, 
notably by Raymond Williams, who tricks out the sound stem of a dialogue on actors with rosettes of 
brightly turned platitudes' (quoted in Steele 1997: 123). 
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of 1960 on television, for example, he calls attention to the absence of 
representations of conflict in the popular police drama Dixon of Dock Green: 
Traditional working-class attitudes to the 'cops' were a compound of suspicion, 
scorn, laughter, and respect. Compare that with the clean, simplified, kindly 
figure of the 'cop' in Dixon. Where is the world in which the police beat you up 
at the station if you've made it difficult for them to get you there? in which you 
suspect they always stick together and will lie to the magistrates to do so? in 
which you believe they are lenient with the local nobs? (Haggart 1970: 158) 
The observation is not an isolated one; similar criticisms are made of 
'concerned' social documentaries: 'on the "colour" problem, nuclear warfare, 
"the problem of youth", and so on'. These are, for Haggart, 'informed with 
intelligent good intentions' but 'almost always off-key, irrelevant to the lived 
pressure and depth and grotesqueness of "problems"': 
Most of them give as nearly as they can a "balanced", an "objective" picture, 
one which represents a "fair cross-section" of the "typical people" involved in 
the "problem". I wonder what effect they have at the level at which we say 
"bloody niggers" or "those damn teenagers ought to be horsewhipped" 
(Haggart 1970: 154). 
Yet the analysis is quite distinct from a critique of ideology, attempting to 
expose an 'underlying' structure of relations which there is an interest 
somewhere in concealing. As Haggart goes on to clarify his remarks on police 
violence: 
I am not saying these qualities exist all the time and are unrelieved. But one 
knew and knows that they do exist, within a whole texture of attitudes to the 
police, a texture that has been formed in the stress of experience, a texture that 
is not simply mean and suspicious but is subtle and qualified (Haggart 1970: 
158). 
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As part of a 'whole texture', conflict does not reveal a more fundamental level 
of reality than other qualities of social relations. It is to be noted in a 
documentary mode rather than taken up as a key for analytic penetration. 
Hoggart's lead in this is not so much from any intellectual authority as from 
traditional English working-class culture. As he relates it in later 
autobiographical reflections: 'The standard working-class phrase before all 
discreditable behaviour in the police was the dour: "Policemen don't shit roses"' 
(Haggart 1988: 128). 
Here, then, is a 'purer' empiricism with respect to power than can be found in 
Williams. Society, for Haggart, is composed of a multiplicity of powers - the 
powers of the police, the magistrates, the bosses, as well as those available to 
working-class communities. The exercise of these powers is often dominative 
and sometimes violent, but such qualities do not represent a fundamental social 
'truth'. Powers have relations with other powers - the magistrates with certain 
middle class institutions, the police with the 'local nobs' - but these relations are 
contingent. They are not reducible to a basic structuring principle which would 
allow power to be considered as one. 
Haggart is quite aware of a more totalising view of power as well as its 
tendency to fasten on evidence of conflict. He recognises it most explicitly in his 
essays on student politics and changes in universities during the late 1960s: 
The extreme student radicals argue that society is thoroughly corrupted and at 
bottom authoritarian; that the amiable part-yielding that it (like the universities) 
seems capable of is worse than frank opposition because, in the end, it gets you 
nowhere but meanwhile blunts your cutting edge ... The much talked-about 
patience of the police is only a fa~ade. If anyone really tries to push things to 
the point at which they challenge the structure, then the mask is dropped and 
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the police become ruthless, exposed as the agents of naked power (Haggart 
1982: 27). 
But Haggart is more secure than Williams in holding to an alternative view. It is 
not necessary, as he sees it, to minimise conflict, merely to recognise it as part of 
a 'mongrel mixture of attitudes': 'There are a great many rigidities and 
snobberies ... But there are also a great many decencies' (Haggart 1982: 26). 
THE ORIGINS OF THE (PRESENT?) CRISIS 
If my argument so far is generally accepted, the interesting question which 
emerges is why an empiricism with respect to power has been eclipsed in more 
recent cultural studies. It becomes no longer possible to offer the common 
progressivist account according to which later theoretical positions replaced 
earlier positions because of a failure of the latter to recognise power. Nor can it 
be suggested that later positions have been superior in their recognition of social 
conflict. Attention must be directed to quite a different set of questions: Why has 
there been a tendency to totalise power? Why has power come to be considered 
in the abstract? Why has social conflict been so widely accepted as an index of 
structural contradictions? 
The answers to these questions can only be sought in the contexts in which the 
developments have taken place. For the British case, this requires us to look 
more closely at the history of the New Left, particularly its response to a rapid 
and massive expansion of what John Hartley has called the 'G-E-M' complex, 
the interlinked agencies of government, education and the media (Hartley 1999: 
5-7). The initial catalyst for this expansion was the war, which displaced 
unprecedented numbers of people from what had been their expected activities 
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and locations, involving them in more rationalised, centralised organisations. 
But the tendency was confirmed in the post-war period. Industrial restructuring, 
increasing prosperity and a removal of obstacles to social mobility all raised the 
prospect of a break-up of established class cultures. At the same time, previous 
limits to cross-demographic communication were breached as business and 
media organisations moved to establish 'mass' markets and audiences. Further 
contributing to the tendency was the development of the welfare state which 
required greater penetration by government agencies into 'ordinary lives'. 
The relevance of this to the above discussion is touched upon obliquely in 
Williams' essay on Hume. The greatest limitation of Hume's moral philosophy, 
for Williams, is that it is not immediately suited to contexts of social diversity. 
The problem is evident in an ambiguity in Hume's use of the word 'society' 
itself. At some points, it carries an old sense of 'the company of one's fellows'. 
Where this is the usage, appeals to shared conventions appear a plausible way of 
achieving consistency between individual reason and wider 'social' experience. 
But at other points, Hume refers to 'society' in the more abstract modem sense 
of a 'system of common life' (involving not only one's 'fellows' but also those 
with quite different experiences). As Williams identifies the problem: 
Hume, unconsciously assimilating 'society', at many points, to a sense not far 
from the class-based 'company of his fellows', misses what seems to me the 
central difficulty in his whole argument ... [He] is trying to generalize and even 
universalize, in the matter of virtue and society, while retaining within this 
crucial term not only an unconscious particularity but also, largely unanalysed, 
the essential complexities of the operative and connecting word. (Williams 
1983: 140). 
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In Hume's time, the problem may not have been acute: the intellectual discourse he was 
engaged in was still, effectively, a dialogue internal to a particular class, gender and 
geopolitical location. But where this condition no longer holds, the whole approach is 
brought into question. 
If there is any origin of the 'crisis' in English intellectual life identified by Anderson in 
1964, it appears to have been here, in the difficulty of adapting an empiricist style to 
increasingly pluralistic contexts of public discussion and debate. As Anderson, himself, 
pointed out in 'Components of the National Culture', English cultural criticism up to 
F.R. Leavis employed a characteristic mode of address. The reader was engaged with a 
rhetorical question which was implied, if not actually explicit: 'This is so, is it not?' 
( Anderson 1968: 52) So long as there are sufficient similarities of experience between 
addresser and addressee for the answer, in general, to be 'yes', then the strategy can 
work effectively; common ground can be negotiated for more developed arguments. But 
where, instead, the answer becomes uncertain, the very conditions for public discourse 
begin to evaporate. The problem is one which British cultural studies has faced from the 
outset. If anything is shared between Hoggart, Williams, E.P. Thompson and indeed 
Stuart Hall, it has been a sense of the urgency of addressing it. While immersed within 
strongly empiricist intellectual traditions, they have been, at the same time, highly 
exposed to social diversity. 
For Hoggart and Williams, this exposure had a strong personal dimension. As 
'scholarship boys' who had come to a university education from working-class 
backgrounds, they had had to negotiate it as part of their own development. As Hoggart 
. put it in The Uses of Literacy, the scholarship boy exemplified the 'anxious and 
uprooted' who could be recognised 'primarily by their lack of poise, their uncertainty' 
(Hoggart 1957: 291). He found it difficult to identify fully with the class from which he 
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had come. While normally he might have been inducted into the masculine world of 
work, his experience was, instead, of doing homework in a space cleared on the kitchen 
table among piles of ironing and cups of tea: 
With one ear he hears the women discussing their worries and ailments and 
hopes, and he tells them at intervals about his school and the work and what the 
master said. He usually receives boundless uncomprehending sympathy: he 
knows they do not understand, but still he tells them; he would like to link the 
two environments (Hoggart 1957: 296). 
Yet the scholarship boy was no more comfortable in the middle-class environment in 
which he later moved: 'He rarely feels the reality of knowledge, of other men's thoughts 
and imaginings, on his own pulses; he rarely discovers an author for himself and on his 
own' (297). 
But as Haggart saw, the scholarship boy was not unique; he was merely one of 'the 
more sensitive, though now bruised, tentacles of society. The main body of the whole 
ignores them; but the symptoms they show refer in some degree to all' (317). In the area 
of education, the scholarship system was only a precursor to a wider expansion of 
tertiary sector and it is here that the most significant developments occurred. As Tom 
Steele has pointed out, all the figures most closely involved in the early development of 
cultural studies began their careers in the area where this expansion first occurred: in 
adult education or the extra-mural sector of the universities (Steele 1997: 14-16). In a 
late essay, Williams makes it clear that this is where, for him, cultural studies first took 
form: 
[I]t can hardly be stressed too strongly that Cultural Studies in the sense we 
now understand it ... occurred in adult education: in the WEA, in the 
extramural Extension classes. I've sometimes read accounts of the development 
of Cultural Studies which characteristically date its various developments from 
texts. We all know the accounts which will line up and date The Uses of 
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Literacy, The Making of the English Working Class, Culture and Society, and 
so on. But already in the late forties ... Cultural Studies was extremely active in 
adult education. It only got into print and gained some kind of general 
intellectual recognition with those later books (Williams 1989a: 154 ). 
Williams is equally clear on the significance of adult education: it was a context in 
which modes of address could not be presumed. Like the scholarship boy, WEA or 
extension students often found themselves unable to 'feel the reality of knowledge on 
their own pulses'. This did not mean they rejected the knowledge that was offered to 
them, but it did mean an insistence on two conditions: '(I) that the relation of [it] to 
their own situation and experience had to be discussed, and (2) that there were areas in 
which the discipline itself might be unsatisfactory' (Williams 1989a: 156). It was out of 
this encounter that the new kinds of writing which became known as 'cultural studies' 
emerged. 
The history here has often been framed in terms of relations between 'high' and 
'popular' culture, particularly with reference to the confrontation between Leavisite 
literary criticism and new commercial forms of entertainment. But the problem of 
address was more general than this suggests. As Haggart pointed out in his writing on 
media, it also affected communication internal to 'popular' cultural forms. It was most 
extreme, in fact, in television, which faced 'a vast, unknown, unassessed, varying 
audience which has to be wan': 
This situation is not wholly limiting, but it can be inhibiting. How will a miner 
in South Wales or a woman in a North Yorkshire farmhouse or a solicitor in 
London take this? Will some be dangerously shocked? Dare I assume this? 
How far will most people go along with me ifl risk this? (Haggart 1970: 160) 
Such anxieties were not restricted to middle- or upper-class elites; they were also felt by 
those attempting to adapt themselves from older working-class publications: 'writers in 
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Britain are so used to working within known limits, not only of genre but of 
unconsciously-assumed audience, that they feel outfaced by the imponderables within a 
new medium of communication' (154). 
In considering the emergence, in this context, of a generalised concept of power, two 
factors appear particularly significant. The first was a widespread appeal, in response to 
the problem of address, to 'neutral' points of reference free of particular associations 
with any social group. As Haggart noted, such an appeal was very marked in the new 
'mass' media: 
mass communications tend to seek an 'objectivity' which can be pretty well 
statistically demonstrated, and, if necessary, defended against those literal-
minded pressure-groups which haunt all public organs of opinion. It may be, 
too, that there is a general tendency among individuals ... to hold to what is 
semi-scientifically demonstrable in preference to that which is called 'mere 
impressionism' or even 'mere interpretation' (Haggart 1970: 154). 
The suggestion of a more 'general tendency' is confirmed by Anderson's diagnosis, 
discussed in Chapter 1, of the need in Britain for 'fundamental concepts of man and 
society'. If Anderson is any guide, there can be little doubt that much of the attraction of 
European 'theory' in Britain was, initially, its apparent universality. A more abstract 
analytic vocabulary, augmented by 'foreignness', promised to transcend the particular 
contextual references of existing class cultures. 
The second factor which appears to have favoured a generalised concept of power was 
increasing levels of social suspicion. One of the clearest analyses of this development is 
in Williams' discussion in The Long Revolution of a common response to the loss of 
·confidence that one's experiences are shared. This is a 'retreat into private worlds' 
which are set up in abstract opposition to those 'others' - the 'masses' - who belong 
outside one's immediate sphere of meaning and control: 
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[l]nevitably, by this extending process, we are all converted into masses, for 
nowhere, in a world so composed, can our own individuality be fully 
recognized by others; they are turning away from us to establish their own. This 
is the experience we are now trying to face and interpret, at the limit of the 
meanings we know (Williams 1965: 114 ). 
The result of this tendency, for Williams, is a reduction of political options to a choice 
between 'romantic individualism' and 'authoritarian and abstract social thinking' (130). 
The individual or primary group becomes the only recognisable locus of affirmation 
while social involvement can be thought only in terms of manipulation for extrinsic 
ends: 'The image of society is then of something inherently bad: a restrictive, 
interfering, indifferent process, whether it claims the virtues of an established order or 
the creation of human brotherhood' (128-9). 
It seems reasonable to suggest that generalised concepts of power were a condensation 
of these two factors. If Hoggart and Williams are accepted as witnesses, the pressure to 
develop an 'objective' social vocabulary coincided in the 1950s and 1960s with a 
widespread sense of social hostility - an experience which did, in fact, transcend social 
classes. The concepts of power which began to take form from the late 1960s have 
sometimes been characterised as associating power with 'badness' or negativity. This 
association has been criticised, particularly from a 'Foucauldian' perspective, as a 
preface to suggesting that power might also be thought of as 'positive' or 'productive'. 
But the more significant development may have been that power was totalised. What 
had previously been understood in Hoggartian terms as distinct and specific powers 
came to be seen merely as variants - whether 'positive' or 'negative' - of a single, 
objective social phenomenon. 
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OF 'SNAIL-EATING FRENCHMEN' 
This development clearly crystallises in British cultural studies during the 1970s. But to 
proceed immediately to the adoption of generalised concepts of power might give an 
impression that it represents the only response to the 'crisis' outlined above. I wish to 
begin an argument here, to be continued throughout the dissertation, that this is not the 
case. If postwar developments in Britain have favoured generalised concepts of power, 
there have also been continued efforts to resist them or to dilute their implications. Such 
efforts have sometimes been identified with conservative opposition to cultural studies, 
but the situation has been more complicated. As I will point out in Chapter 3, the 
concept of power was quite well-established in other disciplines and projects before 
being taken up by cultural studies - not all of them, by any means, identified with the 
'left'. The field has not initiated its use so much as responded to its use by others. If 
there is any consistent pattern to the response, it has been ambivalence. For every move 
to engage the concept, there has been a move to back away. The history of cultural 
studies is as much a history of scepticism towards the concept as it is of enthusiastic 
embrace. 
This scepticism is articulated most clearly in the early work of Hoggart and Williams. In 
order to understand it, we need to take seriously their reservations about the idea of an 
objective hierarchy of social privilege or fundamental points of social contradiction. 
These lie, quite explicitly, in concerns about the ethics of address in contexts of social 
diversity. The assumption of an objective truth about social relations, however much it 
seems to involve sympathy for those addressed, leads, as Hoggart and Williams saw it, 
, to an insensitivity in observing their actual circumstances. As Hoggart put it of the 
'middle class Marxist': 
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He pities the betrayed and debased worker, whose faults he sees as almost 
entirely a result of the grinding system which controls him. He admires the 
remnants of the noble savage, and has a nostalgia for those 'best of all' kinds of 
art, rural folk-art or genuinely popular urban art, and a special enthusiasm for 
such scraps of them as he thinks he can detect today ... Usually, he succeeds in 
part-pitying and part-patronizing working-class people beyond any semblance 
of reality (Haggart 1957: 16). 
Williams' position was, at many points, similar. In The Long Revolution he rejects the 
assumption that class mobility from a working-class background can be seen in terms of 
an upward movement. As he points out, such an idea assumes a general equivalent 
against which class position can be measured, an equivalent which is implicitly middle 
class: 'We all like to think of ourselves as standard, and I can see that it is genuinely 
difficult for the English middle class to suppose that the working class is not desperately 
anxious to become just like itself' (Williams 1965: 324). The only response to this, for 
Williams, is to indicate that things can be imagined otherwise: 
I can only say for myself that I have never felt my own mobility in terms of a 
'rise in the social scale', and certainly I have never felt that I wanted to go on 
climbing, resentful of old barriers in my way: where else is there to go but into 
my own life? ... It is ... less the injustice of the British class system than its 
stupidity that really strikes me. People like to be respected, but this natural 
desire is now principally achieved by a system which defines respect in terms 
of despising someone else, and then in turn being inevitably despised (Williams 
1965: 349). 
The avoidance here of reference to a fundamental social injustice cannot be entirely 
explained by the uniqueness of Williams' personal experience; it also has a clear 
political motivation: To appeal to abstract measures of equality and inequality is to 
~ssume a general social norm, yet such an assumption is precisely what needs to be put 
in question in responding to diversity. 
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It was in the context of these concerns, in fact, that the concept of culture assumed a 
central importance. The significance of the concept, for Haggart and Williams, was to 
particularise, to deny points of reference external to the limited contexts in which 
habits, customs and forms of knowledge have emerged. The strategy is used to 
exemplary effect in Haggart' s rendition of class difference in The Uses of Literacy: 
To live in the working-classes is even now to belong to an all-pervading 
culture, one in some ways as formal and stylized as any that is attributed to, 
say, the upper-classes. A working-class man would come to grief over the right 
way to move through a seven-course dinner: an upper middle-class man among 
working-people would just as surely reveal his foreign background by the way 
he made conversation (the tempo of conversation, not only the matter of idiom), 
used his hands and feet, ordered drinks or tried to stand drinks (Haggart l 957: 
32). 
The position is contrasted against a view that class can be read off from objective social 
coordinates. Haggart does not believe that the working class has generally thought of 
the highly-educated as structurally dominant; nor does he see that they should: '[T]hey 
are on the whole just not interested in artists or intellectuals; they know of their 
existence, but regard them as oddities rarely seen within their orbit, like snail-eating 
Frenchmen' (183). 
The model of foreign relations here is significant. As Williams points out in his essay 
on Hume, it suggests a possible solution to the impasse of empiricism when faced with 
diversity. Hume himself was a notable contributor to the recognition of differences in 
experience where they occurred between different societies. To quote an example cited 
by Williams: 
In countries where men pass most of their time in conversation and visits and 
assemblies, these companionable qualities, so to speak, are of high estimation 
and form a chief part of personal merit. In countries where men live a more 
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domestic life and either are employed in business or amuse themselves in a 
narrower circle of acquaintance, the more solid qualities are chiefly regarded 
(Hume quoted in Williams 1983). 
One way of describing the project of early British cultural studies might be as an 
attempt to apply a similar principle of relativity to comparisons between moral systems 
within particular societies. As Williams puts it in The Long Revolution, 'we need to 
learn ways of thinking and feeling which will enable us genuinely to know each other in 
the other's terms' (Williams 1965: 117). The problem of address to those whose 
experiences one does not share is resolved through an appeal to models of translation 
and diplomacy. 
Williams' much-quoted definition of culture as 'the whole way of life' is, in some ways, 
unfortunate, as it suggests a totalising perspective. As applied by Williams, however, it 
is the opposite of totalising. The function of the definition is to resist the application of 
analytic categories which suggest easy equations between different contexts and 
experiences: 
Politics and art, together with science, religion, family life and other categories 
we speak of as absolutes, belong in a whole world of active and interacting 
relationships, which is our common associative life. If we begin from the whole 
texture, we can go on to study particular activities, and their bearings on other 
kinds. Yet we begin, normally, from the categories themselves, and this has led 
again and again to a very damaging suppression of relationships (Williams 
1965: 56). 
To 'begin from the whole texture' is to insist on contextual specificity. To see analytic 
categories as limited abstractions from that texture, rather than as having a substantive 
. or transcendental value, is to refuse a global perspective. Such a position requires an 
attention to 'particular activities'; relations between activities can only be seen in terms 
of imaginative translations. 
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To put the point, alternatively, in the terms I borrowed from Oakeshott in Chapter 1, the 
emphasis on 'culture' was, for Hoggart and Williams, an option for a politics of 
scepticism. The consistent refusal of a generalised concept of power is a refusal also to 
imagine society as available for comprehensive reform. The relevant contrast is sharply 
drawn by Williams in Culture and Society through a comparison between his own 
political position and Leninism. All that a socialist should wish for, for Williams, is that 
the 'channels of communication are widened and cleared'; what emerges as a result 
must be valued as 'an actual response to the whole reality'. The alternative view is that 
put by Lenin: 
Every artist ... has a right to create freely according to his ideals, independent 
of anything. Only, of course, we communists cannot stand with our hands 
folded and let chaos develop in any direction it may. We must guide this 
process according to a plan and form its results (Lenin quoted in Williams 
1958: 283). 
Williams' comment on the latter is an acerbic rejection: 'There is no "of course" about 
it, and the growth of consciousness is cheapened ... by being foreseen as "chaos"' 
(283). 
There is clearly some common ground between this position and certain forms of 
conservatism. But to move from this observation to simple equations would be to 
reduce left politics to comprehensive projects of social engineering. If the rigid 
binarisms of the Cold War often made such reductions difficult to avoid, early British 
cultural studies serves as a reminder of a greater complexity. A wariness of totalising 
social visions - including a totalising concept of power - has not been the sole preserve 
. of those with substantial interests to protect; it has also been articulated with the 
perspective in mind of those with relatively few resources. There are good reasons, from 
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such a perspective, to have reservations about issuing licenses for an overbearing 
intrusion of public agencies into everyday lives. 
'A WHOLE WAY OF CONFLICT' 
Where a generalised concept of power does emerge in British cultural studies, therefore, 
it emerges as an alternative strand to these already-established positions. The most 
significant text in this development appears to have been E.P. Thompson's review, 
mentioned earlier, of Williams' The Long Revolution. Despite its slenderness and now 
relative obscurity, it deserves to be seen as one of the more important documents in the 
early formation of cultural studies. As Hall (1980) makes clear in his account of the 
history of the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, it was an essential reference in 
the early 'curriculum' of the field. In many ways, it can be seen as laying the 
foundations, in Britain, for what is now recognised internationally as 'cultural studies'. 
Thompson's differences with Williams fasten immediately on the theme of social 
conflict. He opens by taking issue with a line from Williams in a review for the 
Guardian: 'You can feel the pause and effort: the necessary openness and honesty of a 
man listening to another, in good faith, and then replying' (Thompson 1961: 25). For 
Thompson, this betrays a misunderstanding of communication, even in the literary 
tradition to which Williams so often refers: 'Burke abused, Cobbett inveighed, Arnold 
was capable of malicious intent ... ' (25). But more seriously, Williams is charged for 
complicity with forms of social privilege: 
What is evident is a concealed preference - in the name of 'genuine 
communication' - for the language of the academy. And it is easy for the notion 
of 'good faith' to refer, not only to the essential conventions of intellectual 
discourse, but also to carry overtones - through Newman and Arnold to the 
formal addresses of most Vice-Chancellors today - which are actively offensive 
(Thompson 196 l: 25). 
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The knife is twisted on the issue of Williams' continued respect for the English literary 
tradition: 
Oh, the sunlit quadrangle, the clinking of glasses of port, the quiet converse of 
enlightened men! ... [H]ow wide (or narrow) does an opinion have to be to be 
handled with such deference - does it become part of The Tradition only when 
it can be washed down with port? (Thompson 1961: 25: 26-7) 
The reversal here of Haggart and Williams is complete: intellectuals are to the working 
class not as 'snail-eating Frenchmen' but as a fundamentally oppressive social presence: 
'the tone of the academy has seemed less than disinterested to those millions who have 
inhabited the "shabby purlieus" of the centres of learning' (25). Thompson even 
confirms Hoggart's suspicions of 'middle-class Marxists', casting Williams as a 
displaced and benighted Jude the Obscure (35). 
There are many points on which Thompson's arguments might be questioned: If Burke, 
Cobbett and Arnold were often abusive, how can measured attempts at understanding be 
associated with the literary tradition? Is 'pause and effort' necessary or likely in smug 
conversations between class-equals over glasses of port? Is the figure of 'pause and 
effort' intended by Williams as a description of communication in general or an ideal of 
how it can be? But to raise these questions is perhaps to miss the point. Thompson's 
conflictual vision of the social is not developed out of an argumentative engagement 
with Williams so much as a reaction to the whole tenor of his writing. He himself may 
have come closest to the truth in admitting 'I have a real problem with Raymond 
Williams tone' (24). 
What Thompson most objects to in Williams is a drift towards a kind of relativism. 
Williams has 'partially disengaged' from the socialist intellectual tradition (24), he has 
neglected the 'problems and approaches which have been the particular concern of the 
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socialist tradition' (28), 'he has tried to take in too much, over-reached himself, and is 
in danger of losing some of the ground he has really gained' (32), 'he has cast loose his 
moorings' (34 ). The thought of Williams at Cambridge - possibly with a glass of port in 
hand! - presents a category confusion which Thompson clearly finds intolerable. The 
idea of a 'long' revolution is similarly unacceptable. If there is a revolution, he argues, 
'then it is fair to suppose that it is a revolution against something (classes, institutions, 
people, ideas) as well as for something' (25). Williams fails to lead people towards 
'active confrontation' (28); 'there are no good and bad men in Mr Williams' history, 
only dominant and subordinate "structures of feeling"' (29). 
These objections anticipate a wider reaction against Williams on the part of a younger 
generation, a good example being Eagleton' s judgement on his writing: 
an elaborately formal, resoundingly public discourse ... a conjuring of weight 
out of emptiness which lacks all edge and abrasiveness. Concrete particulars are 
offered in such a modified, mediated and magisterial a guise as to be only dimly 
intelligible through the mesh of generalities ... It is a style which in the very act 
of assuming an unruffled, almost Olympian impersonality displays itself (not 
least in its spiralling modifications) as defensive, private and self-absorbed 
(Eagleton 1976: 8). 
Thompson's distinction between 'good and bad men' could be seen as responding, more 
generally, to a widely-felt disgust at a malaise in English intellectual life - a tendency 
which Anderson memorably described as a 'slow, sickening entropy': 'Today, Britain 
stands revealed as a schlerosed, archaic society, trapped and burdened by its past 
successes, now for the first time aware of its lassitude, but as yet unable to overcome it' 
(Anderson 1964: 50). A desire to inject some structuring principle into public debate 
can be found even in Hoggart: 
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We can soon put ourselves in a position in which we lie back with our mouths 
open, whilst we are fed by pipe-line, and as of right, from a bottomless 
cornucopia manipulated by an anonymous 'Them'. One would be happier if the 
dislike of authority were more often an active dislike, implying a wish to stand 
on one's own feet ... We are moving towards a world of what Alex Comfort 
has called 'irresponsible obedients'; it would be better if more were 
'responsible disobedients'(Hoggart 1957: 196). 
Williams appears, in this context, to have been trapped by the very tendencies he so 
clearly diagnosed. In the absence of a sense of ongoing material bases for shared 
experience, the very appeal to experience comes to appear as mere subjectivism, lacking 
in any public principle. 
The significance of Thompson's intervention is in offering a vigorous solution. Within 
the terms of this solution, themes of conflict are only a vehicle for establishing objective 
points of reference. An important strategy here is a deployment of figures of violence. 
Williams' history of the 1840s is accused by Thompson of ignoringjailings, deaths and 
tyrannical abuse: 'tens of thousands of handloom weavers starved out of their "whole 
way of life" at home and with millions starved out theirs in Ireland' (Thompson 1961: 
29). But the point is taken further, illustrating precisely why, for Williams, reference to 
conflict was always fraught with difficulties: 'Suffering', Thompson argues, 'is not just 
a wastage on the margin of growth: for those who suffer it is absolute' (29). The clear 
implication is that it licenses a certain categorical absolutism, dividing the world into 
'oppressed' and 'oppressors', 'good' and 'bad' men. 
Thompson's commitment to certain fundamentals defines an entirely different 
intellectual terrain, a terrain which can be outlined through a number of significant 
features. The first are the twin concepts of 'interests' and 'ideology'. Thompson's 
understanding of conflict as a strictly social phenomenon implies objective stakes 
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around which positions are organised. Material interests are posited as a point of 
political orientation entirely independent of cultural forms: 
[l]t is not clear to me how 'universal participation' or a 'common culture' can 
'dismantle the barriers of class' which are also barriers of interest: if improved 
communication enabled working people to understand better the way of life of 
the corporate rich they would like it less, and feel the barriers of class more 
(Thompson 1961: 36). 
The question here is not whether Thompson sees material interests as determining 
cultural forms - whether, in Marxist terms, he sees a causal relation between 'base' and 
'superstructure'. What is important is that he abstracts them from each other. It is only 
at this point that it becomes possible to ask what relations pertain between the 
abstracted terms. Once this question is asked, we are faced with the classical problem of 
ideology: how does culture contribute to - or how is it determined by - objective 
regimes of material interest? For Thompson, this is exactly the question which should 
be posed: '[I]t is only when the systems of communication are placed in the context of 
power-relationships that we can see the problem as it is. And it is the problem of 
ideology' (37). 
A second major feature of Thompson's program is a redefinition of the concept of 
culture. This follows from the effective displacement of the concept by the concepts of 
'interests' and 'ideology'. If any sense is retained of culture as a 'whole way of life', 
then the concept comes to do double duty: it appears as both the way of life and an 
element within the way of life. 11 Williams drew attention to this problem in Culture and 
11 John Frow has argued that this confusion remains a basic problem in cultural studies: 'The central 
"anthropological" version of the concept of culture ... is a serious embarrassment ... The main line of 
filiation here is to Raymond Williams ... [C]ulture both is the "way of life" and is the "meanings and 
values" in that way of life; the "way of life" and the "culture" are at once identical and in an expressive 
relation based on some ontological distinction between them' (Frow 1995: 7-8). But to trace the problem 
to Williams is unfair. Frow overlooks the fact that he was the first to point it out. 
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Society, as one affecting the Marxism of the 1930s.The use of the term 'culture' by 
Marxists was, he argued, inconsistent: 
It normally indicates, in their writings, the intellectual and imaginative products 
of a society; this corresponds with the weak use of 'superstructure'. But it 
would seem that from their emphasis on the interdependence of all elements of 
social reality, and from their analytic emphasis on movement and change, 
Marxists should logically use 'culture' in the sense of a whole way of life, a 
general social process (Williams 1958: 282). 
Thompson approaches the question on the assumption that a distinction between culture 
and objective 'interests' is a given: 'Any theory of culture must include the concept of 
the dialectical interaction between culture and something which is not culture' 
(Thompson 1961: 33). This means that the concept acquires the relatively specialised 
sense of 'the intellectual and imaginative products of a society'. It is defined as a 
specific instance within social totalities, losing its association with a resistance to 
analytic abstraction. 
A third significant feature is a perceived need for general 'theory' and a tum to 
European sources to provide it. Once 'interests', 'ideology' and 'culture' are posited as 
objective social phenomena, then an account of their relations seems to be required. The 
English literary tradition could not provide such an account because it was not a 
sociological tradition; it was a tradition of situated argument through imaginative 
categories of thought. As Thompson points out, Williams is 'still' within this tradition: 
'I must record my view that he has not yet succeeded in developing an adequate general 
theory of culture' (Thompson 1961: 28). The lack of a general theory is immediately 
experienced as embarrassing. For Thompson, Williams' cast of interlocutors were 
theoretical light-weights who tended to talk 'out of the top of one's head'(30): 
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The Tradition (if there is one) is a very English phenomenon ... If Williams had 
allowed himself to look beyond this island, he might have found a very 
different eleven Players fielding against him, from Vico through Marx to 
Weber and Mannheim, beside whom his own team might look, on occasion, 
like gentlemen amateurs (Thompson 1961: 30). 
England becomes identified with 'tradition' and a suspicion begins to form over both. 
Thompson is the first in a distinguished line of intellectual entrepreneurs to propose an 
import licence for European theory. 
But the feature which draws together and thematises all of the above is a generalised 
concept of power, a concept which is introduced through an appeal to Marxism. In 
moving from criticisms to constructive suggestions, Thompson proposes a series of 
transformations which would make Williams' position more acceptable: 
[l]f we were to alter one word in Mr. Williams' definition, from 'way of life' 
to 'way of growth', we move from a definition whose associations are passive 
and impersonal to one which raises questions of activity and agency. And if we 
change the word again, to delete the associations with 'progress' which are 
implied in 'growth', we might get: 'the study of relationships between elements 
in a whole way of conflict'. And a way of conflict is a way of struggle. And we 
are back with Marx (Thompson 1961: 33). 
As Thompson goes on to summarise his argument, 'what has been left out of Mr 
Williams notion of "communication" is power' (36). 
A REVOLUTION COMPLETE? 
At a certain level, it is obvious which of the two strands in early British cultural studies 
has been dominant in later developments. The field, as currently defined, appears 
thoroughly 'Thompsonian'. Culture must be placed in relation to real relations of power 
which are external to it; politics is defined not by dialogue but by 'struggles' in which 
different interests are structurally opposed; a sophisticated political understanding 
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requires the rejection of empiricism for the universalist scope of European 'theory'. 
These positions have come to be so widely accepted that they rarely appear any longer 
as positions - they are taken simply to be the established ground on which work in 
cultural studies is able to proceed. In the formal representation of positions, the 
significant question is only how the concept of power is used: Are gender, race and 
sexual orientation admitted beside class as dimensions of power? Is power considered 
exclusively in terms of domination? What relations are posited between culture and 
power? 
But to begin from an awareness that a generalised concept of power was not 
'foundational' to cultural studies opens the possibility of quite a different question. It 
allows us ask whether its introduction has succeeded in fully restructuring the field. On 
first impressions, the answer may appear obvious, but on closer investigation it is much 
less so. It is, in fact, ironic that Thompson should have been the first great entrepreneur 
in British cultural studies of European theoretical approaches, for he later became one 
of their most vociferous opponents (see Thompson 1978). But in this ambivalence, he 
has not been alone. The pattern of response within the British New Left to the 
introduction of an abstract theoretical vocabulary might best be described as a complex 
fracturing, finely graded by degrees of acceptance and resistance. Even those, like 
Anderson, who could fairly be placed at the 'far' end of the spectrum, have reached 
their point ofreversal (Anderson 1983; 1992: 193-301). However far debates may have 
shifted from the positions of Hoggart and Williams in the 1950s, it is not at all clear that 
the influence of those positions - and of the contexts which informed them - has been 
completely erased. It is to the question of this influence in later developments that I now 
want to tum. 
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The 1970s for cultural studies might be described as the decade of the 'break'. The 
theme was most sharply focussed in the Althusserian concept of the coupure 
epistemologique - an abrupt transformation from 'ideology' to 'science' - but 
contemporary accounts of the development of the field abound in references to 
'interruptions', 'departures' and 'ruptures'. These are defined in two ways: at a 
theoretical level, in terms of the new possibilities opened up by the uptake of Marxism, 
structuralism and European philosophy; and at the political level, in terms of the 
upheavals of the late 1960s and the possibilities opened up by student activism, 
feminism and the 'new social movements'. For those who participated in these 
developments, there was little doubt that something had fundamentally changed. 
The point is significant because the 1970s is also the decade in which cultural studies is 
often assumed to have taken form. It is the decade in which Stuart Hall and the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies produced their most influential 
work. It is the decade in which communication developed with and between a number 
of other initiatives, from London and Cardiff to Sydney and Illinois, in a way which has 
since allowed the field to be projected as more than a local phenomenon. And it is the 
decade in which something like a 'curriculum' was defined - a set of common 
references which have provided a basis for the undergraduate programs and publishing 
industries of the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The conjunction of the theme of the break with the current constitution of cultural 
studies presents, potentially, a major obstacle to the argument I have so far developed. 
The problem is not so much that the account in the last chapter of early British cultural 
studies may be invalidated; it is more that it may appear as simply irrelevant. If the 
1970s were a historical 'caesura' (to use another term of the time), then anything 
preceding them might be seen as having little bearing on cultural studies as presently 
defined. It may be conceded that Hoggart and Williams did, indeed, resist a generalised 
concept of power, yet any attempt to enlarge on the significance of this may be 
dismissed. The intellectual formation out of which they emerged has clearly been 
displaced. It could be concluded that cultural studies as now practiced derives from 
different contexts entirely. 
Such a view has well-established precedents. It became common, from the late 1970s, 
to look for ways in which the field had transcended its early beginnings. Hall's reading 
of Williams is modelled, for example, on Althusser' s reading of Marx. The Long 
Revolution is nominated, together with E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English 
Working Class, as a work 'of the break'. The earlier arguments of Culture and Society 
become significant, from this perspective, only in 'writing the epitaph' of the English 
literary tradition (Hall 1996b: 32). The break in Williams' writing is identified, 
particularly, in intimations of a generalised concept of power. In an essay of the late 
1970s, Hall quotes a line from Williams which he takes to indicate 'a significant 
modification of his earlier positions': 'in any particular period there is a central system 
of practices, meanings and values which we can properly call dominant and effective ... 
which are organized and lived' (Hall 1977a: 332). The suggestion is best developed, for 
Hall, through Marxist theories of ideology. Althusser and Gramsci come to occupy the 
space left vacant by the interment of Coleridge, Ruskin and Arnold. 
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The line between past and present was drawn even more decisively at the political level. 
An influential statement here was Terry Eagleton's dismissal in 1976 of the program set 
out in the Mayday Manifesto by Williams, E.P. Thompson and a young Stuart Hall: 
The essentially liberal conception of socialist organization implicit in the 
circular totality of the [first] New Left- 'connecting', 'co-operating', 
'explaining', 'communicating', 'extending' - was politically sterile from the 
outset. Only the media could provide a provisional point of intersection 
between the literary academics and real politics. May 1968, the date of the 
Manifesto's publication in book form, signalled a political moment of rather 
more import than this well-intentioned offering, before which it was inevitably 
thrust into oblivion (Eagleton 1976: 18). 
The shift in political orientation of the Birmingham CCCS is humorously recorded in a 
recollection by Hoggart of receiving minutes of a meeting after his departure to become 
deputy-director of UNESCO: 'One of the minutes had a sentence which said "You've 
got to recognize that we are now a Red Cell and must have no more to do with the 
Hoggartian, Matthew Arnoldian literary tradition". It was wonderful. In a way, what 
this student was doing was pointing out the way things had leaned before I left' (Gibson 
and Hartley 1998: 18-19). 
The dissociation of cultural studies from the early British initiatives has greatly 
increased with the internationalisation of the field. As I will argue in Chapter 4, the 
development of cultural studies outside Britain has often been identified with anti-
colonialism in the ex-British Empire. In Australia, particularly, the desire to find an 
alternative to the elitism and inertia of academic English has had clear continuities with 
a long tradition of radical nationalism. The new theoretical perspectives and political 
possibilities of the 1970s were embraced, in this context, as an opportunity to emerge 
finally from the shadow of colonialism. Exchanges with British cultural studies have 
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generally been with the 'post-Hoggartian' CCCS and other sites of theoretical 
innovation which have themselves been defined in opposition to 'Englishness'. 
A good index of the effect of international contexts on British cultural studies has been 
the changing intellectual identity of Stuart Hall. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there 
was little question that Hall's significance was as a leading figure of the British New 
Left. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, he has become increasingly defined as a 
'diasporic intellectual', exemplary for his negotiation of a global structure of relations 
between 'centres' and 'margins' (see, for example, Chen 1996a). The implications of 
this redefinition is made clear in a bid by Jon Stratton and Ien Ang to remove any 
specific reference to Britain in representing the history of cultural studies. For Stratton 
and Ang, the common element in the field, whatever its location, has been 'the 
empowering validation of the marginal, although the naming of the marginal differs 
greatly from one context to another' (Stratton and Ang 1996: 377-8). While Hoggart 
and Williams are written into this account, their work is seen as flawed by the 
assumption of a British frame of reference. Hall's recent writing on the politics of race 
is correspondingly promoted as freeing cultural studies from such a limitation. 
There are grounds, however, for questioning whether cultural studies has indeed broken 
with its past. The very fact that the break must be continually redefined and insisted 
upon suggests that it has never quite been achieved. As Dick Hebdige admits in relation 
to his own work in Hiding in the Light, the transcendence of early contexts of formation 
remains incomplete: 
My reluctance to acknowledge my own 'englishness' is inscribed in the sources 
I cite. Many of the theoretical and critical reference points which provide the 
primary orientations in this book are French. Some are American. A few are 
Italian and German. Very few are identifiably British. Like so many arts and 
social science graduates educated in the late 1960s and 1970s, I tried to escape 
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the English tradition, to find my own 'elsewhere', to stage-manage my own 
symbolic defection. But in the end, the legacy of an English education 
(however poorly assimilated, however badly understood) shows through 
(Hebdige 1988: 11). 
While Stratton and Ang might respond to this by urging further efforts to discover an 
'elsewhere' - projected now onto the development of cultural studies in Asia -
Hebdige's admission suggests that the very attempt to do so be approached with a 
certain scepticism. Such a scepticism requires a different understanding of cultural 
studies, at least as the term has been used in Britain. Rather than attempting to define 
the field in universalist terms - in which perspective associations with 'englishness' 
appear as an embarrassment - it needs to be seen instead as a specific intellectual 
formation which has always been defined in part by an 'english' approach to politics 
and culture. 
It is important, in developing this suggestion, to emphasise the inverted commas and use 
of the lower case. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, there has been a persistent confusion in 
cultural criticism since at least the 1960s between, on the one hand, a style of thought 
particularly associated with England and significantly related to an English experience 
of modernity - a style which Oakeshott would call the 'politics of scepticism' - and, on 
the other hand, essentialist notions of Englishness defined in terms of nation or race. 
'Englishness', for Hebdige, is not a matter of identity. It is characterised by a 'sense of 
awe engendered by the incandescence of the particular, the reverence for the 
irreducibility of the thing-in-itself and on the other, a faith in correspondence, a faith in 
the endurance, the relative stability through time of that which is' (Hebdige 1988: 11-
. 12). The outlook corresponds to a scepticism towards 'reasoning from universal 
premises taken on trust from authority': '[W]e are left after Occam, after Bacon, Hume, 
Locke and Berkeley, to generalise from what we know and see.' (12) The citations here 
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may be English, but an orientation to the 'incandescence of the particular' is not the 
same as being English in any literal sense. 
A number of commentators on the history of cultural studies have rightly criticised 
'diffusion' models, according to which the field has spread from an original 'core' at the 
Birmingham CCCS to other locations. John Frow and Meaghan Morris have argued, for 
example, that cultural studies in Australia cannot be traced to British origins but has had 
its own independent contexts of formation: 
We suspect that a history of cultural studies in Australia would find that the 
1960s and 1970s adult education influence (notably in the Workers' 
Educational Association) both nourished and perpetuated a strong but informal 
intellectual culture of autodidactic and amateur practice which shaped the 
values of many who later became, with the expansion of the education system, 
professional intellectuals. Our own first encounter with a 'culture and society' 
approach in the late 1960s came not from reading Raymond Williams but in 
attending WEA summer schools on film run at Newport Beach in Sydney by 
John Flaus (Frow and Morris 1993: xxv). 
It is possible to agree with this, however, while also pointing out considerable 
similarities - including traditions of adult education - between British and Australian 
public culture. This is not to suggest a common English origin or 'essence', but merely 
to draw attention to shared characteristics of societies whose histories have been closely 
intertwined. A specificity can be identified in cultural studies which is not reducible to a 
single or simple derivation. 
With this in mind, my argument in the remainder of this chapter is that an empiricism 
with respect to power persists in what is often taken to be the 'classical' cultural studies 
of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies during the 1970s under 
the directorship of Stuart Hall. My point is not that what holds of the CCCS must 
necessarily hold for everything which is now called 'cultural studies'. It is merely that 
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what has been one of the most influential and widely-recognised sites for the 
development of cultural studies has been informed as much by sceptical 'english' 
approaches to questions of power as it has by moves to reject them. This is to reverse 
the onus of proof in the question of relevance. Rather than assuming that an empiricism 
with respect to power has been a limited case, now only of interest to antiquarians, we 
can begin to ask where it has not had some influence. If there has been no absolute 
break between the early work in Britain of Hoggart and Williams and the later work of 
the CCCS, where is the rupture or departure which would allow a line to be drawn 
between an empiricism with respect to power and the present constitution of the field? 
'AN INDECENT ADVENTURE' 
The interpretation of the 1970s which I am suggesting could certainly be taken too far. 
There is little doubt that those involved in the major developments in cultural studies at 
the time believed that the adoption of oppositional forms of politics and general theories 
of power marked a significant break with the past. This in itself needs to be respected 
and there is also evidence that the belief was justified. It has to be remembered that the 
1970s was a violent decade in which deeply held convictions were often bitterly 
opposed. In this context, the development of the new positions with which cultural 
studies became associated required a determination and sometimes courage which 
should not be ignored. 
Two points can be made, however, in moderating the conclusions which might be 
drawn. The first is that the significance of oppositional politics and general theories of 
power cannot be separated from the context into which they were introduced. As 
Meaghan Morris pointed out in the late 1970s of the development of Marxist theory in 
Australia at the time: 'marxism ... has a local subversive potential unthinkable to most 
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European intellectuals, when deployed in a culture where the most elementary 
affirmation of the existence of class struggles past or present is capable of triggering 
explosions right and left' (Morris 1988: 52). Marxism in Australia must be considered, 
therefore, as a different phenomenon from Marxism in contexts where it has been more 
deeply-rooted in the political culture. A similar point could be made of psychoanalysis 
and semiotics which have figured in much the same way as counters within English-
language debates. As Morris puts it, 'Marx and Freud have had less the status of master-
thinkers, and more the exhilarating effect of an indecent adventure' (52). Even in its 
representation as 'foreign', imported theory has been significantly transformed by what 
Yuri Lotman would call the 'receiving culture'. 
The same could be said of the political level. As Hoggart pointed out of the British 
student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s: 'One would think that the political 
model being drawn upon had been found somewhere over the mid-Atlantic or mid-
Channel, without the intervention of any British history'. Following observations on the 
subject by Colin Crouch, however, he goes on to suggest that 'in a deeper manner the 
British student movement, even at its most lively, was nevertheless English to the core 
in another sense, in that with some exceptions it showed a gentleness rarely found 
elsewhere' (Hoggart 1982: 54). Claims in relation to 'breaks' or 'departures' need, in 
other words, to be put in perspective. In local contexts, the adoption of new political 
models, as of new theoretical approaches, was clearly significant. But this does not 
mean that it completely displaced what had gone before. 
The second point is that the struggles which took place over the new forms of theory 
and politics were never simply struggles between 'past' and 'present'. In some respects, 
the conservative defence of 'Anglo' virtues was as different from the traditions it sought 
to uphold as those who set out to reject them. As Perry Anderson pointed out in his 
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essays of the 1960s, English intellectual life had been significantly transformed in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The shift involved its own processes of intellectual 
importation, through the agency, particularly, of the 'emigre intellectuals' - Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Bronislaw Malinowski, Lewis Namier, Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Ernst 
Gombrich, Hans-Jurgen Eysenck and Melanie Klein. In Anderson's negative gloss: 
British empiricism and conservatism was on the whole an instinctive, ad hoe 
affair. It shunned theory even in the rejection of theory. It was a style, not a 
method. The expatriate impact on this cultural syndrome was paradoxical. In 
effect, the emigres for the first time systematized the refusal of system. They 
codified the slovenly empiricism of the past, and thereby hardened and 
narrowed it. They also, ultimately, rendered it more vulnerable (Anderson 
1968: 19). 
While the distinction has often been blurred, the theoretical initiatives of the 1970s were 
articulated not so much against 'the slovenly empiricism of the past' as against the 
'hardened and narrowed' attempt at systematisation - particularly claims to an 
'objective' basis for knowledge. To the extent that the latter developed as a complex 
cross-cultural hybrid, it might as well be described as 'Viennese', 'Polish' or 'Russian' 
as 'English'. 
It is misleading, therefore, to represent divisions as occurring between 'European' 
theory and 'English' empiricism. They occurred, more accurately, between divergent 
responses to a particular historical conjuncture, both of which developed out of English 
intellectual culture while also appealing to intellectual imports. I will argue below that 
this point is particularly important in understanding the tendency in British cultural 
studies towards a generalised concept of power. In the case of Hall, at least, a 
commitment to such a concept developed not so much from criticisms of 'traditional' 
English intellectual culture as from a desire to resist another kind of import - a 
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positivism with respect to power associated with American political science, sociology 
and 'mass communication' theory. 
The historical interpretation I am suggesting here is not entirely new. There have always 
been sceptics about the theme of the 'break'. One of the most interesting and persistent 
has been Colin Sparks. Sparks spent two years at the Birmingham CCCS in the mid 
1970s, but always felt distanced from the main work of the Centre by a more 
thoroughgoing commitment to Marxism. In an article which first appeared in 1974 in 
the Centre's Working Papers in Cultural Studies, he expressed doubts as to whether the 
'conversion' to Marxism was more than superficial. Marxism, for Sparks, was 
inseparable from its historical relation to working-class political organisation, 
particularly in Europe (Germany being the model). The latter was never seriously 
considered by cultural studies: 
What happened ... is that a number of thinkers, of varying degrees of ability, 
were lifted out of the Marxist tradition and gutted quite ahistorically for the 
light they could shed on other concerns. With staggering arrogance, the 
collective experience of millions of working people was tossed away with the 
label: 'profoundly residual' ... There was not, and never has been, any attempt 
to come to terms with Marxism as a revolutionary practice, any attempt to 
critically assimilate the history of that practice, any effort to understand or 
relate to the organisational expressions of revolutionary practice, any 
recognition of the historical dynamic of that practice (Sparks 1974: 17). 
Marxism, in this view, did not constitute a real departure from the early British 
formation of the field; a methodology was abstracted from the contexts which gave it its 
sense and grafted onto 'the unreconstructed problematic bequeathed by Hoggart' (16). 
'It is not', as Sparks puts it, 'that nothing has changed, but that the transformations of 
vocabulary and methodology, and even some of the attempts to negate the Hoggartian 
framework, remain trapped within [the ear:lier] conception of Cultural Studies' (13-14). 
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Sparks' position on the relation between Marxism and cultural studies has remained 
fairly much unchanged over twenty years. In revisiting the subject recently, he restates 
many of the arguments of the mid 1970s with the added knowledge now that the two 
have increasingly grown apart. In this longer perspective, it becomes clearer still to him 
that the relation was never fundamental: 
[I]n the current associated with Stuart Hall, the link between marxism and 
cultural studies was much more contingent and transitory than it once appeared 
even to its main actors. The initial formation of cultural studies was in part a 
rejection of the then dominant version of marxism. The later elaboration of 
marxist cultural studies took place through the appropriation of one particular 
version of marxism. It was from the start beset by internal intellectual problems 
arising in part from the radical incommensurability between the project of 
cultural studies and the variety of marxism adopted. The productive life of this 
marxist cultural studies was very short: certainly less than a decade and perhaps 
as little as five years (Sparks 1996: 97-98). 
If these estimates are accepted, then Marxism does indeed begin to fade in significance. 
If the beginnings of cultural studies are dated from the late 1950s, it can be counted as a 
direct influence for at most a quarter of the history of the field. 
Sparks' perspective might be dismissed as idiosyncratic, betraying too pure an 
understanding of Marxism, but it is confirmed to some extent by no less a figure than 
Hall himself. Speaking at Illinois in 1990, Hall went to some lengths to set the record 
straight for an international audience: 
There never was a prior moment when cultural studies and Marxism 
represented a perfect theoretical fit ... [T]he encounter between British cultural 
studies and Marxism has first to be understood as the engagement with a 
problem ... It begins, and develops through the critique of a certain 
reductionism and economism ... ; a contestation with the model of base and 
superstructure, through which sophisticated and vulgar Marxism alike had tried 
to think the relationships between society, economy, and culture. It was located 
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and sited in a necessary and prolonged and as yet unending contestation with 
the question of false consciousness (Hall 1992: 279). 
If this leaves any doubt, Hall goes on to underline the point: 'the notion that Marxism 
and cultural studies slipped into place, recognized an immediate affinity, joined hands 
in some teleological or Hegelian moment of synthesis and there was the founding 
moment of cultural studies, is entirely mistaken. It couldn't have been more different 
from that' (280). 
A different objection to my argument at this point might be that to question the 
significance of Marxism is not, in itself, to question the adoption of a generalised 
concept of power. Certainly, the two cannot simply be equated: feminist cultural 
studies, black cultural studies, gay and lesbian cultural studies, post-colonial criticism, 
approaches based on the work of Foucault - all have, in various ways, taken issue with 
Marxism while using the concept in its most expansive sense. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will 
argue that a rationalism with respect to power has, in fact, deepened with these later 
developments. But the historical importance assigned to Marxism is nonetheless 
significant because of the way it has functioned to imply a settled consensus on the 
theoretical and political orientations of cultural studies. If, as Hall, puts it, there was a 
'founding moment' at which cultural studies was simply 'Marxist', then it can be 
assumed that a generalised concept of power was firmly established as a starting point 
on which everything else has grown. If, however, there was no such moment, then the 
status of the concept begins to appear much less certain. 
Many of the 'post-Marxist' initiatives in cultural studies have been introduced, to use 
terms suggested by John Hartley, according to a logic of the 'ampersand' (Hartley 1999: 
20). In the beginning, so this logic goes, the field was concerned with power as it 
operated along the axis of class. It was realised, however, that such an approach was 
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limited, ignoring relations of power which operated along other axes. It was necessary, 
therefore, to supplement class analysis with an attention to other dimensions of social 
difference - first of gender, then race, then a string of other categories of identity. 
Cultural studies, in this context, becomes 'analysis of (insert object of analysis here -
film, TV series, cultural form) according to questions of class & gender & ethnicity & 
sexual orientation & nationality & language-community & age & size & disability 
&&&' (20). Each initiative made on the basis of this logic, has further entrenched an 
assumption that previous versions of cultural studies were always already concerned 
with the operation of power in the cultural domain. It is Marxism, above all, which 
secures the end of the chain. Even as Marxism is rejected for its exclusive emphasis on 
class, its historical importance is paradoxically inflated. 
A good example here is Angela McRobbie's 'Settling Accounts with Subcultures', one 
of the most widely cited feminist critiques of the work which developed during the 
1970s at Birmingham. There is no question, for McRobbie, that this work can be 
reduced to Marxist political commitments. The relative lack of interest in home and 
family in texts such as Paul Willis's Leaming to Labour and Dick Hebdige's Subculture 
is attributed, for example, to a 'New Left' tendency to see them as a temptation 
provided by Capital to divert workers and militants away from the 'real business of 
revolution' (McRobbie 1980: 40). McRobbie's criticisms start from the assumption that 
the 'subculture' writing aimed to provide an account of 'oppression' and a political 
program for overturning it. It is clear from the criticisms themselves that 'oppression' is 
also understood in its most extended sense. McRobbie's argument is that women have 
been 'excluded' from Willis's and Hebdige's accounts. The argument only works on the 
assumption that the latter were concerned not with specific oppressions but with 
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oppression as such. It is this assumption which generates an expectation that every 
'form' of oppression must be recognised. 
McRobbie' s feminism is 'post-Marxist' in the sense that gender differences are 
emphasised over those of class. 'In our daily lives', she suggests: 
feminists wage a similar semiotic warfare [to male subcultures]. Knitting in 
pubs, breast-feeding in Harrods, the refusal to respond to expressions of street 
sexism, the way we wear our clothes - all the signs and meanings embodied in 
the way we handle our public visibility play a part in the culture which, like the 
various youth cultures, bears the imprint of our collective, historical creativity 
(McRobbie 1980: 49). 
Yet her position remains heavily dependent on Marxism as a model and point of 
reference. The semiotic warfare waged by feminists is introduced through comparison 
with 'the various youth cultures' as theorised by Marxist class analysis. The suggestion 
that the position of women may be accounted for in terms of a dialectic of oppression 
and resistance is dependent on an assumption that these terms have already been fully 
established as an appropriate description of social relations. 
The historical importance attributed to Marxism is therefore significant well beyond an 
assessment of 'Marxist' cultural studies itself. What is at stake, more substantially, is 
whether a rationalist concept of power has ever been foundational. If it has not, then the 
implications flow through into feminism, writing on 'race' and all the other 'post-
Marxisms'. Once the imaginary anchor of an 'original' Marxist cultural studies is lost, a 
whole chain of associated reasoning begins to drift. The important point is that cultural 
studies can no longer be defined as simply 'about' power. It becomes more appropriate 
to see it as a field which has engaged, more or less critically, with the concept of power. 
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THE SOCIAL EYE OF CULTURAL STUDIES 
The key figure in relation to these questions is undoubtedly Stuart Hall. Hall has always 
stressed the importance of intellectual cooperation and a significant amount of his work 
has been co-authored with others, but there is little question that his efforts were crucial 
in establishing an intellectual space for the work which developed during the 1970s at 
Birmingham. His adaptation of Marxist concepts and arguments has been more 
influential than any other and has been widely accepted as definitive. If there was ever a 
moment in which cultural studies was decisively influenced by Marxism, it is the 
moment represented by Hall's directorship of the CCCS. If doubts can be raised about 
the extent of this influence, we must begin to question whether there has ever been a 
fully 'Marxist' cultural studies. 
It is not difficult to show that Hall had well-developed intellectual and political 
positions before any serious identification with Marxism. His first major publication, 
The Popular Arts, co-authored with Paddy Whannel, closely follows the examples of 
Haggart and Williams in its analysis of popular culture. As Hall and Whannel put it 
themselves: 'They [Haggart and Williams] have made a major contribution to this 
whole debate, and our debt, directly and indirectly, to them is immense' (Hall and 
Whannel 1964: 15). The approach adopted to popular film, television, literature, music 
and dance is more generally informed by the English literary tradition. Matthew 
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy is described in an appendix as setting the debate about 
popular culture 'in its proper perspective' (435) and Q.D. Leavis's Fiction and the 
Reading Public as 'still perhaps the best introduction to the subject [of popular 
literature]' (448). Such references might appear surprising given Hall's 'outsider' status 
in English intellectual life, but as Chris Rojek (1998: 57) has argued, his education in 
Jamaica would have given him a far more systematic exposure to the elite values of 
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British culture than would have been common in English state schools in the 1940s and 
1950s. 
The Popular Arts makes no systematic use of the concept of power, but its argument has 
a bearing on how the concept might be regarded. Hall's and Whannel's strategy in 
claiming a space for the serious study of popular culture is similar to the strategies of 
Hoggart and Williams in gaining recognition for working class culture. It is not to adopt 
an oppositional stance on behalf of the popular against 'high art', but to contextualise 
both to the point where they no longer appear in competition: 
Popular music, for example, has its own standards. Ella Fitzgerald is a highly 
polished professional entertainer who within her own sphere could hardly be 
better. Clearly it would be inappropriate to compare her with Maria Callas; they 
are not aiming at the same thing. Equally it is not useful to say that the music of 
Cole Porter is inferior to that of Beethoven ... Porter was not making an 
unsuccessful attempt to create music comparable to Beethoven's (Hall and 
Whannel 1964: 38). 
The argument is most clearly directed against the assumption of a universal hierarchy of 
value, but it is also inconsistent with the idea of a structural hierarchy of cultural forms. 
Like Hoggart and Williams, Hall and Whannel are sensitive to a condescending 
approach to popular culture which regards it distantly, even if sympathetically, from a 
presumed position of 'privilege'. The context for this sensitivity is also similar. The 
Popular Arts is embedded in a practical engagement with problems of education. Hall 
and Whannel are concerned with pedagogical modes of address and work from 
experience, as teachers themselves, of what students are likely to accept. There is a 
consistent effort throughout the book to think of differences in other than hierarchical 
terms. 
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It is clear from this why Hall should have had an uneasy relation with Marxism. He has 
described his early political position as of the 'independent left': 'We were interested in 
marxism, but not dogmatic marxists, anti-stalinist, not defenders of the Soviet Union' 
(Hall 1996c: 492). His wariness of Marxism appeared to be vindicated following the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the ensuing crisis of the British Communist 
Party. In a 1958 article in the Universities and Left Review, he argued that the evolution 
of capitalism had made Marxist analysis obsolete (Hall 1958). An old sense of class was 
breaking up as workers began to forge their identities in the sphere of consumption. The 
'base and superstructure' metaphor was now inadequate as ownership of the means of 
production was no longer fundamental. What was needed was an attention to patterns of 
fragmentation and dispersal rather than a more concentrated structural analysis. This 
distance from Marxism continued well into Hall's time at the Birmingham CCCS. By 
his own account of the early period of the Centre: 'for five or six years, long after the 
resistance to theory of cultural studies had been overcome ... we walked right around 
the entire circumference of European thought, in order not to be, in any simple 
capitulation to the zeitgeist, Marxists' (Hall 1992: 280). 
There is no clear sense, then, in which Hall was 'originally' a Marxist. The important 
question is the nature and significance of his turn to Marxism in the early to mid 1970s. 
How complete was this tum? What were its circumstances? To what extent did it 
commit him, and the CCCS, to a rationalist concept of power? The most useful texts to 
consider here are not so much the mature 'Marxist' manifestos as the more exploratory 
efforts which preceded them. It is possible to observe in these the points of transition 
where Hall is considering what to retain from his previous positions, what to leave 
behind and the stakes involved either way. A good example is 'The Social Eye of 
Picture Post', which appeared in Working Papers in Cultural Studies in 1972, just on 
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the cusp of the declared 'conversion' .12 The essay was written in homage to the popular 
wartime photo-magazine Picture Post, but Hall uses it also as an opportunity to take 
some distance from the 'social democratic' politics with which he had so far identified. 
In writing of Picture Post, it is almost as if Hall cannot help but show a respectful 
warmth towards an old love: 
Picture Post captured for the still commercially-produced 'news' photograph a 
new social reality: the domain of everyday life. The decisive impact of a 
Picture Post page lies in its ability to look hard and record ... [T]here is a sort 
of passion behind the objectivity of the camera eye here, a passion to be 
present. Above all, to present people to themselves in wholly recognizable 
terms: terms which acknowledged their commonness, their variety, their 
individuality, their representativeness, which finds them 'intensely interesting' 
(Hall 1972: 83). 
The significance Hall sees in Picture Post has strong resonances with his own project of 
The Popular Arts. It was its ability to present popular culture and everyday life simply 
in its own terms rather than in terms of an abstract hierarchy of relations with other 
spheres: 'This clarity of attention raises the "unnoticed subjects" to a sort of equality of 
status, photographically, with the heroic subjects (Prime Ministers) and activities they 
elsewhere depict' (83). The emphasis is on social variety distributed along a continuum; 
ordinary lives are documented in 'cross-section' rather than sampled for 'vox pops' 
(82). 
Picture Post's achievement is closely identified by Hall with 'Englishness'. John 
Hartley has questioned this identification, pointing out that the magazine was originally 
12 My attention has been drawn to the significance of this essay by John Hartley. For Hartley's own 
analysis, somewhat different from my own, see his discussion in The Uses of Television (1999: 112-126). 
In the following discussion I am also drawing on an essay of my own on the television coverage of the 
funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales (Gibson 1999). 
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the creation of a Hungarian Jew - Stefan Lorant - and relied heavily on the skills of 
emigre German photographers (Hartley 1999: 116-7). But Hall's use of the term 
'English' is not as literal as Hartley assumes. He is clearly aware of the national origins 
of those involved in Picture Post; 'English' is used in a more abstract sense as a 
description of a certain field of political possibilities. In the later part of the essay, this 
sense is developed through an extended discussion of George Orwell's wartime hopes 
for an 'English revolution'. This was to be a non-violent revolution, though catalysed by 
the war, in which social contradictions were not sharpened but left to fade through no 
longer being observed. In Orwell's words: 
It will not be doctrinaire, nor even logical. It will abolish the House of Lords, 
but quite probably will not abolish the Monarchy. It will leave anachronisms 
and loose ends everywhere, the judge in his ridiculous horse-hair wig and the 
lion and the unicorn on the soldier's cap-buttons. It will not set up any explicit 
class dictatorship. It will group itself round the old Labour Party and its mass 
following will be in the trade unions, but it will draw into it most of the middle 
class and many of the younger sons of the bourgeoisie. Most of its directing 
brains will come from the new indeterminate class of skilled workers, technical 
experts, airmen, scientists, architects and journalists the people who feel at 
home in the radio and ferro-concrete age. But it will never lose touch with the 
tradition of compromise and the belief in a law that is above the State (Orwell 
quoted in Hall 1972: 106). 
Hall's judgement on this is far from dismissive. '[I]t is worth pondering', he suggests, 
whether Orwell's powers of foresight were not greater than his reputation, or indeed his 
own estimate, has led us to believe' (Hall 1972: 106). 
It is not in its origins or essence, then, that Picture Post was 'English'; it was in 
participating in the 'structure of feeling' described by Orwell. Williams' concept is, in 
the context, highly appropriate. As Hall points out, the magazine was similar to other 
strands of British social documentary in seeking a consistency between structure and 
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social aspiration: 'The documen~ary style, though at one level, a form of writing, 
photographing, filming, recording, was, at another level, an emergent form of social 
consciousness' (100). As with the tradition of documentary film associated with John 
Grierson (in any case a Scot), Picture Post borrowed many of its techniques from 
continental Europe. But in Britain these techniques were 'domesticated' so that, in 
Grierson's words, 'an adventure in the arts assumed the respectability of a public 
service' (97). Whatever its weaknesses, in Hall's view, this tendency also had definite 
strengths. Most importantly, it 'opened up the difficult space between the "free 
movement" of art and the social engagement of rapportage' (100). The analysis is 
striking in itself, but is all the more significant given that it was exactly the 'difficult 
space' referred to which had been staked out by cultural studies. 
Yet, despite all of this, Hall's assessment of Picture Post is ultimately more reserved. 
His criticisms start from a simple observation that its momentum was not sustained. 
From the early 1950s, the circulation of the magazine was progressively eroded by the 
new 'colour supplements' until its eventual closure in 1957. The latter were a very 
different media form: 
[T]hough ... the art of the photograph has been raised to a pitch of technical 
perfection, the social rhetoric on which the art is founded is not based on the 
passion to record, inform or document. No one in the Colour Supplements is 
interested in looking hard or straight: everything is angled, posed, framed, 
prettied up or cocooned. Men and women, in those glossy pages, need to be 
rich, glamourous, trendy, primitive or degraded. Trapped in the extremes of 
fantasy or poverty, to be interesting subjects for the camera (Hall 1972: 84). 
But in pointing to the demise of Picture Post, Hall is also moving to develop a new 
style of writing which is able to find a level of social engagement in the kind of media 
environment represented by the colour supplements. It is a style which requires him to 
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set aside the 'passionate objectivity' of British social documentary in favour of the 
intellectual resources of European philosophy and aesthetics. 
The latter, for Hall, are considered first in historical terms. Indicating an awareness of 
their context of formation, he relates European thought on the visual image to the 
revolution in photographic techniques which occurred, particularly in Germany, 
between the wars. His key witness here is Walter Benjamin: 
Benjamin observed that, in the transformation of forms and values consequent 
upon the revolutionary innovations in the new media of mechanical 
reproduction, tradition had been shattered forever, and art, in its traditional 
sense, had lost its 'aura' (Hall 1972: 100). 
The promise held out for relocating the scene of thought to this historical conjuncture is 
immediately indicated through a quotation from Benjamin: 
'For the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the 
work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual ... Instead of being based 
on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice - politics' (Benjamin quoted 
in Hall 1972: 100). 
It is not just politics which Hall is interested in, of course, but more specifically 
revolutionary politics (in the 'French' not the 'English' sense). It is the explosive heat 
generated by the opposition between 'tradition' and 'change' which provides him with a 
new point of rhetorical engagement. 
Having opted in this way, Hall begins to commit himself to the consequences. The most 
significant of these is that the consistency of 'structure' and 'feeling' is effectively 
dissolved. In writing of Picture Post, Hall uses the term 'structure of feeling' in ways 
which Williams might have done, but elsewhere the usage is subtly shifted to an 
equivalent of either 'structure' or 'feeling' in the relatively abstracted sense in which 
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their separation and formal opposition allows. An example of a reduction to 'feeling' is 
an interpretation of the· politics of The Mirror: 
[B]y a fortunate series of events, the paper found itself in a position, first, to 
overhear what was actually being said and felt among ordinary people, and then 
to be converted by this powerful, and changing, 'structure of feeling' (Hall 
1972: 95). 
The 'structure of feeling' is identified here with 'what is said and felt among ordinary 
people' (feeling), which is placed in tum in an external relation to the media institution 
and forms of journalistic writing (structure). Hall goes on to imply that the relation is 
not only external, but always at some level contradictory; the 'authentic trends, moods 
and attitudes articulated among people' are 'limited', 'altered' and 'transformed' by the 
media (Hall 1972: 95-96). The popular voice is subverted and controlled by the fixed 
constraints of convention. 
Where the reduction is made to 'structure', the idea of a 'structure of feeling' is overlaid 
with harder-edged, structuralist concepts which were just beginning to gain currency in 
English-language cultural criticism in the early 1970s - concepts such as 'logic' or 
'code' (although not yet the Althusserian 'problematic'). Hall draws these together in 
the concept of a 'social eye'. The concept is a deliberate echo of themes developed out 
of European theories of the visual image in the work of Christian Metz, John Berger and 
Peter Wollen. As Hall himself observes in a later essay on the concept of ideology, 
these theories owe most to a quite different intellectual tradition from British 
empiricism - that of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy (Hall 1977b: 11ft). Within 
this tradition, forms of thought and perception are considered in abstract from what is 
thought or perceived. It is this abstraction which opens up the possibility of formal 
'critique'. The categories and structures of thought can be systematically considered for 
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what they make it possible to see or prevent from being seen. In fact, this theoretical 
work assumes priority, as the categories and structures are regarded as a condition of 
possibility for experience. 
It is inevitable, at a certain point, that Hall should use this critical perspective to reflect 
back on the tradition of social documentary from which he is taking his leave. Hence 
the 'straightness' of Picture Post - its simple use of commonly-understood 
photographic conventions - begins to be interpreted as a liability. Even as Hall 
appreciates the magazine for capturing the texture of everyday life in a way which 
communicated directly to its readership, he criticises its photographic technique as 'not 
yet revolutionary' (Hall 1972: 83). The tragedy of Picture Post, for Hall, is that it 
neglected the talents of John Heartfield, a founding member of the Berlin Dada group 
who had emigrated to Britain before the war. Heartfield' s experiments in photomontage 
were explicitly designed to 'destroy the "logic" of perception which underpinned 
bourgeois artistic expression' (Hall 1972: 109). The use of such techniques would have 
offered the best hope, in Hall's view, of transforming the magazine into a vehicle for the 
development of a revolutionary political consciousness. 
THE 'SOCIOLOGICAL ENCOUNTER' 
It might be concluded from this that Hall's own transformation was complete, that The 
Popular Arts and other early writings can safely be dismissed as juvenilia, of little 
relevance for the later development of cultural studies. This is perhaps how they would 
now appear to Hall himself, but a closer examination of the shift suggests a more 
complex picture. 
There is certainly evidence that Hall's new emphasis on structural antagonism comes to 
organise his whole way of thinking. Towards the end of the essay on Picture Post, 
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social contradictions begin to assume the status of a fundamental truth. In this 
perspective, Orwell's 'English Revolution' was always ill-conceived and therefore 
bound to fail: 
The war did democratize the society to a degree, but the political meaning of 
the process was never taken up as a conscious strategy nor its full significance, 
in terms of structural change, ever fully articulated ... The solid foundations of 
class society in Britain were never really undermined. The message and 
symbolism of the 'war effort' pulled the classes together in a curious way, 
thereby working against the necessary division and class-polarization (Hall 
1972: 108). 
Taken out of context, such passages do, indeed, suggest a systematic 'conversion'. But 
to read them in this way is to overlook tensions between Hall's theoretical judgements 
and a milder historical mode of assessment. His essay concludes, in fact, with the latter: 
the demise of Picture Post is attributed not so much to a fundamental error as to an 
inability to adjust to the new political divisions and more ruthless commercial 
competition of the postwar period: 'Squeezed by the Cold War on the one hand, and the 
greed and philistinism of commercial journalism on the other, Picture Post gave up the 
struggle ... The era of social democracy was over' (116). 
This second perspective suggests the possibility of quite a different reading of Hall. The 
entire shift in his thinking could be seen, in a sense, as unfolding within a continuing 
'English' intellectual identity. That is to say, his recognition of social contradiction and 
antagonism might be interpreted in a similar way to my interpretation, in Chapter 2, of 
Williams' recognition of 'domination' and 'subordination': not so much as a 
recognition of universal social phenomena as a recognition of particular historical 
experiences. The language of 'solid foundations', 'necessary divisions' and 'structural 
change' would appear then not as elements of a general social theory or political 
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program but as a rhetoric appropriate to the times. Chris Rojek (1998) has made a 
provocative argument somewhat along these lines, but it is not quite the argument I 
wish to make. There is too much to suggest that Hall has really been convinced, at 
times, of an ontological basis for the concept of power. His differences from Williams 
on this point are significant. My claim is only that Hall's early formation has continued 
to exercise some influence over his later development. 
There is evidence of this influence in his impatience with the use of the concept of 
power in recent cultural studies. An example is the quotation I placed at the opening of 
the Introduction. Another is some comments, in an interview with Kuan-Hsing Chen, on 
the difference between the use of the concept by Foucault and the way it has been taken 
up in American cultural studies: 
Foucault is not a political activist in any simple sense, but when you read the 
Foucault interviews, you know at once that his work has a bearing on 
resistance, on sexual politics, on '1968', on the debate about the West, the 
nature of state power, and the Gulag; it has political implications. Wonderfully 
agile Foucauldian studies can be produced in the American academy which 
invoke power all the time: every second line is power/discourse, 
power/knowledge etc., whilst the actual integument of power is absolutely 
nowhere located in concrete institutions, as it is in Discipline and Punish or in 
the disciplinary regimes of knowledge, as it is in The Birth of the Clinic (Hall 
1996a: 397). 
There is, again, a way of reading this which would preserve the view that Hall's own 
use of the concept assumes an ontological foundation. This is the implication of his 
reference to the 'actual integument' of power. But another reading is at least as 
plausible: that the concept of power only gains its meaning from a historical field of 
reference - in Foucault' s case, from sexual politics, '1968', the debate about the West, 
the nature of state power and the Gula g. The sense of 'political implications' is similar 
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to passages in which Hall applies the description to Hoggart, Williams and the early 
British New Left (see, for example, Hall 1996b: 33). What is essential to the application 
is not reference to power but a directness of relation between concepts, whatever they 
are, and the contexts from which they have been abstracted. 
More substantial evidence can be found, however, in the nature of Hall's adoption of 
Marxist concepts and arguments. A key point here is that his negotiation of the concept 
of power is played out against the background of already established uses outside 
cultural studies. It is a point which needs to be emphasised. The concept has become so 
central to recent definitions of the field that it is sometimes regarded almost as a unique 
property - the species differentia which sets cultural studies apart from other kinds of 
social or cultural enquiry. There is little, however, to support such a view. Debates 
around power formed a whole subset of political science weU before the concept was 
taken up in cultural studies and also had a history in sociology. On the political 'right' 
there was a fully-developed 'pluralist' concept of power, particularly well-represented 
in American 'mass communication' theory. On the 'left', a different use of the concept 
was readily abstracted from existing variants of Marxism - from the 'mass society' 
critiques of the Frankfurt School to the 'bad old' Marxism of the Communist Party - all 
of which Hall and the CCCS had, until the early 1970s, been determined to hold at a 
distance. 
Hall's negotiation of a position for cultural studies can only be understood in relation to 
these points of reference. The territory he entered in committing the field to the concept 
of power was not only occupied, but jealously guarded within the polarised field of the 
Cold War. In his 1982 essay 'The rediscovery of "ideology": return of the repressed in 
media studies', he sets out the options with a retrospective clarity. Given, as he takes as 
a starting point, that some engagement in sociological discourse was necessary or 
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unavoidable, two major alternatives suggested themselves: the 'European' approach 
exemplified by the Frankfurt School, 'historically and philosophically sweeping, 
speculative, offering a rich but over-generalized set of hypotheses' and, significantly 
defined in reaction against it, the 'American' approach, 'empirical, behavioural and 
scientistic' (Hall 1982: 58). Both of these approaches are, for Hall, unsatisfactory; the 
program he puts forward, some twenty years before Tony Blair's 'New Labour', is to 
chart a 'third way' which avoids the problems of both. 
Of the Scylla and Charybdis of Marxist 'grand theory' and positivist sociology, Hall is 
more concerned to avoid the latter. This is not, as the history has often been told, 
because it did not have a concept of power; it is because of the nature of the concept. 
Hall is quite explicit on this: 
Pluralism, as [Steven] Lukes has suggested, did retain a concept of power, 
based on the notion of 'influence'. A influenced B to make decision X. 
Certainly, this was a form of power. Pluralism qualified the persistence of this 
form of power by demonstrating that, because in any decision-making situation, 
the As were different, and the various decisions made did not cohere within any 
single structure of domination, or favour exclusively any single interest, 
therefore power had been 'pluralized'. The dispersal of power plus the 
randomness of decisions kept the pluralist society relatively free of an 
identifiable power-centre (Hall 1982: 64). 
Hall's objection to this is not that it was 'wrong' in some absolute sense; it is rather that 
an atomistic conception of power, founded on notions of individual psychology, lent 
itself to a narrow scientism: 
its primary focus was the individual; it theorized power in terms of the direct 
influence of A on B' s behaviour; it was preoccupied ... with the process of 
decision making. Its ideal experimental test was the before/after one: its ideal 
model of influence was that of the campaign ... [A] mixture of prophecy and 
hope, with a brutal, hard-headed, behaviouristic positivism provided a heady 
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theoretical concoction which, for a long time, passed itself off as 'pure science' 
(Hall 1982: 59). 
Hall's preference, in this context, for the idea of a 'power-centre' cannot be read as an 
indication that his earlier reservations about Marxism were swept aside; it had an 
essentially strategic motivation. This is clear in his objection to attempts by 'post-
Marxist' theorists such as Ernesto Laclau, to weaken the idea of a 'ruling class': 'to lose 
the ruling-class/ruling-ideas proposition altogether is ... to run the risk of losing 
altogether the notion of "dominance". But dominance is central if the propositions of 
pluralism are to be put in question' (84). 
If Hall is less critical of Marxism than he is of pluralism, it is only because it appears to 
offer some space for a freer, more experientially-sensitive use of the concept of power. 
Because propositions in relation to power are framed at a 'macro' level, they are less 
amenable to claims of scientific verification. Even so, Hall is prepared to accept them 
only on the evidence of major internal critique and reform. As he puts it himself, 
'important modifications to our way of conceiving dominance had to be effected before 
the idea was rescuable' (Hall 1982: 84-5). All of these modifications are such as to 
weaken assumptions of a direct relation between concept and referent. In a sense, Hall's 
wariness of Marxist concepts of power remains quite consistent throughout his 
intellectual career. He moves to an accommodation with them only on condition that 
their claims to transparency are significantly weakened. 
Hall's first softening towards Marxism follows his encounter with Althusser and the 
argument that the economic 'base' is determining only in 'the last instance'. From his 
perspective, this could be seen as much a case of Marxism moving towards cultural 
studies as of cultural studies moving towards Marxism. The significance of Althusser 
for Marxist analyses of power was the suggestion that there was no direct relation 
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between the mode of production and other spheres - particularly the spheres in which 
meanings and identities were formed. This is no more than Hall had been arguing, 
against Marxism, in 1958. At the same time, Althusser opened the possibility for Hall of 
a strategic adoption of the 'proposition of dominance'. The proposition becomes 
acceptable because its implications are limited. The kinds of 'superstructural' analysis 
developed by cultural studies - in effect a continuation of the projects of Haggart and 
Williams - could continue fairly much unaffected because of the assurance from 
Althusser that the superstructures are 'relatively autonomous'. 
But the more significant development was Hall's adoption of Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony. Despite its deferral of the moment of economic determination, 
Althusserianism still retained mechanical assumptions and a tendency to cast itself as a 
'science'. Gramscianism went much further in weakening the idea that there is any 
'foundation' of power. As Hall puts it in his recent attempt to correct historical 
misconceptions: 
while Gramsci belonged and belongs to the problematic of Marxism, his 
importance for this moment of cultural studies is precisely the degree to wh.ich 
he radically displaced some of the inheritances of Marxism in cultural studies. 
The radical character of Gramsci' s 'displacement' of Marxism has not yet been 
understood and probably won't ever be reckoned with, now that we are entering 
the era of post-Marxism (Hall 1992: 281). 
Hall may be right on the latter point, but it is worth making a suggestion here. What has 
never explicitly been recognised about Gramscianism is its implication, no less, that the 
most central political processes cannot be understood in terms of power. The formation 
of hegemonic blocks is, for Gramsci, a precondition for domination. As such, the 
process of formation cannot be explained in terms of domination. The crucial moments 
in which political alliances are negotiated are moments in which some other dynamic 
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must be operating. If this were not the case, no distinction could be made between 
domination and hegemony, 'coercion' and 'consent'. Power is implicitly demoted by 
Gramsci to the status of a second order concept, describing an effect of other processes 
rather than a fundamental principle. 
It might seem to stretch credibility, given the importance of Gramsci to British cultural 
studies, that this could be so and yet not have been recognised. If we return to the 
historical context, however, there are good reasons why the 'radical' implications of 
Gramsci could never be fully explored. The first is the strategic importance, already 
noted, of the 'proposition of dominance' in countering the positivist tendencies of 
political science and sociology. In order for Hall to present a critical alternative to 
'pluralism', he had to appear to engage in similar positive references to power. For 
purely pragmatic reasons, a collapse of 'hegemony' into 'domination' is an option 
which needed to be kept open. Probably more important, though, was the extreme 
sensitivity, during the 1970s, of professions of belief or disbelief in domination. Not to 
affirm the reality of domination was to place oneself out of sympathy, as Williams 
might have put it, with an emergent 'structure of feeling'. As we have seen, this is a 
problem which Williams himself struggled with. I will argue in Chapter 4 that it became 
much more acute with the development of feminism. Hall clearly decided, at some 
point, to make a less hedged affirmation than Williams of the new political forms which 
burst onto the scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This precluded an open 
scepticism about power. 
But the evidence is there that Hall has consistently taken the next strongest option, 
tempering the concept of power in such a way as to prevent it ever from being used with 
certainty. It is not too much to suggest that the significance of 'Birmingham' cultural 
studies in relation to the concept is almost the opposite of that which is widely assumed. 
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It has not been an insistence on the 'fundamental realities' of power, but a resistance to 
suggestions by others that such realities exist. The problems, for Hall, with pluralism 
and Marxism are, despite their differences, very similar: too confident a belief that the 
concept of power corresponds, in a simple way, to some universal or absolute reality. 
His determination to reject such certainty has never significantly wavered. Hall has 
sometimes been found theoretically inconsistent (McGuigan 1992; Chen 1996b ). He has 
particularly disappointed his Marxist comrades of the 1970s for appearing to abandon 
earlier commitments. But to criticise him on these grounds is perhaps to miss the whole 
'point' of his work: to maintain a space for a use of the concept which is responsive to 
historical experiences, yet proofed against familiar tendencies to intellectual 
fundamentalism. In many ways, this is still the space, adapted to a different context, 
which he had admired in Picture Post - one in which the 'free movement of art' can be 
combined with the directness of social rapportage. 
'MONDAY MORNING AND THE MILLENNIUM' 
This account of the history of Birmingham may appear to skate over the surface of a 
complex series of theoretical developments. But to deal with the latter in greater detail 
would be to risk subverting my main argument: that these developments have been, in 
themselves, relatively unimportant. What has been significant about the theories of 
power developed at the CCCS is not their positive claims, but the kinds of openings 
they have offered through their neutralisation of other claims. In the remainder of this 
chapter, therefore, I will attempt to indicate what these openings have allowed. I will 
use as examples the two texts, already referred to, which are criticised by McRobbie in 
'Settling Accounts with Subcultures': Willis's Leaming to Labour and Hebdige's 
Subculture: the Meaning of Style. 
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If we were to consider only the second half of Leaming to Labour, all of McRobbie's 
criticisms might be justified. Willis' s discussion of class relations here is a classic piece 
of Marxist sociological analysis. Cultural phenomena are conceived as a 'surface' 
behind which it is possible to discern a 'determinate social structure' (Willis 1980: 121). 
The latter is not precisely defined but is clearly taken to involve the operation of power 
in its most expansive sense, involving a 'system of exploitation and oppression for 
working class people' (120). In theorising the relation between surface and depth, Willis 
proposes a distinction between 'penetration' and 'limitation': 
'Penetration' is meant to designate impulses within a cultural form towards the 
penetration of the conditions of existence of its members and their positions 
within the social whole ... 'Limitation' is meant to designate those blocks, 
diversions and ideological effects which confuse and impede the full 
development and expression of these impulses (Willis 1980: 119). 
The distinction provides a framework for interpreting the language, behaviour and other 
symbolic forms of Willis's object of study: 'the lads', a self-defined group of 
disaffected boys at a school in an industrial conurbation in the Midlands of England. 
Willis attributes the counter-culture of 'the lads' with a 'partial penetration' of the 
system. They correctly perceive that the knowledge offered to them by the school 
assumes middle class norms of behaviour and has little relevance to working class lives. 
A full understanding of their subordinate position within a class society is limited, 
however, by a number of 'mystifications'. These are revealed particularly in their 
sexism and racism which offer a false sense of superiority over others. It is here that 
Willis locates the mechanism for the reproduction of labour power within capitalism. 
The analysis clearly suggests an indulgence towards masculinist forms of English 
working class culture. Whatever their imperfections, 'the lads' are cast in heroic mode 
as proto-revolutionary subjects. Sexism and racism are not defined as problems in 
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themselves, but only as 'diversions' from a political logic organised around class. At the 
same time, the counter-culture of 'the lads' is elevated to a level of general significance; 
they are attributed with the status of historical agents through which 'exploitation and 
oppression' are revealed. 
But to concentrate only on these suggestions is completely to ignore the other half of the 
book: a detailed 'ethnography' of the school and of the fraught relation between 
teachers and 'problem kids'. Willis not only places this half first, but clearly expects 
some readers to go no further. 'A general aim of the book', he says, 
is to make its arguments accessible to audiences of social scientists, 
practitioners and general readers ... Practitioners [teachers and careers advisers 
within schools] may be more interested in Part I [the 'ethnography'] and the 
Conclusion; social theorists in Part II [the sociological 'analysis']' (Willis 
1980: vii). 
The book is explicitly designed to work at different levels and employs different modes 
of address. 
As suggested by Willis's advice to his first class of readers (the 'practitioners'), the 
'ethnography' is an argument complete in itself, a fully-developed attempt to explain 
'how working class kids get working class jobs'. It is an argument which is made in 
very different terms from those described above. As Willis summarises in introduction: 
I want to suggest that 'failed' working class kids do not simply take up the 
falling curve of work where the least successful middle class, or the most 
successful working class kids leave off. Instead of assuming a continuous 
shallowing line of ability in the occupational/class structure we must conceive 
of radical breaks represented by the interface of cultural forms (Willis 1980: 1 ). 
This is no less than the characteristic proposition, traceable from Hoggart and Williams 
to the early Hall, that values and forms of understanding are specific to the contexts in 
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which they develop, having little direct relevance when applied to other contexts. As 
Willis goes on to expand: 
[T]he working class pattern of 'failure' is quite different and distinct from other 
patterns ... And this class culture is not a neutral pattern, a mental category, a 
set of variables impinging on the school from outside. It comprises experiences, 
relationships, and ensembles of systematic types of relationships which not only 
set particular 'choices' and 'decisions' at particular times, but also structure, 
really and experientially, how these 'choices' come about and are defined in the 
first place (Willis 1980: 1 ). 
Again, this proposition does not demand a recognition of objective social hierarchies, 
but, on the contrary, an effort of imagination which would allow us to think of relations 
in other terms. Willis asks us to question whether the lives of 'the lads' are 'obviously' 
undesirable and rejects the idea that they 'have no choice' but to take their place at the 
unskilled end of the labour market. As he points out, they appear in many ways to make 
more active and conscious decisions than the school 'conformists'; their rejection of 
institutional recognition and approval requires some determination and even courage. 
Such behaviour can only be understood if it is recognised that the informal counter-
culture might actually be experienced as preferable to anything offered by the formal 
domains of school and career. As one of 'the lads' explains simply: 'we want to stop as 
we am' (168). 
Willis's sympathy with these life-choices is flatly at odds with the construction of 'the 
lads' as proto-revolutionary subjects. Yet it is not atypical of the work of the CCCS. As 
Tony Bennett has argued, the working-class male youth 'subcultures' which provided 
the main object of study for the Centre during the mid 1970s were clearly recognised as 
defensive cultural formations. In the key text of the period, the collectively-authored 
Resistance Through Rituals (Hall and Jefferson 1976), they 
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are construed as essentially defensive reactions to a situation in which the 
accommodation between the working-class and ruling-class cultures which had 
characterised the 1930s and 1940s was profoundly disturbed by the intrusive 
invasion of the postwar ideologies of consumerism, affluence and growth into 
the traditional forms of working-class culture (Bennett 1998: 172). 
The questions this raises are more complex than Bennett himself realises. The 
conclusion he draws is that subcultural 'resistances' could never provide a focus for 
progressive politics: 'Such resistances may be ... factors which a politics should take 
into account, but they do not amount to a politics or provide an adequate basis for the 
development of one' (173). The argument is a useful corrective to any view that the 
Birmingham subculture theorists were, in a simple sense, Marxist 'revolutionaries', but 
it fails to explain why the subculture writing was widely perceived as having political 
implications. 
Like McRobbie, Bennett pays attention too exclusively to positive claims about power, 
missing a different sense in which intellectual work may be 'political'. This is the sense 
which Hall had recognised in Orwell's idea of an 'English revolution', where radicalism 
consists precisely in denying a structural foundation for social antagonism, in refusing 
to construe social relations as necessarily competitive. In Learning to Labour, as in 
Resistance Through Rituals, it is a sense which is eclipsed at a formal level by general 
theories of power, yet without it whole passages of argument can only appear confused 
or obscure. This is particularly the case, in fact, where Willis comes to draw out the 
implications of his research at what he calls the 'practical/political level' (Willis 1980: 
185). 
In a final chapter, titled 'Monday morning and the millennium', his address returns to 
the teachers and careers advisers, taking up the question of how they might better 
respond to the problems posed in the classroom by 'difficult' working class kids. Some 
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tension remains here with the sociological analysis: 'We cannot now naively return to 
discrete cultural forms and independent cultural initiatives to yield a full and effective 
programme' (186). But the main thrust of Willis's argument runs entirely the other way. 
In an impassioned moment of reversal, he points out that practitioners cannot avoid the 
problem of 'Monday morning': 
If we have nothing to say about what to do on Monday morning everything is 
yielded to a purist structuralist immobilising reductionist tautology: nothing can 
be done until the basic structures of society are changed but the structures 
prevent us making any changes ... To contract out of the messy business of day 
to day problems is to deny the active, contested nature of social and cultural 
reproduction: to condemn real people to the status of passive zombies, and 
actually cancel the future by default. To refuse the challenge of the day to day -
because of the dead hand of structural constraint - is to deny the continuance of 
life and society themselves (Willis 1980: 186). 
Political activism is actually opposed here to the analysis of social relations of power. 
The latter comes to signify abstraction and removal, a 'contracting out' of day to day 
problems and the 'active, contested nature of social and cultural reproduction'. 
Willis's 'practical/political' suggestions return, in short, to the terms of the 
'ethnography'. They centre on proposals for a kind of cultural diplomacy, a set of 
protocols for engagement between teachers and 'problem kids' which might allow 
relations to develop more constructively. The key element of this diplomacy is an open 
recognition of cultural difference and the granting of certain rights to those who are 
disaffected with the school system to relate to it on their own terms. Some of the 
specific recommendations for teachers which flow from this are: 
* be sensitive to the double coding of class and institutional meanings so that 
teaching responses and communications are not mistaken as insults to social 
class and identity 
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* ... Try to limit the scope of the inevitable vicious circle which develops in 
post-differentiated [antagonistic] relationships. 
* use where possible small classes ... and techniques of group discussion and 
collective work. Such techniques ... move towards some kind of organisational 
unit which might be homologous to the collective processes and forms which 
are to be explored. 
* take cultural forms, basic transitions, social attitudes sometimes as the basic 
texts for class work (Willis 1980: 190-191 ). 
None of these suggestions are revolutionary in the sense of proposing a comprehensive 
program of social transformation. They do not even seek to question established 
authority: where antagonism is openly expressed, Willis recommends 'a tactical 
withdrawal from confrontation but which avoids any simplistic expression of sympathy 
and maintains a degree of institutional authority' (190). Such authority is necessary, he 
argues, 'in order to maintain any initiative at all in the particular direction of 
class[room] activity' (191). 
Yet the argument is far from a defence of an authoritarian status qua. The effect of the 
'ethnographic' argument is to remove the school system and working-class life from the 
familiar interpretative grid of social hierarchy, creating a comer from which they might 
begin to relate to each other in different terms. As Willis concludes: 
The recognition of commonality in cultural forms and the understanding of 
their own processes is already to have strengthened an internal weakness, to 
have begun to unravel the power of the formal [the school system] over the 
informal [working-class life] and to have started a kind of self-transformation. 
This may not be the Millennium but it could be Monday morning. Monday 
morning need not imply an endless succession of the same Monday mornings 
(Willis 1980: 192). 
What is 'political' in this position - perhaps even 'radical' - is not so much what it 
actively seeks, as what it is prepared to allow. The 'self-transformation' envisaged by 
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Willis might be compared to a process of de-colonisation, although its outcome is not 
even fixed by an ideal of 'autonomy' set up in advance. While the teacher has access to 
institutional and governmental resources which might determine certain directions, they 
are enjoined to limit the way these resources are deployed, merely playing 'a sceptical, 
unglamorous real eye over industrial, economic and class cultural processes' (190). 
Opportunities are kept open but it is left to others to decide what they want to do or be. 
THE MEANING OF STYLE 
Hebdige's Subculture is a somewhat different text in that it seeks greater consistency 
between the 'cultural' and 'sociological'. Although published only three years later than 
Leaming to Labour, it shows signs of quite significant shifts in the intellectual space of 
the CCCS. Even in the earlier text, there is a sense that this space is under pressure. 
Willis's 'ethnographic' argument is still possible within the formal structure of a 
'Marxist' analysis because of the Althusserian alibi that the cultural level is 'relatively 
autonomous', but there are a number of points at which this alibi appears in danger of 
giving way. It is only because the 'cultural' and the 'sociological' analyses are kept so 
distinct that the problems do not become more acute than they are. Once 'culture' is 
conceived as a particular sphere within a wider social totality, questions inevitably arise 
about its linkages with other spheres. If the social reality is a 'system of exploitation and 
oppression for working class people', it is implausible that the cultural level could be 
insulated from it to the extent which Willis's 'practical/political' suggestions require. 
The understanding of differences as specifically 'cultural' is eroded in a way that the 
relative autonomy clause is not sufficient to prevent. 
Much of the theoretical development at the CCCS during the mid to late 1970s can be 
understood as an attempt to address this problem. In a 1977 essay, 'Culture, the Media 
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and the "Ideological Effect"', Hall admits that the concept of culture continued to have 
an 'ambiguous and unspecified relation' to the models of power and ideology which 
were being entertained at the time: 'There seems to be a theoretical discontinuity 
between the problematic in which the term "culture" has been developed and the terms 
of classical Marxist theory' (Hall 1977a: 321). Echoing earlier comments by Williams 
(1958: 282) on the English Marxism of the 1930s, he points out that culture is made to 
fit into Marxist models in two different ways: it is sometimes conceived as a general 
pattern of social organisation (in Williams' terms, a 'whole way of life'), at other times 
as a distinct level of reflection upon such patterns (the level associated with language 
and consciousness) (Hall 1977a: 322). The latter sense assimilates culture to ideology, 
requiring everything to be referenced to 'real relations' at the social level. In so doing, it 
is quite incompatible with a specifically 'cultural' politics of the kind suggested by 
Willis. But so long as the idea of 'real relations' remains, it cannot easily be avoided. 
Hall experiments with a number of solutions to the problem. 13 The most significant, 
however, is an attempt to conceptualise culture as, itself, a sphere of 'real relations'. 
Theoretical support for this is found, particularly, in V.N. Volosinov's (1986) idea of 
the 'materiality of the sign' which licenses a transposition of Marxist concepts of 
'production', 'labour' and 'struggle' to the cultural domain. As Hall outlines the 
significance of the idea in 'The rediscovery of "ideology"': 
Meaning, once it is problematized, must be the result, not of a functional 
reproduction of the world in language, but of a social struggle - a struggle for 
mastery in discourse - over which kind of social accenting is to prevail and to 
win credibility. This reintroduced the notion of 'differently oriented social 
13 Another, which I will not discuss here, is the suggestion that culture might be thought of as the 'form' 
of social existence while the social might be though of as the 'content' (Hall 1977a: 318). 
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interests' and a concept of the sign as 'an arena of struggle' into the 
consideration oflanguage and of signifying 'work' (Hall 1982: 77-78). 
The argument removes the need for cultural studies to adopt the kind of defensive 
posture taken by Willis in relation to sociology. The space for considering 'cultural' 
relations in their own terms is cleared of the threat that it may be closed down in the 
light of other approaches more committed to naming the 'real'. 
It has to be admitted that the implications of this move are paradoxical. In a certain 
sense, the concept of culture is retained only at the cost of being 'sociologised'. All the 
concepts and models which had previously been defined as sociological - above all, a 
generalised concept of power - are imported into 'cultural' analysis. To transform 
Thompson's charge against Williams - that in fighting the bourgeoisie he became 
bourgeois (Thompson 1961: 28) - one might suggest of Hall that in fighting sociology 
he became a sociologist. But to draw this conclusion would be to fail to recognise the 
complexity of 'Hallism'. Hall's mediations and compromises can certainly be read as an 
absorption of the concept of culture within sociological models, but they can also be 
read the other way: as a site where sociological concepts are 'culturalised'. The 
abstraction of the concept of power from Marxist analyses of economic relations does 
not leave it unaltered. The dissociation of the concept from its original points of 
reference leaves is relatively 'theatricalised', opened to metaphorical or figurative 
interpretations which weaken the suggestion of a simple referential meaning. 
This is the intellectual space of Subculture. Hebdige opens not in theoretical but in 
literary mode, quoting extracts from Jean Genet's The Thief's Journal. In Genet's 
conflict with police and prison wardens, trivial details assume a symbolic significance. 
As banal an object as a tube of vaseline takes on a highly-charged meaning as evidence 
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of his homosexuality and a counter in his struggle. The example is worked into a 
general social vision: 
I was astounded by so rigorous an edifice whose details were united against me. 
Nothing in the world is irrelevant: the stars on a general's sleeve, the stock-
market quotations, the olive harvest, the style of the judiciary, the wheat 
exchange, the flower-beds ... Nothing. This order ... had a meaning- my exile 
(Genet quoted in Hebdige 1979: 18). 
The passage is clearly suggestive of a rationalist concept of power, but even allowing 
for a certain justifiable paranoia on Genet' s part, it is difficult to believe that this is not, 
in its original articulation, an imaginative vision. In the way it is taken up by Hebdige, 
its status as such is further confirmed. It is quoted in the context of a discussion of the 
concept of culture in which he also cites T.S. Eliot's famous definition: 
... all the characteristic activities and interests of a people. Derby Day, Henley 
Regatta, Cowes, the 12th of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the 
dart-board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in 
vinegar, 19th Century Gothic churches, the music of Elgar ... (Eliot quoted in 
Hebdige 1979: 7) 
The differences between Eliot (culture) and Genet (power) should not lead us to 
overlook their similarities. In both quotations, the incongruity of the listed objects 
breaks down any sense that a substantive phenomenon is being invoked. Attention is 
drawn instead to the creative act of association. The literary quality of Hebdige's own 
writing carries this emphasis over into his descriptions of punk, reggae, rastafarianism 
and the complex exchanges between different fractions of British working class youth. 
It is by no means the only emphasis. Hebdige demonstrates that he is also able to write 
in a sober, 'sociological' mode. The first chapter of Subculture presents a condensed 
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summary of the state of theoretical debate at the CCCS. Here the concept of power is 
introduced more explicitly: 
[I]n highly complex societies like ours, which function through a finely graded 
system of divided labour, the crucial question has to do with which specific 
ideologies, representing the interests of which specific groups and classes will 
prevail at any given moment, in any given situation. To deal with this question, 
we must first consider how power is distributed in our society. That is, we must 
ask which groups and classes have how much say in defining, ordering and 
classifying out the social world (Hebdige 1979: 14). 
The passage shows the influence of Hall's theoretical initiatives discussed above and 
similar passages appear at various points throughout the text. The transitions between 
them and the more 'literary' mode are eased by the fact that both appear to address 
questions of power. The contradiction felt by Willis between the perspectives of 
'Monday morning' and the 'millennium' are, as a consequence, less awkwardly 
negotiated. 
Nonetheless, a tension remains. It is a more subtle tension than in Willis and therefore 
easier to miss, but is no less important to Hebdige's arguments or to the political 
implications of his work. The more empirically-oriented sections of his text are, again, 
actively subversive of his formally-stated theoretical positions. While the latter suggest 
an interpretation of culture in terms of power, the former suggest an interpretation of the 
concept of power in terms of culture. What Hebdige develops in his study of British 
youth subcultures is nothing less than a cultural history of the concept in popular music, 
fashion, street-level class relations and symbolic representations of colonialism. The 
effect of this is that the concept becomes absorbed within the kind of 'cultural' 
understanding which can be traced continuously from Hoggart and Williams. 
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The key word in Hebdige's empirical analysis is 'dialogue'. His central argument is that 
youth subcultures in postwar Britain have been the site of a concentrated cross-cultural 
exchange between the white working class and black immigrants. Musical styles, 
elements of dress, speech and movement were exchanged particularly between punk 
and Rastafarianism. With its origins in Jamaica, Rastafarianism introduced potent 
figures of rebellion and utopian possibility which were given widespread currency 
through the popularisation of dub and heavy reggae: 
All these developments were mediated to those members of the white working 
class who lived in the same areas, worked in the same factories and schools and 
drank in adjacent pubs. In particular, the trajectory 'back to Africa' within 
second-generation immigrant youth culture was closely monitored by those 
neighbouring white youths interested in forming their own subcultural options 
(Hebdige 1979: 43). 
The intensity of this experience sensitised British youth culture to other traditions of 
cross-cultural exchange, particularly the 'subtle dialogue between black and white 
musical forms' in American imports (50), a dialogue which had earlier gone largely 
unnoticed. In increasing the range of available cultural perspectives, it also made 
possible new kinds of reflexive awareness within the white working class: 
Ironically, those values conventionally associated with white working-class 
culture (the values of what John Clark calls the 'defensively organised 
collective') which had been eroded over time, by the relative affluence and by 
the disruption of the physical environment in which they were rooted, were 
rediscovered embedded in black West Indian culture ... The skinheads, then, 
resolved or at least reduced the tension between an experienced present (the 
mixed ghetto) and an imaginary past (the classic white slum) by initiating a 
dialogue which reconstituted each in terms of the other (Hebdige 1979: 57). 
The result was an extraordinary explosion of cultural possibilities as various class and 
ethnic fragments interpreted their own positions in each other's terms: 
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Just as the mod and skinhead styles had obliquely reproduced the 'cool' look 
and feel of the West Indian rude boys and were systematically placed in the 
same ideal milieux (the Big City, the violent slums), so the punk aesthetic can 
be read in part as a white 'translation' of black 'ethnicity' (Hebdige 1979: 64). 
It is impossible to ignore the fact that some of the key cultural elements being 
'translated' here are figures of power. The black youth cultures which developed in 
postwar Britain have a similar status, for Hebdige, to Genet' s vision of 'an edifice 
whose details were united against me'. They drew on histories of colonialism not as a 
direct experience but as a symbolic resource and were articulated in the language of 
myth and religion. The use of their terms to re-code white class relations was in tum an 
imaginative achievement. In his final chapter, Hebdige makes this point explicit: 
Much of this book has been based on the assumption that the two positions 
'Negro' and 'white working-class youth' can be equated. This equation is no 
doubt open to dispute; it cannot be tested by the standard sociological 
procedures ... it is there as an immanence, as a submerged possibility, as an 
existential option; and one cannot verify an existential option scientifically 
(Hebdige 1979: 131 ). 
The subversive implication of this is clear: no formal equivalence can be drawn between 
concepts of power. The concept which emerges from the history of black experience 
does not refer to the same 'thing' as the concept which emerges from the experience of 
class relations in Britain. The relation between them must be understood not in 
'scientific' but in 'cultural' terms. 
The political implications of this are similar to Willis's recuperation of the 'cultural'. 
Hebdige removes us from an intellectual space in which the social appears bound by 
some 'underlying' principle and therefore available for comprehensive reform. This is a 
consistent effect, more generally, of the 'subculture' corpus of the CCCS. Its full 
significance can only be understood in the context of the times. The whole debate about 
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the direction of British society in the 1970s was pervaded by a sense of 'crisis', widely 
taken to call for major 'action'. On the political right, such action was envisaged as 
authoritarian, a determined effort to return Britain by force to an imagined former 
'greatness'. On the left, it was envisaged as libertarian, a collective struggle to overturn 
established institutions conceived as uniformly 'bad'. Within the terms of this conflict, 
those on the right won out as Thatcherism set the political agenda throughout the 1980s. 
But the debate itself never accounted for all political possibilities. There was always a 
more moderate left position, not so far from certain forms of conservatism, which 
questioned the whole idea of a crisis and the political forms, whatever their political 
colour, which organised themselves around it. If the work of the Birmingham Centre 
had any 'default' setting, it was always this latter position. 
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'An Impossible Politics to Live' 
Gender, geopolitics and generation 
In the preface to her recent book, Too Soon, Too Late, Meaghan Morris reflects on some 
thirty years of feminist cultural criticism through a review of the life and work of Claire 
Johnston, 'one of the first and most visionary of British feminist theorists working with 
film in the 1970s' (Morris 1998: xiii). Morris's relation to her subject is characteristic in 
its complexity. One of the reasons she first returned to Johnston's writing in the early 
1990s, she confesses, was to understand 'why I found it hard then to read [her] essays 
(along with most other early "second wave" feminist texts)'. But her interest is more 
than one of self-reflection; it is also motivated by a wish to engage with 'some recent 
theses on ethics, truth, and (an often unstated) professionalism that make feminist arts 
and histories an object of tacit criticism, or even direct attack' (xxii). Like Morris's own 
ambivalence about early second wave feminism, these theses are troubling in that they 
cannot be dismissed simply as products of neo-conservatism: 
They belong to Marxist and liberal critical traditions nominally in sympathy 
with feminism: they, too, review twenty years of cultural politics, and they do 
so with an eye to the global tensions that hav·e shaped the 1990s ... Some, like 
David Harvey's influential book The Condition of Postmodernity, associate 
feminist aesthetics with 'nostalgic' ethnic nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism; in this view ... feminism can be potentially fascist. Others, 
like Christopher Norris's Spinoza & the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, 
passionately defend the possibility of truth and Reason against a 'postmodern' 
pragmatist history; for this view ... feminism has not yet happened (Morris 
1998: xxii). 
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A despondency about the legacy of 1970s feminism seems to crystallise, finally, around 
the fact that Claire Johnston tragically took her own life in 1987, after writing an essay 
(never published) on why, in Thatcher's Britain, it was impossible to go on. At the time 
of her death, it was difficult, Morris says, not to read her work 'as though to find out 
what had "gone wrong"' (xiv). The question is allowed to hang briefly as one that might 
be asked of feminist cultural criticism more generally. 
But despite these depressing points of reference, the argument Morris develops in re-
reading Johnston is one of measured optimism. She finds in her work something she did 
not quite expect to find: 
For as time passed, a more complex, less mythical sense of how texts work in history, 
over time - her critical sense, in fact - began to assert itself. Johnston's writing, always 
historical, nervous of myth, became more a part of my present than it ever had been of 
my past. It began to be important, not something to disavow, that I was actually reading 
many of her texts for the first time in my life (Morris 1998: xiv). 
The discovery of 'another 1970s' suggests to Morris the possibility of writing a history 
of feminism as a discourse of scepticism. It is true, she admits, that 'most of the dreams 
of historicism, from bloody revolution to the millenarian community, have been taken 
up, at one time or another, by some form of feminism'; but there has always been, 
beside this, a 'basic skepticism about History' which has made feminism 'at once 
resilient in surviving its own failed experiments and resistant to modes of argument that 
base their claims on necessity' (xv). It is the resources for such scepticism which are 
still valuable in the early feminist criticism of writers such as Johnston. The legacy of 
this work has not been one of defeat but rather of survival. 
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There are some remarkable resonances between this suggestion and themes I have 
developed over the last three chapters. Morris relates the scepticism she identifies in 
feminism both to a certain temporality and to the category of experience. As an 
illustration of the first of these themes, she cites Ann Curthoys and Lyndall Ryan in one 
of the early texts of Australian women's liberation:' ... we see women's liberation as 
working for revolution, but not the sort of revolution which is an event that takes two or 
three days, in which there is shooting and hanging' (Morris 1998: xiv). The tension 
defined by Curthoys and Ryan is, for Morris, characteristic of feminism generally: 
Feminist discourse often stammers when it comes to validating action with a 
logic of events; it is not that logic is renounced, or history deemed chaotic, but 
that there is a struggle to name a different temporality ('not the sort of 
revolution which is an event that takes two or three days ... ') that might make a 
feminist concept of eventfulness historically intelligible ... To act, as I believe 
feminism does, to bring about concrete social changes while at the same time 
contesting the very bases of modern thinking about what constitutes 'change' is 
to induce intense strain, almost a kind of overload, in historical articulation -
and sometimes, in feminists' lives (Morris 1998: xv). 
The 'struggle to name a different temporality' - one not defined by the ruptural violence 
of 'shooting and hanging' - is directly related, for Morris, to a struggle to win 
intellectual recognition for the category of experience. The difficulty of gaining such 
recognition is, she suggests, a major reason for the 'glossing over of feminist 
contributions to cultural debate in recent years', as well as the'criticisms - implicit or 
explicit - of writers such as Harvey and Norris: 
Looking at these instances in politically engaged, energetic works of theory, I 
am convinced that something to do with the troubled feminist category of 
'experience' is involved in this corporate unease about the status of feminist 
intellectual work. The category of experience has always assumed the 
irrelevance of opposing living and writing, art and life (Morris 1998: xxii). 
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But whatever its shortcomings, the archive of feminist cultural criticism remains, for 
Morris, a reminder of the possibility of a subtle negotiation between temporalities 
(thematised in the 'too soon, too late' of her title) which permits a sensitivity to 
experience, not as a stock of generic illustrations but in its 'eventfulness': 'I think that 
this, more than anything to do with "postmodem" pragmatism, describes the activating 
principle of Claire Johnston's feminist film history, and provides me with a starting 
point today' (xxiii). 
GENDER, GEOPOLITICS AND GENERATION 
Morris's argument provides, itself, a useful starting point for this chapter, in which I 
want to review the changing definition of the concept of power with the emergence of 
feminism within cultural studies. It is an argument which is consistent in many ways 
with the one I have so far developed, but it also adds a complication. While Morris's 
attempt to recover a sceptical strain in feminism is similar to my own attempt, over the 
last three chapters, to recover a sceptical strain within British cultural studies, it also 
differs in identifying the themes of scepticism, experience and 'non-ruptural' 
temporalities specifically with feminism. Feminism is distinguished on the point of 
scepticism not only from 'many of the left-wing political traditions with which [it] has 
been associated' (Morris 1998: xv), but also, significantly, from 'Britishness'. Britain 
figures in Morris's argument in the distinctly unattractive forms of 'British Film Theory 
prose' and Thatcherism. The first of these she describes as a form of 'Latin': 'a mythic 
Latin saying "I am an instance of rigorous scientificity'; as [Lesley] Stem says, the 
effect can be 'sombre, not to say tyrannical"'. The significance of Johnston in this 
context, is that she seemed to escape it: 'she had a way of using that Latin to make it 
sound like a fart in church' (xvi). In a similar way, she resisted Thatcher's famous 
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TINA slogan - 'There Is No Alternative' - seeking always to define a horizon of open 
possibility. 
The point assumes greater significance in the longer perspective of Morris's work. In 
the final essay of her collection, in a reflection on why Australian feminists of her 
generation often deny the significance of change, she draws attention to the formative 
experience of growing up in the 1960s: 
Change can be quite shocking for white middle-class cold war babies. For all 
that talk of revolutions, those of us who grew up in Australia did so under a 
political settlement of immense and dazing stability and in an ideological 
climate of seemingly endless fatalism ... I sometimes think that the widespread 
tendency in feminism to know in advance that any event is just more of the 
same old story, more of the same patriarchy, the same racism, the same form of 
class exploitation ... is in Australia as much a legacy of the Menzies era (1949-
1966) as it is a defense against the disappointments of experience (Morris 1998: 
199). 
In a recent interview, Morris describes the intellectual establishment of the 1950s and 
1960s in terms which resonate with Perry Anderson's 'The Origins of the Present 
Crisis', refracted and amplified by the tradition of Australian radical nationalism: 
I can see why hostility to academics became so strong [in Australia]. From back 
in the 1890s when Henry Lawson snarled 'Get out of the tracks we travel' to his 
'Cultured Critics', the Australian literary academy has largely been so British-
oriented, so timorous, dull and mediocre - you get the odd, strange comet like 
H.M. Green flashing through the sky, but mostly this thick grey pall of 
Anglophile gloom that we had no literature, no history, no culture ... Anyone 
with any vitality would want to get away from an atmosphere like that (Morris 
1997b: 249). 
Morris's own 'getting away' was through French feminism and the resources, more 
generally, of European philosophy and aesthetics: 'I was lucky to be a student in French 
at the time when most feminist debates were unquestioningly "English" or "American" 
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in orientation; I got to read a lot of stuff and think about it years before it was 
translated' (Morris 1997b: 244). 
In fact, Morris's work introduces more than one complication. The theme of scepticism 
is intersected not only by questions of gender but also by questions of geopolitical 
relations within spaces shaped by histories of colonialism and by questions of 
generation. If it is important to Morris that she writes as a feminist, it is almost equally 
important that she writes as an Australian; and she also writes as a member of a 
generation on the left whose political experience has been shaped by the Cold War. It 
would be difficult to trace the relation in her work between cultural studies and 
feminism without also tracing the development of cultural studies as an international 
field and the formative influence upon it of the rejection of the political and cultural 
establishments of the 1950s which occurred across most Western countries from the late 
1960s. While all three coordinates are important - gender, geopolitics and generation - , 
none is determining and the complexities allowed by each are multiplied when they are 
combined. 
It may seem wiser, in view of this, to maintain a more limited focus. Given, particularly, 
that I have concentrated so far on the development of British cultural studies, to 
introduce Morris at this point might seem to widen the scope of my historical argument 
beyond what is manageable. But part of my extension of the argument in this chapter is 
that the development of feminism within cultural studies cannot be understood in 
isolation. In its effect on the concept of power at least, to view it by itself or within a 
single national context would be to miss its significance. I want also to suggest that 
attention to the changing definition of the concept allows a number of related 
developments to be kept in some kind of focus. The emergence of feminism, the 
internationalisation of cultural studies and the influence of the new social movements of 
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the late 1960s and 1970s all have at least one thing in common: they have been closely 
associated with a decisive shift in the use of the concept of power. This is not to say that 
they are either singly or jointly responsible for such a shift, but that in shaping or being 
shaped by it they share a common history. 
This suggestion is in some ways an obvious one. The internationalism of feminism is 
routinely observed and it is an internationalism which has generally been framed in 
terms of an analysis, cross-cutting categories of nation and class, of the relation between 
gender and power. Most of the issues raised by Morris's historical reflections might be 
related, in one way or another, to questions of power. The 'mythical sense of history' 
associated with the late 1960s and 1970s, the spectre of a revolution 'in which there is 
shooting and hanging', the insistence of a certain kind of feminism on 'the same 
patriarchy, the same racism, the same class exploitation' - all could be understood in 
terms of particular understandings of power or of the importance of power. Power is 
also a connecting theme between feminism and the other 'left-wing political traditions 
with which it has been associated'. It is the concept in relation to which 'patriarchy', 
'racism' and 'class exploitation' come to be grouped together, and in relation to which 
different local instances of each can be broadly identified. It is the concept, finally, 
which implicitly articulates the generational rejection of the 1950s; it gives sense to 
Morris's figure of the conservative, Anglophile government of Robert Menzies in 
Australia, making it translatable with 'similar' figures elsewhere. 
Yet the concept of power is rarely included within frames of historical understanding. In 
Morris's reflections on feminist criticism it is, in fact, strangely absent. It is constantly 
alluded to but never directly addressed. This might perhaps be explained by the fact that 
it is so obvious that it does not need to be made explicit, but there also seems to be 
another reason. Morris's revision of the history of feminism is a work of subtle 
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diplomacy: it probes sensitivities - sensitivities which cluster around the concept of 
power - but is careful never to push its questioning too far. Her negotiation of a 
continuing space for feminist criticism involves a precarious double act. On the one 
hand, she attempts to loosen the hold of accumulated dogmas within the critical 
discourses with which she identifies; on the other hand, she attempts to preserve a sense 
of a continuing project. As she puts it in the epilogue to Too Soon, Too Late, 'it is 
necessary to gamble on the openness of the future, as well as to make a commitment to 
creating in the present some sense of continuity and solidarity with those who have 
labored in the past' (Morris 1998: 227). The concept of power is a problem on both 
fronts. As it is often applied, it denies the 'openness of the future' (there will only ever 
be 'more of the same'); yet to dismiss it, or even radically revise it, seems to imply a 
careless disregard - if not brutal rejection - of 'those who have labored in the past'. 
Here, finally, is the most difficult problem to be addressed in assessing the re-definition 
of power at the juncture of gender, geopolitics and generation. It is a problem, I want to 
argue, which is not confined to feminism, but which makes debates around feminism 
particularly fraught. It may be impossible to say whether feminism has been more an 
agent of a transformation of the concept of power in cultural studies or a response to it, 
but the association between the two has meant that it has often become burdened with 
particular praise or blame. My approach in what follows is to attempt to remove some 
of this burden by placing the development of feminism within a wider history. It is an 
approach which cuts across the lines which have often been drawn between feminism 
and its 'others'. One of the effects of this is to neutralise some of the criticisms which 
Morris, among others, feels to be directed specifically at feminism. But it also 
neutralises some of the attempts of feminist writers, themselves, to define their 
'difference'. The problem I see, specifically, with Morris's identification of feminism 
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and scepticism is that the form of the relation between feminism and the other 'left-
wing traditions' from which she distinguishes it has been reproduced within feminism 
itself, across the lines of race, class and sexual preference. The discovery of sceptical 
'islands' on the oceans of History as Myth too easily becomes a way of disowning 
common problems, permitting a kind of atomism. 
While I have no wish to defend the particular claims of Harvey and Norris, I would 
defend the legitimacy and relevance of their concern with problems associated with 
feminism as they affect the broad intellectual culture of 'the left'. Morris places some 
question over their relevance at least, describing them as 'major' cultural critics in the 
sense of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari' s distinction between 'major' and 'minor' 
literatures (Morris 1998: xxi). From the point of view of a 'major' literature, cultural 
production is organised by oppositions between 'writing' and 'living', 'art' and 'life'. It 
is from this point of view that the confusion of writing and art with experience appears 
as problematic. But from the point of view of a 'minor' literature - or what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the 'cramped space' of the minor - the oppositions are never posited in the 
first place: 'In any cramped space, there is no material basis for opposing art and life ... 
activism can make a virtue of necessity by demanding a consistency between living and 
writing, acting and thinking, life, art, and labor' (xviii-xix). Feminism, for Morris, took 
shape within such a space. Its activating principles are therefore invisible to critics like 
Harvey and Norris. 
The notion of 'cramped space' is, as Morris says, a suggestive one in thinking about 
early feminist practice, but the distinction between 'major' and 'minor' is somewhat 
forced. Morris is not entirely comfortable with it herself. The concept of the 'minor', 
she admits, is 'entangled ... in shaky analogies and by a history of its romantic use to 
celebrate marginality'· (Morris 1998: xviii). The concept of the 'major', as applied to 
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Harvey and Norris, must be hedged by disavowals: 'I have no wish to attack their 
(historical) position, denounce the limitations of knowledge produced by "white, 
middle-class males", or renounce the institutions and professions in which feminists 
now may work' (xxii). Morris's recognition that her criticisms may apply to feminists 
as well as Marxists and liberals indicates the problem with the terms: they are too 
generalised to be more than crudely 'applied' in particular situations, so that their use 
risks degenerating into a form of moralism. In fact, Harvey and Norris are joined in 
'majority' even by Claire Johnston. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 'major' 
literatures are ones which use language in order to 'extract constants from it'. Yet it is 
exactly such constants which Johnston found plaguing her own feminism, and which 
Morris suggests may have been the cause of her despair: 'any self chronically dependent 
for its identity on "seeing the world in a certain way" could find itself subject to an 
injunction, no longer to change the world, but simply to drop out of history' (xx). 
The concepts of 'major' and 'minor' do avoid some of the problems of reductivism and 
negativity in more common distinctions between 'dominant' and 'subordinate' or 
'centre' and 'margins'. They are rooted, however, in a form of avant-gardism. As 
Morris points out, there are important differences from the classical variety: 'in place of 
an avant-garde negation of art's status in bourgeois society, Deleuze and Guattari offer 
an affirmative project based on mass historical experience' (Morris 1998: xvii). They do 
not associate 'minority' with a marginal cultural elite who define themselves in 
opposition to 'society', but with 'colonized, suppressed, or displaced' populations who 
may actually constitute the statistical majority. Yet they retain, nevertheless, an equally 
important continuity with the classical avant-garde. Their concepts are crucially defined 
with reference to what might be called a 'figure of sameness'. For the classical 
European avant-garde, this figure was 'bourgeois society'. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
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the position is taken instead by 'oedipal' formations (as presided over by Freud) or 
philosophy 'in the shadow of the State' (as presided over by Hegel), which impose a 
monotonous repetition of themes within intellectual culture. As Morris applies their 
concepts, it is 'mainstream' academic writing or, more distantly, the 'thick grey pall of 
Anglophile gloom' of 1950s Australia. 
I do not want to question such figures as such. They clearly correspond to profoundly 
felt experiences and it is not difficult to sympathise with Morris that 'anyone with any 
vitality' would want to get away from some at least of the historical phenomena from 
which they have been abstracted. What I do want to question, however, is their tendency 
to harden as the basis for generalised descriptions and forms of criticism. The tendency 
is one which produces a flat rendition of objects of criticism, inhibiting the possibility of 
negotiated relationships or temporalities. What may begin in what Morris calls a 'totally 
intense present' in which every gesture matters becomes almost the opposite - a time in 
which nothing matters, because it has always already been spoken for in advance. The 
concept of power has been, in this context, a kind of 'setting agent', subtly converting 
critical concepts from specific historical articulations to a level of ahistorical theorising. 
If this is so, then the absence of the concept from Morris's argument may be far from 
accidental. To name the concept directly would be to invoke precisely the tendency she 
is attempting to resist. It would be effectively to shut down on the political scepticism -
the sensitivity to 'experience' and 'eventfulness' - which she wishes to sustain. 
This point has a particular importance given the specific 'figure of sameness' which has 
informed many, if not most, of the avant-gardist tendencies of feminist and post-
feminist cultural studies - the figure of the 'white, middle-class male' which Morris 
invokes in order to disavow. The significance of this figure is not only that it has 
sometimes been an object of simple denunciation within feminism - it has, in fact, been 
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widely denounced by 'white, middle-class males' themselves. It is also that it often 
stands in for an Anglo-derived cultural and intellectual inheritance which offers the 
resources for alternative understandings of politics, culture and historical change. A 
major tendency of this inheritance may be, as Morris describes its Australian variants, 
'timorous, dull and mediocre' - a reactive formation often indistinguishable from anti-
intellectualism and made all the more unbearable by an alliance with imperial 
chauvinism. But if my argument over the last three chapters is accepted, it also includes 
a particularly rich archives of negotiated responses to change in modernity. To permit a 
blanket characterisation of 'Britishness', particularly within Anglo-derived political 
cultures, is radically to limit the available resources for a politics of scepticism. 
My argument here is emphatically not a general criticism of avant-gardism or 'French 
theory'; it is rather to suggest that their importance be historically contextualised. As 
Morris says in reflecting on her own work of the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is 
important to remember how theory can succeed in connecting intellectual culture and 
popular experience: 
It was one of those times when there is a coincidence or a buzz between 
theoretical terms and those more widely circulating in the public culture, in an 
effect that we readily call 'relevance'. At other times, when there is no such co-
incidence, we may too easily assume that the relationship between theory and 
public culture is therefore one of irrelevance (Morris 1998: 15). 
As Raymond Williams argued in The Politics of Modernism (1989a), one of the most 
remarkable developments in the emergence of post-war mass commercial popular 
culture has been the 'buzz' between an aesthetic modernism previously limited to very 
small numbers of writers and artists and far more widespread activities and practices. 
To historicise this development is not to deny its significance, but rather to test its 
limits. 
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'AS THE THIEF IN THE NIGHT' 
The argument I am making here can be illustrated most clearly by returning to the 
British case itself. To allow ease of cross-reference with previous chapters, I will 
continue to use the example of the Birmingham CCCS. It is an example which 
indicates, perhaps better than any other, the complexity of relations between feminism, 
on the one hand, and scepticism, the category of experience and negotiated 
temporalities on the other - a complexity which makes simple identifications or 
oppositions impossible. 
In a recent account by Stuart Hall, feminism appeared at Birmingham as 'ruptural': 
As the thief in the night, it broke in; interrupted, made an unseemly noise, 
seized the time, crapped on the table of cultural studies. The title of the volume 
in which the dawn-raid was first accomplished - Women Take Issue - is 
instructive: for they 'took issue' in both senses - took over that year's book and 
initiated a quarrel (Hall 1992: 282). 
In a reflective response to Hall's description, as one of those who 'took issue', Charlotte 
Brunsdon admits to having at first been shocked by its implication: 
When I first read this account, I immediately wanted to unread it. To deny it, to 
skip over it, to not know - to not acknowledge the aggression therein. Not so 
much to deny that feminists at CCCS in the 1970s had made a strong challenge 
to cultural studies as it was constituted then and there, but to deny that it had 
happened the way here described (Brunsdon 1996: 280). 
But Brunsdon recognises that there was, in this immediate reaction, something of a 
desire 'to have my feminist cake and eat it- to have drafted discussion documents, 
contributed to presentations and made arguments that attacked "men at the centre", but 
not to have contributed to feelings of betrayal and rejection' . 
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If it is difficult, in the case of Birmingham, to place feminism clearly on the side of 
negotiated temporalities, it is also difficult to place it clearly on the side of scepticism or 
the category of experience. One of the examples given by Hall of how the debate 
around feminism was actually played out is a conflict between himself and women at 
the Centre over whether Raymond Williams should give way on the reading list for the 
MA program to Julia Kristeva (Hall 1996c: 500). However such a substitution might be 
viewed, and however appropriate it may have been at the time, it cannot easily be 
represented as introducing an attention to experience where there had previously been 
none. Williams, if anyone, was the writer who had established an intellectual credibility 
for the concept of experience and The Long Revolution remains one of the most 
sustained arguments in cultural studies for a revolution of the kind described by 
Curthoys and Ryan - 'not the sort of revolution which is an event that takes two or three 
days, in which there is shooting and hanging'. Yet it was also Williams whom feminists 
at Birmingham sought to displace. 
It is not even true to say that feminism introduced an attention to women's experience. 
According to Hall, the first collective project of the CCCS was concerned with 
women's magazines, although the manuscript which resulted was somehow lost: 
We took on fiction in women's magazines. We spent ages on a story called 
'Cure for Marriage', and all those papers, which were supposed to be written up 
into a book, then disappeared; which means that moment from the history of 
cultural studies is lost. That was the Centre's 'pre-feminist' moment (Hall 
1996c: 499). 
In the light of my argument of the last two chapters, this early 'pre-feminist' interest in 
questions of gender is not surprising. As Hall points out, the interest of cultural studies 
in class was, initially, 'in Hoggart's and Williams' sense, not in the classic marxist 
sense' (498-90). Classes were not conceived in terms of structural principles, but as 
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cultural complexes embracing a 'whole way of life'. A 'class perspective' did not, 
therefore, subordinate gender to the level of secondary considerations. As Hoggart 
argued in The Uses of Literacy, there was if anything a tendency for working class 
intellectuals to overemphasise the domestic, 'feminine' aspects of working class life 
because of their alienation from the public, workplace culture which had traditionally 
defined working class masculinity (Hoggart 1957: 295). It is not an accident that the 
figure he himself chose in order to problematise the relation between intellectual culture 
and working class life was the kitchen table, strewn with piles of ironing and cups of 
tea. 
The respect in which feminism did differ from what had preceded it was in its particular 
emphasis on questions of power - an emphasis clearly underlined by the subtitle of 
Women Take Issue, 'Aspects of women's subordination'. As Hall puts it, cultural 
studies had previously been 'sensitive to the gender question ... but not very sensitive to 
feminist politics' (Hall 1996c: 499). What distinguished 'feminist politics' was, above 
all, 'the radical expansion of the concept of power, which had hitherto been very much 
developed within the framework of the notion of the public, the public domain' (Hall 
1992: 282). This development had implications well beyond considerations of gender 
itself: after feminism 'we could not use the term power - so key to the earlier 
problematic of hegemony - in the same way'. It is clear that the expansion of the 
concept of power was also the key factor in a series of shifts which Hall identifies as 
accompanying it: 'the opening of the question of the personal as political, and its 
consequences for changing the object of cultural studies'; 'the centrality of questions of 
gender and sexuality to the understanding of power itself'; 'the opening of many of the 
questions we thought we had abolished around the dangerous area of the subjective and 
the subject, which lodged these questions at the centre of cultural studies as a theoretical 
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practice'; and "'the reopening" of the closed frontier between social theory and the 
theory of the unconscious - psychoanalysis'. 
A certain reading of the history at Birmingham might, in fact, draw exactly the opposite 
conclusions from those suggested by Morris about the place of feminism within the 
broader context of left cultural criticism. Feminist criticisms of existing approaches 
within cultural studies coincided with the effective abandonment of the detailed 
attention to 'lived experience' which had characterised work on subcultures and 
working class youth. The new theoretical problems associated with feminism -
particularly the 'dangerous area of the subjective' and the 'theory of the unconscious' -
were precisely the terrain on which there had arisen the Latinate edifice of 'British film 
theory prose'. More importantly, feminism increased levels of anxiety about 
fundamental premises, intensifying pressures for 'rigorous scientificity'. This is clear, 
for example, in a defence by Hall in 1980 of the increasingly abstract, theoretical tone 
of debates in cultural studies: 
If this has appeared, at times, a form of theoretical self-indulgence, we would 
simply point to the elegant studies and sophisticated theorizing in our own areas 
of work which have elaborated their protocols, done their field work, 
questioned their respondents, read their documents, produced their accounts and 
results - and all on the unexamined premise that the world, for all practical 
purposes, is 'masculine' (Hall 1980: 42). 
Nor did feminist work at Birmingham achieve notable success in developing new ways 
of connecting with experience. It is significant that in Brunsdon's retrospective 
assessment of Women Take Issue, the sections which came closest were those which 
had not made the shift from the 'gender question' to 'feminist politics', from older 
'culturalist' emphases to an emphasis on questions of power: 'We remained too caught 
up in the dialogue with the particular form of marxism dominant in CCCS at the time -
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in self-justification. The most successful chapters seem those which anticipate future 
reports of empirical investigation, rather than the attempts to theorize women's 
subordination at a general level' (Brunsdon 1996: 283). 
It is arguable, finally, that the extension of the concept of power associated with 
feminism was related to an increasingly 'mythic' sense of history. Hall's blanket 
description of the diverse range of theories, protocols and empirical investigations of 
pre-feminist cultural studies as 'masculine' is typical of a tendency at the time towards a 
sweeping characterisation of positions - a tendency which became even more 
pronounced with the extension of similar arguments to questions of 'race'. The logic of 
the argument is revealed, for example, in an attack on 'white feminism' by Hazel Carby 
only two years after Women Take Issue in The Empire Strikes Back: 
Feminist theory in Britain is almost totally Eurocentric and; when it is not 
ignoring the experience of black women 'at home', it is trundling 'Third World 
women' onto the stage only to perform as victims of 'barbarous', 'primitive' 
practices in 'barbarous', 'primitive' societies (Carby 1982: 222). 
The significance of the accusatory (or, alternatively, self-flagellatory) tone which 
appears in much feminist and post-feminist cultural studies is not only that it clearly 
favours an abrupt rejection of the past (Carby admires 'explosions' in debates in the 
United States, scorning the reaction in Britain as 'more akin to lighting a damp squib' -
221). It is also that it obscures histories of sceptical alternatives. Only the 'millennial' 
aspirations of earlier positions are brought into focus and criticised while the attention 
to 'Monday morning' disappears from view. It is not only that history is represented in 
mythic terms; myth is represented as the only known form of history. 
But it would also be a mistake to invert Morris's suggestions, charging feminism with 
terminating an uncomplicated, sceptical vision of cultural studies and setting the field 
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on a course towards totalising criticism and defensive system-building. The suggestion 
of blame in such an interpretation would be a consequence of abstracting feminism from 
the context in which it took form. Hall's metaphor of a 'thief in the night' may be useful 
in capturing a sense of disruption and trauma - the assault on positions and ideas which 
had previously been valued- but it is also misleading in characterising feminism as an 
autonomous development. The 'radical extension of the concept of power' which Hall 
attributes to feminism was, in fact, extensively pre-figured in his own work of the mid 
1970s. It is true that this work was framed by Marxism, but it was a Marxism modified 
precisely not to limit the understanding of politics to the classical public domain. If, 
following Volosinov, signification is intrinsically defined by 'struggle', then power 
must be conceived as coextensive with meaning. The implications may not all have 
been drawn explicitly, but the 'public'/'private' distinction had already effectively been 
breached. 
The clearest confirmation of this is that gender had begun to be politicised at the CCCS 
before the development of feminism. Women Take Issue was not the first themed issue 
on women of Working Papers in Cultural Studies. While it is rarely mentioned in 
histories of feminism at the Centre, the 1974 issue was titled 'Women in Sport'. The 
two papers written to the theme, by Charles Critcher and Paul Willis, were 
transcriptions of presentations to a symposium organised by the Department of Physical 
Education at Birmingham University in 1973, more than a year before the formation of 
the Women's Studies Group within the CCCS. Critcher's paper makes what he calls a 
'controversial' suggestion: 
It is that by and large female sport is not taken too seriously in our society. This 
is a general impression gained from various sources, especially masculine ones. 
It seems to be crystallised in the press treatment of women in sport (Critcher 
1974: 15). 
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In presenting the argument, Critcher admits: 'It is incidentally ironic that I should be 
doing this analysis. It is a product of the situation I'm describing that a man should be 
giving this talk at all: lecturing is a very masculine activity' (7). He justifies the 
exercise, however, by claiming to examine an objective structuring principle which 
exists independently of individual positions and intentions: 
[l]f we' re honest with ourselves, we know that we habitually designate certain 
types of activity as more appropriate for one sex or the other ... I've culled a 
list of ... habitual expectations from what is a very good college text on the 
subject of sex roles. The male characteristics come out as: clever, ruthless, 
logical, competitive, rational, handsome, strong, tall, powerful, aggressive, 
loyal to friends, making swift decisions, good with money, mechanically-
rninded. Female characteristics come out as: emotional, kind, intuitive, pretty, 
small, soft, quiet, weak, tender, gentle, good with children, given to malicious 
gossip, imaginative but impractical, dithering, feather-brained, no head for 
business and silly about money (Critcher 1974: 7). 
The paper is followed by a discussion - also transcribed - which provides interesting 
insights into the context of formation of feminism at Birmingham. A number of women 
express annoyance at what they see as generalising abstractions and hubristic 
presumption. A response by a sportswoman in the audience, Diana Wilkinson, is 
illustrative: 
Being a rather dithery, feather-brained female I find it rather difficult to follow 
such an academic talk by such a strong, handsome man good with money, but I 
would at least like to begin really with a denial of the characteristics you give in 
the first part when you say you claim these for all sports, because I feel quite 
strongly that it depends on the sport and on what level (Wilkinson quoted in 
Critcher 1974: 14). 
The objection is endorsed by another contributor to the discussion, Susan Hilliam: 
'Charles Critcher said that female sport is not taken seriously. I'd like to ask by whom? 
Is it by the public at large? Is it by the participants?' (15). 
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Wilkinson and Hilliam were not members of the CCCS, and were not significantly 
involved in the development of feminism, but the form of the encounter complicates a 
simple understanding of feminism as arising from a desire by women to extend the 
concept of power to questions of gender. Many of the early moves to suggest such an 
extension appear to have been made by men. In addition to Critcher and Willis, Hall and 
others also made efforts to sponsor the development of feminist arguments (Hall 1996c: 
499). When women at the Centre themselves 'took issue', it was not over a failure by 
men to include gender within considerations of power; in some cases, it was almost the 
reverse - over the ease and apparent complacency with which such an extension was 
admitted. In a presentation on behalf of the Women's Studies Group at the time, 
Brunsdon identified what she called a 'peculiarly oppressive form of sexism' in which 
'people individually agree that "women are oppressed", but where there is no collective 
effort to do anything about it, or even to examine how it operates in practice' (Brunsdon 
1996: 283). The criticism is typical of feminist arguments at the CCCS: it was the 
response to the extension of the concept of power which was in question, not the 
extension itself. 
There are obvious reasons why the pre-history of feminism at Birmingham has been 
relatively ignored. Since Women Take Issue, there has been a general embarrassment 
about the early attempts by men at the Centre to relate gender and power. Hall, for his 
part, describes his own efforts in the area as 'patriarchal' and unreservedly endorses the 
move by women to claim feminism as their own: 'Of course, they had to do it. They 
were absolutely right to do it. They had to shut me up; that was what the feminist 
political agenda was all about' (Hall 1996c: 499-500). Hall's sense of the 
inappropriateness of speaking for or on behalf of supposedly powerless others is 
consistent not only with the objections to Critcher by Wilkinson and Hilliam, but also 
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with Hoggart's suspicions in The Uses of Literacy of 'the middle class Marxist': 
'Usually, he succeeds in part-pitying and part-patronizing working-class people beyond 
any semblance of reality' (Hoggart 1957: 16). But whereas the response of Hoggart, 
Wilkinson and Hilliam was to resist the implication of totalising theories of power, the 
solution within post-feminist cultural studies has been more often to insist that 
'domination' and 'oppression' be named and criticised only by those who are 
themselves identified as 'dominated' or 'oppressed'. The interest in questions of 
subjectivity has been accompanied by a greatly increased sensitivity to the propriety of 
'speaking positions'. 
There is no doubt that this sensitivity has established important ethical principles for the 
conduct of highly-politicised debates. But it has also obscured much of the complexity 
of the development of feminism, making it particularly resistant to historical 
understanding. The problem is significant not only for the ability of cultural studies to 
reflect upon its approach to questions of gender; it is also significant for the field more 
generally. The emergence of feminism coincided with early signs of a dissatisfaction 
and loss of confidence in the project of cultural studies which has since become far 
more widespread. It is telling that it was the point at which Hall found himself unable to 
continue at Birmingham. By his own admission: 
the question of feminism was very difficult to take ... [I]f I had been opposed to 
feminism, that would have been a different thing, but I was for it. So, being 
targeted as 'the enemy', as the senior patriarchal figure, placed me in an 
impossibly contradictory position ... I couldn't live part of the time being their 
teacher, and being their father, being hated for being their father, and being set 
up as if I was an anti-feminist man. It was an impossible politics to live (Hall 
1996c: 500). 
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There is some suggestion in this that the problem related specifically to Hall's own 
position, but there is every indication that it was much more general. The contradictions 
he faced equally affected women at the Centre - they were, in many ways, the reason 
why they 'took issue'. On the one hand, they were encouraged to participate in a 
collective intellectual enterprise - an enterprise which assumed an equality of status; on 
the other hand, they were casually referred to as an 'oppressed group'. As this tension 
developed, it became increasingly unsustainable. 
The problem in allowing feminism to appear as an autonomous development is that it 
contains, rather than substantially addressing, some fundamental problems which 
emerged concurrently with the extension of the concept of power. The humility of 
Hall's abdication - 'they needed to shut me up' - is, in a certain sense, admirable, but it 
also places too much of the responsibility for the complex of changes which occurred 
around feminism with feminism itself. In the case of the CCCS at least, it is not quite 
true to say that the feminist agenda was to 'shut men up'. There is an extreme 
ambivalence in feminist texts of the time about the withdrawal of men from an 
engagement with what became identified as 'women's issues'. The editorial 
introduction to Women Take Issue expresses strong reservations about the model of 
autonomy - or as it was described, of 'the "woman question" claimed by, and relegated 
to, the women' (CCCS 1978: 10). The model was not so much enthusiastically 
embraced as accepted as a least worst option: 'Sporadic attempts to argue against the 
"hiving off' of the woman question ... were viewed as double-binding other CCCS 
members - either we had something to say and we should say it, or else we didn't, and 
so we should stop making everyone feel guilty'. It is significant that despite the obvious 
difficulty of relations between men and women at the Centre, two of the eleven authors 
of Women Take Issue - Steve Bumiston and Frank Mort - were men. 
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The evidence suggests that no-one at the CCCS was particularly satisfied with the 
compromises developed in response to the politicisation of gender and other forms of 
identity. For Hall, the tendency towards fragmentation coincided with a drift, on his 
own part at least, towards academicism in the bad sense: 'I thought to myself, "You're 
becoming a typical disenchanted academic, you must get out"' (Hall 1996c: 500). This 
is particularly significant given that the intellectual generosity of the Centre had been 
one of its greatest strengths. It has remained, for Hall, one of the achievements he most 
wants to remember: 'We tried to do something innovative ... at Birmingham, 
institutionally. I don't think anybody has come close to the Centre, in terms of 
producing knowledge through collective working practices' (Hall 1996a: 398). For 
women at the Centre, the formation of specific 'women's studies' groups was only a 
marginal improvement on the difficulties of participating in wider forums: 'we assumed 
an illusory shared feminist position, which ... meant the atmosphere was rather tense, 
although still easier for women to work in than other CCCS groups' (CCCS 1978: 14). 
And similar problems arose in the collective address to questions of 'race'. As Paul 
Gilroy laments in the preface to The Empire Strikes Back, 'it has been sad to watch the 
numbers of our group dwindle as we put our ideas on to paper and real conflicts began 
to emerge' (CCCS 1982: 8). 
Perhaps the most significant effect of the model of autonomy is that it requires the 
extension of the concept of power to be represented according to a simple narrative of 
enlightenment. Feminism, black cultural studies, and later post-colonial criticism, are 
made to appear as having 'revealed' or 'brought to light' timeless phenomena which 
had previously been invisible or concealed. While this narrative was clearly important 
in providing fresh inspiration to cultural studies from the late 1970s through the 1980s, 
it has also contributed to a radical de-historicisation of the concept of power. 
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Particularly in the more theoretical discourses which developed or consolidated in the 
field during the 1980s, the concept is presumed to refer transparently to a universal or 
quasi-universal phenomenon, specified at most with reference to 'patriarchy', 
'modernity' or the historical mission of 'the West'. This de-historicisation makes it 
impossible to consider problems in relation to the specific circumstances in which they 
arose. While increasingly elaborate theories of power have appeared, very little 
attention has been paid to the way the concept has been formed by the social, political 
and cultural contexts of the 1970s. The result is a tendency towards the kind of 
absolutism observed by Morris: the values which have come to be associated with the 
1970s, and most specifically with feminism, must either be defended against the least 
sign of erosion or simply condemned. 
THE ORIGINS OF 'TOTALISM' 
There is an interesting suggestion in the editorial introduction to Women Take Issue of 
alternative possibilities. One of a number of 'paths not taken' by the Women's Studies 
Group was an historical analysis of the politicisation of gender during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. It was a path which was considered precisely in response to limitations 
perceived in more abstract theoretical approaches - specifically, the theorisation of 
patriarchy in Juliet Mitchell's influential Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), which 
imposed a strict analytic distinction between questions of gender and questions of class: 
It was ... because of that separation within theory that we next tried to 
understand the contradictions of femininity as 'lived' (at the same time holding 
to class specificity) through a study of the particular historical conjuncture 
which saw the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement (CCCS 1978: 
13). 
That the project collapsed may be an indication not so much that it was weak or ill-
conceived as of the difficulty at the time of sceptical, historical modes of inquiry. The 
212 
'An Impossible Politics to Live' 
reasons for its abandonment were, themselves, contentious, but they were clearly related 
to the problems discussed above. Relations within the Group became fraught by the 
antinomies of 'solidarity' and 'individualism' and energies were increasingly absorbed 
in defining external relations with other work within the CCCS (CCCS 1978: 14). 
There are, however, other texts from the time which offer at least some insight into the 
historical formation of the extended concept of power associated with feminism. Two 
which are particularly useful, and which were widely referred to in work of the CCCS, 
are Juliet Mitchell's earlier book Women's Estate (1971) and Sheila Rowbotham's 
Women's Consciousness, Man's World (1973), both first hand accounts of the 
emergence of the women's movement. As Brunsdon suggests, feminism might be seen 
as 'one of the bridgeheads into CCCS of the new social movements of the late 1960s 
and the 1970s, of the "new" identities and identity politics' (Brunsdon 1996: 282). I 
want, in what follows, to take this somewhat further and suggest that feminism might 
also be seen as one of the bridgeheads into cultural studies of a new understanding of 
power. It would be too strong to suggest that Mitchell and Rowbotham were fully 
reflexive on the formation of the concept of power at the time, although at points they 
come very close. There is, in both their texts, an often contradictory mixture of 
contextual analysis and appeals to universal principles. But the immediacy of their 
writing in relation to the political and cultural developments which inspired the 
women's movement is more revealing of historical specificities than more recent 
material, even if (or perhaps rather because) the latter is more theoretically elaborated. 
One of the most illuminating ways to approach Mitchell and Rowbotham might be to 
compare their writing with the early work of Hoggart and Williams. The similarities 
between them are, in many ways, striking. Like Hoggart and Williams, Mitchell and 
Rowbotham are concerned with an expanding interface between the institutions of 
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government, education and the media and groups (in this case women) who had not 
previously been represented within them. Like Hoggart and Williams, their thinking on 
the problems of this interface developed in the context of an interest in education. 
Rowbotham had taught in technical and further education colleges and for the Worker's 
Education Association, while Mitchell had taught English literature at Leeds and 
Reading Universities. Rowbotham' s analysis of the problems facing women within an 
expanding education system could almost have been written as an extension to 
Hoggart's analysis, sixteen years earlier, of the problems of the 'scholarship boy': 
The clash between home values and university or college is extreme for all 
students from families where higher education is unfamiliar. This is especially 
true for female students. Girls who go to university encounter capitalism in one 
of its most sophisticated forms, but their socialization in the family has 
prepared them for marriage and motherhood, traditional production at home. 
Temporarily co-workers with boys in the knowledge industry, the contrast 
between their traditional feminine role and competitive academic life is extreme 
(Rowbotham 1973: 90-91). 
There are also remarkable resonances with Hoggart in Rowbotham's appeal to 'culture' 
in developing her own personal response to the experience of this disjuncture: 
I defended myself implicitly by distinguishing myself in my head from other 
girls who seemed to accept their fate without resistance. It was easy to develop 
this sense of separateness because most of the people I was at school with left 
to go on typing courses. They all became much more smart and confident than 
those of us who stayed on. I consoled myself by retreating into an intellectual 
inner world of mysticism and reverie; I read everything I could find which 
would help me to build an important little private sphere of 'culture' 
(Rowbotham 1973: 13). 
But there are also differences here from the writing of the 1950s. It is significant that 
Rowbotham associates culture with 'mysticism' and 'privacy'. The emotional and 
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political intensity of her writing is directly proportional to its withdrawal from 
established institutions and forms of public culture: 
I acquired wild and dangerous notions about sex and marriage which were in 
marked contrast both to what everyone around me thought and to my own total 
ignorance in practice ... Only moments of intense subjectivity seemed to have 
any honesty or authenticity. All removed ways of thinking appeared to me as 
necessarily suspect ... Every rock record simply was. The words were 
subordinate to the rhythm and the music went straight to your cunt and hit the 
bottom of your spine (Rowbotham 1973: 13-14). 
That this could not have been written by Hoggart or Williams is not only a function of 
gender; it is equally a function of generation. Rowbotham explores, more fully than Hall 
or Hebdige, the consequences of the separation examined in Chapter 3 between 
'structure' and 'feeling'. For Hoggart and Williams, the negotiation between working-
class and middle-class cultural domains was always a matter.of translating between sites 
which had associations both of structure and feeling. For Rowbotham, by contrast, the 
terms - represented now by 'removed ways of thinking' and the libidinal intensity of 
rock music - are relatively abstracted and opposed. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, this opposition is as much a product of historical circumstance 
as of choice. If there is a site of 'women's culture' which might provide a similar 
intellectual resource for Rowbotham to the tenements of Leeds for Hoggart or the 
Welsh border country for Williams, she provides numerous indications of why it can no 
longer serve quite the same function: 
New ways of processing, preserving and selling food, new ways of storing food 
by refrigeration, mean that the nature of housework has become increasingly a 
service operation ... There is a rather hopeless last-ditch stand in home-baked 
bread and health foods. It is evident that such work is a matter of choice, not 
necessity. It assumes the character of a quaint pursuit, almost a hobby 
(Rowbotham 1973: 108-9). 
215 
'An Impossible Politics to Live' 
The risk of descending into sentimentality or nostalgia, always incipient for Haggart 
and Williams, is, for Rowbotham, much more urgent. The intensification of the 
interface between government, education and media and 'traditional production at 
home' exposed the latter in quite new ways to the instrumental rationality of public 
institutions, particularly to those of capitalist enterprise. This exposure opens up a 
distinction between 'choice' and 'necessity', reducing attempts to articulate the value of 
social activities not already recognised by public institutions to subjectivity and privacy. 
As Rowbotham identifies the problem herself: 'Chased out of the dominant mode of 
production where there is no room for emotion, such characteristics as love, tenderness 
and compassion assume a mawkish guise from confinement. The family is thus in one 
sense the dummy ideal, the repository of ghostly substitutes, emotive fictions which 
dissolve into cloying sentimentality or explode into thrashing, battering, remorseless 
violence' (59). 
The differences might also be considered in terms of organisations of space. The model 
of relations between cultural domains for Haggart and Williams might be described as 
an 'ambassadorial' one. It is significant that Haggart always referred to the 'scholarship 
boy' in the singular; he was an individual who, while he may share experiences with 
others, was also unusual in moving between collective forms of life which were still 
clearly distinct and relatively stable. In the context of middle-class intellectual culture, 
the scholarship boy was able to represent the background from which he came. In the 
context of an adult education class, he was able to represent a middle-class intellectual 
heritage to those for whom it was not their own. But it never appeared that there might 
be a single space of representation or a perspective from which one might consider 
representation in general terms. The context for the emergence of feminism is quite 
different. As Mitchell commented of the social movements of the late 1960s: 'An 
216 
'An Impossible Politics to Live' 
essential and dominant aspect of the common context for these movements seems to me 
to be the vast expansion in higher education in the first half of the sixties' (Mitchell 
1971: 28). The experience of those entering higher education as a result of this 
expansion was not individual but generational. The ambassadorial model is replaced, for 
Mitchell and Rowbotham, by a model of representation within a newly-defined 
homogeneous domain. 
Joshua Meyrowitz has traced similar developments, in America but during the same 
period, in relation to media. Meyrowitz points out that the emergence of feminism 
coincided closely with the maturing of the first television generation - a coincidence, he 
suggests, which is far from accidental. Irrespective of the particular content of 
programming, television created 'a greater sense of informational and experiential 
unity' than was ever possible within a print-based culture (Meyrowitz 1985: 224): 
Unlike McCall's magazine or the women's page of newspapers, television 
brought the same information and the same 'outside world' to men and women. 
And by 1960, television had penetrated nearly 90% of American households ... 
Television exposed women to many 'male topics' that they might not have 
chosen to read about in print ... Further, men and women often watched 
television together, so that it became almost impossible for women and men to 
pretend that women were ignorant of certain worldly affairs (Meyrowitz 1985: 
211). 
The last point here is particularly important. The significance of television as a cultural 
technology is not only in making information available to populations who did not 
previously have access to it; it is also in radically increasing knowledge of what others 
know. If cross-demographic exchange of information by print media has similarities to 
.the 'ambassadorial' model of exchange between cultural domains - crossing between 
sites within a relatively segmented space - , television corresponds more closely to 
mass higher education. The possibility of conceiving relations in terms of translation or 
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dialogue is weakened as information and experience are redefined as belonging to a 
common domain. 
As Tony Bennett has argued, there is a close relation between the politics of 
representation and generalised concepts of power. Using the example of the modem 
museum, Bennett points out that demands for representational adequacy appeal 
implicitly to 'a principle of general human universality in relation to which, whether on 
the basis of the gendered, racial, class or other social patterns of its exclusions and 
biases, any particular museum display can be held to be inadequate and therefore in 
need of supplementation' (Bennett 1995: 91 ). 14 Power is represented in this context as 
an undifferentiated institutional resistance to demands for greater inclusiveness within 
some universal forum. If combined with the insights of Rowbotham, Mitchell and 
Meyrowitz, Bennett's analysis may help us to understand the tendency in the 1960s and 
1970s towards generalised concepts of power. If social, cultural and technological 
developments of the period were such as to produce new spaces in which questions of 
representational adequacy could be posed, they would also have created the conditions 
for such concepts to take form. 
But the context for the reconceptualisation of power was not only in internal 
developments within Britain, America or other countries in which the women's 
movement emerged; it was also the external relations of these countries within the 
highly-politicised international space of the Cold War. As Mitchell points out of the 
social movements of the late 1960s: 'These home-based, home-directed fights took over 
14 Bennett, in fact, goes further than this, making use of Foucauldian arguments to associate generalised 
concepts of power with a merely 'rhetorical' politics. It could be argued that this association tends 
towards the kind of 'tacit criticism' of feminism which Morris observes. But it is possible to take the 
more limited point about the relation between the politics of representation and concepts of power 
without such an extension. I will discuss Bennett's general position in detail in Chapter 5. 
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from a preoccupation with world peace and Third World struggles - Algeria, Cuba, 
Vietnam- yet have never lost the predilection for internationalism which their original 
inspiration provided' (Mitchell 1971: 20). The originality of intellectuals in the 
women's movement was to combine the extensive reference of the concept of power 
which had developed in the context of the Cold War and anti-colonial struggles with the 
intensive reference suggested by changes within advanced capitalist societies. As 
Mitchell puts it: 
The Third World revolutions and guerilla warfare provoked new analyses of 
oppression and new methods of struggle ... The Women's Liberation 
Movement is, in a sense, a summation of so many tendencies which mark these 
slightly earlier formations ... The wish to concentrate on specific oppression in 
one's own country and yet link up with a universal predicament (a reaction to 
the scope of imperialism?) finds perfect expression in the situation of women 
... Women are the most 'international' of any political group, and yet their 
oppression is experienced in the most minute and specific area - in the home 
(Mitchell 197 l: 21 ). 
In recent reflections on the period, Mitchell gives a striking account of an occasion in 
which she herself attempted to establish these connections: 
I remember sitting at the table with all the men of New Left Review, and going 
round the table with people saying 'Well, I will think about Algeria', 'I will 
think about Persia', 'I will think about Tangyanika', as they then were, and I 
said, 'Well, I'll think about women' - and there was silence (Mitchell 1995: 
124). 
This silence might be construed as a sign of a resistance to the inclusion of women, and 
it is possible that such a reading may be justified. But there are other reasons why there 
might have been discomfort. The unlimited reference of the concept of power when 
taken to extend from the global to the 'most minute and specific' implies a new kind of 
politics which Mitchell herself described at the time as 'totalism': 
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'Totalism' ... is the expression of the protest against all oppressed conditions in 
the form of an assertion of complete liberation involving the overthrow at one 
blow of the whole capitalist society. In 'totalism' the oppression of one group 
stands for the oppression of all. Within its undifferentiated inclusiveness there 
is only place for tactics, not overall strategy (Mitchell 1971 : 24 ). 
Even in this description there are suggestions of instability, contradiction and a potential 
for political despair. Everything appears to be staked on 'overthrowing capitalist 
society', yet the 'undifferentiated inclusiveness' of the concept of oppression also 
makes this seem highly unlikely if not impossible. The Marxist internationalism of 'the 
men' at New Left Review was still, in Mitchell's terms, 'strategic'. While the reference 
of their concept of power was extensive, it was nevertheless limited (to questions 
relating to regulation of the mode of production and the role of the state), allowing the 
scope of political action to be specified. In 'totalism', by contrast, strategy becomes 
unthinkable. Any attempt to engage with power can no longer be specifically directed. 
It is clear from Mitchell's account that 'totalism' was associated both with political 
generosity and serious intellectual ambition. The principle according to which 'the 
oppression of one group stands for the oppression of all' provides a basis for 
cooperation between very diverse projects, connecting the otherwise remote experiences 
of Third World guerilla fighters and suburban 'housewives'. The idea that questions of 
power might be pursued in the intensive as well as the extensive dimension also 
suggests the possibility of quite new ways in which they might be addressed. But 
'totalism' also produces a number of problems which were widely sensed within 
feminist writings themselves. The most serious is that while power is negatively 
identified, it is also conceived in such a way as to appear intractable. As Mitchell has 
said recently of her motivations for turning to psychoanalysis: 
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By the end of the decade [the 1960s] there seemed to be something so 
entrenched about patriarchy ... , that where we had been seeing through the 
work of Fanon and others that one could have multiple differences, there 
seemed to be some absolute difference that was socially or culturally 
constructed between men and women, and was more entrenched ... And there 
was something in psychoanalysis that spoke about the depth of patriarchy, and 
the really difficult question of eradicating it (Mitchell 1995: 125). 
By Mitchell's own account, Psychoanalysis and Feminism was written substantially as 
a response to the perceived 'failure' of the revolutionary movements of late 1960s. The 
diagnosis of failure is, however, ambiguous. The implication of the concept of power 
which began to form at the time is that they could not possibly have 'succeeded'. This is 
not so much because any specific power could not have been displaced or overthrown; 
it is rather that power was no longer conceived as specific. It was understood in such a 
way as to appear not only as omnipresent but also as necessarily omnitemporal. The 
significance of the term 'patriarchy', for Mitchell, was not only that it identified the 
oppression of women; it was also that it introduced a new understanding of power as 
transcending any particular historical or cultural formation. The emphasis is explicit in 
her use of a definition of the term from Kate Millett: 'a universal (geographical and 
historical) mode of power relations' (Mitchell 1971: 65). 
Contemporary unease about the direction of cultural politics in the 1970s has since been 
eclipsed by highly developed criticisms of the period - some of which I will review in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Many of these criticisms are, however, historically insensitive. It is 
worth drawing attention to Mitchell's parenthetical question in describing the 
universalism of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s: 'a reaction to the scope 
. of imperialism?' The new emphasis on an 'undifferentiated inclusiveness' was not a 
theoretical proposition put forward in a vacuum, but a response to complex and 
disturbing developments. Many of the tendencies within left politics of the time can also 
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be observed in other fields. As Mitchell points out in Women's Estate, much of the 
political rhetoric of the social movements was carried over from the ideological 
discourses of the Cold War: 
A great deal of the radical protest has taken the form of a demand for the 
realization of the gifts we are supposed to be enjoying anyway ... If the society 
says we are so lucky, so mature, etc. let's see it ... Of course, freedom, equality 
and the rights of the individual are fundamental ideologies of a 'free enterprise' 
economy (Mitchell 1971 : 17 6-7). 
A similar argument has been made recently by P.O. Knight about the theme of 
'conspiracy' within many of the early American second wave feminist texts. An 
example used by Knight is the concept of 'brainwashing' in Betty Friedan's The 
Feminine Mystique. The emergence of the concept in American public discourse can be 
traced quite specifically to Cold War contexts, in the attempt by authorities to explain 
why American troops in Korea had apparently succumbed to an enemy program of 
propaganda and indoctrination . 'In developing an account of a conspiracy to brainwash 
American women into domesticity, Friedan draws on one of the key terms of cold war 
politics' (Knight 1997: 42). 
There is little evidence to suggest that the totalist extension of the concept of power was 
any more unique to left cultural criticism than the concept of freedom or the theme of 
conspiracy. There are very clear shifts in usage associated with the development of the 
Cold War. The emergence of superpower confrontation brought an effective end to the 
pluralist understanding of international politics, deriving from an older European 
response to modernity, as a web of rivalries and alliances between the 'Great Powers'. 
While a binary system still has two poles, it is unlike a multi-polar system in the ease 
with which one pole can be characterised simply as the complement or 'negative' of the 
other. The logic of superpower confrontation was always such as to suggest a 
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substantial consistency of power - a potential, at least, to be conceived in rationalist 
terms as a single global phenomenon. With the loss, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of a 
distinction between military and civilian space, there was an obvious context for an 
extension of a totalising use of the concept beyond the 'public' domain. It is easy, from 
a position of historical distance, to criticise or deride Mitchell's hope of 'overthrowing 
at one blow the whole capitalist society', but in a context where entire societies were 
held to ransom against the threat of nuclear annihilation, such apocalyptic suggestions 
belonged to a discursive field with points of reference which were all too real. 
The strongest argument against too easy a dismissal of 'seventies politics', however, is 
that the most important intellectual shift in the cultural politics of the period has not 
been extensively questioned or revised. It is true that there has been a widespread 
rejection of the original form in which 'totalism' was articulated, particularly its 
inflection towards apocalyptic or revolutionary themes. But the most common usage of 
the concept of power in cultural studies remains 'totalist' in much the sense which 
Mitchell outlines. Even the strongest critics of the revolutionary political models of the 
1970s have generally assumed that power is a universal phenomenon extending from 
the global to the particular and substantially consistent however diverse its 'forms' or 
'modalities'. As I will argue in Chapter 5, one of the most developed lines of criticism -
a line associated with an appeal to Foucauldian arguments - has, in fact, only 
consolidated the universalism in relation to the concept which first emerged in the social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. While an insistence that there is nothing 'outside' 
power is often represented as a definitive break from the revolutionary aspirations of the 
latter, it might equally well be represented as a formalisation and logical extension of 
their central intellectual innovation. 
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THE ORIGINS OF BANALITY 
The above analysis remains little more than an outline and perhaps overgeneralises on 
the basis of two rather slight British texts of the early 1970s. But it establishes, at least, 
that there is a clear case for considering the history of feminism in parallel with a 
history of the concept of power (a history which needs to be distinguished from a 
history of theories of power, where the object of theory is assumed to be stable and 
clearly defined). The use of the concept which has developed in association with 
feminism has a complex formation which could be traced in much greater detail. Rather 
than developing the case more fully, however, I want in the remainder of this chapter to 
indicate how it might shed new light on some of the issues raised by Morris about the 
problematic relation of feminism to its own past and to broader debates in cultural 
criticism. My argument, specifically, is that a historicisation of the concept of power 
offers an approach which Morris herself does not consider to countering the tendency of 
positions to become polarised between a dogmatic defence and a simple dismissal of the 
political values and modes of analysis established in the 1970s. It allows a recognition 
of the contributions of feminism to cultural studies to be seen as fully consistent with 
critical attention to problems it has introduced to the field. 
The most important condition for this is care in relating feminism and 'totalism' - or, in 
the terms I have used in previous chapters, a fully-developed rationalist understanding 
of power. As Mitchell's analysis makes clear, the two cannot simply be identified. 
'Totalism' was never in any sense 'invented' by feminism (or, for that matter, by any 
other single movement or agency); it emerged in a far more complex way in response to 
the post-war developments of a mass commercial popular culture, an expanded 
education system and the Cold War. But for precise historical reasons relating to 
women's experiences of these developments, feminism has inhabited the space of 
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'totalism' in a way which was not the case of the early formations of cultural studies 
organised around questions of class. To put it in this way is to suggest a very general 
framework for assessing both the strengths and possible limitations of feminist 
contributions to debates about power in cultural studies. In so far as 'totalism' has come 
to be widely accepted as a theoretical premise, the exploration by feminism of its 
potentials and problems has been of very general importance. The strength of feminism, 
I want to suggest, has been in the political and intellectual sophistication of this 
exploration; its limitation - a limitation whose significance is by no means certain - has 
been a closure against critical reflection on the premise itself. 
A good illustration of this argument, if also a daunting one to frame as an object of 
criticism, is Morris's own work. There is little difficulty in identifying the strengths of 
her writing; they are strengths which have made her an inspirational figure well beyond 
feminism in any strict sense. While she has consistently written as 'a feminist', she has 
understood feminism not as a specific field of concerns ('the woman question') so much 
as a position from which to participate in a range of debates, including those of cultural 
studies. The problems, for Morris, in sustaining such a position are not only 'external', 
in what she describes as 'the cultural and social conventions that make speaking 
difficult or impossible for women' (Morris 1988: 7); they are also internal to feminism 
itself. As she puts it sharply in the title essay of The Pirate's Fiancee: 
Feminisms both past and present have run into some solid brick walls through 
trusting too lightly to 'the obvious', assuming a continuous and evenly 
distributed, consistently significant, oppression of the eternal natural object 
'woman' or 'women' through the ages (Morris 1988: 54). 
The effort to negotiate a way over or around these 'brick walls' has involved Morris in 
what might be described as an internal critique of 'totalism'. To emphasise the 
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constructive dimension of this project, it might be read alternatively as an extended 
attempt to make the space of 'totalism' habitable - to develop, in her own terms, 
'enunciative strategies' which prevent its politics from becoming 'impossible to live'. 
Morris has not, of course, been alone in this project. Many of the problems she has 
worked to address were identified in the early women's movement by writers such as 
Mitchell and Rowbotham. Mitchell was concerned, for example, with the dangers of the 
concept of experience as it emerged from the new social movements: 
The aspect of the ideological revolution that has enabled the promotion of 
'feelings' to the ranks of political action (the 'politics of experience', 
propagated above all by the Hippies) has certainly had important liberating 
effects ... However, while being a crucial initiator of Women's Liberation 
itself, sometimes it has also boomeranged back in a way that has been highly 
detrimental ... Here, as with all the other radical movements in which they 
initially participated, women have found their inspiration and their desolation 
(Mitchell 1971: 38). 
Rowbotham was more concerned with the emergence of a fatalistic notion of 'anatomic 
destiny': 'the different possibilities for men and women are held to be biological and 
psychological in origin, and thus the need to transform the social relations between all 
human beings is ignored' (Rowbotham 1973: xii). Feminist writing since the late 1960s 
constitutes, more generally, an extraordinarily rich archive of practical and theoretical 
responses to such problems - problems which have been closely associated with a 
universalist conception of power. 
But Morris has been particularly successful in contributing as a feminist to debates in 
cultural studies. It may be worth speculating on the extent to this has been related to a 
specifically Australian political formation. As Andrew Milner has pointed out, there are 
significant differences between the development of British and Australian cultural 
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studies. Where the initial problematisation of the old literary conception of 'culture' was 
developed in Britain in relation to class, it was developed in Australia in relation to 
nation: 
From at least as early as the 1890s, Australian radical nationalisms had sought 
to relocate the national community and a putative national literary canon away 
from the past and toward a liberal-democratic or even socialistic future, away 
from England and toward Australia. Despite the attenuation of the Bulletin's 
more generalized republican political nationalism, a structural opposition 
persisted thereafter between the more Anglophile forms of academic literary 
criticism, on the one hand, and radical nationalist non-academic criticism on the 
other (Milner 1997: 138). 
This opposition crystallised in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in writing associated 
with the journals Meanjin and Overland. It is here, for Milner, that many of the political 
orientations of Australian cultural studies first took form. 
The argument is in itself an illuminating one, but it is particularly provocative if read 
against the long and complex debate over 'englishness' in the development of British 
cultural studies. As I have argued over the last three chapters, this has been a debate not 
only about ethnic or national identity, or the history of British imperialism; it has also 
been about a particular kind of political and intellectual response to modernity, the 
legacy of which is deeply at odds with universalising or rationalist uses of the concept 
of power. If the debate has often been agonised and has never quite been resolved, this 
is because it has never clearly been settled whether democratic projects are better 
advanced through the rejection of this legacy or its creative appropriation. It is far from 
an anomaly, according to my reading, that of the key early figures in British cultural 
studies, Williams should have spent much of his working life at Cambridge, Hoggart 
should have titled a book of essays An English Temper and Thompson should have 
passionately defended the 'peculiarities of the English' in the interests, as he saw them, 
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of radical politics. If the tendency in the field has been consistently away from its early 
formation, the latter has remained a continuing influence on as central and enduring a 
figure as Stuart Hall. 
Any similar trajectory in Australia has been greatly truncated, if not completely 
bypassed. Williams, Hoggart and Thompson were never a major influence on the work 
which came to be identified in Australia as 'cultural studies' and there have been no 
comparable figures to stand in their place. At the same time, Australian debates were 
remarkably early to anticipate new intellectual directions and particularly to register the 
significance of theoretical arguments abstracted from the experience of 1968 in France. 
Milner's comparative analysis of the British and Australian cases suggests a possible 
explanation: The old identification in Australia between radical democratic politics and 
a differentiation from England and 'englishness' meant that issues which took decades 
to resolve in Britain were effectively decided in advance. What appeared for Perry 
Anderson in the mid-1960s as a 'crisis' of English intellectual culture, appeared for left 
cultural criticism in Australia as an opportunity. Where in Britain the appeal to 
European 'theory' was associated with a sweeping rejection of local institutions and 
histories (including, importantly, those of left), it was associated in Australia with a 
much more affinnative project of nation-building. 
The comparison could, no doubt, be overdrawn. The picture is complicated by the fact 
that many practitioners of cultural studies in Australia - among them Milner - have 
been British migrants. There are also other complexities. Milner is critical of what he 
sees as a failure of Australian cultural studies to examine the weaknesses of the alliance 
between radical nationalist discourses and the new social movements, particularly a 
resulting tendency to neglect questions of class. But there has been more attention to the 
problems of the alliance than his account suggests. A notable oversight is Morris's 
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essays of the 1980s, many of which deal critically with the 'corporatist' progressivism 
which developed in Australia during the long period of Labor government from 1983 
(see, particularly, Morris 1992a). Despite this, however, the general point still holds. 
Milner is right, in particular, to point out the significance of differences between Britain 
and Australia in the relation of cultural studies to the processes of social and economic 
restructuring which occurred in both countries during the 1980s. Where in Britain the 
field was strongly formed in critical opposition to Thatcherism, it was formed in 
Australia by a sense of positive investment in change - a belief that however imperfect 
or compromised, it was generally producing a more open, tolerant, multicultural society. 
One of the consequences of this history is that a universalist understanding of power in 
Australian cultural studies has been relatively uninhibited. The effects can be seen in the 
work of Morris. While she has always been sceptical in her adoption of theory, there is 
little evidence that she has ever seriously questioned the extended use of the concept 
which emerged from the new social movements and which is also characteristic of post-
war French philosophy. Such a use has been assumed as a general coordinate in relation 
to which her position has been defined. This is somewhat obscured in much of her 
earlier writing as she has often engaged in debate with others less cautious in drawing 
the implications of 'totalism'. What has been striking in this context is her preparedness 
to work away from strong assumptions about power. There has been a tum, however, in 
some of her recent work in which certain basic commitments are made explicit. This 
tum has occurred, significantly, at the point of a widespread popular rejection in 
Australia of the policies and discourses which developed out of the alliance between the 
new social movements and the reforming Labor governments of the 1980s and early 
1990s. It has also occurred in the context of increasing challenges - both from within 
and without - to the use of the concept of power in cultural studies. 
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There is an uncharacteristic defensiveness in some of Morris's responses to this 
conjuncture. In a recent essay, for example, she responds with irritation to criticisms of 
cultural studies by newspaper columnist Beatrice Faust as obsessed with 'capitalism, 
elitism, racism, sexism': 'This is hardly a scandal; after all, what area of the humanities 
capable of sustaining a skerrick of interest in the great human conflicts of our time is 
not deeply concerned with these things?' (Morris 1997a: 39) In clarifying her position, 
she accepts a definition of the field proposed by Tony Bennett: 
It now functions largely as a term of convenience for a fairly dispersed array of 
theoretical and political positions which, however widely divergent they might 
be in other respects, share a commitment to examining cultural practices from 
the point of their intrication with, and within, relations of power (Morris 1997a: 
39). 
Morris proceeds from this definition to point out the internal complexity which it 
allows: 
Cultural studies does not ... treat power relations as intrinsically or uniformly 
bad, and it does not construe power only as an oppressive property that other 
people 'have'. Power is not necessarily a bleak and paranoid concept, and 
cultural studies is not a discourse of powerlessness (Morris 1997a: 40). 
The discussion clearly demonstrates openness in the way power is conceptualised, but 
the extended reference of the concept - in Mitchell's terms, its 'undifferentiated 
inclusiveness' - is not presented as negotiable. 
It is unlikely that Morris would accept such a use of any other term. Much of the rest of 
her essay is, in fact, concerned with arguing that concepts in cultural studies are - or 
should be - radically contextual: 'For cultural studies, the theoretical is a response to 
(or, as Roland Barthes once put it, an "outcome of') specific practices and contexts' 
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(Morris 1997a: 43). The point is expanded with reference to a similar argument by 
Lawrence Grossberg (1997): 
For Grossberg, 'if someone's theory tells them the answers in advance, because 
their theory travels with them across any and every context', they are not doing 
cultural studies - although their work may be interesting and important, and 
their answers may provide 'important truths' (Morris 1997a: 43). 
The significance of this demarcation, for Morris as for Grossberg, is that it disqualifies 
generalising theoretical discourses, exemplified by the work of literary theorists like 
Fredric Jameson, from inclusion within the field. The intellectual project which Morris 
wishes to defend is one where such discourses are not permitted to set terms in advance 
of attempts to engage with specific issues or contexts. 
Morris's work has been, more generally, exemplary of a sceptical approach to the use of 
theoretical concepts and arguments. This is not to suggest that she has ever been 
opposed to theory. She makes the relevant distinction here in indicating her approach to 
textual analysis in Too Soon, Too Late: 
... textual analysis ... is not hostile either to generalizing models (on which it 
depends for its conceptual materials), or to theorization, but rather assumes that 
the objects we read can provide, through their material 'resistance' to our acts 
of abstraction, terms for questioning and revising the models we bring to bear 
(Morris 1998: 143). 
Particularly in her earlier work, Morris has been a theoretical entrepreneur, introducing 
'generalizing models' often well before they have been widely known in English-
language debates. But she has always assumed that such models have limits - that their 
status is that of attempts at understanding ('acts of abstraction') likely to encounter 
phenomena or experiences which they cannot readily explain. Rather than working from 
exposition to formal 'application' (a procedure which always risks an unreflective over-
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extension of claims), she has preferred the genre of the essay, entertaining a variety of 
perspectives in order to explore their explanatory potential while avoiding the 
suggestion of an unqualified identification with any one. 
This approach is not adopted on purist grounds - or as Morris puts it, 'to tick down my 
allegiance automatically to a politics (which I do support) of the provisional and 
definitely uncertain' (Morris 1988: 51); it is clearly motivated by an attempt to avoid 
destructive tendencies in debates within left cultural criticism. If Morris has not 
questioned the extended use of the concept of power, she has been keenly aware of the 
problems it generates. This awareness is indicated even in her wish to pre-empt a 
reading of the 'politics of the provisional' as merely a matter of 'automatic allegiances' 
- of being, in some abstract sense, on the 'right side' in theoretical or political debates. 
The problem with 'totalism' is that it tends to produce precisely this kind of 
simplification. Its weaknesses here are the obverse of its strengths. In articulating 
profoundly-felt generational experiences, the concept of power has been associated with 
a potent moral authority; in its universalising extension, it has invited that authority to 
be exercised indiscriminately. Where, inevitably, differences have become evident, they 
have tended to be represented in the form of competing absolutisms. The result is the 
kind of ethical bankruptcy - what Morris (1988: 53) describes as 'the politics of the 
pointing finger' - which, as I argued in Chapter 1, motivated Foucault's interventions 
into left-political debates after 1968 in France. 
As a feminist, Morris has been particularly concerned with the consequences of 
imperious generalisations for the responsiveness of intellectual culture to the 
experiences of women. The Pirate's Fiancee is framed as a series of attempts to 
preserve a space for such responsiveness in the face of apocalyptic or absolutist themes 
which circulated widely in left cultural criticism during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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Morris uses the introduction to take issue, specifically, with the terms of debates around 
'postmodemism': 
... in spite of its heavy (if lightly acknowledged) borrowings from feminist 
theory, its frequent celebrations of 'difference' and 'specificity', and its 
critiques of 'Enlightenment' paternalism, postmodemism as a publishing 
phenomenon has pulled off the peculiar feat of re-constituting an 
overwhelmingly male pantheon of proper names to function as ritual objects of 
academic exegesis and commentary (Morris 1988: 12). 
In her analysis of this phenomenon, Morris refuses to fall back on readily available 
paranoid interpretations for which writing on postmodemism might be read as merely 
'the last ruse of the patriarchal University trying for power to fix the meaning, and 
contain the damage of its own decline' (Morris 1988: 15). It is significant that she 
chooses, in the first essay of the collection, to identify intolerances - dogmatic attempts 
precisely to 'fix meanings' - in Mary Daly's Gyn/Ecology, one of the more influential 
feminist texts of the time. 
It is this attention to the form of common problems which has made Morris an 
important commentator on cultural studies. While her location within feminism has 
meant that she has sensed the problems of 'totalism' with a particular intensity, she has 
used this location productively to address herself outwards to wider debates in which 
these problems are shared. Perhaps the key essay in this context is 'Banality in Cultural 
Studies' (1990) which, in its disturbing combination of directness and sympathy, has 
come in some ways to haunt the field. 
The essay is not an easy one to summarise as it deals with widely different objects. The 
'banality' of the title refers both to its specialist use in Jean Baudrillard' s theory of the 
media and to a tendency to anodyne celebrations of popular 'agency' in cultural studies. 
Baudrillard' s work and the 'populist' tendency in cultural studies are themselves 
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responses to problems in theoretical discourses on power: Baudrillard has attempted to 
explode the aura of the concept in French philosophy by arguing that in the world of 
media simulations power, along with 'reality' in a classical sense, has ceased to exist; 
cultural studies has often resorted to formulaic appeals to the counter-themes of 
'resistance' and 'subversion' projected indiscriminately onto popular culture and 
everyday life. Both solutions are, for Morris, as simplifying and reductive as the 
problems they seek to resolve: 
To simplify matters myself, I'd say that where the fatal strategies of Baudrillard 
keep returning us to his famous Black Hole - a scenario that is ... grim, 
obsessive, and, in its enunciative strategies, maniacally overcoherent . . . - the 
voxpop style of cultural studies is offering us the sanitized world of a deodorant 
commercial where there's always a way of redemption. There's something sad 
about that, because cultural studies emerged from a real attempt to give voice to 
much grittier experiences of class, race and gender (Morris 1990: 26). 
Although the problems here clearly go well beyond feminism, it is not an accident that 
it is a feminist critic who should have identified them so precisely. Feminism has 
always lived in danger, as Morris puts it elsewhere, of becoming 'cruelly bound by 
repetition, confined by the terms that we are contesting'. Without a continued and active 
scepticism, 'feminist criticism ties its own hands and finds itself, again and again, 
bound back home for the same old story' (Morris 1998: 92). 
THE END OF 'TOTALISM'? 
Why, given all this, has Morris never questioned the generalised extension of the 
concept of power - the premise which so clearly generates most of the problems she has 
worked to avoid? It is difficult in the context of present debates for the question to be 
put in a way which does not seem crudely unsympathetic. As Morris points out in 
relation to Beatrice Faust, most of those who have recently challenged the investment of 
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cultural studies in the concept of power have been poorly informed about their objects 
of criticism. This is true not only of the media polemics which have come to be loosely 
organised around the theme of 'political correctness'; it is also true of criticisms from 
within cultural studies of earlier approaches in the field - what Morris describes as 'the 
self-promoting fairy tales of cultural studies today ( once upon a time in the seventies, 
the story goes, feminists had a monolithic view of the media as repressive ... )' (Morris 
1998: xxi). The cause of her irritation with these debates could not be more obvious: 
many of the arguments now being made about the flattening effects of the concept of 
power - as if as revelations - have been put by feminists like herself for at least twenty 
years. 
But the risk of becoming embroiled in the often ugly and unedifying battles of the 
'culture wars' should not prevent the question 'why power?' - or, more precisely, 'why 
power in the singular?' - from being asked. If accepted as genuinely inquiring, it is not 
as perverse or reactionary as more aggressive or ideologically-weighted phrasings have 
sometimes made it seem. It may be true, in a very general sense, that any area of the 
humanities with 'a skerrick of interest in the great human conflicts of our time' must be 
concerned with 'capitalism, elitism, racism, sexism' - and, as Morris expands for Faust, 
'with imperialism and colonialism as well' (Morris 1997a: 39). But it is far from clear 
whether this is sufficient to resolve the point at issue. A generous reading of Faust' s 
objections might be that they are objections precisely to the insistent thematisation of 
diverse phenomena under a generalised rubric of 'power'. The reasons for such a 
thematisation need at least to be explained. It is a recent development within English-
language criticism which can be traced to quite specific contexts. It is, in fact, a recent 
development even within those 'progressive' intellectual projects such as cultural 
studies which have emerged out of the New Left since the 1950s. And as Morris herself 
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has been among the first to recognise, it is a development which has produced 
significant problems - not least, for feminism. 
There are a number of reasons why Morris may find it difficult to contemplate an 
external critique of 'totalism'. In her response to Faust, she reveals something of her 
investment in the concept of power in explaining her position on one of the more 
highly-charged issues of recent 'culture war' debates - the question of canons: 
... all my work in cultural studies is connected with those projects in literature 
that have, as [Eve Sedgwick] argues, most effectively challenged not the 
'empirical centrality' of the master-canon in the English curriculum, but its 
'conceptual anonymity'. I, too, would like to think with Sedgwick that, 'never 
again need women - need, one hopes, anyone - feel greeted by the Norton 
Anthology of mostly white men's Literature with the implied insolent 
salutation, "I'm nobody. Who are you?"'(Morris 1997a: 39) 
Like Sedgwick, Morris is concerned to avoid being constrained as simply oppositional; 
she sees herself as involved in a positive attempt to contribute to 'the proliferation of the 
"potentially infinite plurality of mini-canons" that follows from the "fracturing" (in 
Sedgwick's phrase) of the master-canon.' She wishes, nevertheless, to keep faith with a 
profoundly-felt generational experience of alienation from established institutions of 
public culture - with a sense of affront, in this case, at the 'implied insolence' of 'white 
men's Literature'. The expanded concept of power has been too important in 
articulating this experience - recognition of which has itself been too hard fought - to 
consider abandoning. 
But perhaps more important to Morris's thought on the question is that she has 
considered it precisely in terms of a possible abandonment. The alternative to a 
continuing commitment to a universalist concept of power tends to appear in her work 
as no concept of power. Her framing of options here is particularly clear in her extended 
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engagement with the work of Jean Baudrillard (Morris 1984; 1990) and also appears in 
some of her interventions into debates on postmodernism. In an essay on the property 
boom in Sydney during the 1980s, for example, she criticises popular discourses which 
seek to deflate the corporate claim over urban space as merely a projection of petty male 
egos. Such a response, for Morris, 'misses the point about the role of the "urbanization 
of capital" in creating economic and social inequalities, precisely at a time when its 
operations in our cities are reaching new heights of intensity and savagery, directly 
affecting our lives' (Morris 1998: 128). The criticism is extended to theoretical work, 
not only of Baudrillard, but also of Robert Venturi, Paul Virilio and Robert Somol. The 
articulation of the concept of power in these debates is not entirely straightforward, but 
the ontological solidity of, at least, a certain classical figuration of power is clearly in 
question. The danger in this, for Morris, is that it deprives criticism of the ability to 
point out exploitation, social inequality or, as was often the case in corporate strategy 
during the 1980s, hardened indifference to the effects of economic change. 
Given the options considered by Morris, her argument is a strong one. If to question the 
concept of power is to accept a political quietism, then the motivations in doing so 
appear dubious, if not vaguely obscene. But it is here that Morris's early rejection of 
'englishness' becomes a limitation, for there is always another reading of the loss of a 
rationalist understanding of power: a return to a more limited, empiricist use of the 
concept. If, as Baudrillard suggests, 'power' in the expanded sense no longer has any 
clear referent, this could be taken to suggest a more restricted attention to particular 
'powers'. What may be at stake, in other words, is not the 'end of politics' as such but 
rather, in Oakeshott' s terms, the nemesis of a certain style of politics - the 'politics of 
faith'. It is true that Oakeshott's alternative, the 'politics of scepticism', is unable to 
represent powers as instances of global totalities - whether they be 'capitalism', 
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'patriarchy' or 'Western imperialism' - and may therefore appear to lack critical force. 
But it does not follow that it is necessarily accepting of quietism. In the present context, 
in fact, the charges might even be reversed. Thirty years from 1968, the universalist 
concept of power has become so fraught in its use - so hedged with problems and 
difficulties - that it is not clear to what extent it is still critically effective. Where any 
attempt to make it so is neutralised as always already 'heard', the field of criticism 
becomes prone to inertia, cynicism and complacency. If this is even partly so, a case 
might be made for scepticism in relation to the expanded use of the concept precisely in 
the interests of a sharpened social criticism. 
This is not to say that such a scepticism would necessarily be more successful. It is 
important to remember why 'englishness' was so widely rejected by those involved in 
progressive politics during the 1960s and 1970s. My argument throughout this chapter, 
as in previous chapters, has been that the use of the concept of power in cultural studies 
has never simply been a matter of choice. The concept is enmeshed in complex ways 
with contexts and histories which have given it sense. Any attempt to suggest a 
modification to the use of the concept must take account of these. In some ways, the 
prospects for an empiricist use of the concept do not seem promising. Many of the 
contexts which have informed 'totalism' have not disappeared: processes of global 
integration have only accelerated and the interface between those processes and intimate 
aspects of everyday lives continues to intensify. But there are other developments -
notably the end of the Cold War and a loss of enthusiasm for 'grand' ideological 
conflicts - which appear more hopeful. It is in this context that I want, in Chapters 5 and 
6, to review some recent work in cultural studies which intimates, or at least creates the 
conditions for, a 'post-totalist' approach to power. 
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'Talking to the ideological state apparatuses' 
The therapy of governmentality 
Cultural studies remains fixated on theoretical and textual orientations which 
provide little purchase in seeking to equip students with knowledge and skills 
for citizenship and employment in the 1990s. 
Stuart Cunningham ( 1992: 177) 
The problem with aesthetic critique - and with cultural studies to the degree 
that it is caught in its slipstream - is that it presumes to comprehend and judge 
... other cultural regions from a single metropolitan point, typically the 
university arts faculty. To travel to these other regions though - to law offices, 
media institutions, government bureaus, corporations, advertising agencies - is 
to make a sobering discovery: They are already replete with their own 
intellectuals. And they just look up and say, 'Well what exactly is it you can do 
for us?' 
Ian Hunter (1992: 372) 
... it is only by using the kinds of correctives that would come from putting 
'policy' into cultural studies that cultural studies may be deflected from ... 
those forms of banality which, in some quarters, have already claimed it while 
also resisting the lure of those debates whose contrived appearance of ineffable 
complexity makes them a death trap for practical thinking. 
Tony Bennett (1992a: 32-33) 
In the early 1990s, an aggressively revisionist move appeared within cultural studies 
organised broadly around the theme of 'policy'. What followed as the 'policy debate' 
was a phenomenon largely confined to Australia and was conditioned in important ways 
by Australian contexts. But the arguments developed in support of the 'policy' position 
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have gained an international currency and are also matched to some extent by similar 
arguments elsewhere. Two of the quotations above are taken, in fact, from the 
proceedings of the conference 'Cultural Studies Now and in the Future' at Illinois in 
1990 - the conference which marked, in many ways, the 'arrival' of cultural studies as 
an internationally-recognised field. The theoretical end of the 'policy' position has 
developed in close parallel with British work located within 'social theory', particularly 
as associated with the journal Economy and Society and the influence in the field of 
Foucauldian theories of 'governmentality'. Many of the arguments resonate more 
generally with diverse attempts across· many different sites to define a 'relevance' for 
progressive projects in the humanities and social sciences in a context where the criteria 
of relevance have shifted radically since the late 1960s and 1970s when many of those 
projects took form. 
At the centre of the 'policy' arguments have been a set of claims over the use of the 
concept of power. Interestingly, this has not been a major point of focus in critical 
responses, most of which have chosen to engage over other issues, but it is quite explicit 
in programmatic statements of the 'policy' position itself. It is immediately 
foregrounded, for example, in Tony Bennett's 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies'. 
Bennett prepares the ground for his argument with the definition of cultural studies 
already quoted in the previous chapter as cited by Meaghan Morris: 
It now functions largely as a term of convenience for a fairly dispersed array of 
theoretical and political positions which, however widely divergent they might 
be in other respects, share a commitment to examining cultural practices from 
the point of view of their intrication with, and within, relations of power 
(Bennett 1992a: 23). 
Further clarifying his understanding of the field, Bennett describes it as 'an area of 
debate in which, certain things being taken for granted, the dialogue can be more 
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focused' (33). What is 'taken for granted' is that any discussion of culture must relate it 
in some way to power. 'As such', Bennett concludes, 'the only matter of substance at 
issue in these debates concerns the development of ways of theorizing the relations 
between culture and power that will be of service to practical engagements with, and 
within, those relations' (33). The 'policy' position is advanced as a series of related 
claims as to the conditions for addressing this 'matter of substance' satisfactorily: 
First, the need to include policy considerations in the definition of culture in 
viewing it as a particular field of government; second, the need to distinguish 
different regions of culture within this overall field in terms of the objects, 
targets, and techniques of government peculiar to them; third, the need to 
identify the political relations specific to different regions of culture so defined 
and to develop appropriately specific ways of engaging with and within them; 
and, fourth, the need for intellectual work to be conducted in a manner such 
that, in both its substance and its style, it can be calculated to influence or 
service the conduct of identifiable agents within the region of culture concerned 
(Bennett 1992a: 23). 
The immediacy of the concern with power recedes somewhat at the level of detail, but 
the revisionist ambition of the position clearly rests on an argument as to how the 
concept should be used. 
In its initial phase, at least, the 'policy debate' was a somewhat confused one, 
generating, as John Prow and Meaghan Morris have put it, 'much heat and less light' 
(Frow and Morris 1993: xxix). The 'policy' position itself has been more contradictory 
and internally divided than it has often been taken to be or than the presentation of a 
confident and unified revisionist front has sometimes made it seem. Even individual 
positions have been paradoxical. Much of the advocacy for 'policy' might be described 
as a fanatical anti-fanaticism, a totalising critique of totalisation or a fundamentalist 
anti-fundamentalism. As a number of commentators have observed, calls for 'modesty', 
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'specificity' and 'pragmatism' have been framed by sweeping characterisations of other 
positions and highly theorised arguments that involvement in policy formation is not 
only desirable but somehow ordained by History. 15 There has been a pervasive sense 
throughout the 'policy' debate of cultural studies at war with itself. 
There is no doubt that those aligned with the 'policy' move can claim significant 
achievements. The establishment, in particular, of an Institute for Cultural Policy 
Studies at Griffith University, succeeded by the well-funded Key Centre for Cultural 
and Media Policy, has provided a space for sustained analysis of cultural policy in 
Australia at a time of very rapid change. But the initiative may seem an unlikely place 
to look for openings of the kind assayed at the end of the previous chapter. If the 
'policy' advocates have vigorously criticised the way the concept of power is used in 
cultural studies, the one aspect of that use they have not criticised has been the 
assumption that the concept corresponds to a single universal phenomenon. The 
arguments are 'Foucauldian' in the sense developed in Chapter 1: while there is an 
insistent emphasis on the specificity of 'mechanisms', 'technologies' and 'modalities' 
of power, it is never seriously questioned that these mechanisms, technologies and 
modalities represent different forms of fundamentally the same thing. Bennett's 
identification of power as the 'matter of substance' in debates within cultural studies is, 
in this context, highly indicative. The very premise of these debates, as he sees them, is 
that power is a phenomenon which, however diverse its forms and however varied the 
accounts which may be given of it, retains a substantial consistency. 
15 For criticisms of the 'policy' arguments see Frow (1992), Jones (1994), Levy (1992), Morris (1992b), 
O'Regan (1992a; 1992b) and Wark (1992). 
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One of the effects of the 'policy' intervention has been, in fact, to confirm and formalise 
the general tendency from empiricism to rationalism traced in previous chapters. 
Bennett's assumption of consensus over his definition of cultural studies is as much an 
indication of the state of the field as it is of his own position within it. It is an 
assumption which has been widely accepted. While Morris, for example, has been 
sharply critical of many of the 'policy' arguments, she describes the definition as 'the 
most relaxed general definition that I know' (Morris 1997a: 39). The definition is also a 
starting point for the argument of Jon Stratton and Ien Ang, discussed in Chapter 3, for 
a new 'internationalised' cultural studies. It is against the universalism of Bennett's use 
of the concept of power that specific associations with Britain come to appear as a 
limitation (Stratton and Ang 1996: 361-2). The moment of cultural studies' 
internationalisation has been one in which the extended use of the concept of power 
which emerged from the new social movements has been prominently foregrounded and 
largely accepted as defining the field. 
In so far as the 'policy' position is 'Foucauldian' - and Foucault is frequently cited as 
an authority - it might be criticised for the kinds of limitations which I attempted to 
identify in relation to Foucault's own writings on power in Chapter 1. Questions might 
be raised, specifically, about claims by the 'policy' advocates to scepticism. It is true, as 
it is of Foucault, that they have developed corrosive arguments against many of the 
universalising pretensions common within left cultural criticism. But they retain, in their 
use of the concept of power, a commitment to universalism - a commitment which has 
the potential, at least, to produce its own kinds of dogmatism. 
Rather than pursuing this line exclusively, however, I want in this chapter to suggest 
that there are other possibilities opened up by the 'policy' arguments - possibilities 
which paradoxically subvert their theoretical claims. At a superficial level, the use of 
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the concept of power by the 'policy' advocates is not greatly removed from other work 
in cultural studies. The propositions that power can be 'positive' as well as 'negative', 
that it can work 'in and through' rather than 'over and against' objects of control, that 
there are no spaces 'outside' power from which it might be criticised, are all quite 
widely accepted in the field. There is, in fact, some justification in criticisms of the 
'policy' advocates as merely asserting, in a polemical fashion, principles which had 
already been generally established elsewhere. But the single-minded rigour with which 
they have applied these principles is more important than it may seem. The work of Ian 
Hunter and Tony Bennett, in particular, has shown a determination to test them to the 
limit, demanding an absolute theoretical consistency and seeking out the most minor 
forms of deviationism. If their writing has sometimes had a grim and obsessive tone, it 
needs also to be recognised as producing novel outcomes. One of these outcomes has 
been, ironically, to create the conditions for what might be described as a 'post-
Foucauldian' cultural studies. 
To present my argument here in outline, the explicit position of Hunter and Bennett on 
power is a 'hyper-rationalist' one. They accept in general terms the universalist 
reference of the concept which, as we saw in the previous chapter, developed most 
notably out of the 'totalism' of the new social movements of the late 1960s and 1970s. 
But they also develop it further. Power is not only taken to be a substantially consistent 
phenomenon extending from the global to the most local and particular; it is also taken 
to be all-inclusive - an immanent sub-stratum of all human activities and practices. 
Many of the theoretical arguments of the 'policy' position involve an attempt to reduce 
'culture', in particular, to an effect of power. This is the significance of Bennett's call 
for the recognition of culture as a 'field of government': given that 'government' itself 
is understood as a technology of power, culture assumes the status of an 
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epiphenomenon. But the rationalist absolutism of such arguments is never quite what it 
seems, for the point at which it is claimed that there is nothing 'outside' power is also 
the point where the concept itself loses any capacity for discrimination and hence its 
meaning. The spectre could be raised here of a Baudrillardian 'end of Power', but as I 
have been suggesting throughout the dissertation, there is also another possibility: the 
emergence of a 'neo-empiricism' - a non-substantialist understanding of powers (in the 
plural) as qualitatively distinct. 
This might seem an overly ingenious reading of the 'policy' arguments if it were not for 
the examples chosen by Hunter, Bennett, Stuart Cunningham and others in developing 
their case at the level of detail. These have been drawn, with few exceptions, from the 
field of British liberal governance (in the case of Hunter and Bennett) or close 
derivatives (in the work of Cunningham and others on Australian institutions and 
cultural industries). One of the most distinctive characteristics of this field, as I argued 
in Chapter 1, has been a marked resistance to totalising uses of the concept of power. 
The significance of this has been obscured in the 'policy' arguments by a tendency to 
subsume examples under generalised theories claiming an almost universal 
applicability. Hunter and Bennett could, in fact, be seen as marking a 'point of 
saturation', according to Yuri Lotman's model of cultural exchange, in the absorption 
since the 1960s of continental European influences in English-language cultural 
criticism (Lotman 1990: 145-7). There is a negligible trace in their writing of a sense of 
the 'peculiarities of the English' and they are clearly more at home in European political 
and cultural theory than in" English or Anglo-derived intellectual traditions. 16 There is, 
16 Hunter is, in fact, explicitly dismissive of the suggestion of differences in English traditions of thought 
on politics and culture. He has argued, for example, that Leavisite literary criticism is merely a variant 
form of intellectual paradigms recognisable elsewhere: 'Despite the recent and perhaps understandable 
tendency to poke fun at [Leavis] as a 'peculiarity of the English', it is worth remarking that Leavis' 
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nevertheless, a subtle reconnection with the latter at the point where Foucauldian 
formulations of the specificity of forms of power (still in the singular) begin to 
transmute with a more 'english' understanding- embodied as much in practices as in 
theories - of the specificity of powers. 
If this is so, then the 'policy' position might best be seen not as a 'position' at all, but as 
a contradictory field of potentials. Uneasily suspended between a hyper-rationalism and 
a neo-empiricism, the 'policy' arguments are inherently fraught with ambiguity. While 
this is not perhaps the way the 'policy' advocates themselves would want to see them, it 
makes them a much richer site in considering current and future possibilities for cultural 
studies than first appears from the narrowly focussed polemics of the 'policy debate'. 
The interest of the arguments, and of responses to them, is further magnified if read in 
relation to changes in the context of cultural criticism in which they have taken form. I 
want to suggest in what follows that the whole field in which 'policy' has become an 
issue is only fully intelligible against the background of the complex set of political, 
economic and cultural transformations best identified in shorthand as 'the end of the 
Cold War'. As a response to these transformations, the discussion surrounding 'policy' 
is a valuable, if necessarily partial, window on the possible shape of cultural criticism 
following the long phase of developments which have had their primary point of 
reference in the explosive upheavals of the late 1960s. 
GREENFIELD SITES FOR THE STUDY OF POWER 
It is worth considering, as background, the political and intellectual formation of the 
'policy' proponents. To do so is immediately to reveal a more interesting relation to the 
organic society is neither more nor less than a transposition of the image of classical Greek society 
deployed by the German Romantics, and serves a similar function' (Hunter 1988a: 10). 
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concept of power than Bennett's assumption of the 'taken for granted' would lead us to 
believe. In contrast to Morris, for whom the assumption is in some ways more easily 
explicable, Bennett's own formation was not in the new social movements or anti-
colonial nationalism but in an earlier moment of the British New Left. His location 
within the latter follows, almost classically, the pattern established by the first 
generation of British cultural studies. From a provincial background in the north of 
England, he began his professional career teaching adult non-degree students in an 
extra-mural department. His first induction into what was to become known as 'cultural 
studies' was through Raymond Williams' The Long Revolution and Richard Hoggart' s 
The Uses of Literacy. As he describes it in a recent essay: 
My own first encounter with these works was in 1962 as a student in a newly-
fashioned teaching context - a general studies adjunct to the fifth-form English 
class in a north of England state grammar school - that was governed by a 
pedagogic agenda which (although I did not realise it at the time) was that of a 
left-Leavisism in search of a broader range of texts, outside the literary canon, 
through which to shape the formative moral and political consciousnesses of a 
new generation of 'English subjects' (Bennett 1998: 50). 
The characterisation of Williams and Hoggart as vehicles for 'shaping moral 
consciousnesses' marks a divergence from the way they, themselves, understood 
democratising educational reforms, but it is clear, nonetheless, that they were an 
important early influence. Hoggart has never appeared in Bennett's published work as a 
significant figure, but Williams has remained an abiding point of reference. 
Bennett(l 990: ix) himself has described his debt to him as 'inestimable'. 
This background lends a particular significance to Bennett's specialist interests in 
literary education and museums and public exhibitions. These interests have seemed 
puzzling to many commentators, especially in the light of his recent attempts to chart 
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'new directions' for cultural studies. As McKenzie Wark has put it, as a wider criticism 
of the 'policy' arguments: 
The specific institutional histories towards which the policy people gravitate are 
hardly on the cutting edge of the dynamic transformations of cultural 
technologies. They are holding up a rear vision mirror. The school, the 
museum, literature and cinema probably won't mean much to the Nintendo 
generation that is presently growing old enough to get their own credit cards 
(Wark 1992: 678). 
Wark's response to the 'policy' arguments is characteristic of a more general position 
which I will review at some length in the following chapter. My purpose in citing it here 
is only to point out that there is a significance to Bennett's chosen fields of research 
which such criticisms may fail to recognise. In the context of British liberal governance 
- and it is this context which Bennett is almost exclusively concerned with - the 
histories of literary education and the public museum offer models of political and 
cultural change which contrast sharply with the revolutionary or avant-gardist themes -
including Wark's 'Nintendo generationalism' - which have tended to accompany 
totalising uses of the concept of power. 
Evidence of this is strongest, perhaps, in Bennett's work on museums. In an essay 
included in his recent book Culture-A Reformer's Science, he traces the 'museum 
idea', as it was first described by the American museologist George Brown Goode, to 
the English social reformer, Sir Henry Cole: 
Closely associated with the Philosophical Radicals, and personally acquainted 
with John Stuart Mill, Cole was well versed in the principles of Benthamism 
and, through his roles as architect of the Great Exhibition, founder of the South 
Kensington Museum and the first effective head of the Department of Arts and 
Science, he sought strenuously to put these principles into practical effect 
(Bennett 1998: 107). 
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The model of the public museum established under Cole - a model which was realised 
in its most exemplary form in the South Kensington Museum - is distinguished by 
Bennett from the envoi system which formed the basis of exhibitionary practices during 
the Napoleonic period in France. In the latter, 'the system's primary purpose was to 
embody and circulate an image of state power throughout the nation ... [L]ess 
importance was attached to the pictures selected ... than the labels accompanying them, 
which indicated that they were the gift of the Emperor or of the state' (116). If the envoi 
system was organised around the theme of sovereignty, Cole and others schooled in the 
tradition of utilitarianism were concerned with other questions: 'they constantly stressed 
art's divisibility, its capacity to be broken down into different quantities from which 
different degrees and kinds of benefits might be derived' (117). 
What Bennett does not say is that among the 'principles of Benthamism' is a position in 
relation to the concept of power. He allows the Anglo utilitarian tradition to be spoken 
for on this question by Foucault, equating the differences between the envoi system and 
Cole's South Kensington model with the distinction between 'juridico-discursive' and 
'governmental' forms of power. This obscures one of the most significant 
characteristics of utilitarianism, as of English political thought more generally: its 
resistance to totalising discourses on power - a resistance which would make it difficult 
to talk in general classificatory terms of 'forms' of power. The insight which opened the 
way for Benthamite reforming liberal enthusiasm was not only that power might be 
distinguished from sovereignty, but that it need not be thought of as a basic structuring 
principle or continuous sub-stratum of political activity. It is an insight which Bentham 
himself attributed to the scepticism of David Hume: 'I well remember, no sooner had I 
read that part of the work which touches on this subject, than I felt as if the scales had 
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fallen from my eyes. I then, for the first time, learnt to call the cause of the people my 
own' (Bentham 1988: 51). 
But there is, in Bennett's work, a certain understanding of the utilitarian tradition - a 
sense, at least, of its importance and sometimes a real sympathy for its political 
achievements. This sympathy shows through particularly in his recent 'policy' 
arguments, but it can be traced at some level in much of his earlier writing as well. This 
is not, by any means, to suggest that Bennett's relation to 'englishness' has been a 
simple one - that his theoretical commitments to Marxism and later Foucauldianism 
might be stripped away to reveal, in some way, a 'real' position. It is rather to suggest 
that his 'Marxism' and 'Foucauldianism' be read with a certain caution, as always 
involving a complex set of translations, negotiations and compromises between quite 
different political and intellectual formations. 
It becomes an interesting question in this context why Bennett should assume so 
confidently that cultural studies is, and has always been, 'about power' (the usage 
implying a full-blown rationalist understanding of the concept). In Culture - A 
Refonner's Science, he puzzles over the fact that Williams never gave much attention to 
the possible meanings of the term 'resistance'. It is, he suggests, a curious omission 
given the latter's consistent attention to the histories and contexts of use of 'key words': 
Resistance is not among the terms ... Williams discusses in his Keywords, 
which is a pity, as some attention to the history and characteristics of its usage 
might have helped in defining more clearly the assumptions the term brings 
with it when it is translated from the other contexts of its usage to the cultural 
field (Bennett 1998: 169). 
The point is an interesting one, but it also reveals a curious omission in Bennett's own 
reading of Williams: he neglects to mention that power is not among the terms included 
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in Keywords either. Given the importance he attributes to it in defining cultural studies, 
the absence, in this case, cannot easily be dismissed as a minor oversight. It has the 
potential, in fact, to overturn the definition itself. 'Culture, power, resistance: wherever 
and whenever cultural studies is discussed', Bennett says, 'these three terms are in 
play': 
How is culture tangled up with the exercise of power? What forms of resistance 
arise from, and are provoked by, these entanglements of culture and power? 
How can these resistances be translated into, or connected to, something else -
organised movements of political opposition, for example? Questions of this 
kind have been at the centre of debate in cultural studies from the outset 
(Bennett 1998: 167). 
The analysis here of the present state of cultural studies may be a fair one, but the claim 
in relation to the history of the field shows a peculiar blindness. If the early work of 
Hoggart and Williams is included - and Bennett never doubts that it should be ~ cultural 
studies has not always been concerned with questions of power and resistance. The 
absence of the terms from Keywords is more than an oddity: they were simply not 
important to Williams' early 'vocabulary of culture and society'. On any standard 
definition of 'the outset', culture was certainly at the centre of debate, but power has 
only assumed that status more recently. 
Bennett's strangely ahistorical perspective on cultural studies' address to 'questions of 
power and resistance' is given some context by the example he chooses to demonstrate 
their founding significance: 'They [these questions] are clearly implicated in the very 
title of Resistance through Rituals ... , a book which can deservedly claim to have first 
placed the trio of culture, power and resistance on the intellectual map of Anglophone 
cultural studies' (Bennett 1998: 167). The field only really 'begins', for Bennett, with 
Marxist cultural studies. Its origins are to be found in the Birmingham Centre's analysis 
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in 1976 of working class youth subcultures in which the first systematic use was made 
of Marxist theoretical models. From this perspective, cultural studies only became fully 
present to itself - more than ten years after the establishment of its first institutional site, 
and almost twenty years after Culture and Society and The Uses of Literacy - at the 
point where power and resistance joined culture on the terrain of what must previously 
have been a vaguely-defined pre-history. What this suggests is that Bennett's definition 
of the field is, at least in the British context, much less 'relaxed' than it seems; it does 
not simply identify certain common commitments, but functions to exclude any work in 
which those commitments have not been shared. 
It is unlikely that this exclusion is deliberate; it simply never occurs to Bennett that left 
political aspirations might be articulated in any other way than through a generalised 
concept of power. Given that the early work in cultural studies clearly had political 
implications, such a concept must have been present, however confused and inarticulate 
it may have been. Bennett reads Williams' early work, symptomatically, through E.P. 
Thompson's attempt to reframe it in the review of The Long Revolution discussed in 
Chapter 2: 
The gist of Thompson's argument ... was that Williams had gone into the heart 
of enemy territory in seizing the concept of culture from the monopolistic 
clutch of the likes of Arnold and Eliot and so redefining it that it could serve as 
the basis for a new intellectual and political project. This ... is also the status 
which it has been accorded within cultural studies. (101) 
Bennett's characterisation of current orthodoxies in cultural studies may, again, be fair. 
What is forgotten, however, is that Thompson was highly critical of Williams for his 
failure to represent the English literary tradition as 'enemy territory' - a failure directly 
related to the absence of any generalised concept of power. Williams is read as if he was 
making the kinds of claims for himself that Thompson wanted him to make. 
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The confusion goes back before Bennett to the attempt by Stuart Hall to cordialise 
relations between the 'first' and 'second' generations of British cultural studies. As I 
suggested in Chapter 3, Hall always retained, beyond a superficial loyalty, a sense of the 
political importance of the early work in the field. But he also recognised its inability, in 
the changed political climate of the 1970s, to meet the experiences of a new generation. 
It was for this generation, Bennett among them, that the literary tradition and other 
institutions of British public culture became defined as 'enemy territory'. It was for this 
generation, too, that the concept of power assumed a central significance. Thompson's 
attempted re-casting of Williams as a fully 'revolutionary' figure became a useful 
means, in the context of the times, for bridging an otherwise fraught generational 
divide. 
Bennett's neglect of the complex history of the concept of power is related, in other 
words, to a tendency to generalise from a particular generational experience. When he 
writes that 'We were once very adept at identifying the ideological processes that were 
going on 'behind the backs' of other social agents' (1998: 43), he clearly wishes to put 
this in the past. Yet he still equates the 'we' of cultural studies with the generation who 
came to the field in the 1970s - the generation, that is, who were caught up in the 
sharpened antagonisms and paranoid suspicions at the domestic flashpoints of the Cold 
War. However much he now wishes to re-assess the political values and modes of 
analysis of the time, his work remains profoundly formed by them. In Culture - A 
Reformer's Science, many of the old battle-lines remain drawn between a cultural 
studies calling attention to 'relations of power' and other forms of criticism 
characterised as merely concerned with the maintenance of social privilege. In a telling 
presentation of options, Bennett describes the field as having had to advance 'in the face 
of those familiar kinds of elitist disdain which typically greet any intellectual project 
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concerned with power relations of the cultural field rather than simply training the next 
generation of cultic consumers'(18). It is not necessary to question that 'elitist disdain' 
has, indeed, existed to suggest that Bennett's readiness to see it as the foundation for 
entire institutions is generationally specific. 
Similar generational prejudices affect much of Bennett's work on museums. In The 
Birth of the Museum, he writes with sympathy of fairs and popular entertainments, but 
more formal institutions are an object of extreme ambivalence. In an analysis of the 
North of England Open Air Museum at Beamish, for example, he criticises the way in 
which subordinate social classes are figured as a 'picturesque element'. The terms in 
which the ways of life of these classes are represented are, for Bennett, 'so mortgaged to 
the dominant culture that "the people" are encountered ... only in those massively 
idealized and deeply regressive forms which stalk the middle-class imagination' 
(Bennett 1995: 110). What most disturbs him about Beamish is its absence of any 
recognition of structural contradiction. The museum displays 
that distinctively bourgeois countryside of the mind in which the present 
emerges uninterruptedly from the past in which the presence and leading role of 
the bourgeoisie is eternally naturalized. This ability to transform industrialism 
from a set of ruptural events into a mere moment in the unfolding of a set of 
harmonious relations between rulers and the people may well turn out to be a 
distinctively English contribution to the development of the open-air museum 
form (Bennett 1995: 117). 
The obvious revulsion here at an 'English' absence of themes of rupture and opposition 
is all the more striking as the book is framed by arguments about the positivity and 
productiveness of the governmental administration of culture. It is, in fact, the first in a 
series, 'Culture: Policies and Politics', designed to promote 'a significant transformation 
in the political ambit and orientation of cultural studies and related fields' (Bennett 
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1995: facing page). The transformation is the one urged by the 'policy' arguments for a 
tum away from oppositional forms of criticism. 
It is probably impossible to understand Bennett's conviction in his use of the concept of 
power without understanding the emergence of the new generalised spaces of 
representation which I attempted to trace in the last chapter as a context for the 
emergence of feminism. In a revealing discussion of extra-mural adult education, he 
contrasts his view of the field with what he calls the 'myth of the margins'. Within the 
terms of the latter, the extra-mural sector was not only outside but also opposed to the 
institutionalised intellectual culture of the universities. On the basis of his own 
experience of the 1970s, Bennett suggests that the situation has always been more the 
reverse: 
... it was clear to me then (as now) that if a centre/periphery logic is to be used 
to describe the relations between such departments and the remainders of their 
universities, then they are more accurately described as the centre's outposts 
than its margins. This was, indeed, an explicit aspect of their conception within 
the history of the extension movement - a movement which, heir to the 
civilising and improving mission of the earlier 'rational recreations' movement, 
had been governed by a centre-to-outpost model of knowledge and 
dissemination (Bennett 1998: 4 7). 
There is a brief opening here where a centre/periphery logic appears open to question 
and Bennett is aware that it may be historically contingent. But the possibility of 
exploring this contingency is immediately foreclosed by the suggestion that the extra-
mural departments have 'indeed' been governed by a centre-to-outpost model. The 
'ambassadorial' model of cross-demographic exchange- the model I have suggested 
informed the view of adult education of Haggart and Williams - is never considered. 
There is no question for Bennett that class relations are best understood against the 
background of a uniform homogeneous space organised by basic structuring principles. 
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Bennett's view of adult education is highly coloured by his subsequent professional 
experience as a pioneer of quite a different institutional site - the new universities of the 
1960s and 1970s. He takes issue with the 'myth of the margins' in the context of a 
defence of the course on Popular Culture which he took a lead in developing for the 
Open University. The course was a highly-capitalised operation, taking some eight 
years from original conception to full preparation, making extensive use of television 
for delivery and enrolling over a thousand students in its first year (Bennett, Mercer et 
al. 1986: vii-ix). It is obvious, in this context, why an 'ambassadorial' model would 
have been unworkable. Despite his recent scepticism about the politics of 
representation, it is clear that Bennett has strong investments in norms of 
representational adequacy. His major argument on behalf of the Open University model 
- what made it in his own terms 'radically progressive' (Bennett 1998: 220)- is that it 
offered degree qualifications, providing formal access for a broad cross-section of 
students to arenas whose social composition had previously been more limited. Always 
implicit in such an ideal, as he himself has pointed out, is a principle of general human 
universality in relation to which exclusions and biases can be criticised. This is more 
than a minor slippage; at the centre of his work is a basic commitment to universalism. 
The greenfield sites of the new universities have held the promise, for Bennett, of open 
vistas, uncluttered by outdated and elitist traditions, in which general theoretical 
arguments about power can be pursued together with a pedagogy devoted to greater 
representativeness. 
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF DISGUST 
If this goes some way to explaining Bennett's assumption of a generalised concept of 
power, the context for the 'policy' arguments needs to be sought in more recent 
developments. As is clear from the quotations at the head of the chapter, the arguments 
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are pervaded by an overwhelming sense of disgust. The project of cultural studies 
which, for Bennett at least, seemed so promising during the 1970s and 1980s is 
represented in the 1990s as mired in stasis, irrelevant and banal, yet at the same time 
blindly hubristic and pretentious in its claims. The aggressiveness of the 'policy' 
arguments - what Meaghan Morris (1992b: 546) described in reference to Stuart 
Cunningham as their 'desperately gung ho corporatism' - has largely been motivated by 
a belief in the need for radical measures to puncture a dangerous complacency and 
rescue the field from terminal decline. 
Perhaps the most useful text to consider here is Accountingfor the Humanities, a 
collection of essays from the Institute of Cultural Policy Studies intervening in debates 
about reforms to the Australian higher education system at the end of the 1980s. The 
reforms themselves were initiated by John Dawkins' (1988) White Paper as Federal 
Minister for Employment, Education and Training outlining major changes to funding, 
structure, management and operations. As Ian Hunter summarises: 
The objective of these changes was to harness universities and colleges to the 
problems of national productivity and national debt. This was to be achieved 
through an overall expansion of the system and a selective prioritising of those 
sectors deemed most relevant to 'knowledge-based' and 'value-added' 
industrial production: engineering, computer and information sciences, business 
studies and economics, Asian studies. The means of implementing the new 
policies comprised an increasingly familiar - if politically incongruous - mix of 
regulatory and de-regulatory strategies. Measures to prioritise strategic 
research, unify different sectors of the system, establish uniform budgeting 
procedures and attach funding to output and performance measurement 
appeared alongside proposals to encourage academic entrepreneurship, give 
greater autonomy to university managements and admit 'market forces' by part-
charging students for their education (Hunter 1991: 7-8). 
257 
'Talking to the Ideological State Apparatuses' 
As Hunter points out, these policies and measures had clear parallels in Britain with the 
Thatcher Government's educational reforms of the 1980s and were also echoed by 
policy recommendations of the OECD. 
To sketch the context for these changes more widely, they might be related to an 
institutional convergence of government, education and media around models of 
business management with the disappearance, at the end of the Cold War, of an 
alternative ideological pole to state-sponsored capitalism. In a usefully oblique 
contribution to the 'policy debate', John Frow (1992) places Hunter's contribution to 
Accounting for the Humanities beside Michael Pusey's (1991) Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra. While the arguments and approaches of Hunter and Pusey are very different, 
they are clearly responding to similar developments. It was not only the relation 
between government and the education system which was transformed during the 
1980s; it was also the organisation and structure of government itself. Pusey's study 
traces the intellectual formation of senior public service administrators in what he 
describes as a 'restrictive, technically oriented, neoclassical economics curriculum' 
increasingly dominant in Australian universities during the postwar period ( quoted in 
Frow 1992: 507). He further documents the ascendancy of 'central agency' departments 
espousing minimalist laissez-faire policies to a position of supervisory and agenda-
setting control. Within this new regime, 'program and service' departments (Health, 
Social Security, Aboriginal Affairs, Community Services, Veterans Affairs and 
Education) have correspondingly slipped in prestige, occupying a third tier below 
'market-oriented' departments representing the vestiges of a Keynesian interventionist 
state. 
In their general character these changes have, of course, been far from unique to 
Australia. To continue the line of argument of the previous chapter, they could be seen 
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as a final extension of the tendencies which gave rise, in the late 1960s and 1970s, to a 
'totalist' concept of power. If, in the context of the Cold War, it was still possible to 
invoke alternatives or countervailing forces to market liberalism, by the late 1980s these 
were becoming increasingly difficult to identify. This has been reflected in much left 
political writing in an exacerbation of the despair which follows when power is 
conceived as all-pervasive but remains negatively identified. As Prow points out of 
Pusey's analysis of economic rationalism, the grim documentation of a relentless 
advance by abstract technical reason is relieved only by idealised projections of 'the 
way things used to be'. But as in the case of the 1970s, it would be a mistake to see 
these tendencies as entirely specific to the left. Similar visions of a universal 
predicament pervaded the triumphalism of those on the right of the old Cold War 
divide. The best known example is probably Francis Fukuyama' s 'The End of 
History?': 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing 
of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such; that is, 
the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama 
1989: 15). 
There is a certain point at which the perspective of the deputy director of the US State 
Department's policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation 
(Fukuyama) coincides with that of the left sociologist of the 'rationalisation of the 
public sphere' (Pusey). However stark the differences in their political leanings may be, 
they confirm each other in their view of what Fukuyama describes as 'the total 
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism' (15). 
At the centre of Hunter's response to the Dawkins reforms to Australian higher 
education is a certain insight - albeit somewhat displaced - into the implications of this 
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conjuncture for any project claiming to maintain or preserve a space outside 'the 
system'. If there is a single underlying principle of political organisation, then any 
attempt to disown or resist it can only rest on an appeal to some transcendent domain 
free of organisation. As Hunter demonstrates, this has been the logic implicit in many of 
the arguments for the autonomy of 'the university' against the encroachments of 
technical reason. It is a logic which is to be found above all in a reactive defence of the 
humanities: 
On the one hand, the governmental discourse seeks to constitute universities as 
legitimate objects of governmental intervention. It does so by conceiving of 
their educational activities in terms of the formation of skills and knowledges 
with calculable, hence plannable, economic outcomes. On the other hand ... the 
defence of the humanities seeks to establish their institutional autonomy by 
rendering their ends opaque to all purposive rationality ... Pushed to its 
extreme, which is not in fact very far from its centre, this defence ends by 
identifying the autonomy of the humanities with their ineffability (Hunter 1991: 
11-12). 
The real sting in the argument is in Hunter's diagnosis of the consequences of this 
identification for any considered assessment of the position and possibilities of 
humanities education and research: 'Needless to say significant intellectual and political 
penalties are incurred in trying to calculate one's situation and prospects by proclaiming 
their incalculability' (12). 
The significance, in the 'policy' arguments, of claims over the concept of power has 
been in making a similar point at a more abstract level. The clearest example here may 
be a critique by Bennett of Michel de Certeau's theorisation of popular resistance 
through the influential distinction between 'strategy' and 'tactics'. The discussion is 
important as de Certeau's position has increasingly come to eclipse earlier discussions 
of resistance in cultural studies, such as the Birmingham Centre's Resistance Through 
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Rituals. This is partly because it has seemed to avoid the rather static oppositional 
models of resistance often associated with work of the 1970s. It has appeared to 
provide, as Bennett puts it, 'a more nuanced account of the varied and pliable ways in 
which the practices of everyday life play in the space of "the other" to warren out a 
space for the oppressed in which, if nothing else, they are able to "make do"' (Bennett 
1998: 174). But de Certeau has also been widely taken up - particularly in the context 
of cultural studies' internationalisation - because of the relative abstractness of his 
terms. As Bennett points out, 'the language of "the other" has proved far more mobile 
than the language of ruling-class and subordinate-class cultures in being transportable 
across different fields of power (those of class, gender and colonisation) to net the 
practices of everyday life in a common problematic irrespective of their social 
locations' (174). 
Bennett's criticisms of de Certeau are almost a precise analogue of Hunter's criticisms 
of the reactive defence of the humanities. The loss of faith in the possibility of locating 
any stable position independent of the functional requirements of 'the system' is 
articulated by de Certeau in an extreme literalisation of Foucault' s analysis of the 
disciplinary society. In Bennett's paraphrase: 
Panoptic power ... is ubiquitous and all-triumphant: there are no longer any 
spaces outside it capable of nurturing the cultural resources through which it 
might be resisted or counter-attacked. All of the fortifications and barriers 
behind which the subordinate might have developed cultural spaces of their 
own are down; all of the ditches and banks of civil society within which 
autonomous forms of life once flourished have been razed. All that exists is 
absolute power faced with the ultimately atomistic sources of resistance, 
monadic individuals who, however, have been stripped of all weapons and 
fortifications except guile, ruse and deception (Bennett 1998: 177). 
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If the all-pervasiveness of panoptic power presumed by de Certeau is similar to many 
left political visions of economic rationalism, the implications for attempts to identify 
alternatives are also much the same. Any claim to avoid collusion with power becomes 
not only gestural but also necessarily unaccountable. As Bennett asks: 
Where do the ruses and tactics come from? What accounts for their guile and 
deception? No-one can say, and certainly not de Certeau, whose only account 
of these is to recast them as a series of images which convert any particular 
resistances on the part of particular actors into the mere contingent stand-ins 
for, variously, the opacity of popular culture, 'a dark rock that resists all 
assimilation', 'the enigma of the consumer-sphinx', or for an operational logic 
which stems from outside culture and history entirely and 'whose models may 
go back as far as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise and 
transform themselves in order to survive' (Bennett 1998: 178-9). 
As Bennett points out, de Certeau in fact prohibits himself from anything more than 
poetic allusions. He is obliged 'to forgo the possibility of describing practices in terms 
of an external analytic vocabulary since this would, eo ipso, place him on the side of 
knowledge and power' (180). In what has been the consistent refrain of the 'policy' 
arguments, Bennett concludes that the logic of the position requires an appeal to the 
'domain of the ineffable' ( 179). 
What most disturbs Bennett about this is that it appears to return cultural studies to 
everything he thought it had left behind in rejecting the literary tradition: 
For haven't we heard all this before? The reading that eludes explicit 
knowledge; that constitutes itself in a secret place; that remains unfathomable, 
out of analytic reach: what else is this but to attribute to the reader precisely 
those properties which the literary reading attributes to the literary text in 
rendering its meaning undecipherable and undecidable? (Bennett 1998: 183) 
What returns here is also an unaccountability, mixed with bad faith, of hierarchical 
social relations: 
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For the fathomless depths of the undecipherable reader allow the popular text to 
be pedagogically organised as a vehicle for inducting students into resistive 
readings which, with the assistance of the cultural studies teacher, can be 
corrected, revised and even assessed. It is, however, difficult to see how this is 
anything but a form of licensed poaching performed under the watchful, 
tutelary eye of gamekeepers still in the employ of the literary apparatus 
(Bennett 1998: 184). 
After all the efforts to mark out a new intellectual space and after all the attempts to 
develop a more democratic pedagogy, cultural studies appears, in short, to be nothing 
more than the 'heir to English' (25). 
Much of the provocation of the 'policy' arguments within cultural studies has been in 
challenging the distinction between the 'old' and the 'new' humanities - between the 
intellectual establishment of the 1950s and the 'critical' movements of the 1960s and 
1970s. The key figure here has been Hunter, on whom Bennett has drawn substantially 
for his theoretical understanding of literary education. According to Hunter's analysis -
which draws, itself, on Weber and Foucault - , cultural studies and other 'oppositional' 
movements in criticism are merely variant forms of an aesthetic 'practice of the self' 
with origins in German romanticism. Within this tradition, the aesthetic object is 
'essentially a device in a practice of self-problematization' (Hunter 1992: 351 ). In order 
to perform such a function it must be construed as devoid of any determinate 
characteristics, making the act of interpretation a reflection upon the subject interpreting 
rather the object of interpretation itself: 
Its instituted incomprehensibility provides a convenient site for individuals to 
begin to relate to themselves as subjects of aesthetic experience. This is 
achieved through the successive counterpointed destruction of one's 'ordinary' 
responses as sentimental or narve, as 'too tensed' or 'too relaxed', as moralistic 
or rhapsodic, and so on (Hunter 1992: 351 ). 
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In the necessary inadequacy of their attempts to comprehend the incomprehensible, the 
subject of aesthetic interpretation comes to recognise their 'ethical incompleteness'. 
This recognition provides the condition for a continuous project of self-improvement in 
which the subject aspires to greater 'wholeness'. It is the basis on which individuals 
undertake 'a special kind of ethical work on the being whose incompleteness they have 
accepted as their own' (353). 
Cultural studies remains, for Hunter, deeply embedded within this 'ethic of the 
aesthetic' and has continued to reproduce its characteristic social relations. The 
rejection of the literary canon and other 'high art' objects of aesthetic appreciation does 
nothing, in itself, to alter the aesthetic disposition. In so far as canons establish 
definitive norms of judgement, they are, in fact, inherently problematic; the very 
condition for aesthetic self-formation is that there be no definitive norms: 
The aesthetic is not identified with a particular kind of literary object but with 
an attitude individuals can adopt in relation to all kinds of objects, literary or 
not. This aesthetic attitude is the 'critical' outlook arising from the inclusion of 
these objects in practices of aesthetic problematization. The fact that this 
practice is carried out using autonomous ethical techniques means that it is not 
dependent on particular aesthetic objects nor, indeed, on aesthetic objects in 
particular (Hunter 1992: 356). 
From this perspective, the tum by cultural studies to popular culture and the 'political' 
has only opened up new fields for the aesthetic problematisation. What is more, Hunter 
argues, the move has not escaped old forms of social hierarchy but, on the contrary, 
extended them. These forms have never been the simple expression of the dominance of 
a gender, race, or class, but are a 'direct and autonomous creation of the techniques and 
functions of the ethic itself' (358). Aesthetic discipline - institutionalised above all in 
the context of pedagogy - 'provides the means for some individuals to distinguish 
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themselves from others by problematizing "ordinary" experience and conducting 
themselves as subjects of a superior mode of being' (358).ln their very rejection of 
established criteria of taste, 'critical' movements in the humanities have continued to 
cultivate an aesthetic elitism. 
There is little in either Hunter's or Bennett's arguments to suggest that they may have a 
context as specific as economic rationalism or the end of the Cold War. Hunter's 
analysis of romantic aesthetics provides, in fact, a highly elaborate perspective from 
which the recent history of cultural politics is relieved of significance. The most 
obvious target for deflation are claims for the importance - whether political or 
intellectual - of the revolutionary aspirations of the 1960s and 1970s, but there is a 
more general flattening of relief within any immediate historical frame. There is a 
similar evacuation of historical considerations in Bennett's criticisms of de Certeau. The 
issue at stake in these criticisms is not the appropriateness of different responses to a 
particular conjuncture, but the general adequacy of competing theories of power. While 
it is a requirement for Bennett that such theories allow for historical specificities, he 
assumes that the theories themselves stand outside them. 
There are, however, too many coincidences between theories and contexts for this 
assumption to go unexamined. In his critique of de Certeau, Bennett describes his view 
of power as an extreme case of a bipolar model of domination and resistance: 'one in 
which it is carried to excess in the magnification of one pole of power to the point 
where it becomes all-encompassing and the diminution of the other to the point where it 
disappears entirely, becomes a zero power' (Bennett 1998: 177). The analysis is 
strongly suggestive of contextual determinants: the magnification of one pole and the 
virtual disappearance of the other describes, precisely, the end of the Cold War. A 
similar contextual density could be brought to the loss of distinction between the 'old' 
265 
'Talking to the Ideological State Apparatuses' 
and the 'new' humanities. If Hunter's analysis suggests an abstract perspective from 
which they might be identified, the identification has also been realised in more 
concrete ways. As Denise Meredyth points out in her contribution to Accounting for the 
Humanities, 'traditional' and 'critical' approaches have been thrown together in their 
common opposition to economically-driven administrative reforms: 
Those formerly divided by the critique and defence of cultural heritage or 
disinterested knowledge have temporarily united against a common enemy, the 
administrator, supposedly indifferent to the value of personal cultivation, 
critical education or knowledge for its own sake (Meredyth 1991: 117-118). 
Although the implications of the coincidence are not explored by Meredyth, it raises 
questions about the relation between Hunter's account of the humanities and the 
predicament of cultural criticism at the end of the 1980s. 
If the shrinking to a 'zero point' of any alternative to power is indeed as much an effect 
of the end of the Cold War as of strictly theoretical considerations, then the theme of the 
'ineffable' may best be traced not, as Hunter suggests, to eighteenth century German 
romanticism but to much more recent developments. The identification of cultural 
studies with romantic aesthetics may have some plausibility in relation to de Certeau 
and certain other theoretical positions which gained influence in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, but it has less in relation to cultural studies of the 1960s or 1970s. It is difficult 
to see, for example, that the location of sites of resistance in the Birmingham Centre's 
Resistance Through Rituals involved an appeal to the ineffable. As Bennett recognises, 
resistance was understood there in far more concrete terms. Working-class male youth 
subcultures were construed quite specifically as defensive reactions to the intrusion of 
postwar ideologies of consumerism, affluence and growth into traditional forms of 
working-class culture (Bennett 1998: 172). Resistance was not associated with obscurity 
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or evasion but was described as a concrete phenomenon, demonstrable in actual 
behaviours and involving a specific reconfiguration of elements of traditional English 
working-class culture. 
The very pointedness of Hunter's and Bennett's interventions suggest that the problems 
they have responded to are more specific than seem. There is a certain consistency in 
their objects of criticism. The 'policy' arguments have been concerned, firstly, with 
gaining intellectual leverage over what Hunter calls 'personality as a vocation'. Hunter 
himself gives the phrase an almost formal definition in the context of his analysis of 
aesthetics, but it is clear that there is also a specific object in view. It is most 
transparent, perhaps, in Bennett's concern that cultural studies may have become a field 
in which 'intellectuals can preen a chic radicalism through the grand gesture of turning 
their backs on ... institutional contexts' (Bennett 1998: 231). Secondly, the 'policy' 
arguments have been consistently opposed to theories of the indeterminacy of meaning 
which became particularly influential in poststructuralist textual analysis during the late 
1980s. Hunter develops his argument that the ineffability of the aesthetic object is 
'instituted' by taking issue not with older oppositional rhetorics within the 'new' 
humanities, but with an analysis of pedagogy by American literary theorist Stanley Fish. 
Whereas, for Fish, students should be taught to 'recognise' the indeterminacy of 
meaning - implying that it is a 'real' property of texts - , Hunter points out that Fish, in 
fact, enjoins them to see meaning as indeterminate and that he does so in the context of 
formal pedagogical relations backed by institutional authority (Hunter 1988a: 277-279). 
There is, finally, a deep ambivalence in the 'policy' arguments towards the form taken 
by cultural studies since its rapid expansion in the United States. This is evident, above 
all, in a suspicion towards what Bennett describes as 'the libertarian formulations that 
have been the worm in the bud of American cultural studies ever since it made its trans-
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Atlantic passage' (Bennett 1998: 5). As I have indicated, the 'policy' intervention was 
launched in the context of cultural studies' internationalisation - an internationalisation 
which has been strongly identified with its recognition within the American academy. 
The 'policy' proponents have consistently criticised the tendencies to abstraction and 
generalisation which have accompanied this development. In the Australian context, the 
'localist' aspect of the case has been put most strongly by Stuart Cunningham. Greater 
attention to questions of policy would, for Cunningham, 'play a central role in 
Australianising the field because policy issues and processes are by nature more 
localised and oriented to realisable change' (Cunningham 1992: 22). 
The three aspects to the polemical organisation of the 'policy' arguments - against 
'personality', against 'indeterminacy' and against abstract universalism - could be seen, 
together, as a kind of negative imprint of tendencies in left cultural criticism at the 
beginning of the 1990s. With the loss of confidence in organised forms of left politics as 
a systematic alternative to state-sponsored capitalism, the oppositional rhetorics 
established in the 1960s and 1970s have increasingly become capitalised in an 
individualist rejection of organisation as such. The development is consistent with the 
shift in the centre of gravity of cultural studies to the United States where traditions of 
left political organisation have always been weak and where well-established relations 
between celebrity and the market have made personality not only a 'vocation' but often 
a highly lucrative one. While the revisionist ambitions of the 'policy' proponents have 
required them to develop a broad-ranging critique of the field, the central target of their 
interventions has been a certain kind of figure made possible by the space of intellectual 
production at the end of the Cold War- a figure claiming recognition and status on the 
basis of personal experience and identity, proclaiming 'indeterminacy' and 'alterity' but 
also assuming a universal authority, exemplifying an extreme form of individualism and 
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commanding prestige within an international star system yet doing so in the name of 
'opposition' and 'resistance'. 
THE EXORCISM OF 'PRINCIPLE' 
It should be pointed out that in many of their reservations about the condition of cultural 
studies, the 'policy' proponents have not been alone. In some ways they have merely 
focussed a widespread dissatisfaction with an increasing gap between highly 
sophisticated theorising and any clear sense of a context in which the outcomes might 
'matter'. In a postscript responding to the proceedings from the 1992 conference at 
Illinois, Angela McRobbie found the only word to describe her feeling about the 
transformed state of the field was 'panic': 
[W]hat has worried me recently in cultural studies is when the theoretical 
detours become literary and textual excursions and when I begin to lose a sense 
of why the object of study is constituted as the object of study in the first place. 
Why do it? What is the point? On my first reading of many of the papers I was 
gripped by panic. Where have I been for the last five years? Much of this kind 
of cultural studies does not tally with what I teach, with what I find useful in 
understanding the everyday world and everyday culture around me (McRobbie 
1992: 721). 
If 'literary and textual excursions' have become a common object of concern, areas of 
agreement have also developed in identifying problems at the theoretical level. In their 
preliminary moves, the 'policy' arguments have often been developed in alliance with 
others. Bennett's criticisms of de Certeau build, for example, on earlier criticisms by 
John Frow (1991) and Jeremy Ahearne (1995). 
What has distinguished the 'policy' arguments has not been their diagnosis of problems, 
therefore, so much as the radicalism of their proposed solutions. At the abstract level, 
best represented by Bennett, this has been to attempt a complete reduction of social and 
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cultural phenomena to the effects of power. The proposal claims the authority of 
Foucault's late work on govemmentality and is given at least an initial plausibility 
through reference to nineteenth century administrative programs for reforming the 
habits, tastes and dispositions of entire populations. As Bennett presents it in 'Useful 
Culture' 
... an understanding of the relations between culture and power in modem 
societies needs to take account of the instrumentalization of culture which 
accompanies its enlistment for governmental purposes. For the culture/power 
articulation which results from these developments is quite distinct from the 
organization of such relations in earlier societies ... In the early nineteenth 
century ... we see the sphere of culture being, quite literally, refashioned-
retooled for a new task - as it comes to be inscribed within governmental 
strategies which aim less at exacting popular obedience to a sovereign authority 
than at producing in a population a capacity for new forms of thought, feeling 
and behaviour (Bennett I 992b: 401-2). 
The attribution of a 'productivity' to power is essential to the argument. Resistance and 
opposition are not so much eliminated in Bennett's analysis as fully accounted for by 
the forms of power which they resist or oppose. It becomes pointless, from this 
perspective, to seek a ground 'outside' power or to hope for tactics which somehow 
escape it; in contemporary 'govemmentalised' societies, our very capacities for 
'thought, feeling and behaviour' are entirely owed to power. 
The position provides an obvious potential for countering emergent tendencies in 
cultural studies in the 1990s: it makes it possible, in particular, to deflate the aura of the 
ineffable which has come to be associated with themes of resistance and opposition. 
The central motif of the 'policy' arguments has been the word 'mundane'. Cultural 
change, for Bennett, is 'a largely technical matter' in the sense that 'it results from 
tinkering with practical arrangements rather than from an epic struggle for 
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consciousness' (Bennett 1992b: 406). The argument has been developed in greatest 
detail by Hunter with reference to the history of education. For too long now, he argues 
in Rethinking the School, 
the school system has been dwarfed by the grandeur of its 'underlying' 
principles and impoverished by the wealth of expectation invested in it. This 
book offers an account of the school not as a flawed realisation of a principle 
but as an improvised reality, assembled from the available moral and 
governmental 'technologies', as a means of coping with historical contingency 
(Hunter 1994: 3). 
Modem schooling is not owed, for Hunter, to theorists or 'critical intellectuals'; nor is it 
open to 'principled criticisms'. It has been the product of administrative programs 
directed at resolving historically specific problems and making pragmatic use of 
practices and disciplines immediately to hand. It is not to abstract ideals such as the 
realisation of human potential or political emancipation that we should look if we are to 
understand the process by which large sectors of the population have acquired a 'moral 
personality' or the status of citizens: 'it is to the inglorious micro-technics of 
conscience, patiently adapted from Christian spiritual discipline by the journeymen 
intellectuals of the state' (142). 
The implications of the argument for contemporary debates are drawn quite explicitly: 
[T]he idea that 'transformative intellectuals' can exercise 'emancipatory 
authority', based on their pure insight into the future form of human 
development, begins to look dangerously self-deluding. Under this degree of 
moral inflation the teacher's role threatens to break free of its professional and 
civic moorings, drifting into moral grandiloquence and political fantasy (Hunter 
1994: 30). 
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The most immediate target of criticism here is the 'critical pedagogy' of Henry Giroux 
and his collaborators, 17 but the arguments also press towards more generalised 
conclusions. This is particularly the case where Hunter introduces the concept of power: 
[W]e must learn to see abstraction as first and foremost a social gesture. The 
claim to 'pure' theory, made in the name of withdrawing from the power-
tainted perceptions of the governmental sphere, is in fact a means of exercising 
power on and within this sphere, as the claimant reappears wielding the moral 
authority and social prestige of the untainted theoretical persona (Hunter 1994: 
14). 
It is not just the understanding of the school which is at stake here; a larger claim is 
being made about any position which disavows an involvement in the governmental 
exercise of power. As with Bennett's analysis of resistance, Hunter recognises the 
position from which such disavowals are made but reduces them to an epiphenomenon 
of governmental power itself. 
The style of argument has been important in questioning the authority of generalising 
theoretical claims, but it has only been developed at a certain cost. It demands what 
might be described as a 'governmental absolutism'. Nothing can be allowed to escape 
reduction to governmental power for to do so would be to concede a space in which 
'criticism' and 'resistance' might reclaim an aura of exceptionalism. The result is a 
return of exactly the kind of universalism which the arguments are designed to overturn. 
Governmentality is attributed with the status of a fundamental truth, dividing the field 
of criticism between those who have been enlightened and those who have not. In 
Rethinking the School, Hunter writes tellingly of the need to 'exorcise' what he calls 
'the spell of educational principle' (1994: 3). While the metaphor may be intended 
17 The term 'emancipatory authority' is Giroux's. See Giroux (1989). 
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ironically, it is also somehow appropriate. There is an obsessiveness in the way the 
'policy' proponents have sought to nail down their claims and a dogmatic air of 
certainty in the way they have addressed alternative positions. As Meaghan Morris 
pointed out at the time of the 'policy debate', there is, in fact, nothing 'modest' or 
'specific' about the polemical form of the 'policy' vision: 'It is a generically neo-
marxist grand narrative about the vanguard role of intellectuals in divining the correct 
road to change' (Morris 1992b: 549). 
The irony of this can be traced most clearly in relation to the concept of power. It may 
already have seemed strange that Bennett should criticise de Certeau for a totalising use 
of the concept when, as I have argued, his own career has been built on a commitment 
to a use which tends in a similar direction. But what is stranger still is that Bennett 
leapfrogs de Certeau with his own proposals. If, for de Certeau, there are still gaps and 
interstices - albeit mysterious - in the grid of power, the gaps, for Bennett, are closed 
and the interstices filled in. Admittedly, power has the capacity in Bennett's account to 
divide against itself so that it appears as having fluid characteristics. Citing Foucault, he 
argues that 
the mechanisms of modem forms of liberal government ... are themselves 
partly responsible for generating counter-demands on government owing to 
their inability to entirely satisfy the demands they generate. It is, Graham 
Burchell contends in summarising this line of argument, 'in the name of forms 
of existence which have been shaped by political technologies of government 
that we, as individuals and groups, make claims on or against the state' 
(Bennett 1998: 178). 
It is important, for Bennett, that the position allows for relations which are 'active and 
·disputatious' (178). Nevertheless, everything is orchestrated by a single principle: the 
all-pervasive 'political technologies of government'. Even where conflicts arise which 
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these technologies are unable to resolve, they are conflicts which the technologies have 
generated in the first place. There is - which is precisely the point - no 'outside'. 
The most serious effects of this absolutism are at the level of political prescriptions. The 
reduction of activities to governmental 'technologies' effectively excludes any 
recognition of dialogue or of the need for discussion of the kinds of ends for which the 
technologies are employed. This is perhaps most explicit in Hunter's intervention into 
the debates around reforms to higher education. The intervention makes extensive use 
of Max Weber's argument in 'Science as a Vocation' that criteria of judgement are 
internal to particular 'disciplines of cultivation'. The argument is useful to Hunter in 
dismissing the pretensions of generalised forms of critique. But it also presents him with 
a problem: how to address the question of disputes which arise between disciplines. If 
there are no criteria which operate at this level, then the resolution of such disputes can 
only be arbitrary: 'Weber leaves (normative) political knowledge and administration 
completely beyond the expanding pale of rationality, in the domain of the irrational and 
incalculable, peopled only by false prophets and demagogues' (Hunter 1991: 46). The 
solution to the problem is to be found, for Hunter, in Foucault's work on 
governmentality, according to which the array of political technologies, discourses, 
techniques of calculation and forms of social supervision deployed by government has 
brought about a 'gradual transformation of political power into a "rational activity" in 
the Weberian sense; that is, into an activity responsible for subjecting a department of 
existence to technical control through the methodical deployment of particular 
instruments of calculation and intervention' (46-7). 
Politics, in other words, is completely given over to 'technical control'. In the context in 
which it appears, Hunter's argument functions, in effect, as an endorsement of the 
expert managerialism of economic rationalism. In his review of the argument, Frow 
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cites a description by Hunter of the bureau as 'an authentic, irreplaceable and 
irreducible technology for living' whose 'mode of existence places it beyond the 
political and moral reach of democratic control' (Frow 1992: 515). Prow agrees that this 
may not be altogether implausible as a description of the current situation; what alarms 
him, however, is that Hunter not only presents it as an 'eternal, unalterable state of 
things' but that he seems 'entirely unworried by it'. There are frequent warnings in 
Hunter's writing of the need to respect the 'fragility' of governing institutions. In 
Rethinking the School, for example, he refers darkly to sectarian violence in Northern 
Ireland and the disintegration of Yugoslavia as lessons of the costs of failing to do so 
(Hunter 1994: 157). The point cannot be taken lightly, but the logic of Hunter's position 
suggests a demand for something more than respect. No alternative is allowed to 
warring fundamentalisms except a complete subordination of political aspirations to the 
technical requirements of corporate forms of governance. The implication is clear: the 
price of security is political quietism. 
The conclusion is not unique to Hunter; it follows more generally from the way the 
'policy' arguments have worked away from earlier oppositional forms of criticism. At 
no point in their rejection of the latter have they questioned an instrumentalist view of 
public institutions as means for determining social outcomes. Bennett has aptly 
described the 'policy' position as committed to 'talking to the ideological state 
apparatuses' (Bennett 1992a: 31-33). The formulation is intended to indicate a shift 
from a hostile Althusserian view of government agencies as instruments of ruling class 
domination. But there is never any doubt, in the revision of Althusser, that these 
agencies are indeed 'apparatuses' - that they are fully reducible to an instrumental 
function of some kind. The mechanical metaphors formed at a moment of alienation 
from public institutions and associated with accusations of abstract impersonality are 
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carried over almost without modification in the Foucauldian vocabulary of 
'technologies'. However much they are dissociated from suspicions of 'manipulation', 
they continue to imply a rigorous separation between 'means' and 'ends'. Yet there is 
nowhere in the 'policy' proposals where 'ends' can be accounted for or addressed. This 
leaves the proposals unable to recognise any organisation of social activity other than 
corporate instrumentalism in which desired outcomes have somehow always already 
been 'decided'. 
The kinds of ends assumed by the 'policy' advocates are often, on the face of it, 
'progressive', but this does not compensate for the anti-democratic way in which they 
are framed. The point was made in the 'policy debate' by Meaghan Morris in criticism 
of Stuart Cunningham's Framing Culture. Although Cunningham consistently 
demonstrates a concern for access and equity in the provision of services and a 
responsiveness of cultural industries to local demands, his arguments against 'criticism' 
require these goals to be accepted as 'obvious'. As Morris puts it: 
Cunningham assumes that there are given 'progressive policy' outcomes that 
coincide with the outcomes he desires; these set the standard against which 
others can be deemed 'politically dubious'. He also accepts that critical 
activities that have no bearing on the policy process must be 'reconstructed' in 
the national interest, or else confirm their irrelevance; only policy makes the 
nation, so critics who want to be citizens must make policy (Morris 1992b: 
549). 
A similar point could be made of many of Bennett's arguments. In Culture -A 
Refonner's Science, he indicates a commitment to developing 'frameworks, customs 
and procedures ... that will prove capable of managing the complex and highly different 
forms of cultural diversity which characterise the relations between the Anglo-Celtic, 
multicultural and indigenous populations of Australia' (Bennett 1998: 104). Citing the 
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recent popular reaction against government programs in this area, he suggests that 'there 
is a good deal further still to go before an acceptance of such goals will be firmly 
secured in "mainstream" Australia'. What is never considered is that the reaction may 
have been to precisely the corporatist instrumentalism which Bennett so clearly favours 
- an instrumentalism which identifies target populations for reform according to 
programs whose aims are to be 'secured' without ever needing to be canvassed openly 
with those populations themselves. 
THE EMERGENCE OF NEC-EMPIRICISM 
If these problems are serious, they should not be taken to suggest that the 'policy' 
arguments be entirely dismissed. As foreshadowed at the beginning of the chapter, the 
issues are more complex than they seem. There is a milder side to the arguments, where 
the claim to 'modesty' begins to look genuine - a side which is best captured not by the 
metaphor of exorcism but by another proposed by Hunter: that of 'intellectual therapy' 
(Hunter 1994: 172). The stated desire for a move in cultural criticism towards 
specificity and ethical limitation needs, in itself, to be respected. But the arguments also 
go further, creating an intellectual space in which such a move can actually begin to 
occur. 
To understand how this could be so, it is necessary to recognise the full paradox of 
hyper-rationalism. If the extreme totalisation of the concept of power incurs many of the 
problems of rationalism in an exacerbated form, it is also reveals a point at which they 
begin to evaporate. However procrustean the 'policy' solutions may seem, they are, in a 
sense, benignly impotent. The attempt to account for all social activities and practices in 
terms of governmental 'technologies' eliminates any space in which the arguments 
themselves could make a difference. To 'put policy into cultural studies' would- if the 
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arguments are followed consistently - have precisely no effect: the field has always 
been completely enmeshed in government, hence always already involved in policy 
considerations. The most abstract dialectician, the most romantic aesthete, the most 
revolutionary ideologue are all, for Hunter and Bennett, agents of government, 
exercising power 'on and within the governmental sphere'. To enjoin them to adopt 
governmental functions, therefore, can only be redundant. Given their absolute 
determination by governmental technologies, such a function will always already have 
been assumed. Indeed, even if they were deliberately to reject the injunction, it would 
only confirm their inability to escape it. The one area where there may be room for 
change is, ironically, at the level of consciousness, where the agent of government 
might recover from misapprehension and come to recognise their 'true being'. 
Needless to say, the arguments are not consistent in drawing these conclusions. In 
Hunter's Rethinking the School, for example, there is a central contradiction in the 
characterisation of 'principled criticism'. Consistent with the reduction to governmental 
power, the latter sometimes appears as a mundane epiphenomenon of administrative 
programs with no independent effects: '[T]he line of critique that flowed through 
[Wilhelm von] Humboldt and [John Stuart] Mill has had no discernible impact on the 
development, organisation or reform of the modem school system' (Hunter 1994: 140). 
Here it would seem that the 'policy' arguments are, indeed, redundant; governmental 
rationality is in full command and there is nothing of substance that a criticism of 
criticism could achieve. At other times, however, criticism looms as having a potential 
for 'extremely damaging consequences' (37); it is framed as a cause for urgent concern 
in its erosion of the efforts of administrative intellectuals through 'the winds of principle 
and zealotry' (103). In order to be attributed with such destructive potential, it must also 
be attributed with some independence. Both Hunter and Bennett have, in fact, explicitly 
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drawn back at times from the claim that all capacities for reasoning are governmentally 
formed and circumscribed (Hunter 1994: 163; more ambiguously Bennett 1998: 202). 
But even in these contradictions, the arguments have had important productive effects. 
In testing rationalism to the point of destruction, they have also neutralised its 
intellectual force. The major intellectual discovery of the 'policy' arguments may, in 
fact, be no more than this: that when inflated to the point where it explains everything, 
the concept of power also explains nothing. In the vacuum thus created, it becomes 
possible to reconnect with quite a different style of thought - a style in which the scope 
of the concept was always limited in the first place. It is in this context that Bennett's 
references to Sir Henry Cole begin to appear not merely as an 'illustration' to 
theoretical arguments developed elsewhere but as a full citation of an intellectual 
influence. Similar figures appear in the work of Hunter. To stretch my argument for the 
sake of provocation, the major 'theorists' of Rethinking the School may not be Weber or 
Foucault, but David Stow and James Kay-Shuttleworth - a Glaswegian philanthropist 
and social reformer and an English civil servant and founder-member of the Manchester 
Statistical Society. There is no mistaking Hunter's enthusiasm for the work of these 
two. The battles pitched around the concept of power can be read, in many ways, as 
little more than an enabling condition for their voices to be heard. 
If the suggestion still appears implausible, it may be worth considering a recent work in 
which the tum I am identifying is more fully realised: Thomas Osborne's (1998) 
Aspects of Enlightenment- Social theory and the ethics of truth. While Osborne works 
within 'social theory' rather than cultural studies, his thinking has developed along 
similar lines to Hunter and Bennett, particularly in finding inspiration in Foucault's 
work on govemmentality. He acknowledges Hunter as one of those, along with Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, Ian Hacking and Nikolas Rose, who have 'motivated this book 
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in ways they do not know, and would probably not much like' (Osborne 1998: xv). All 
belong to an international 'community of discourse' with strongest bases in Australia 
and Britain, in which similar concepts have been developed and problems addressed. 
Osborne describes Aspects of Enlightenment as 'stimulated' by Foucault, but as 
'emphatically not a "Foucauldian" work' (1998: x). The Foucault that interests him is 
not a general theorist whose propositions might be 'applied', but a figure who provokes 
a dialogue over the ethics of intellectual work. He is not 'the subversive continental 
philosopher, the arcane prophet of transgression, the iconoclastic poststructuralist, the 
meta-theorist of power, the functionalist theorist of social control, or the gloomy 
prophet of the totally administered society', but 'a much more buttoned-up animal': 
An ethical thinker with a Kantian heritage, a good modernist rather than a 
faddish postmodernist, a rigorous and not so unconventionaJ historical 
epistemologist concerned with the 'immature' human sciences and, most 
unlikely of all, something of an Anglo-Saxon empiricist manque (Osborne 
1998: x). 
It is with the last suggestion that Osborne takes his biggest risk. The 'Anglo' themes 
which can also be found in Hunter and Bennett are no longer authorised by Foucault; 
they come to stand in their own right and even to restructure our understanding of 
Foucault himself. What Osborne proposes, in short, is nothing less than a reversal of 
dialogic positions which Yuri Lotman would lead us to expect at the point of saturation 
at the site of 'reception' in cross-cultural exchange. An 'English' intellectual style, fully 
restructured by the absorption of European philosophy and political theory, begins 
unmistakably to assert itself as a possible site of 'transmission'. 
This development is conditioned by the evaporation of a generalised concept of power. 
At a certain level, Osborne's arguments are consistent with Hunter's and Bennett's; in 
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fact, Hunter's work on the 'ethic of the aesthetic' is cited with approval. But there is 
also a significant difference. It is a difference which is most evident in his 
understanding of governmentality, which is conceptualised in terms not of power but of 
ethics: 
To talk of modem arts of government is not the same as talking, in epochal 
terms, about the characteristics of whole societies. The mentality in 
'govemmentality' is important. What is at stake are quite restricted rationalities 
or mentalities for the governing of conduct, not the structural principles of 
whole societies; there is a difference between, on the one hand, talking about 
the transformation from a form of govemmentality based on reason of State to 
one based on something like 'liberalism' and, on the other hand, talking about 
the transformation from a police State to a liberal society (Osborne 1998: 30). 
Governmentality, for Osborne, is not a positive phenomenon; it is an ethical disposition 
which has been adopted unevenly in the practice of government - a disposition to 
govern in the name of truth: 
Put schematically: to govern in a 'liberal' way - and in the highly restricted 
sense we need to give to the notion of liberalism here, which is not the sense 
that is usual in political philosophy - one had to subject the terrain over which 
one governed to apparatuses of truth, and the knowledge that this supplied 
would likewise supply the ends of government- the security, welfare and 
tranquillity of the population (Osborne 1998: 30). 
While the reference here to 'apparatuses' continues the use of mechanical metaphors, 
there can be no doubt about the implications of the position. To recognise the historical 
emergence of governmentality is not to apprehend a structural principle of social 
organisation or a new modality of power. It is only to recognise a new ethic informing 
the conduct of those involved in the specific and limited sphere of government. It 
provides no grounds whatsoever for general claims about 'relations between culture and 
power'. 
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The consequences of this shift extend well beyond the understanding of 
governmentality itself: it frees Osborne from the fundamentalism with respect to power 
which still affects the work of Hunter and Bennett. This is clear, for example, in his 
view of aesthetic discipline and the humanities academy. It is here that he is both closest 
to Hunter and at the same time furthest away. In general terms, he accepts Hunter's 
analysis of the 'ethic of the aesthetic', but drops the suggestion that it might be 
contrasted with a more positive knowledge of 'real' institutional determinants. There is 
often, in Hunter's account, a thinly veiled sarcasm which comes through, for example, 
in his description of practitioners of aesthetic discipline as 'moral notables' (Hunter 
1994: 166-8). The implication of empty posturing is also clear in Bennett's barbed 
comments on 'the endless preening of the intellectual persona that is the hallmark of 
aesthetico-moral styles of criticism' (Bennett 1998: 25). It is an implication which rests 
on an assumption that aesthetic practices can be set off against 'genuine knowledge' and 
'real effects'. These are, of course, the knowledge and effects of power. In Osborne's 
view of aesthetics, by contrast, there is no such assumption: aesthetic discipline offers 
no further grounds than governmentality for universal claims or absolute norms of 
'good conduct', but it has a rigour and integrity which cannot be dismissed as empty or 
arbitrary. 
In fact, the qualities which Hunter attributes to aesthetic discipline are not dissimilar, for 
Osborne, to those of the 'arts of government'. To govern in the name of truth is not to 
govern in the name of certainty but almost the reverse. The concept of truth which lies 
at the heart of liberal governance is, like aesthetic 'wholeness', a constantly receding 
ideal. The point at which it appears that truth has actually been reached is also the point 
at which it is most under suspicion as having been lost to dogma, calling for a renewed 
effort of sceptical enquiry. This is why liberalism places such an emphasis on 
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intellectual 'freedom': it is only when claims to truth are submitted to an unrestricted 
scrutiny that truth can be most closely approximated. As an exemplary statement, 
Osborne cites John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: 
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the 
reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently 
capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to 
correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between 
combatants fighting under hostile banners (Mill cited in Osborne 1998: 31 ). 
For such a politics, Osborne argues, 'truth is up for grabs as a question; in fact, we 
might say that what determines the concern for truth in our societies is that we do not 
know what that concern involves' (32). This is not to say that it is 'ineffable'; the ethic 
demands, on the contrary, that claims to truth have sufficient definition and 
accountability to be submitted to critical examination. It is only to say that it cannot be 
known with certainty. 
The similarities between aesthetic discipline and governmentality are captured by 
Osborne in the phrase which gives him his title: 'aspects of enlightenment'. He uses the 
word 'enlightenment' advisedly as part of an attempt to escape the terms of a polemic 
which he sees as having overshadowed work in social theory and the social sciences 
over the last twenty years - a polemic which has often been organised schematically 
around 'the Enlightenment': 
It seemed to me ... that these fields were divided by a rather unproductive 
stand-off between competing positions - foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism, realism and relativism, modernism and postmodemism, 
sensible (often German) rationalists and irresponsible (usually French) post-
structuralists and so forth - which, while generating certain lucrative amounts 
of intellectual drama, tended nevertheless to make something of a mockery of 
each other (Osborne 1998: ix). 
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At the centre of these debates - to the extent that they are debates - has been a 
disagreement over the application of reason to matters of social and political 
organisation. The polarised terms of the disagreement have tended to mean that 
enlightenment is represented only in the caricatured forms of an 'iron cage' or a 'realm 
of freedom': 
And hence the sense that today many in the human sciences are stuck in the 
blackmail of a veritable politics of enlightenment. This is a politics in the strict 
sense of the term, one structured by the friend/enemy distinction that Carl 
Schmitt held to be at the heart of all politics; a resolute logic of being either for 
or against. And hence, consequently, the anxiety of many in the social sciences 
and elsewhere who do not quite know where they should stand in relation to 
this politics (Osborne 1998: 2). 
Not to escape from this sort of binarism is, for Osborne, to remain 'perpetually trapped 
in a cycle of what is best just called immaturity, a rather childish polemicism; in a 
perpetual state of firing blanks at our enemies without ever taking responsibility for the 
difficulty of cultivating a considered- as opposed to a kneejerk - attitude to the status 
of truth and the possibilities of criticism' (6). 
In developing an alternative sense of enlightenment (firmly in the lower case), Osborne 
appeals explicitly to English empiricism. Revisiting Perry Anderson's arguments of the 
1960s, he rejects the association of empiricism with anti-intellectualism or mere 
'common sense', seeing it, rather, as a 'way of stylizing our responsibility towards the 
truth; basing itself on a form of history that is not related to ideologies of progress or of 
dogma' (Osborne 1998: 163): 
The English ethics of time, one might say, entails a kind of immanent critique 
of time itself. For the English, it might be said that the lesson of history is that 
things are contingent, that people act, that people will govern each other in 
certain ways, and that some things will go wrong, and others may never be 
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understood. Here enlightenment consists of a kind of contextualist, even 
ethnographic, attitude to time: to follow its episodes, interruptions and flows, to 
bring to bear a painstaking erudition on its circumstances (Osborne 1998: 163). 
What is important about this ethic of enlightenment, in the context of Osborne's wider 
project, is that it resists both an appeal to 'fundamental principles' and the suggestion of 
arbitrariness or pure relativity. It is neither foundationalist nor anti-foundationalist, 
neither realist (in a metaphysical sense) nor relativist, neither 'modem' nor 
'postmodem'. But nor is it merely fence-sitting. History is substituted in the place of 
metaphysics and ideology as the ultimate horizon of cognitive legitimation, producing a 
distinctive form of criticism and a distinctive model of 'intellectual personality'. 
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[T]he question for cultural studies is whether it has changed enough in 
response to ... wider social and cultural developments, or whether it has 
survived into middle-aged respectability with many of its youthful prejudices 
intact. If so, any apparent innovations that are associated with cultural studies 
as it gains a firmer foothold in academic institutions (a process most notable in 
North America), may not be so bold and radical and new after all, but merely 
the beginning of a spoilt, arrogant, pouting phase for a discipline which has 
abandoned its 1960s idealism and commitment to social change in favour of a 
belated discovery of its own 'me generation' selfishness. 
John Hartley (1992a: 16) 
The maintenance of democracy requires a practice within the public networks 
for responding to events that it was never quite designed to handle ... One has 
to experiment with relatively freely available conceptual tools and practices and 
base a democratic knowledge on these. This may involve moving beyond the 
techniques and procedures of the academy. In Antonio Gramsci' s terms, the 
academic intellectual risks becoming merely a traditional intellectual, one of 
many layers of cultural sediment, deposited and passed over by the engine of 
capital and the trajectory of the vector. One has to make organic connections 
with the leading media and cultural practices of the day. 
McKenzie Wark (1994: 20) 
Feminism has historically been concerned with the dominant nature of one 
point of view in the production and consumption of images: a male, patriarchal 
perspective. Yet, the popular feminist critique of the media has itself become a 
dominant point of view. It has become self-satisfied and lazy. It has failed to 
take account of changes in popular culture and the media more generally. It is 
out of touch with the way people consume images. 
Catharine Lumby (1997: xxv) 
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The 'policy' initiative has not been the only response in cultural studies to the 
convergence during the 1990s of government, education and media or the disappearance 
of an alternative ideological pole to state-sponsored capitalism. Nor is the generalisation 
of the category of government the only revisionist move in the field. Roughly 
concurrent with the arguments reviewed in the last chapter, there has emerged quite a 
different set of suggestions as to how cultural studies might articulate a new relevance 
for itself post-Cold War - a set of suggestions which has explored the potential, by 
contrast, of a generalisation of the category of media. While it has not gained quite the 
profile of the 'policy' initiative and has not occasioned such a focussed 'debate', it is a 
move which deserves to be recognised as no less ambitious in its claims. Certain 
emphases, and particularly a tendency to an abstract libertarianism, have led some to see 
it as little more than a reworking or extension of familiar themes. But to dismiss it on 
these grounds is to underestimate the challenge it represents. A central motivation of the 
move, as indicated by the quotations above, is a sense that established positions and 
commitments have become a liability. The proposed re-invention of cultural studies is 
as extensive as the 'policy' initiative and offers, I will argue, as important a point of 
reference for considering future options for the field. 
Like the 'policy' arguments, the initiative centred on media - an initiative which I will 
call 'media republicanism' - has developed, at least partly, in response to perceived 
problems in established uses of the concept of power. This is clear, for example, in John 
Hartley' s criticisms of the 'pouting' tendency in cultural studies - his diagnosis of the 
possible 'bad future' for the field. In Hartley's analysis, the theme of power may always 
have been unfortunate: 
In fact it might be argued that the oppositional intellectuals whose early efforts 
established the theoretical and analytical agenda for cultural studies as an 
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academic subject were interested in television's potential to manipulate the 
masses because some time in the future they hoped they'd be able to have a go 
at doing that too. What's the point of Gramsci if not to show how the 
hegemonic can be countered, and, once the strategy is determined, who's going 
to direct it if not the strategists? (Hartley 1992a: 25) 
But the problem with the concept has been exacerbated, for Hartley, by the loss of 
confidence in a coherent left-political alternative at the end of the Cold War. If 
criticisms of intellectual vanguardism might once have been waved away by attributing 
a generosity of motive ('advancing the cause of socialism' ), the possibility of such a 
defence has all but evaporated. The danger in this is that cultural studies might 
degenerate into simple resentment: 'dammit, we ought to have won - not least because 
Stuart Hall is a more congenial, inspiring and convincing political theorist than the 
"Countess of Finchley" - but we didn't, so they must've manipulated the masses' (26). 
According to such a logic, oppositional criticism becomes little more than ajustification 
of the position of the critic - at best defensive and at worst self-serving in its circular 
rationalisation of 'youthful prejudices'. 
There are obvious similarities between this criticism of criticism and those of the 
'policy' arguments. They share a frustration with the limitations imposed by general 
theories of domination and oppression. But the solution proposed by 'media 
republicanism' is quite different. Rather than claiming a more sophisticated grasp, either 
theoretical or practical, of 'relations between culture power', Hartley suggests that 
cultural studies might direct its attention to other questions entirely, returning, in fact, to 
simpler motivations which preceded the development of current theoretical paradigms. 
Revisiting an early article by Stuart Hall, he points out that cultural studies might claim 
to have its origins in such a revisionism. Defending his position against critics, Hall 
distinguishes his project from a sectarian leftism for which 'Aunty Dogma still rules the 
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roost' ( quoted in Hartley 1992a: 19). It is this kind of inspiration which Hartley wishes 
to regain: 
[A]s Stuart Hall put it in 1959, the success of cultural studies won't be 
primarily to 'arm us for the struggle against capitalism' (risking, when we get 
the theory wrong, 'scientifically constructed bent pitch-forks'); success will be 
measured against a different yardstick: 'I wrote the article', says Hall, 'because 
I wanted to know'. Me too (Hartley 1992a: 27). 
The appeal to curiosity is not as naYve as it might appear. 'Wanting to know', for 
Hartley, would align cultural studies with media audiences whose interest in television 
(or other media) is motivated not by a 'struggle against capitalism' but by pleasure, 
desire or aesthetic appreciation. The position is supported in more recent work by an 
historical argument that the public sphere is, in fact, a differentiated aspect of the 
'mediasphere'. To affirm motivations for engaging with the latter on positive terms is to 
expand the potential of democracy. 
The 'republican' resonances of the suggestion have been developed most explicitly in 
McKenzie Wark's The Virtual Republic. Following a classical distinction in political 
theory between republicanism and more formal doctrines of 'social contract', Wark 
proposes an understanding of political community as based simply on a belief that 'all 
members ... are equally entitled to have our sympathies extended to them, and from 
whom we presume a sympathy extends' (Wark 1997: 13). The idea is developed, 
ironically, with reference to Australia (formally, still a constitutional monarchy) against 
the counter-example of the United States: 
In America, I feel like I am governed by a social contract. I walk around, buy 
the new issue of the New Yorker, ride the subway, read my magazine. It is as if 
all that connected me to other people was something that kept each of us within 
a certain limit ... Americans dream of being mugged, bashed, car-jacked or 
serially killed, so Americans grudgingly pay a few taxes to keep the police up 
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to speed in an arms race with gangsters, hoodlums, thugs and punks, and to 
keep one-and-a-half million former fellow citizens in prison (Wark 1997: 10). 
Wark admits that this logic by no means captures all aspects of political life in America; 
nor does he see it as entirely absent in Australia. But he wishes to contrast it with 
'another Australia': 
The one that makes possible that strange feeling of sympathy I and many other 
Australians have for each other, as something one just sort of feels without 
thinking. It's ... the feeling offeeling together, with others, the feeling of 
belonging to a community of sense. As Larry Grossberg argues, feeling is a 
much underrated quality of what it is that cements people into the wider world. 
In both analysis and in culture itself, the affections have been relentlessly 
privatised, pushed back toward the secret worlds of romance, sex and family, 
but these are really particular instances of a structure of feeling: points from 
which to reimagine the whole of life and create new figures of speech for it 
(Wark 1997: 11). 
The national comparisons are in some ways a distraction from the general argument. It 
is no longer to the territorial space of the nation, for Wark, that we should look for the 
maintenance or development of republican virtues; it is to a 'virtual' terrain which he 
elsewhere calls 'third nature', 'the terrain created by the television, the telephone, the 
telecommunications networks crisscrossing the globe' (Wark 1994: vii). It is to the 
terrain, in short, of the media. 
Those associated with media republicanism can claim achievements in precisely the 
areas which the 'policy' advocates have tended to neglect. They have developed styles 
of writing and practices of public engagement which permit an open canvassing of the 
ends which left political projects might pursue. These styles and practices have created 
a bridge between academic and non-academic forums of debate. Among other public 
engagements, Wark and Lumby have both been regular newspaper columnists and 
Hartley has also made frequent media appearances. All three write 'out of' academic 
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genres, attempting to connect with more popular forms of public expression. Equally 
importantly, media republican themes have created a bridge between intellectual 
generations, particularly through attention to questions of pedagogy. Where the 'policy' 
advocates have tended to reduce the ambitions of teaching to a simple transferral of 
'skills', 'media republican' arguments have supported pedagogical approaches which 
aspire to involve a new generation in defining the projects or activities in relation to 
which skills are defined. 
But 'media republicanism' is perhaps an even less obvious place to look than 'policy' 
for new approaches in the use of the concept of power. The address to questions of 
power has often been seen, in fact, as a major area of weakness. Where it is not simply 
absent, it appears at best ambiguous, lacking in any serious commitment. For Greg 
Philo and David Miller, the kinds of arguments put forward by Hartley are an 
'abdication of responsibility', indicating a more general tendency for recent academic 
cultural criticism to ignore 'the corruption and abuses of power' (Philo and Miller 1998: 
47). A similar diagnosis of lack has been made even by otherwise sympathetic critics. In 
a recent review, Gay Hawkins (2000: 195) describes Hartley's Uses of Television as 'a 
book oozing with ideas and insights. A book that shows once and for all that liking 
one's object, that recognizing the circuits of desire that shape all intellectual work, is 
not a recipe for a lesser or uncritical knowledge'. Despite this, however, she feels 
compelled to enter a criticism: Hartley fails to address 'forms of subjection' which 
operate in the media. His work, in summary is 'intellectually engaging, challenging and 
profoundly useful, except on the issue of rethinking media power' (198, italics mine). 
These criticisms have a context. If there has been no 'media republicanism' debate as 
such, the initiative is shadowed by two other debates Which have dominated many 
discussions of the state of cultural studies since the late 1980s: debates around 
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'populism' and 'postmodemism'. Both have themselves developed, at least partly, 
around positions in relation to the concept of power. The 'populism debate' has been led 
by critics - often from outside cultural studies - of what is seen as a vapid celebration of 
popular 'agency', particularly of active media audiences. The theme of the 'active 
audience' is most strongly associated with arguments which have set themselves against 
a view of audiences as passive victims of ideological manipulation or 'cultural dopes'. 
A theoretical basis for such arguments was provided as early as Stuart Hall's (1973) 
'encoding/decoding' model of communication, with its recognition of 'negotiated' and 
'resistant' readings. But criticisms have been directed most strongly against later work 
in which resistance to or subversion of 'the dominant' has become the major theme. The 
figure whose work has been consistently at the centre of criticism has been John Fiske. 
Jim McGuigan, for example, identifies Fiske as representing a drift in cultural studies 
towards an 'abjectly uncritical complicity with prevailing "free market" ideology and its 
hidden powers' (McGuigan 1992: 75). McGuigan frames his critique of cultural studies 
as generally sympathetic, but in his loss of patience with certain tendencies he echoes 
many others. Populism has become a spectre haunting the field. 
The 'postmodemism debate' is more complicated, ranging across a diverse and often 
confused assortment of loosely related themes which cannot be summarised in any 
convenient form. One of the threads which has made the concept of postmodemism 
controversial, however, is its association with the idea of an epochal shift which has 
rendered traditional analyses of power irrelevant or beside the point. While the idea is 
sometimes conflated with positions characterised as 'populist', there is a clear 
distinction to be made. The suggestion is not that media audiences or other subordinate 
groups resist or subvert power; it is rather that the forms of power which they might be 
seen as resisting or subverting (or, for that matter, submitting to) are seriously weakened 
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- to the point, in some versions, of having disappeared (the work of Jean Baudrillard 
often taken to mark this extreme). Whether these forms of power have been associated 
with 'grand narratives', hermeneutic depth, the sovereignty of the nation-state or with 
the classical phase of industrial capitalism, modes of analysis which continue to oppose 
them have failed to take account of a new logic at work in the politics of culture. Much 
of the argument around postmodemism, as with the British debates around 'New Times' 
(Hall and Jacques 1989), can be attributed to the destabilising effect of this proposition 
on the critical approaches which emerged from the 1970s. 
It is clear why 'populism' and 'postmodemism' have often been confused. Their 
implications in relation to questions of power occasion similar anxieties - anxieties, 
particularly, about a loss of political seriousness. The connection was identified by 
Meaghan Morris in 'Banality in Cultural Studies'. One of the strengths of the essay is 
that Morris recognises points of convergence between positions without simply 
collapsing them into each other. As she admits at the outset, there is no obvious logic in 
reviewing the kinds of arguments associated with Fiske (in the terms above, 'populism') 
beside those of Baudrillard ('postmodemism'). She brings them together only because 
they are both sources of irritation for her about the direction of cultural studies. 'But 
irritation', she points out, 'may create relations where none need necessarily exist' 
· (Morris 1990: 14 ). During the course of the essay, such relations do indeed begin to 
emerge: 
[I]t is remarkable, given the differences between them and the crisis-ridden 
society that each in its own way addresses, that neither of the projects I've 
discussed leaves much place for an unequivocally pained, unambivalently 
discontented, or momentarily aggressive subject. It isn't just negligence. There 
is an active process going on in both of discrediting - by direct dismissal 
(Baudrillard) or covert inscription as Other (cultural studies) - the voices of 
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grumpy feminists and cranky leftists ('Frankfurt School' can do duty for both) 
(Morris 1990: 25). 
Morris understands the motivations for rejecting dogmatic tendencies in the use of the 
concept power; as I argued in Chapter 4, they are motivations which have been central 
to her own work. Her concern is that the rejection often seems to involve the 
elimination from analysis of what Michel de Certeau calls the 'polemological'. The 
basic assumption of a polemological space, for de Certeau, is summed up by a quotation 
from a Maghrebian syndicalist at Billancourt: 'They always fuck us over' (27). The 
problem, for Morris, is that while such sentiments undeniably correspond to important 
fields of experience, they have come to seem inadmissible in cultural studies: the field is 
'losing its polemological edge' (31). 
The anxiety is a common one, but it has not always been articulated so carefully. If, for 
Morris, banality is a problem to be worked through, for many it has been simply a 
charge to lay against others. The result has been an often crude polemic against 
'aestheticisation' and triviality, a polemic in which the 'polemological' is implicitly 
attributed with the status of a fundamental truth. It is a polemic which has been 
answered, predictably, by counter-charges of essentialism and authoritarianism. Like 
the 'policy debate', positions have tended to become entrenched, with argument 
degenerating into accusation and caricature. It is in this context that the 'media 
republican' initiative has been received. One of the reasons why the novelty of the 
initiative has not been widely recognised is that it has appeared in many ways to 
conform to the terms of the polemic. It has to be admitted that there is a certain amount 
in the arguments to confirm such suspicions. There is a thin line between identifying 
'pouting' tendencies in cultural studies, diagnosing the possible irrelevance of 
'traditional intellectuals' or criticising feminist analyses of the media as 'self-satisfied 
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and lazy' and generalised broadsides against 'bad Others'. At points, the arguments 
seem to require such Others in order to launch the claims being made. 
The generalisation of the category of media has, itself, a certain polemical function. 
Like the generalisation of the category of government by the 'policy' advocates, it 
eliminates any position from which the initiative might be opposed. The strategy here 
has been demonstrated most effectively by Wark, who counters criticisms of the 
manipulations or superficiality of the media by insisting that such criticisms are 
themselves internal to the media. How do we know, he asks, that the media often 
purvey distortions or lies? 'Through other media. Slower and more considered media, 
like articles in the highbrow monthlies, or earnest, truthful hour-length documentaries, 
but media all the same' (Wark 1994: 6). A similar point is made in his recent book, 
Celebrities, Culture and Cyberspace: 
Robert Hughes once wrote of Andy Warhol that 'he went after publicity with 
the single-minded voracity of a feeding bluefish'. A great line, but one that begs 
the question: what kind of fish that would make Hughes? As Catharine Lumby 
points out, the art critic has an altogether different relation to publicity and 
celebrity, but a relation to it all the same (Wark 1999: 46). 
If, for Bennett and Hunter, there is no escape from govemmentality, for Wark and 
Lumby there is no escape from publicity and celebrity. The implication is a similar 
absolutism of perspective: the media are our destiny. 
This absolutism is open to criticism as generating its own forms of dogma, but my aim 
in this chapter is to draw attention to other possibilities. Whatever the problems 
associated with a generalisation of the category of media, it has produced novel effects. 
One of these effects has been a subtle reconnection with an empiricist use of the concept 
of power, a reconnection by a different route from that of the 'policy' proponents. 
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Rather than forcing rationalism to the point of destruction, media republicanism has 
worked, in a sense, from the 'other side'. At the most obvious level - and the level for 
which it is most often criticised - the initiative appears simply to avoid the concept. 
Given that power has normally been associated most strongly with government or the 
state, the generalisation of the category of media has an opposite implication from the 
arguments of Bennett and Hunter. Modernity does not appear as an effect of 
governmental 'technologies' of power but, in Hartley' s terms, as an effect of the twin 
energies of 'freedom' and 'comfort' as articulated through the media (Hartley 1996: 1-
29). But an absolutism of media has similar inconsistencies to the absolutism of 
government. Once everything is theorised as an effect of media, nothing can be 
identified as particularly so. The concept of media itself loses any specificity of 
meaning, no longer functioning to exclude other bases of interpretation. It is within this 
space that a neo-empiricism in relation to power is able to emerge. 
My suggestion here is intended to connect with others. In a recent interview, Morris 
cites Lumby's Bad Girls as an example of a tendency she is bold enough to describe as 
'a serious post-Cold War movement in letters. Writing for a world not simply divided 
into camps, yet writing that's prepared to take sides' (Morris 1997b: 255). Of the style 
which Lumby exemplifies - journalistic and addressed to a general readership, yet 
informed by academic debates - she says: 
I like its vitality as writing. It has a direct but very tolerant mode of address. It 
has a rhetorical punch, but it doesn't scold and whine. It's 'open' in the sense 
that it isn't always telling the reader what qualifications the reader needs to be a 
good reader of the book. I don't mean academic qualifications - one of the 
great things about Bad Girls ... is that it doesn't try to make you feel stupid for 
having read a lot of books ... Which conservative populism does ... (Morris 
1997b: 253) 
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There is a gap, however, between the generosity of Morris's intuitions and her ability to 
identify how this mode of address is produced. 'In my own academic work', she admits, 
'I've been critical of some of the "active consumer" models that Lumby draws on to 
talk about advertisements' (251). How then, does Lumby escape the irritation which 
Morris has felt in the past towards 'populism'? It is this gap between intuition and 
analysis which, in the following, I will attempt to close. 
A BARD FOR THE NEW CULTURAL COMMONS 
It is useful, again, to sketch in some historical background. Like the 'policy' arguments, 
the debates outlined above have been affected by profoundly ahistorical assumptions 
about the concept of power. McGuigan, for example, finds early signs of the 'uncritical 
populism' of Fiske's later work in the idea of the 'bardic' function of television 
developed in collaboration with Hartley in Reading Television (1978). The analysis 
rests on an assumption that a generalised (rationalist) concept of power has provided a 
timeless backdrop against which positions are defined. It is only given this assumption 
that the idea of a 'bardic' function can be identified with the later themes of 'resistance' 
and 'subversion'. Yet any attention to the early work of Fiske and Hartley reveals a 
more complex and interesting history than such an identification suggests. 
Reading Television was not, in fact, informed by any general theory of power. The 
book, which became an influential text in the early development of undergraduate 
teaching programs in cultural studies, was published in Methuen's New Accents series 
edited by Terence Hawkes. In his preface as general editor, Hawkes introduces the 
series as a response to the challenges posed by rapid and radical social change to the 
'central field of what may, in general terms, be called literary studies': 
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Here, among large numbers of students at all levels of education, the erosion of 
the assumptions and presuppositions that support the literary disciplines in their 
conventional form has proved fundamental. Modes and categories inherited 
from the past no longer seem to fit the reality experienced by a new generation 
(Hawkes in Fiske and Hartley 1978: 9). 
As Graeme Turner (1996: 76-77) has suggested, a history might be written of a lesser-
known formation of British cultural studies geographically centred at Cardiff, but also 
defined by publishing associations with Methuen (later succeeded by Routledge). While 
developing independently, however, it followed a similar trajectory with respect to the 
concept of power to the more recognised currents reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. In its 
early 'Hawkesian' inspiration, it was most consistent with the projects of Williams, 
Hoggart and the 'pre-Marxist' work of Hall and the Birmingham CCCS. The New 
Accents series was conceived by Hawkes as extending the methods, approaches and 
range of objects of literary criticism: 'Each volume in the series will ... stretch rather 
than reinforce the boundaries that currently define literature and its academic study' (9). 
Fiske's and Bartley's approach to television sits squarely within this brief. They 
introduce their subject by pointing out the historical relativity of aesthetic judgement 
and the lag between cultural developments, on the one hand, and, on the other, forms of 
criticism which are able to articulate their significance: 
[l]f we are to go by some of the criticisms made about Elizabethan theatres and 
dramatists by their own contemporaries, we can see that those closest to the 
scene do not always make the best judgements. After all, Shakespeare himself 
was called an 'upstart crow' who 'supposes he is as well able to bombast out a 
blank verse as the best of you' by a fellow playwright, Robert Grene (Fiske and 
Hartley 1978: 13). 
The argument probably draws some of its inspiration from Hawkes' brilliantly 
revisionist Shakespearian scholarship which 'stretched the boundaries' in the way 
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literary texts are approached rather than by turning attention to other cultural forms 
(Hawkes 1986). 'High culture' and 'popular culture' are not set in opposition to each 
other but revealed as historically determined categories, loosening prejudices which 
might affect our understanding of that which is classified as belonging to one or other 
side. The importance of this, for Fiske and Hartley, is that it opens a space in which the 
intellectual sophistication which has been brought to the study of literature might also 
be brought to television: 'Elizabethan drama has been subjected to a great deal of 
scrutiny ... What is lacking in respect of television is this same kind of scrutiny' (Fiske 
and Hartley 1978: 14). 
The intellectual resources called upon in Reading Television are eclectic, including 
American 'mass communication' studies (quantitative content analysis and 'uses and 
gratifications' theory), semiotics, McLuhanite arguments about the specificity of 
electronic media and the structural anthropology of Edmund Leach. It is true that within 
this mix are also Marxist theories of ideology: Roland Barthes' Mythologies is an 
important reference, as is Hall's theoretical work of the mid 1970s. Fiske's and 
Hartley's political sympathies are clearly left-leaning. The central motivation for the 
development of television studies, as they see it, is that it might allow a democratisation 
of criticism: 
[T]he kind of analysis which has read Joyce and Kafka without 'reading' 
television eventually denies to the ordinary viewer the power - even the 
possibility - of recognizing for himself [sic] his own situation in all its 
complexities and contradictions ... [W]e should, as critics, learn to understand 
what it is that the language of television is saying to us (Fiske and Hartley 
1978: 19-20). 
But none of this warrants the attribution of generalised models of domination and 
resistance. Marxism functions in the text as I have argued it did in much of the work of 
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the Birmingham CCCS - not to insist on general questions of power but to moderate or 
even resist them. Structural social contradictions are, for Fiske and Hartley, so restricted 
as to warrant bracketing from consideration. Media managers and professionals, for 
example, are not distinguished by class interest from manual workers. While 'relatively 
privileged' in the premium they are able to set on their labour power, they are 
'ultimately just as dependent on selling their labour power as blue-collar workers (103). 
The practical effect of this analysis is to place television programmers, critics and 
audiences - in short, the relevant participants in the field being considered - on a plane 
where there are significant differences but no fundamental divisions. 
The idea of television as 'bardic' gains much of its sense from a belief in the possibility 
of what might be described as a 'cultural commons' - a space which is not segmented 
by structural oppositions. Television functions, for Fiske and Hartley, as 'a social ritual, 
overriding individual distinctions, in which our culture engages in order to 
communicate with its collective self' (85). The proposition is as much ethical as it is 
descriptive or theoretical. What is called for is approach to television which is routinely 
assumed in relation to literature or art - an approach which respects the creative effort 
involved and starts from a position of sympathy. As Fiske and Hartley point out, a bard 
does not simply 'represent' in a neutral sense but performs more actively as a 'mediator 
of language': 
one who composes out of the available linguistic resources of the culture a 
series of consciously structured messages which serve to communicate to the 
members of that culture a confirming, reinforcing version of themselves. The 
traditional bard rendered the central concerns of his day into verse. We must 
remember that television renders our own everyday perceptions into an equally 
specialized, but less formal, language system (Fiske and Hartley 1978: 85-6). 
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The idea of a 'bardic' function clearly does not involve a critique of television as an 
instrument of social domination, but nor does it involve a bland affirmation of 
resistance to social relations of power. The generalised concept of power assumed by 
both positions is simply absent. This does not mean that television is placed beyond 
demanding criticism, only that criticisms are directed at particular uses or instances 
rather than the medium as such. Fiske and Hartley conclude with the hope that 
audiences may become better able to 'understand and where necessary to challenge the 
role that television has hitherto established in society' (194, emphasis added). 
The 'where necessary' here is as important as the 'challenge'. The relations between 
media institutions, critics and audiences are not defined by any general form of 
opposition or conflict. Fiske and Hartley identify more specific contexts in which 
critical judgements might be made. Hence, for example, police series are reviewed in 
terms of the adequacy of their symbolic response to the changing social and economic 
conditions of Britain in the 1970s. A Man Called Ironside is read as a 'conscious 
enactment of the values of an ordered, stable, liberal-conservative society' but one 
which seeks relevance by relating its nostalgia-based values to the contemporary city 
(Fiske and Hartley 1978: 171 ). While refraining from simply condemning the series for 
its paternalism, Fiske and Hartley point out the crudeness with which it negotiates 
gender and race relations, concluding that its formula is 'under stress' (178). Moving on 
to newer series such as The Sweeney and Starsky and Hutch, they address concerns over 
their levels of violence. From the point of view of the symbolic resources of a culture, 
they argue, the problem with screen violence is not violence itself but its frequent 
association with easy narrative resolutions: 'Television violence too often disposes of 
really intractable sources of social tension, dislocation or conflict with a neat, bloodless 
hole in the villain's heart' (180). More extended sequences of violence may, in fact, be 
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an improvement, allowing space for greater complexity. The 'prolonged and nasty 
fights' of The Sweeney, for example, suggest 'that the old answers will not serve, that 
problems and conflicts can still be solved, but at greater risk, with greater suffering, and 
with less confidence in the outcome' (180). 
To revisit Reading Television is to throw a different light on Fiske's and Hartley's later, 
independently authored, writing. There is no doubt that a generalised concept of power 
comes, in both cases, to affect their work. It is most evident in the figure of 'white 
patriarchal bourgeois capitalism' which appears as a framing assumption of Fiske's 
Reading the Popular (1989a) and Understanding Popular Culture (1989b ). But even 
here, it is not clear how much of a shift from earlier positions this figure represents. Its 
very excessiveness makes it difficult to take seriously. In fact, much of the criticism of 
Fiske has been directed not so much at his affirmation of popular 'agency' as at a 
general lack of gravity in his use of the concept of power. McGuigan is offended as 
much by the hyperbolic proportions of 'white patriarchal bourgeois capitalism' - an 
'empty rhetorical hybrid' with 'no real analytic function' (McGuigan 1992: 72) - as he 
is by the claims of popular resistance and subversion. His criticisms here extend to 
Fiske's lack of respect for the integrity of theoretical positions: 'He recruits several not 
entirely compatible theoretical authorities (Bakhtin, Barthes, Bourdieu, de Certeau, 
Foucault, Gramsci, Hall, to mention a few). They are raided and sanitised ... He is 
essentially a good populariser of difficult ideas and a bowdleriser of their subversive 
implications, not by any means an original thinker' (72-74). 
The problem with this assessment is that it associates 'original thought' exclusively 
with theoretical innovation within the terms allowed by a rationalist concept of power. 
McGuigan admits that Fiske's observations on popular culture are 'often quite acute' 
(McGuigan 1992: 71 ), but sees this as merely incidental. Any arguments which are not 
302 
'Citizens of Media' 
connected with general theoretical positions on power are effectively dismissed. The 
tendency is not unique to McGuigan. Even Morris's analysis shows a certain 
insensitivity to other possibilities. The style of cultural studies exemplified by Fiske is, 
she argues, 
an apologetic 'yes, but ... ' discourse that most often proceeds from admitting 
class, racial, and sexual oppressions to finding the inevitable saving grace ... 
And in practice the 'but ... ' - that is to say, the argumentative rhetoric - has 
been increasingly addressing not the hegemonic force of the 'dominant classes' 
but other critical theories (vulgar feminism, the Frankfurt School) inscribed as 
misunderstanding popular culture (Morris 1990: 25-26). 
The criticism here of simplistic characterisations of 'other critical theories' is probably 
more than justified, but there is also a volatile counter-charge. A 'yes, but ... ' discourse 
is clearly, for Morris, an evasive discourse - one which fails adequately to address 
'class, racial, and sexual oppressions'. Despite her efforts to avoid accusations, the 
analysis carries suggestions of political irresponsibility. The association between 
concern for the social bases of suffering and a generalised concept of power leaves little 
space for the recognition of a 'serious' address to the former which conceives them as 
particular. 
To clarify here, there are two quite different ways in which the debate over 'populism' 
might be read. The first, and by far the most common, is to assume that the debate is 
internal to the field of options determined by a rationalist concept of power. The 
question, in this case, is the degree to which consumers, media audiences or socially 
subordinate groups are able to exercise 'agency' over and against capital, the state or 
institutionalised forms of domination. This is the understanding of both McGuigan and 
Morris, and within its terms, their arguments are clearly compelling: in a world shaped 
by global movements of capital and corporate structures of governance, 
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uncompromising claims for popular agency appear implausible, if not absurd. The 
second way of reading the debate, however, is to see a rationalist concept of power not 
as a premise but as what is at issue. The question, in this case, is whether any general 
theory of power is to be taken seriously, whatever its qualifications and subtleties. The 
claim that the activities and practices of consumers, media audiences or socially 
subordinate groups are not determined by power would be a claim that they cannot be 
understood in relation to power, in a generalised sense, at all. My suggestion is not that 
the latter proposition has ever been made in quite such a pure form. It is rather that the 
second way of reading the issues has always been somewhere in play, complicating and 
confusing what is at stake. 
WAITING FOR GODARD 
There are good reasons why a scepticism towards a rationalist use of the concept of 
power should only appear in a refracted form. As I have argued in previous chapters, 
rationalism has not been simply a theoretical proposition; it has articulated profoundly 
felt historical experiences - experiences which those 'on the left' of Fiske's and 
Hartley' s generation have been unavoidably confronted with, if not caught up in 
themselves. The work of both has been particularly affected by feminism. Reading 
Television was published in the same year as the Birmingham Centre's Women Take 
Issue but remains, in many ways, within an earlier moment. While the book addresses 
gender relations (as in the analysis of A Man Called Ironside), its use of the universal 
masculine pronoun marks it strikingly as 'pre-feminist'. Much of Fiske's and Hartley' s 
subsequent work can be read as an attempt to recognise and come to terms with the 
implications of feminist arguments - or, more specifically, of a 'totalist' use of the 
concept of power. It seems more than an accident, in this context, that Fiske has sought 
authority for an emphasis on agency from revisionist moves within feminism, or that a 
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key example in his arguments of the mid 1980s was the identification by young women 
with Madonna (Fiske 1989a: 95-132). But in sketching the background for 'media 
republicanism' I will trace the somewhat different course taken by Hartley. 
There is a moment in Hartley's writing in which he does appear 'serious' about power-
the moment of Understanding News (1982). The subject matter of the book suggests, in 
itself, an engagement with politics proper; among the illustrations discussed are news 
items covering industrial disputes, the conflict in Northern Ireland and a siege of the 
Iranian Embassy in London, all set within the highly-charged context of the first 
Thatcher government. Television stills of pitched battles between demonstrators and 
police during a visit by Mrs Thatcher to South Wales are metonymic of themes which 
run throughout the text. Any sense of a 'cultural commons' is substantially weakened; 
media programmers, critics and audiences are placed on a plane of contradictions in 
which interests are structurally opposed. Meaning itself is reconceived by Hartley as a 
terrain of 'struggle': 
[S]igns don't command 'general acceptance' in privileged isolation from the 
contending forces which exist in any society. People struggle over what they 
should signify ... When [for example] 'he' is used to denote not a male person 
but any person (male or female), it is aiding and abetting the patriarchal 
discourse which proposes male as the norm and female as secondary, derived, 
or just plain invisible (Hartley 1982: 23). 
The argument lends itself to systematic theoretical exposition. Chapter titles and 
subheadings are indicative: 'News as communication', 'Socially structured discourse', 
'News and society', 'Relative autonomy and ideology'. The concept of ideology 
provides a consistent organising framework and Hartley's citations situate him squarely 
within a broader theoretical project - a project which aims to 'demystify social 
meanings as part of the effort towards more equal relations between people' (10). 
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The shift from Reading Television cannot be attributed entirely to external 
developments. There is also a logic internal to Hartley's own arguments. An important 
component of the early case for considering popular media in similar terms to literary 
texts was an appeal to Saussurean semiotics, the key proposition being the 'arbitrariness 
of the sign'. The proposition makes it possible to strip away assumptions of the 
'obviousness' of media: if signs are arbitrary, then meaning is made; if it is made, then 
it is possible to consider it in its creative aspect. The argument is enhanced in the case 
of television by the obvious manipulability of the medium and its capacity for 
simulation. But the proposition of arbitrariness has a consequence which has rarely been 
recognised as such: it implies a categorical opposition between the arbitrary and the 
fixed. The sense in which signs are 'arbitrary' within semiotic theory is not a relative 
one. The point is not to dismiss local or historical reasons, such as the simple existence 
of a communal habit, for using words of images in particular ways. It is rather that there 
is no reason beyond such contingencies. This absolute conception of arbitrariness 
implies an equally absolute conception of determination or fixity: meaning could only 
be recognised as other than arbitrary if it were somehow divinely guaranteed. 
Hartley's adoption of the principle of arbitrariness has involved him in problems which 
have consumed the theoretical end of cultural studies since at least the late 1970s, 
problems which surface particularly in Tele-ology (1992b), his collection of essays on 
television from the 1980s. The most intractable of these has been a dilemma between 
'textualism' and 'realism'. Both options are, in their own way, unattractive. The first 
('textualism') is to accept the full implications of the arbitrariness of the sign and open 
oneself to the charge of relativism: the meaning of cultural phenomena is regarded, in 
this case, as completely indeterminate and infinitely open to interpretation. The second 
option ('realism') is to suggest some kind of determination - a 'reality' which limits the 
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play of signification or fixes meaning. The problem here is that given the absolute 
conception of fixity, such a suggestion can only appear as a form of fundamentalism. 
Hartley himself likens the dilemma to being forced to perform acrobatics between two 
diverging ice floes: 
The position adopted is precarious - an uneasy balancing act with one foot on a 
floe called reality and one on a floe called discourse, with nothing more to 
connect them than the muscular energy of the analyst, whose intervention is 
always jeopardized by the fact that the two floes are always drifting apart as 
well as touching. Preoccupied with keeping one's feet together in conditions 
where any observer can see that sooner or later there's going to be a nasty 
accident is the occupational hazard of the intervention analyst (Hartley 1992b: 
8). 
In Tele-ology, Hartley does rely largely on 'muscular energy' (a vigorous style), but he 
has also been involved in more systematic attempts at bridge-building. This is the 
context for the use of the concept of power in Understanding News; it provides the 
connection between 'text' and 'reality'. Even in Tele-ology, where he has clearly 
become impatient with theoretical options, he describes his approach as 'socio-textual': 
'the object of study is the text in its social setting - institutional, historical, political, 
economic and personal. The most fundamental concern that the analyst has to confront 
when constructing such an object of study is the question of textual power' (Hartley 
1992b: 15). The sense required of the concept here is a highly generalised one - that of 
a mediator between two abstract theoretical categories. 
Within the terms of theoretical debates, Hartley has tended towards 'textualism'. His 
work of the 1980s is perhaps best known for a strong anti-realism with respect to media 
audiences - an argument that audiences are 'invisible fictions' produced by institutions 
(media organisations, universities, governments) for their own rhetorical purposes: 
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Audiences may be imagined empirically, theoretically or politically, but in all 
cases the product is a fiction that serves the need of the imagining institution. In 
no case is the audience 'real', or external to its discursive construction. There is 
no 'actual' audience that lies beyond its production as a category, which is 
merely to say that audiences are only ever encountered per se as 
representations (Hartley 1992b: 105). 
The form of the argument clearly marks Hartley as a partisan of the 'textualist' cause. It 
is borrowed to some extent from Edward Said' s Orientalism and follows the latter in 
associating realism with fundamentalist desires for control over others. Like the 
populations of colonised territories, Hartley argues, television audiences are 
'disorganized communities which have never developed or won adequate means of self-
representation, and which exist wholly within the imagination or rhetoric of those who 
speak on their behalf' (105). The position is highly recognisable in its hostility to claims 
over the 'real'. 
There is a question, however, whether Hartley has ever fully remade himself as a 
general theorist. At the theoretical level, his arguments have appeared contradictory, 
sometimes almost wilfully so. Hence, the textualist argument of 'Invisible fictions' is 
followed in Tele-ology by 'The real world of audiences'. The title is not entirely ironic; 
the essay takes issue with the more systematic anti-realism of Martin Allor for whom 
'the audience exists nowhere; it inhabits no real space, only positions within ... 
discourses' (Allor in Hartley 1992b: 119). Notwithstanding the similarity of this 
position to his own, Hartley finds it disturbing: 'What struck me about this was not the 
conceptualization of the audience as existing only within discourse ... but the 
presumption that discourse is "nowhere", "no real space"; that is, not real at all, or 
opposed to "the" real' (119). In countering this implication he appeals to the philosophy 
of science of Karl Popper, whose position is underpinned by a belief that questions of 
meaning can be addressed with reference to an objective external world. The contrast 
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with his use elsewhere of semiotics and post-structuralism is odd to say the least. But 
the inconsistency is not atypical. There are contradictions even within the argument of 
'Invisible fictions'. Hartley rejects the realist truth claims of others only to make his 
own. 'Audiences', he tells us, 'treat television shows not as scarce commodities but as 
public utilities for which they are not prepared to pay' (115). Like the suggestion that 
audiences should be left to represent themselves, the claim assumes a 'real' audience in 
precisely the sense which has been dismissed. 
It would be possible, of course, to conclude from this, as McGuigan does of Fiske, that 
Hartley's work is simply confused or 'unoriginal'. But to do so would be, again, to 
ignore the possibility that arguments may be pitched at another level than general 
theory. Hartley's reasons, in Tele-ology, for engaging with arguments between 
'textualism' and 'realism' are not so much a systematic commitment to either as a 
frustration with the entire debate: 
An astonishing aspect of media studies, especially television criticism, is the 
extent to which it ignores what's on television. Neither film nor literary studies 
are quite as emancipated from the quotidian products of their media as is TV 
criticism. And both literary and cinematic critics sometimes intervene directly 
in their media to make contributions in the form of fiction and films, even 
occasionally using the medium to criticize or analyse itself. Television studies, 
in comparison, is still waiting for Godard (Hartley 1992b: 123-4 ). 
Any question of what makes good television is, for Hartley, lost in disputes over the 
metaphysical status of meaning: 'Such terms as "best", "worst", "taste", 
"enlightenment", "appreciation" ... belong, of course, to the ideologically unsound 
branches of evaluative literary criticism that "we" as a discipline have learnt not to 
touch with a barge-pole in these postmodemist days' (125). It is the loss in this 
development that he is troubled by: 
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[P]erhaps we've gone much too far in the opposite direction, covering 
evaluative judgements in the cloak of disciplinary truths, scientific methods, 
philosophical niceties. And perhaps we dodge the issue of what we mean by 
quality by wandering off into aimless discussion of reality (Hartley 1992b: 
125). 
The question which Hartley wishes to recover here is, in fact, the question of Reading 
Television: How might cultural criticism develop the resources for discussing the 
quality of media and popular culture without reducing judgement simply to a matter of 
personal taste? Again, the project implied is an ethical more than a descriptive or 
theoretical one, a project of bringing definition not to what cultural phenomena are or 
have been so much as to what we might want them to be. As such, it has no necessary 
relation either to the debate between 'textualism' and 'realism' or to general theories of 
power. 
What this suggests is that the basis for Hartley's recent positions may be neither 
'populism' nor 'postmodernism' but the ongoing attempt to develop an ethics of 
criticism in relation to media and popular culture. This project has, in fact, been 
remarkably consistent. At a certain point, it seemed compatible with the use of 
generalised concepts of power. The criticisms in Reading Television of the paternalism 
of A Man Called Ironside are clearly located within the ethics of criticism; they are 
concerned with questions of quality. But Fiske and Hartley define quality in terms of the 
adequacy with which the program deals symbolically with 'social tension, dislocation 
and conflict'. These are exactly the kinds of themes which have often been gathered up 
in the concept of power. Even in Understanding News, where the concept is fully 
adopted and made to perform a more theoretical function, it also articulates responses to 
specific historical circumstances. A concern for the quality of popular media in Britain 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s could hardly have avoided an engagement with 
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the theme of power. To have ignored the volatile political confrontations around 
Thatcherism or the demands of feminism would have been to opt for something similar 
in criticism to the paternalism of Ironside. These confrontations and demands were 
widely articulated through the concept of power. 
But Hartley' s project and the use of the concept of power have increasingly diverged. 
What has changed, from the perspective I am suggesting, is not so much Hartley as the 
concept of power. His unease with the concept has developed for similar reasons to the 
ones I identified in relation to feminism in Chapter 4: the emergence of an assumption 
that it corresponds to a universal or quasi-universal phenomenon. It is probably 
impossible to locate precisely where this occurs. In Understanding News, for example, 
the abstraction is only partially realised; the text can be read 'backwards' to the 
concerns around quality of Reading Television or 'forwards' towards general theoretical 
debates between realism and textualism. The overall tendency, however, has been an 
increasing inconsistency between the concept of power and the earlier ethics of 
criticism. The definition of quality in Reading Television requires a historical sense: 
'good television' is that which effectively negotiates change, meeting the challenge of 
new circumstances by offering to audiences 'confirming and reinforcing versions of 
themselves'. Such a definition cannot be applied if the object of criticism is construed in 
universalist terms. Judgement, in the latter case, can only take a categorical form 
involving claims to a more general theoretical 'correctness'. It is this tendency which, in 
his recent work, Hartley has sought to resist. 
The background to 'media republicanism' would not be complete, however, without 
also recognising its generational dimension. While Hartley has followed the entire 
trajectory outlined above, others involved in the initiative have joined debates more 
recently. More than this, though, the initiative has acquired specific generational 
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associations. It is not difficult to see, from my argument here and in Chapter 4, why this 
might be so. Many who have come to cultural studies since the mid 1980s have 
encountered the concept of power only in its 'hardened' universalist form - often in 
pedagogical contexts where it has not appeared open to question. While the problems 
with the concept have been as evident to these entrants to the field as to those involved 
in its introduction and development, the concept itself has also been relatively detached 
from the experiences which motivated its introduction in the first place. It has become, 
as a result, a sensitive point of generational differentiation. Like a number of other 
attempts to displace its centrality, 'media republican' arguments have figured in 
attempts to define possible directions for what Henry Jenkins, Tara McPherson and Jane 
Shattuc (1999) have called 'the next generation'. 
Lumby's Bad Girls is a good example. The book takes issue with critical positions of an 
older generation of feminists on advertising, pornography and popular media. Like 
Hartley, Lumby is concerned at the way generalised positions on power block 
sympathetic critical discussion of popular cultural forms. She opens, in fact, by echoing 
Hartley's astonishment at the extent to which 'TV criticism ignores what's on 
television', asking how prominent Australian feminist Jocelynne Scutt can know that 
television purveys degrading images of women when she claims not to own a television 
set. Lumby resists a crude generationalism: 'The enticing sound of sharp generational 
sword play is all good box-office stuff, but any scrutiny of contemporary feminist 
debate show that issues don't unpack neatly along generational or even political lines' 
(Lumby 1997: xviii). But she clearly wishes to open a space in which a younger 
generation of women might engage in a more subtle and informed criticism of what she 
describes as 'the contradictory, constantly shifting nature of contemporary mass-media 
imagery' (xxiii). To do so requires a revisionism in relation to power. 
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'WE NO LONGER HAVE ROOTS ... ' 
As in the case of the 'policy' initiative, the reservations of the 'media republican' 
proponents about the condition of cultural studies are quite widely shared. What 
distinguishes the initiative is, again, the radicalism of the proposed solution. It is a 
solution, however, which is almost diametrically opposed to that suggested by Bennett 
and Hunter. Rather than attempting a comprehensive reduction of social and cultural 
phenomena to the effects of power, the generalisation of the category of media 
effectively displaces the concept, at least in its rationalist sense. 
As Wark pointed out in his response to the 'policy' arguments, Bennett has attempted to 
solve the conundrums of 'textualism' and 'realism' by subsuming the 'textual' within 
the 'real', fully accounting for 'textual' phenomena in terms of government, policy and 
power: 
If post-structuralism dissolves the boundary of the literary 'outwards', licensing 
the application of the techniques of literary criticism to any and every text, then 
Bennett does the reverse. Rather than broaden the playful indeterminacy of the 
techniques of literary criticism out to other texts, Bennett wants to collapse the 
space of criticism in on itself. Into the space of literature he brings the less 
indeterminate, more 'closed' readings of the past and present offered by history 
and sociology (Wark 1992: 679). 
It is clear from this why the 'policy' proponents have been able to make commanding 
claims over the use of the concept of power. The concept has been strongly associated 
in theoretical debates with the side of the 'real', figuring consistently as resolutely 
opposed to 'playful indeterminacy'. The elimination of the latter (or its retheorisation as 
a marginal 'effect') appears, in this context, to remove a distraction from the sober 
analysis of power. 
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The 'media republican' strategy has been to collapse the boundaries of 'text' and 
'reality' in the opposite direction - in the direction, that is, which Wark identifies with 
post-structuralism. The only qualification is that the category of 'text' is either redefined 
or substituted with 'media'. Wark, in particular, is careful to avoid any association with 
the literary provenance of the term. In a deft manoeuvre in the essay cited above, he 
draws the boundaries so that literature becomes identified with the 'policy' proponents. 
Invoking a Deleuzo-Guattarian opposition between 'trees' and 'networks' or 'roots' and 
'rhizomes', he places literature on the side classically designated as the 'real': 
We all have a touch too much arboreophilia in us. In a world of electronic 
networks and archives, we love the old dead trees of knowledge and culture, 
those broad arbors that shelter and nurture the traditional intellectual ... When 
Gramsci coined this term, he had in mind the church in prewar Italy. He saw 
this as a layer of 'cultural sediment' in the social formation ... cemented there 
by institutional means long after its useful life had expired. Is this true of 
literature too? (Wark 1992: 683) 
It is Bennett, in this account, who appears as aligned with literary culture, despite his 
efforts to escape it. His attachment to institutional solidity associates him with 
'cementedness' and 'cultural sediment': 'perhaps his mode of thinking is still too tied to 
the literary' (683). 
But if Bennett and Wark both attempt to disown literature, the symmetrical opposition 
of their positions is otherwise almost complete. Wark's version of 'media 
republicanism' has a distinctly 'postmodem' inflection. The world has changed, he 
argues, in a way which makes traditional analysis of the institutions and politics of the 
classical public sphere inadequate, or at least seriously incomplete. As he puts it, in 
what has become a signature aphorism: 'We no longer have roots, we have aerials'. The 
proposition is elaborated at greatest length in Virtual Geography through the concept of 
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the 'vector'. In its most general sense, borrowed from Paul Virilio (1983; 1986), a 
vector is 'any trajectory along which bodies, information, or warheads can potentially 
pass' (Wark 1994: 11 ). But it is the media vector which Wark sees as particularly 
significant: 
The whole thing about the media vector is that its tendency is toward 
implicating the entire globe. Its historic tendency is toward making any and 
every point a possible point of connection - everyone and everything is a 
potential object and/or subject of a mediated relation realized instantly ... There 
is no safe haven from which to observe, unaffected. Nor is there a synoptic 
vantage point, above and beyond the whole process, for looking on in a 
detached and studious manner. We are all, always, already- there (Wark 1994: 
15). 
Wark does not deny a space for the continued analysis of territorial forms and relations, 
but rejects suggestions that the latter are in any way 'fundamental'. In writing of the 
1990 Gulf War, for example, he is prepared to endorse critiques of the Orientalist 
presumptions of the West (after Edward Said) or the imperial designs of the American 
state (after Noam Chomsky). He argues, however, that the fields considered by these 
analyses, as well as the analyses themselves, are now profoundly implicated in, and 
therefore conditioned by, the 'matrix of vectors' of the media: 'If radical scholarship 
formerly went to the root of the problems of method and material, now it must tune in to 
the frequencies of everyday life upon which the vector reshapes everyday life and its 
scholarly accomplices' (xi). 
Hartley's arguments are a little different but have similar implications. They rely more 
on a reinterpretation of modernity than the identification of a shift to postmodemity. In 
fact, the characteristics often seen as postmodem - particularly the absorption of the 
public sphere by the media - have been, for Hartley, at the centre of modernity: 'the 
"postmodem" public sphere (the mediasphere) [is] ... a product of ... a history which 
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goes back further than the familiar "nowist" rhetoric of postmodemity might suggest' 
(Hartley 1996: 25). In Popular Reality, he argues specifically that the modem public 
sphere was a product of journalism. 'The public' appeared first as a reading public, 
only then becoming thinkable in any other sense: 
[R]eading publics, and indeed the very idea of the public in the first place, are 
products of theory, journalism and literature, and were literally brought into 
being - out on to the streets, acting as the public - by the press ... The public of 
modernity is coterminous with the readership of the media, and the 
contemporary media developed as a means to call certain kinds of public into 
being (Hartley 1996: 53-54). 
The case is made with particular reference to the 'big bang' of the French Revolution, 
'the most decisive political development of modernity' (2). Hartley traces the 
background of the revolution in radical pamphleteering, an 'electric fire' which made it 
possible for the Parisian masses to realise their 'democratic equivalence'. The 
conclusion he wishes to draw is clear: 'Journalism stands not as a derivative 
commentator on events decided elsewhere in the public sphere, but as a producer and 
shaper of those events; and it is not just a distributor of social narrative and political 
imagery for an audience of private consumers, but the sine qua non ("without that, 
nothing") of complex democratic modernity' (83). 
Again, the concept of power is not entirely rejected here, but is very significantly 
sidelined. The crucial point, perhaps, is that it is not required to mediate between 'text' 
and 'reality': there are no longer two categories to mediate. As a consequence, it no 
longer structures analysis in the way that is expected particularly from theories of 
ideology, appearing instead as relatively incidental. This is one of the most striking and 
provocative suggestions of the media republican arguments. Hence, for example, Wark 
is able to write casually in Virtual Geography of problems in the management of public 
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narratives of global media events which 'mere power' cannot meet (Wark 1994: 142). A 
similar sense of the relative unimportance of power pervades Lumby's Bad Girls. The 
continued existence of patriarchal institutions and attitudes is not denied; they are 
simply regarded as limited in reach and significance: 'The sheer proliferation of images 
has eroded the moral authority of any one social order- patriarchal or otherwise' 
(Lumby 1997: xxiv). 
This marginalisation of the concept of power opens a space for other concepts to be 
brought forward. In the second half of Popular Reality, Hartley uses this space to offer 
unabashedly appreciative readings of what he describes, at one point, as the 'art' of 
contemporary popular culture and communications media (Hartley 1996: 164). The 
extended use of the term is borrowed, significantly, from Terence Hawkes, indicating a 
reconnection with the early inspiration of 'Cardiff' cultural studies and the project of 
Reading Television. A striking example is a reading of a special issue of French Vogue 
featuring Nelson Mandela immediately prior to his election as President of South 
Africa. The text could hardly suit Hartley's purposes more perfectly. It plays explicitly 
with allusions to the French Revolution, allowing him to capitalise on his arguments 
about the origins of political modernity. As an up-market French style magazine, it is 
closely identified with 'art' in even the most restricted sense. Yet it was also available 
with accessible English translations on ordinary news-stands, taking its place as 'just 
another consumer item beside the groceries' (130). Finally, Mandela's presence, not 
only as subject but also as joint author, makes it unquestionably 'political'. 
The last point allows Hartley to launch a direct provocation. Reversing the displacement 
of aesthetic judgement by theories of power, he suggests that the nature of 'postmodern 
political journalism' requires the opposite: 
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Here ... is some of the topography of the mediasphere which takes as its 
opening theme not the logic of critique but the beauty of Nelson Mandela. It is 
as much about style (as befits Vogue), as about politics. But still it is about 
politics, since the issue is given over to a man who was seeking election to head 
a government; a man who, like the rest of his people, had never been allowed to 
vote in an election himself, and who had only recently been set free from 27 
years in gaol for treason (Hartley 1996: 128). 
The onus of proof is thrown back to those who would want to analyse politics in more 
classical 'realist' terms. Although wealthy Western readers of Vogue may not face the 
practical imperatives of voters in South Africa itself, it would be difficult to deny that 
'this is still powerful politics, providing post-national identifications to readerships 
whose allegiances are no longer defined by their territoriality' (130). The concepts of 
beauty and style are substituted in place of the concept of power. 
Similar substitutions are made by Wark. Virtual Geography might be read as an 
impressive 'space clearing' exercise. The book meets general theories of power on their 
own terms, demonstrating a breadth of theoretical reference and a confidence in 
engaging with the political in the strictest sense. The case studies chosen are indicative: 
the Gulf War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the student demonstrations and government 
crackdown in Tiananmen Square and the political management of the 1987 stock 
market crash. Yet Wark also builds a convincing case that such events cannot be fully 
explained in terms of a structural analysis of power relations. The 'vector fields' 
constructed by capital or the state appear quite palpably to escape any purpose for 
which they may have been designed: 'information wriggles loose, and bites the 
powerful hand that fed it' (Wark 1994: 181). 
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In his following book, The Virtual Republic, Wark takes up the license which this 
argument allows. In terms which resonate with Hartley' s arguments about the 'art' of 
popular media, he suggests that a social institution might be defined as 
something that extends partial sympathies ... a positive means of artificially 
extending and integrating the kinds of creative and productive ingenuity of our 
particular little sympathetic worlds - to enable us to fly. In place of plain 
stealing, the conventions of property; in place of violence, a common world of 
conversation (Wark 1997: 13). 
The displacement of the concept of power opens the way, again, for relations to be 
conceived in other terms. Much of the remainder of Wark' s book is an attempt to 
develop a basis for more generous forms of public debate to replace the hardened 
political oppositions left over from the Cold War. There are clear similarities, too, to 
Lumby's Bad Girls, which attempts to move debates about sexual representations into a 
space in which structural oppositions of interest are not presumed. 
'THAT WHICH EXCEEDS AND ESCAPES .•. ' 
It has to be admitted that there are certain costs associated with these arguments, costs 
which are significant as they limit the ability of 'media republicanism' to extricate itself 
from the problems it attempts to address. If the initiative displaces a rationalist concept 
of power, it nevertheless remains substantially affected by it. As the concept is not 
addressed in a more substantial way, it remains always in danger of reappearing. The 
result is that Hartley, Wark and Lumby sometimes appear unable to move on from 
polemical opposition to the kinds of positions they wish to leave behind. 
In a mirror reflection of the 'policy' arguments, 'media republicanism' tends towards its 
own form of hyper-rationalism - not, in this case, a hyper-rationalism of power but 
something closer to a hyper-rationalism of desire. The point might best be made 
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perhaps by comparing the initiative with a full theoretical elaboration of the latter-
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. The 
comparison is not an entirely arbitrary one. Wark describes his project in Virtual 
Geography as a 'rewriting of the Deleuzo-Guattarian negative historicism of 
deterritorialization' in terms of his own experience 'to map the difference between my 
experience and theirs' (Wark 1994: 224). There is no evidence in Hartley's work that he 
has been influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, but there are surprising parallels between 
many of his arguments and theirs. The comparison is useful, at least, in highlighting the 
implications of certain kinds of moves. 
Deleuze and Guattari do for the concept of desire what Foucault does for the concept of 
power. Both attempt to overcome totalising theoretical tendencies by suggesting that 
there is no single form of the phenomenon to which the concept in each case refers. If, 
for Foucault, there are multiple forms of power, there are, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
multiple forms of desire. The position is developed in response to the restrictiveness of 
psychoanalytic theories for which desire is invariably organised around 'lack': 
Unlike psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic competence (which confines every 
desire and statement to a genetic axis or overcoding structure, and makes 
infinite, monotonous tracings of the stages on that axis or the constituents of 
that structure), schizoanalysis [Deleuze and Guattari's proposed alternative] 
rejects any idea of a pretraced destiny, whatever name is given to it (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 13). 
There is no doubt that the pluralisation of forms or trajectories of desire avoids a certain 
kind of reductionism - a reductionism common within French intellectual debates of the 
1960s and 1970s. But as in the case of Foucault's proliferation of modes of operation of 
power, it also entrenches the universalising force of the concept. To use the distinctions 
I borrowed from Foucault himself in Chapter 1, the theme of desire is not taken to be 
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one which has 'built up at a certain moment during history'; it is presented as a 
'universal necessity of human existence'. The greater the variation allowed within 
desire, in fact, the more it assumes the status of a basic substrate of human existence. 
The concept of desire does not have quite this theoretical function in the 'media 
republican' arguments, but the possibility is never far away. Given the way the 
arguments have emerged from the stand-off between 'realism' and 'textualism', the 
category of media has inevitable associations with desire. In Hartley' s case, these 
associations can be traced back to the appeal to semiotics and the principle of the 
arbitrariness of the sign. In the conclusion to Understanding News, he follows Roland 
Barthes in identifying the recognition of such arbitrariness withjouissance. In contrast 
to mere contentment (plaisir), he explains, 'jouissance describes a more explosive kind 
of joy-in French the word is synonymous with sexual pleasure' (Hartley 1982: 191). It 
is this 'active kind of intercourse' which he wishes to inspire in readers by drawing their 
attention to the textuality of news. The association has persisted into his recent work 
where the 'textualisation' of the public domain is closely identified with its 
sexualisation. In the Virtual Republic, Wark directly equates his concept of the 'virtual' 
with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desire, glossing both as 'that which exceeds and 
escapes naming and classifying, ordering and dominating' (Wark 1997: 184). There are 
similar associations in Lumby's Bad Girls between popular media and liberating sexual 
release. 
The incipient formation of an abstract metaphysics of desire produces a similar 
tendency to dogmatism in the 'media republican' arguments as does the metaphysics of 
power of the 'policy' proponents. There is often an air of certainty in the arguments 
which is compounded, again, by the requirement that nothing be permitted to escape 
explanation in terms of the favoured category. It is not, of course, that the 'media 
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republicans' know in advance what form desire will take. In the case of Wark and 
Lumby, particularly, there is an insistent emphasis on its 'multiplicity' and 'fluidity'. It 
is rather that they know in advance that everything is traceable to some form of desire. 
Hence, for example, Wark detects a lie in any suggestion that the motivations for 
participation in the formal institutions of the classical public sphere are significantly 
different from participation in the worlds of media publicity and celebrity: 
Of course people with a strong desire for policy and politics would like to think 
these are more worthy desires than other kinds, and that the machinery that 
propagates them is somehow more rational than that which propagates other 
kinds of desires ... But let's be honest: pop stars, celebrity skin and fashion 
spreads get some people hard and wet, but a good policy document is what it 
takes to light some people's fire (Wark 1999: 259). 
This goes much further than countering prejudices against popular cultural forms. 
'Policy and politics' are forced into an abstract equivalence with 'pop stars, celebrity 
skin and fashion' by their common reduction to sexual stimulus. 
There is another problem here beside a hardening of theoretical certainties. In some 
ways, Wark's argument confinns prejudices against popular cultural forms, simply 
requiring more formal activities and practices to submit to them as well. The problem is 
similar to one which Morris identifies in 'Banality in Cultural Studies' in criticism of 
what she calls the 'distraction model' in cultural studies: 'there are housewives phasing 
in and out of TV or flipping through magazines in laundromats as well as pop 
intellectuals playing with quotes' (Morris 1990: 23-4). As Morris points out, the figure 
of the distracted consumer has, in a term she borrows from Patrice Petro, the 'contours' 
of a familiar female stereotype: 'distracted, absent-minded, insouciant, vague, flighty, 
skimming from image to image. The rush of associations runs irresistably toward a 
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figure of mass culture not as woman but, more specifically, as bimbo' (24). What 
concerns her in this is not a vestigial anti-feminism: 
The problem is that in antiacademic pop-theory writing ... , a stylistic enactment 
of the 'popular' as essentially distracted, scanning the surface, short in attention 
span, performs a retrieval, at the level of enunciative practice, of the thesis of 
'cultural dopes'. In the critique of which - going right back to the early work of 
Stuart Hall, not to mention Raymond Williams - the project of cultural studies 
effectively and rightly began (Morris 1990: 24 ). 
The stereotypical figure invoked by Wark's 'pop stars, celebrity skin and fashion' is not 
quite the bimbo of the 'distraction model'; it is perhaps better characterised as the 
hormone-charged adolescent. But it remains within a range of abstract figures of 
'escape'. In the context of the argument, it functions to identify popular culture 
essentially with an absence of organisation or durability of forms. 
This identification has the further effect of inhibiting any 'common world of 
conversation'. The understanding of desire as 'that which exceeds and escapes' places it 
in opposition to pattern or structure. This makes it impossible to identify areas of shared 
feeling or commitment (in Williams' terms, 'structures of feeling'), resulting in a kind 
of atomism. A good example is a reduction by Lumby of her own sympathetic reading 
of an advertising image to a simple expression of individual desires: 
In arming myself for disagreement with people who see only molestation, 
degradation and sexual violence towards women in the photograph, I've 
reinvented it in my favour. I've minimised details which suggest cruelty on the 
part of the shadowy male figure, and I've opted to see the woman's apparent 
indifference as a sign of her intellectual self-absorption. I've altered the image 
in line with my desires (Lumby 1997: xxv). 
The admission may be an attempt at honesty, but it also bankrupts any potential for 
further debate. Sympathy is reduced to a simple calculus of desire: if our desires happen 
323 
'Citizens of Media' 
to coincide with Lumby's we will sympathise with her reading; if they don't we won't. 
Any attention to the 'art' of cultural forms in developing sympathy is lost. 
But the most serious problem of the 'media republican' arguments is one suggested by 
Lumby's analysis of her motivations as 'arming myself for disagreement'. Having 
denied herself any positive grounds for extending her appeal to others, she is compelled 
to fall back on negative points of orientation to give her argument some form. The 
tendency is even more marked in the cases of Hartley and Wark. In The Virtual 
Republic, Wark attributes the poverty of public debate in Australia during the 1990s to 
the persistence of paranoid fantasies - a tendency to blame an abstract 'they' for all that 
is wrong with the world: 
They are a cancer, a danger and a plague. They are multiplying like mice, but 
they are masters only of the sterile. Theirs is a life hating ideology. They seek 
the revenge of the uncreative and to discredit all natural genius. Every time 
civilisation gets rid ohhis spectre, it turns up with a new hat on (Wark 1997: 
179). 
The irony is that this logic might easily be attributed to Wark himself. The difference is 
only that the 'they' who constitute the threat are not enemies of the moral order but the 
moralists who attempt to impose one. With the consolidation in Australia of 
conservative government and occasional outbursts by public commentators against 
'political correctness' and 'postmodemism', their numbers in Wark's writing have 
swelled. His recent book, Celebrities, Culture and Cyberspace, abounds with negative 
figures: 'moralists', 'greying pundits', 'nay-saying celebrities', disdainful litterateurs, 
'suburban' arbiters of taste and baby boomer opinion makers or 'Burblers' - 'This is the 
sound they make in the media - burble burble. But it is also the place - suburbia- from 
which that sound comes' (Wark 1999: 222). Wark's criticism of these figures is a 
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generalised one: all are condemned for blocking the free flow of 'information' - another 
variety of 'that which exceeds and escapes' - and therefore of thwarting desire. 
Hartley's arguments are pitched against the 'knowledge class', whose anti-democratic 
prejudices prevent popular cultural forms from realising their true potential. The term is 
taken from John Frow who uses it more neutrally to designate 'a class based in the 
performance of knowledge functions' (Frow 1995: 117). Hartley traces functions back 
to desires, which he identifies as fundamentally pernicious: the knowledge class is 'the 
class which wants to take power over information media and cultural technologies like 
television, not only by running the business on behalf of its shareholders and 
stakeholders, but by regulating it, and controlling the literacies and discourses by means 
of which it is understood culturally' (Hartley 1999: 124). The position is unabashedly a 
conspiracy theory: the reason why public discussion of television fails to realise its 
democratic potential is a 'knowledge-class conspiracy against the audience - a 
conspiracy by "opinion leaders" against the led' (125). As with Wark' s barbs at 
'Burblers', Hartley's criticisms of 'knowledge-class chit chat' are an indiscriminate 
broadside, allowing the 'judgmental finger-wagging certainties' and 'pessimistic 
snobbishness' of Leavisite literary criticism (67) to be identified even with the work of 
Williams and Hall: 'The radicals of the Left disliked democracy, suburbia and post-
political consciousness of the ordinary suburban population as much as did the radicals 
of the Right. They didn't like popular visual culture's cheerful ordinariness' (121). 
There is a crudeness to these polemics which, in any other context, Hartley and Wark 
would not accept. Their own arguments provide the strongest reasons for rejecting 
them. As Wark writes in The Virtual Republic, 'it's important to get beyond the fantasy 
of the big bad other': 
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It might be morally satisfying to be able to polarise the whole space of debate 
and attribute all the bad stuff to the other side, but I don't think it's a terribly 
effective cultural politics. The irony is that while I wouldn't deny that there is a 
little too much 'ideological soundness' in some writing in the humanities, I 
think they have been remarkably ineffective as instruments of transformation 
... Where cultural studies has had some effect, it has ... been through inventing 
structures that create new possibilities for dialogue (Wark 1997: 173). 
In a similar way, Hartley argues for the need to 'go beyond the tradition of binarized, 
adversarial criticism' (Hartley 1996: 26). Not to do so, he suggests, is to accept a 
degeneration of criticism to the point where it no longer has any moment of empirical 
engagement with the field it is supposedly examining. The case he has in mind is the 
criticism of journalism: 'a theoretical approach which simply denounces journalists as 
"inculcators of ruling class ideology" gives itself no reason to investigate journalism 
further - there's no more to be said' (26). But the point must equally apply to the 
criticism of criticism. The substitution of 'knowledge class' for 'ruling class' does 
nothing to change the basic structure of criticism and it is in the structure, not the 
objects as such, that the problem lies. 
THE POWER OF THE IMAGE 
It would be a mistake, however, not to look beyond these shortcomings. As in the case 
of the 'policy' arguments, the tendency to polemic is fuelled, to a certain extent, by a 
sense of desperation. Having spent most of The Virtual Republic pointing out the 
negative effects of paranoid fantasies, Wark confesses doubts that there is any 
alternative to their 'relentless logic of otherness': 
Perhaps there's no escape - I certainly operate within fantasies of my own. To 
give just one instance, the fantasy of the cold warriors, whom I would like to 
see demobilised now that their war is over (Wark 1997: 267). 
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In a similar way, Hartley often seems to view knowledge production as simply a battle 
between factions of the knowledge class 'fighting out with each other who gets to speak 
on behalf of an increasingly unknowable audience, in whose name so much 
contemporary media "representation" seeks to gain power for its own point of view' 
(Hartley 1996: 26). But there is also in media republicanism a clear suggestion that 
something more should be possible. And it is a suggestion which is not without 
justification: the arguments create a space in which a different model of criticism is 
actually able to emerge. 
Perhaps the most significant effect of the media republican arguments is to neutralise 
the force of generalised theoretical concepts. As in the case of the 'policy' arguments, 
the extreme extension of the tendency in cultural studies towards conceptual 
generalisation discloses a paradoxical limit. Once all social or cultural phenomena are 
conceived as effects of media, the concept of media loses its capacity for discrimination. 
Once all actions are attributed to pleasure or desire, the terms are emptied of any 
specific meaning. This is also where theoretical differences begin to dissolve. At 
precisely the point where 'textualist' polemics are carried to their extreme, denying 
even a place from which another might speak, they also relent by revealing their 
impotence. If the media republican arguments are followed consistently, there is nothing 
to differentiate their advocates from anyone else. Even the most trenchant forms of 
realism, the most paranoid denunciations of the media, are, in fact, articulations of 
desire through the media. Even Jocelynne Scutt - the feminist critic of television who 
refuses on principle to own one - is, in fact, a celebrity engaging in the mediasphere. 
The only level at which she might be distinguished from Hartley, Wark or Lumby is at 
the level of consciousness. Adversarial critics of the media perceive fundamental 
differences from others where, in fact, none exist. 
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It is at this point that the 'openness' and 'tolerance' which Morris finds in Lumby's Bad 
Girls is produced. At a certain level, the book appears merely to perpetuate familiar 
sectarian tendencies in left cultural criticism. Varieties of feminism which represent the 
media in negative terms are accused as censorious and identified with 'conservatism'. 
Yet at crucial points, the charges are dropped as Lumby adopts a more humorous, 
dialogic tone. In writing of Scutt, for example, she becomes intrigued by the latter's 
claim to know about television from staying in hotels and motels: 
Re-reading her letter now, Dr Scutt' s peripatetic viewing habits strike me as 
more interesting than her refusal to have television in her house. Hotel rooms, 
after all, are traditional havens for lapses from domestic standards. The rninibar, 
the in-room dining menu and the movie channel call the most virtuous interstate 
visitor from their laptop. Even for a critic burdened by the most exacting 
standards, watching television can't be all hard work in this kind of 
environment (Lumby 1997: x). 
Lumby's writing here is more inquisitive than inquisitorial. Scutt is seen as significant 
enough to engage in debate, but her position is not dramatised as ominous or 
threatening. Her views are to be argued with, not fundamentally rejected or opposed. 
This tum is more than an minor retreat from positions which Lumby is fundamentally 
committed to. Within the terms of her arguments, varieties of feminism pitched against 
the 'dominant ideology' do not essentially contradict her own; they merely articulate 
different desires. Positions are no longer represented as competing to exclude one other, 
but as belonging to a spectrum on a plane of consistency. A similar openness can be 
found in Hartley and Wark. To use a term which Wark (1997: 51) himself suggests in 
The Virtual Republic, the media republican arguments produce a 'zone of indifference', 
a space removed from the rigours of debate in which positions are not required to 
account for themselves but are accepted simply for what they are. As he points out, such 
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a zone allows different points of view to be heard on their own terms rather than 
responded to pre-emptively as a possible threat to one's own. It is in this context that the 
polemical tendencies of media republicanism no longer define it. Despite his often 
combative posturing, there is substance to Hartley's claim that the initiative aims at 
'cordialisation' (1999: 10). Beyond the polemic, the conditions are created for a genuine 
intellectual generosity. 
The surest way to develop this potential may be, paradoxically, to insist that the terms 
of the polemic be adhered to more rigorously. So long as the concept of power is merely 
displaced, media republicanism continues to be haunted by its presence, caught within 
the field which it seeks to escape. Yet the logic of the arguments press towards its 
complete elimination. If all relations take place in and through the media, then there is 
no point at which power in the sense of an external 'reality' could intervene. If the basic 
principle of all activities and practices is pleasure, desire or aesthetic appreciation, then 
the concept of power might be fully pensioned off as redundant. 
That this final step is not taken is an indication perhaps that, against protestations, 
Hartley, Wark and Lumby are swayed by the arguments made against them. Despite 
their idealisation of the 'weightless' domains of popular commercial media (Hartley), 
the virtual terrains opened up by new media technologies (Wark), or the consensual 
exchange of sexual representations (Lumby), they still wish to leave a line open to the 
'gravity' traditionally associated with discourses of power. The retainment of the 
concept, even if in a limited capacity, permits a strategic adoption of a 'serious' mode. 
Hence also the importance of maintaining a range of figures defined by power - a 
baleful menagerie of knowledge class despots, moralists and censors. In opposing such 
figures, media republicanism is able to invoke a familiar aura of substance and 
seriousness, heading off charges of superficiality. 
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There is, however, a less arbitrary way in which the initiative might be defended: to 
distinguish between rationalist and empiricist concepts of power, refusing only the 
former. There is actually a basis for such a move within the media republican arguments 
themselves. A good example is a discussion by Wark of the political dynamics of the 
stand-off in 1989 between the Chinese government and protestors in Tiananmen Square. 
Wark is interested in the disruption to government public relations efforts, at the time of 
Mikhail Gorbachev' s visit to Beijing, by student hunger-strikers: 'The government 
intended Gorbachev to lay a wreath at the Monument of the People's Heroes ... The 
students just stole the show' (Wark 1994: 149). The situation demonstrates, for Wark, 
that 'there are many kinds of power': 
There is the power in the image, and there is the power of the image. Power in 
the image: Deng and Gorbachev sitting down to lunch. Power of the image: 
students - kids just like yours, starving themselves. Does that make you feel 
concern? Or a mite hungry? Either way, it's a powerful image, although not an 
image of power (Wark 1994: 149). 
The distinction between 'power in the image' and 'power of the image' bears closer 
examination than Wark gives it himself. There is, in fact, a confusion in their common 
framing as 'kinds of power'. Such a framing suggests that they are different forms of a 
general phenomenon, yet what is significant about the 'power of the image' is its 
particularity. As Wark himself points out, the students ('kids just like yours') did not 
embody power in the abstract. The power they exercised was contingent, a power which 
needs to be identified with a limiting article (a power). The 'power of the image' is, in 
other words, a power in the empiricist sense. 
When considered in the context of Wark's wider project, the point assumes greater 
significance. If followed consistently, his arguments actually exclude a recognition of 
power in any other sense. If the 'power of the image' is a power made possible by a 
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particular matrix of media vectors (the presence of the American broadcasters CBS and 
CNN in Tiananmen Square), 'power in the image' is distinguished by a supposed 
reference outside that matrix. The implication is that the power of institutionally-
recognised figures (Deng Xiaoping, Mikhail Gorbachev) is formed independently of the 
media, only, in a secondary way, being represented in the media. Yet this is precisely 
the kind of proposition which media republicanism rejects. If, as Wark insists, there is 
no space outside the vector field of the media, then to talk of 'power in the image' can 
only be misleading. The powers of Deng and Gorbachev may have been located within 
different kinds of media - the party document, the government edict, the policy 
statement - but from a media republican perspective these must be recognised as media 
nonetheless. The logical conclusion is clear: there is no general phenomenon 'power', 
only particular powers made possible at different points in the vector fields of 
contemporary societies. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Hartley. One of the longest-running 
distinctions in his work has been between 'social' and 'textual' power. As he puts it in 
Tele-ology: 'categories such as class, nation and gender are not only socio-political but 
also meaningful'. It is at the level of meaning, in fact, that one finds 'the mechanisms 
for producing the categories themselves' (Hartley 1992b: 11). There is therefore a 
legitimate place, Hartley infers, for studying the power of textual phenomena as distinct 
from power at the socio-political level. It is in this context that he stakes out a place for 
television studies: 'The most fundamental concern that the analyst has to confront when 
constructing such an object of study [television] is the question of textual power' (15). 
The distinction between 'social' and 'textual' power corresponds closely to Wark's 
distinction between 'power in the image' and 'power of the image'. As presented, it 
appears, again, to be a distinction between different 'forms' of power - one which 
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operates outside the textualised space of the media and another which operates within it. 
But again there are strong suggestions of quite a different way of presenting things. 
'Textual' power is consistently associated with particularity as against the relative 
generality and abstraction of 'social' power. The most extended example in Tele-ology 
is an argument that television provides a model, for modem, industrialised societies, of 
'the power of speech'. The medium is the perfect illustration, for Hartley, that "'the 
power of speech" is not individual but social, therefore subject to technological 
development and historical change in what should be understood not as an innate 
personal capacity for speaking but a global economy of sense-making' (14). The 
reference to the 'global' should not distract us from the fact that 'the power of speech' 
is clearly identified as a power, not power 'as such'. 
That there are two senses of the word power in play (empiricist and rationalist) becomes 
all but explicit at points where they are set in opposition to each other. According to 
Hartley: 
The so-called power of speech is socialized, and therefore subject to economic 
exploitation, technological expansion and, most importantly, power relations. 
Certain people and classes of people have historically taken the power of 
speech much further than others, gaining power over the means of its 
production and circulation (Hartley 1992b: 14) 
If the power of speech is 'subject to' power relations, if certain people or classes 'gain 
power over' the power of speech, then 'power' and 'the power of speech' must be 
distinct. The basis of the distinction is clear. The power of speech ('textual') is a 
specific power; to exercise it does not involve a claim to power in the abstract. This is 
why, for Hartley, it can be regarded positively, being associated with democratic 
freedoms. While it goes beyond individuals, it does not invoke a single, comprehensive 
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order. 'Social' power, by constrast, is power, period- power in an abstract, generalised 
sense. 
If the point is brought into relation with Hartley's recent media republican arguments, a 
similar conclusion follows as in the case of Wark. As his position has become 
increasingly anti-sociological, the space for a recognition of 'social' power has all but 
disappeared. If, as he argues in Popular Reality, the public sphere is a differentiated 
aspect of the 'mediasphere', then the only powers which can operate within the public 
sphere are 'textual' powers. From the discussion above, 'textual' powers are powers 
plural. There is no place, therefore, for a generalised concept 'power'. 
TEXTUALISM OR NEC-EMPIRICISM? 
All of this suggests that there may be a different way of viewing 'textualism' in cultural 
studies from that which is widely assumed. Rather than seeing it as a position within 
general theoretical debates, it might be seen as a kind of shell for an intellectual mode 
which cannot be recognised within the terms of those debates. To the extent, at least, 
that an emphasis on 'text' or 'media' has been used to draw attention to specific powers 
('the power of the image', 'the power of speech'), such an emphasis simply cannot be 
placed in relation to theories about the nature or distribution of 'power'. While textualist 
arguments may often have been given a theoretical face, they have also functioned to 
preserve an empiricist sense of the concept of power. 
In Hartley's most recent book, Uses of Television, the butterfly of neo-empiricism 
begins to emerge from its theoretical chrysalis. The book makes an interesting 
comparison to Thomas Osborne's Aspects of Enlightenment, where, as I argued at the 
end of the last chapter, an 'Anglo-Saxon empiricism' (Osborne's term) begins to 
emerge from the shell of Foucauldian theories of 'governmentality'. Like Osborne, 
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Hartley reconnects unmistakably with the intellectual resources of 'englishness'. His 
title is a tribute to Richard Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy and Hoggart's approach to 
cultural studies is kept in view as a positive model throughout. This is more than an 
isolated reference. The Uses of Literacy is, for Hartley, only 
one point of culmination in a long-standing series of developments that are by 
now rather opaque, forgotten, deleted. J.B Priestley, the BBC Light 
Programme, Picture Post, suburbia, ordinariness, non-aligned middle-ground 
politics, social democracy, G.B. Shaw ... these markers of the semio-history of 
ordinariness have been somewhat lost, or clouded at least, in the adversarial 
Left-Right politics of politicized academic study in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Hartley 1999: 16). 
All the touchstones of the 'structure of feeling' from which Stuart Hall regretfully took 
his leave in the early 1970s are recovered, considered for the way they might be 
revivified. 
A good example of where this turn may lead is a suggestion by Hartley that television 
might be understood as a form of 'teaching'. The suggestion is significant because it 
implies a consistency between a popular medium (television) and a process with clear 
institutional associations (teaching). It departs in this from an earlier tendency in 
Hartley's writing, as in Wark's and Lumby's, to see popular culture as 'exceeding' or 
'escaping' structuring principles, the latter being represented only in negative terms. A 
positive sense of teaching is developed, significantly, from an association by Hoggart 
between good teaching and 'loving to influence others' (43). Hartley does not seek to 
hide the loss, in accepting such an association, of any general basis for opposing 
'influence' - even the Rupert Murdoch variety cannot be simply condemned- but 
presents this more as strength than a weakness: 'I don't ask ... you to love Rupert as 
you might an honoured teacher, but simply ask that the dismissive default setting be 
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toggled off for a while, until there has been time to see whether cross-demographic 
communication can be recuperated as positive rather than negative social activity, on 
the model of teaching, which itself needs to be recuperated in the same way' (32). 
This reconstructed Hoggartism is clearly not the same as the original. Hartley seeks to 
connect with a different world from Britain in the 1950s - a world of Married ... With 
Children, Absolutely Fabulous, Alicia Silverstone, an international publishing industry 
in cultural studies, debates around colonialism, 'globalisation', 'postmodernism'. His 
arguments are also clearly inflected by different generational experiences - the 
absorption of European theory, the impact of feminism, the expansion of higher 
education, the assumption of a more global field of reference. Through all of this, 
though, there is an important reconnection with the Hoggartian moment in cultural 
studies. The crucial point, in the argument cited above, is that 'influence' is not 
conflated with a general phenomenon 'power': 'loving to influence' is not the same as 
'taking power over' (46). An alternative is re-activated to general theoretical discourses 
on power: a more local criticism of distinct and specific powers. 
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Reconfiguring Cultural Studies 
In an interview, cited earlier in the dissertation, between Stuart Hall and Kuan-Hsing 
Chen, Hall expresses reservations about attempts to chart new directions for cultural 
studies: 
because the constant pressure, not just to do good new work but always and 
only to do so by way of repudiating what went before - a sort of desire to 
advance only by way of wreaking an Oedipal revenge ... feels to me like 
struggling over a dead body, which if only you could claim it, retrospectively, 
would validate what you are doing. Whether that is any way to conduct what 
we have agreed is a necessary struggle to renew cultural studies, I don't know. 
Not everything can fit in the house, I know, but I sometimes feel it's a struggle 
over the remains, over the corpse (Hall 1996a: 398). 
Speaking for himself, Hall is tired of general debates over the nature and significance of 
the field: 
I don't really want to write about cultural studies, as such, any more ... I want 
to do some new work, to use cultural studies to open up new questions about 
globalization, new questions about ethnicity. I want to move it on. I don't want 
to wrangle with it (Hall 1996a: 398). 
But the feeling is not unique to Hall. In a somewhat blunter mode, Meaghan Morris has 
suggested that controversies over cultural studies in Australia should now be put aside: 
'it is high time for more Australian practitioners to put their heads down, ignore the 
flak, and start producing the substantive accounts of cultural life, past and present, that 
we claim that our field can generate' (Morris 1997a: 37). A similar desire to 'move 
cultural studies on' pervades the two initiatives reviewed in Chapters 5 and 6. 'Policy' 
and 'media republicanism' respond in different ways to a similar nightmare vision: that 
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cultural studies might become trapped in a snake-pit of left-political sectarianism. Both 
wish, like Hall, to escape 'wrangling' to engage in work that is 'positive', 
'constructive', 'useful'. 
This dissertation has shared substantially in these motivations, but has pursued a 
somewhat different strategy. The problem with the will to 'move on' is that it tends to 
reproduce the structure of relations which it is designed to avoid. It implies a view of 
the present and past of cultural studies as tired, spent, something which it is now 
necessary to 'repudiate'. Even if such criticisms are not made directly, there are 
continued suggestions of a generalised negative judgement. The problem is magnified 
by the fact that assessments of who is 'moving on' vary according to perspective. There 
is an irony, for example, in the fact that Hall cites 'Australian cultural studies' as an 
example of the tendencies he wishes to avoid. The work he has in mind is almost 
certainly the 'policy' initiative; it is the 'policy' proponents who have been marked in 
international contexts as 'Australian' (see, for example, Jameson 1993) and Hall himself 
has been a frequent target of their criticisms. The very desire of Bennett, Hunter and 
Cunningham to reject 'criticism' in favour of a constructive engagement with cultural 
policy can be represented, therefore, as a symptom of the destructiveness which is 
turning cultural studies into a 'corpse'. 
The alternative I have adopted has been similar to that suggested by Thomas Osborne 
for social theory: not so much to propose new initiatives as to recognise 'that we already 
have plenty of good practices in the social and human sciences, and that things are not 
quite as bad in theory ... as many seem to think' (Osborne 1998: xiii). The purpose of 
such an approach is, for Osborne: 
to contribute to a reconfiguration of a discipline that is in effect already there, 
not to succumb to the hubris of attempting to reinvent social theory from 
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scratch, to provide a swingeing critique of everything that has gone before, or to 
re-evaluate all values (xiii). 
The aim is not to clear the ground for a bold new 'greenfield' construction, but to work 
on traditions and practices which already exist in an effort to articulate them to 
contemporary circumstances. Rather than staging debates between competing 
foundational or anti-foundational claims ('Foucault says this ... Habermas says that ... 
Haraway says this ... Rorty says that ... '), Osborne suggests that social theory might 
entail 'a kind of ongoing fieldwork in our existing practices of enlightenment' (xii). 
It is precisely such a 'reconfiguration' which I would like, in conclusion, to suggest for 
cultural studies. If I were to join in finding a 'fundamental flaw' in the field, it would be 
a tendency to look for fundamental flaws. As I argued in Chapter 1, it is a tendency 
which first developed out of a sense of the inadequacy of 'English' intellectual 
resources in responding to the challenges of post-war developments in politics and 
culture. At its highest point, in arguments of the 1970s against 'essentialism' and 
'empiricism', it often functioned to bind cultural studies, as criticism was directed 
outwards at the institutions and locations from which it emerged. But it has always 
functioned also to divide. The first casualties, in the British case, were Richard Hoggart, 
Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson, who were, in varying degrees, 
excommunicated from the field which they had played a major part in establishing. 
They were not the last; as Hall points out, the rejection by cultural studies of its own 
past has become almost routine. The result has been that 'flaws' are diagnosed closer 
and closer to the heart of cultural studies itself. By the 1990s, a curious genre had 
emerged in which the field was criticised in sweeping terms from positions still 
ambiguously located within it. 
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The first way I would summarise the argument of the dissertation, therefore, would be 
that there are not and have never been fundamental flaws in positions adopted in 
debates around culture and society. When any serious 'fieldwork' is conducted into the 
history of these debates, the positions invariably appear more complex and interesting 
than the reductive caricatures which figure in generalised theoretical criticisms. What is 
revealed are, in Osborne's terms, a variety of 'practices of enlightenment', with 
limitations certainly but still with possible relevance to problems today. 
At the centre of this argument has been a shift of perspective in relation to the concept 
of power. It is this concept, more than any other, which has served to identify flaws and 
has been correspondingly associated with claims to a relative theoretical 'correctness'. 
My response to debates around power has been to suggest that there are two ways in 
which the concept may be used: on the one hand, a familiar 'rationalist' one, according 
to which power is conceived as a single homogeneous phenomenon (albeit, in some 
versions, with many 'forms' or 'modalities'); on the other hand, an 'empiricist' one, for 
which the various phenomena comprehended under the concept are, in fact, distinct. 
The recognition of the possibility of empiricism defuses the tendency to think in terms 
of 'flaws' or 'correctness'. It requires us to ask, firstly, whether positions which have 
not made use of a generalised concept of power are 'lacking' in the way that has often 
been alleged. As I argued in Chapters 1 and 2, it may simply be that they have 
addressed questions of power (or powers) in an empiricist mode. Secondly, it allows us 
to consider generalised concepts of power in a different way - not as warranted by an 
absolute referent, but as imaginative constructions which gain their meaning from the 
'passions, actions and ends' which have informed their use. 
This is not to put forward any general prescription as to how the concept of power 
should now be used. It is rather to propose a new way of reflecting upon those uses 
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which already exist. This is why it was necessary to distinguish my position at the 
outset from 'Foucauldianism'. The arguments I have developed in the dissertation are 
similar, in many ways, to those widely associated with Foucault. Like Foucault, I have 
attempted to trace how supposed 'universal necessities' have, in fact, 'built up at a 
certain moment during history'. The idea of an empiricist concept of power might be 
seen to resonate with a Foucauldian insistence on the specificity and plurality of forms 
of power. I am also positively disposed to many of the developments which have 
emerged from engagements with Foucault's work on 'govemmentality'. There is 
something at stake, however, in resisting the authority of Foucault. As I argued in 
Chapter 1, Foucault never seriously considered the possibility that the concept of power 
might be historicised or contextualised in a similar way to other concepts; there is, 
indeed, a consistent suggestion in his writing on the subject that power must be accepted 
as a 'universal necessity'. At the same time, he admitted plurality only at the level of 
different 'forms', reinforcing an assumption that there is a single universal 
phenomenon. The effect of all this is to leave in place a logic of theoretical correctness. 
The point has significant implications for attempts to suggest possible relations between 
the past and future of cultural studies. From a 'Foucauldian' perspective, the passion 
which has been invested in the concept of power appears in retrospect as little more than 
a waste - as misdirected if not fundamentally ill-conceived. There are suggestions of 
this kind even in Osborne, for whom similar passions in social theory are best 
characterised simply as 'childish' or 'immature'. While I have some sympathy for such 
a view, the perspective I have developed does not allow the heat associated with the 
concept to be so easily dismissed. 
It is here, perhaps, that the history of cultural studies offers particularly useful lessons. It 
could be argued that the field began with precisely the kind of 'fieldwork' which 
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Osborne recommends, in attempts to extend and adapt to new circumstances what was 
understood to be a long tradition of thought about 'culture' and 'society'. But cultural 
studies has always been exposed to contexts which, writing from 'social theory', 
Osborne does not quite bring into focus. The point could be made by drawing attention 
to an important difference between his project and the early work of figures such as 
Williams and Hoggart. Osborne does not consider 'practices of enlightenment' in, say, 
working class life or the activities of those, more generally, who are remote or alienated 
from formal institutions of government, education and the media. This may not threaten 
his arguments directly, but it does raise questions about their capacity to provide 
solutions to current problems. 
If the history of cultural studies is any guide, the major intellectual developments of the 
last forty years have occurred not merely at the level of theory but in response to a 
rapidly expanding interface between government, education and media and the 
populations, students and audiences which they administer, teach or address. The key 
insight of the work of the 1950s was that if serious attention was not paid to the 
intellectual and ethical practices which these populations, students and audiences 
brought with them in relating to formal institutions, then 'practices of enlightenment' 
would inevitably appear -and understandably so - as crudely imposed. This is, in fact, 
much the way they did appear to the intellectual generation of the 1970s and it is in this 
context that both a generalised concept of power and polemical tendencies in debates 
around culture and society have emerged. However immature these tendencies may be, 
they are also a symptom of social, political and cultural developments which cannot 
simply be wished away. 
A failure to address these developments similarly affects Bennett's and Hunter's 
suggestions for reform. In writing of nineteenth century models of liberal governance, 
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they are often highly persuasive. In a provocative essay in Culture-A Reformer's 
Science, Bennett argues that the nineteenth century museum placed the visitor in 'a 
particular form of being in time': 
Rather than functioning like an ideology which works to secure social relations 
by inscribing social agents into an historically complacent acceptance of their 
given positions, typological displays were calculated to produce a regulated 
restlessness, a worrisome insertion of the self into a developmental time which 
generated a requirement for a progressive movement through time while 
simultaneously restraining that movement (Bennett 1998: 163). 
Close parallels with this argument can be found in analyses by Hunter of the school 
playground and the literary text (1988a: 17; 1994: 72-75). His phrase 'supervised 
freedom' closely echoes Bennett's 'regulated restlessness' and suggests a similar 'being 
in time'. But nowhere do Bennett or Hunter address the problem of how nineteenth 
century governmental practices might be articulated to the present. Instead of 
considering why 'regulated restlessness' has tended, since the late 1960s, to be eclipsed 
by questions of 'ideology', they effectively dismiss the complex history of cultural 
politics over the last thirty years as little more than a gross theoretical error. In relation 
to the present, their persuasiveness is abandoned to forced argument: no articulation to 
current circumstances is necessary, it is implied, governmentality must simply be 
accepted as having been decreed. 
The problem here is more than one of oversight. Without mentioning Williams directly, 
Osborne (1998: 15) explicitly rejects the idea that enlightenment should be thought of as 
pertaining to 'a whole way of life'. The reasons for doing so are clear. It is essential to 
his argument that the ethics of enlightenment be thought of as limited and specific: 
... the terminology of ethics is intended to signify something restricted and 
deliberate: that is, something that is not 'ethical' in the sense that it guides all 
342 
Conclusion 
aspects of the conduct of our life but, on the contrary, something which might 
involve a deliberate break from everyday life; to submit to an ethic can mean a 
temporary retreat into a particular commitment, and deliberately and rather 
artificially even at the expense of other commitments (Osborne 1998: xiii). 
Hunter is even more emphatic in distinguishing ethical practices from 'everyday life'. In 
fact, his entire project could almost be seen as an attempt to wind back Williams. As he 
describes it himself in the title to a key essay, it is a project of 'Setting Limits to 
Culture': 
Cultural studies has been driven by the imperative to expand the aesthetic 
concept of culture - the dialectic, the goal of complete development - to all 
social activities and relations, so that aesthetic fulfilment can be both 
superseded by and extended to the 'way of life as a whole'. In the light of the 
preceding discussion it is possible to formulate quite a different imperative: to 
restrict the concept of culture to the specialized practice of aesthetico-ethical 
self-shaping in which it has pertinence and to begin to chart the limited degree 
of generality it has achieved as a technique of person formation in the 
educational apparatus (Hunter 1988b: 115). 
To generalise the concept of culture is, from this perspective, to risk losing an 
association with deliberate practices - the sense of specific application which Osborne 
wishes to capture in the idea of 'aspects of enlightenment'. Culture becomes little more 
than a weak sociological category with imperialist ambitions, producing a rampant 
inflation of aesthetic discipline and the elevation of its principles to a universal norm. 
My view of this argument is that it correctly identifies a problem but mistakes its 
origins. The extension of the concept of culture is not attributable to Williams, cultural 
studies, practitioners of 'the aesthetic' or any other single agency. It is an effect of a 
general loss of boundaries between practices which were previously relatively distinct. 
It should be pointed out that the 'aesthetic concept of culture' is not the only category to 
have been 'expanded'. As Tom O'Regan argued in one of the most considered 
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contributions to the 'policy' debate, a convergence between institutional practices has 
produced a widespread confusion of ethical protocols. Invoking Robert Merton's (1968) 
distinction between 'attached' and 'unattached' intellectuals, O'Regan draws attention, 
for example, to the way in which 
the rise of consultancy and commissioned research has created opportunities for 
unattached intellectuals to perform the work of bureaucratic intellectuals. In the 
process the unattached intellectual's role as 'a gadfly, a critic of established 
policies' is being superimposed on the traditional function of the bureaucratic 
intellectual ... The 'unattached/attached' intellectual is caught between two 
different forms of conduct and self-representation (O'Regan 1992b: 519). 
While, from one perspective, the ethos of the bureaucrat might be seen as 
inappropriately exposed to principles deriving from aesthetic criticism, the situation 
could equally be represented as the reverse. The point could also be generalised: 
business leaders have become exposed to principles of media performance, journalists 
to principles of governmental responsibility, politicians to principles of business 
management, while all have been subjected to demands and expectations generated 
within practices outside formal institutions altogether. 
To hope, in this context, for a reinstitution of traditional distinctions between ethical 
practices appears simply unrealistic. Towards the end of Rethinking the School, Hunter 
suggests that we disarm forced options and false unities by 'distinguishing between 
their components and coaxing them back into their respective spheres of life, inside 
whose limits they make sense and cause no harm' (Hunter 1994: 154). The suggestion is 
in many ways attractive, but fails to address practicalities. If 'spheres of life' is taken to 
designate formal institutions, then the suggestion may amount, in fact, to little more 
than revulsion at the loss, over the last thirty years, of clear boundaries between culture, 
government, politics and 'everyday life'. The case for a recognition of 'specificities', in 
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this case, would not so much 'coax' as coerce, requiring everything to return to its 
'proper place': 'culture' to the English Department, 'government' to the administrative 
bureau, 'politics' to parliament and 'everyday life' to a sphere beyond ethical or 
intellectual reflection. Such a program would require that the interface between 
institutional sites - and even more between institutions and 'everyday life' - was 
radically diminished, approximating an age before television, before mass higher 
education and before the expansion of government programs under the Keynesian 
welfare state. 
A similar reluctance to admit a historical context for antagonisms in cultural studies can 
be found in the 'media republican' arguments reviewed in Chapter 6. It is not, in this 
case, that there is a failure to recognise a convergence of institutions and practices. It is 
rather that the resulting terrain is represented as if it is, or should be, free of the sort of 
problems and tensions which have been articulated through the concept of power. The 
implications of convergence are considered only in the relatively 'frictionless' domains 
of popular commercial media (Hartley), the 'virtual' terrains opened up by new media 
technologies (Wark) or the consensual exchange of sexual representations (Lumby). 
Anxieties, hostilities, dissatisfactions - in short, negativities - are, again, dismissed as a 
superficial intrusion of a single agency. The 'authentic' condition of converged terrains 
is one of democratic innocence; only authoritarians, moralists or the 'knowledge class' 
would seek to represent them otherwise. 
As I argued in Chapters 5 and 6, both the 'policy' initiative and 'media republicanism' 
make important contributions to changing the terms of debates around power. The most 
significant of these has been to introduce the possibility of reconnecting with 
empiricism. But from the perspective of the dissertation, both still remain within the 
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historical arc of a crisis of 'englishness' identified in the mid 1980s by Terence 
Hawkes: 
As that crisis deepens in the latter years of this century, its displaced academic 
manifestation finds itself pushed more and more into the foreground, as if the 
problems were in fact located and might even be solved there. A kind of 
smouldering hysteria has been no stranger to the field of academic literary 
criticism in Britain for the last fifty years and more. Accusations, 
denunciations, reports of traitors and double-agents are not unknown. It is 
almost as if a way of life were under siege (Hawkes 1986: 122). 
Hawkes' points of reference may seem too local to be relevant to cultural studies: the 
field is not limited to Britain and cannot be identified with literary criticism. But his 
perspective might be generalised. The debates which have clustered around the term 
'cultural studies' have largely developed in sites historically characterised by an 
empiricist intellectual style. England has a particular - perhaps mythical - status in this 
context, but is not alone. Nor is literary criticism ('English') the only field in which the 
problems of empiricism in adjusting to developments of the twentieth century have been 
played out. Cultural studies, in particular, has been centrally located within this 
conjuncture. 
So long as this history is simply avoided or repressed, unfinished business remains. My 
aim in all of the above has been to reduce the main obstacle which prevents it from 
being addressed - a certain aura which has developed around the concept of power. In 
terms of Yuri Lotman's theory of cross-cultural translation, it can be seen as the aura 
attributed within a 'receiving' culture to incoming influences for which there are no 
local resources with which to respond. The most ambitious proposition of the 
dissertation has been that the historical context informing this situation may now be 
seen as coming to a close. Options in relation to generalised concepts of power in 
346 
Conclusion 
English-language cultural criticism have, over the last forty years, been narrowly 
confined. If not simply embraced, it has been necessary to set up reactive defences 
against them. Against this background, I have attempted to excavate a 'third way': a 
sceptical regard for the concept of power which recognises its historical force and 
relevance but refuses to validate it with the assumption of an absolute referent. Such an 
alternative has, in fact, always been present at a suppressed level in cultural studies; it 
only needs now to be crystallised. 
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